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Afghan war. Afghan war Chronology of the Afghan war 1979 1989

The entry of Soviet troops into Afghanistan in December 1979 dramatically changed the course of world history. About 15,000 Soviet soldiers died fighting the Afghan mujahideen, and the Soviet economy suffered huge losses. In fact, this invasion was the beginning of the end of the Soviet Union. But who lured the “red bear” into the Afghan trap? There are many different versions about this. The most common one is that the USSR was lured to Afghanistan by the insidious Americans. Former CIA Director Robert Gates wrote directly to
in his memoirs that American intelligence services began helping the Islamic Mujahideen in Afghanistan long before the entry of Soviet troops there.

The national security adviser to then US President Carter, Zbigniew Brzezinski, claimed that the CIA allegedly carried out a secret operation to “lure the Russians into an Afghan trap and ... ensure the USSR had its own Vietnam War.”

Having provoked the entry of Soviet troops into Afghanistan, the Americans and their NATO allies began to supply the Mujahideen with the most modern weapons, including man-portable air defense systems (MANPADS). Actively using them, Afghan rebels paralyzed the actions of Soviet aviation, and then blocked army garrisons at their bases. A classic situation developed in which neither side could inflict a decisive military defeat on the other.

Thus, the USSR had to wage a difficult war for almost ten years, which entailed the demoralization of the army, the collapse of the economy and, ultimately, the collapse of the USSR. Reasoning logically, it should be admitted that the special operation “Vietnam for the Soviets” could indeed have been staged by the Americans. However, the United States could not
they say, drag the USSR into Afghanistan by the collar. This required appropriate action on the part of the Soviet leadership. And, as is known, at that time it was distinguished by excessive caution and conservatism.

The “Kremlin elders” led by Brezhnev categorically refused to carry out even the most modest reforms. And suddenly - the invasion of Afghanistan!

Many modern political scientists believe that this could only happen in one case - in the top leadership of the USSR there were people for whom the military invasion was very beneficial. And here the figure of the Chairman of the KGB of the USSR Yuri Andropov comes to the fore. Already in the summer of 1978, Andropov’s subordinates sounded the alarm - the enemy was at the gates. Through the KGB, the Politburo constantly received alarming information about far-reaching US military plans for the use of “territories immediately adjacent to our southern border.”

Soviet intelligence reports stated that the US goal was undivided dominance in Afghanistan, which in turn would lead to the installation of American missiles
short and medium range on Afghan territory, in close proximity to the borders of the USSR. These missiles could easily destroy many important military installations, including the Baikonur Cosmodrome and the Balkhash training ground.

In addition, the Kabul station of the KGB constantly discredited the then leader of Afghanistan, Hafizullah Amin. It was noted that he is closely connected with the Americans, Pakistanis and Chinese, receives expensive gifts from them, and has bank accounts in Tokyo and Hong Kong. The flow of negative information eventually influenced Brezhnev, and he agreed to send a “limited contingent” of Soviet troops to Afghanistan.

On December 27, 1979, the KGB Alpha special forces produced . After which units of the Vitebsk Airborne Division, blocking parts of the Kabul garrison, captured key objects.

Instead of the odious dictator Amin, Babrak Karmel, “our man in Kabul,” hastily brought from Moscow, was placed in the chair of the country’s leader. Then, within two weeks, motorized rifle units took control of virtually the entire territory of Afghanistan. In general, the operation went brilliantly.

After the first successful and peaceful months in Afghanistan, bloody battles began, which involved virtually the entire hundred-thousand-strong Soviet army group. The Islamic Mujahideen, armed with modern Western weapons, began a guerrilla war. The losses of personnel of the Soviet army began to amount to hundreds and thousands of military personnel.

It became clear to anyone, even a non-military person, that troops had to be urgently withdrawn from Afghanistan. However, this did not happen. Moreover, the intensity of the fighting has only intensified. Why were the leaders of the USSR unable to escape from the Afghan trap?

As you know, the main power structures in the Soviet Union were the KGB, the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the army. All of them were rather tightly controlled by the party elite. Excessive elevation of any one power structure was not allowed. However, at the end of the 1970s, for a number of objective reasons, the influence of the army increased sharply. The army recovered from Khrushchev's harsh cuts, rearmed, and received good funding.

Accordingly, the appetites of Soviet generals and their claims to a share in the leadership of the country increased. These “negative”, from the point of view of party nomenkpatura, trends should have been nipped in the bud. This is why the invasion of Afghanistan was organized.

By the way, the high army command from the very beginning objected to the introduction of troops into Afghanistan. Soviet military leaders were clearly aware that Afghanistan was a huge bag of stones without railways or waterways. But they were forced to obey the order of the Politburo.

As a result, the generals, tied hand and foot by combat operations, did not interfere with the “showdowns” in the upper echelon of the party nomenklatura. As a result, the head of the KGB, Yuri Andropov, having taken over all power structures, became Brezhnev’s official successor.


The location of Afghanistan, in the very center of Eurasia, at the junction of “South” and “Central” Asia, places it among the key regions in ensuring the stability of the military-political situation in the entire Central Asian region, where the interests of all the leading powers of the world intersect for centuries.

Soviet troops entered Afghanistan unhindered at the end of 1979. This issue contains photographs from the time of the Afghan war of 1979 - 1989.
The purpose of the entry of Soviet troops at the end of 1979 was to secure its southern borders and the USSR's desire to support the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan.

1. Soviet tanks near Kabul.

2. Afghan combat helicopter. Provides cover for the Soviet convoy, which supplies food and fuel to Kabul. Afghanistan, January 30, 1989.

3. Afghan refugees, May 1980. (AP Photo):

4. Mujahideen. Herat, Afghanistan, February 28, 1980.

5. Muslim insurgents with AK-47s, February 15, 1980. Despite the presence of Soviet and Afghan government troops, insurgents patrolled the mountain ranges along the Afghan border with Iran.

6. Soviet troops on the way to Afghanistan in the mid-1980s.

7. A detachment of Muslim insurgents near Kabul, February 21, 1980. At the time, they were attacking convoys moving from Pakistan to Afghanistan.

8. Soviet soldiers are observing the area.

9. Two Soviet soldiers captured.

10. Afghan partisans on top of a downed Soviet Mi-8 helicopter, January 12, 1981.

11. Before the withdrawal of Soviet troops began in May 1988, the Mujahideen had never managed to carry out a single major operation and had not managed to occupy a single major city.

The exact number of Afghans killed in the war is unknown. The most common figure is 1 million dead; Available estimates range from 670 thousand civilians to 2 million in total.

12. Afghan guerrilla leader Ahmad Shah Massoud surrounded by Mujahideen, 1984.

It is curious that according to UN statistics on the demographic situation in Afghanistan, in the period from 1980 to 1990, there was a decrease in the mortality rate of the population of Afghanistan compared to previous and subsequent periods.

13. Afghan partisan with an American Stinger man-portable anti-aircraft missile system, 1987.

USSR losses are estimated at about 15,000 people.

14. Soviet soldiers leave an Afghan store in the center of Kabul, April 24, 1988.

800 million US dollars were spent annually from the USSR budget to support the Kabul government. From 3 to 8.2 billion US dollars were spent annually from the USSR budget on the maintenance of the 40th Army and the conduct of combat operations.

15. A village destroyed during fighting between the Mujahideen and Afghan soldiers in Salang, Afghanistan.Rebours):

16. Mujahideen 10 kilometers from Herat, waiting for a Soviet convoy, February 15, 1980.

17. Soviet soldiers with German shepherds trained to detect mines, Kabul May 1, 1988.

18. Mangled Soviet cars in northeast Pakistan, February 1984.

19. Mujahideen with an anti-aircraft gun, July 20, 1986.

20. A Soviet plane lands at Kabul airport, February 8, 1989.

21. Our plane, cars and shell casings at the air base in Kabul, January 23, 1989.

22. Soviet soldiers in Kabul, February 10, 1989.

23. Afghan firefighters and a girl killed in a powerful explosion in the center of Kabul, May 14, 1988.

24. Soviet soldiers in the center of Kabul, October 19, 1986.

25. Soviet and Afghan officers pose for the press in the center of Kabul, October 20, 1986.

26. The beginning of the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan, May 1988.

27. A column of Soviet tanks and military trucks leaves Afghanistan, February 7, 1989.

28. After the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan, the situation on the Soviet-Afghan border became significantly more complicated: there were shelling of the territory of the USSR, attempts to penetrate into the territory of the USSR, armed attacks on Soviet border guards, and mining of Soviet territory.

Source: photochronograph.ru


  • flaying our soldiers on occasion, such lawless Basmachi... but in fact, almost the entire population was ready to take up arms, and when most of the country is ready to take up arms, it is not easy to fight, this is the difficulty of this idea wars

  • The photos are colorful, lively...thank you...the complexity of the war in Afghanistan from 79-89 was still
    and the fact that the majority fought with the USSR, that is, if these were some separate gang formations of radical fanatics like the Taliban (by the way, the Taliban are also different, and very different) then this would have been half the trouble, but since any invasion of third-party states Under any pretext, even the most reliable one, it is perceived by the Islamic world as a seizure, occupation, uninvited invasion, intervention, etc., etc....then, accordingly, those who were in no way a member of any groups at all take up arms and there .., peacefully herding some sheep, for example, if you watch documentary films... 20 years later, what do the locals think about the war? In Afghanistan, it turns out that almost every 4th person shot at ours, and everyone calmly talks about it ...now all of these storytellers are civilians, they bake cakes, sell behind the counter, work as taxi drivers, etc., etc....and you would never think that 20 years ago they were evil mujahideen...for example, I always use the word mujahideen basmach or dushman got involved with some bastards terarugs
    flaying our soldiers on occasion, such lawless Basmachi... but in fact, almost the entire population was ready to take up arms, and when most of the country
    ready to take up arms, it’s not easy to fight, this is the difficulty of this war

    Click to expand...

    Everything is correct. From the point of view of the Afghans - We, or the United States, are the invaders. Today there is a lot of talk about whether it was necessary or not to send troops to Afghanistan. I think it was necessary then. Unfortunately. And Eternal Memory to All Soldiers. They fought for their homeland.

  • By the way... there is such a documentary film, very famous in the world and sensational, and there is a reason for this... it was shot by Paul Refsdal, a Norwegian journalist... called "Taliban without a mask" where you can see the classic type of enemy... these are the so-called moderate groups whose main theme is to drive out the invader from their land (that is, patriotically minded comrades), and there are those whose main theme is everything else... that is, those who only hide behind the idea of ​​patriotism - these are usually called radicals... both of them prefer once again don't argue with each other
    but it doesn’t always work out and then wars begin between the clans. During the Afghan War, both of them united against the common enemy of the USSR, .. as ours left, clashes between clans began... in general, the situation was predictable... then the Americans came.. and again the common enemy,
    True, there is no such unity here as during the Afghan war, there are no national heroes like Massoud... and the situation is a little different... soon Refsdal was kidnapped by radicals... he was filmed... but it cost money later... the man in white is a Helmand hillock ...or something like that...almost the most important, his family after this shelling was covered by US drones and a day later razed to the ground
    after which he probably still had all the reasons to hate Americans)

  • The topic is correct and necessary. Trembling.
    My call came just in time for the withdrawal of OKSVA from the DRA. The company commanders, foreman and platoon commander were from there. Everything is sensitive, undermined... Between the officers and ensigns, from across the river, and those who had never been there, there was an unspoken, silent and not always visible to the eye but clearly felt difference. We young men immediately sensed this and trusted them more than those who had not fought.... Without witnesses, a fighting ensign could have grounded even a major, such incidents sometimes happened to staff officers... To the credit of the officers and ensigns who fought, I will say that in two years I was among them assholes I never met, and among the staff and support sometimes rare specimens came across....... The first category was forgiven a lot, the second were paid with soldier’s hatred and, in especially favorable circumstances, with soldier’s fists. By this time the country was already rushing at full speed towards the cliff and a lot of things that were hidden for the time being and not the best in people were asked to come out....

    89-91. St.s-t, Brest.

    I'll throw in a hazing. Found on the web.

  • 1 December 1 - Remembrance Day for reconnaissance officers of 783 ORB who died on this day in 1984 in a battle near the village of Ishanan (Kunduz province)

    - Captain Karataev A.A. – commander 2 rr
    – junior sergeant Aseev S.I. – squad leader 2 rr
    – Private Tsyganov A.V., gunner-operator 2 rr
    - Private Tukhtaev T.M., reconnaissance officer 2 rr

    Aseev Sergey Ivanovich, junior sergeant, commander of the reconnaissance department. Born on May 9, 1965 in the village of Kalinka, Skopinsky district, Ryazan region. Father - Aseev Ivan Vasilievich, mother - Aseeva Evdokia Kirillovna. In 1983 he graduated from the Moscow Metro Construction School and worked as an installer at Metrostroy. On May 3, 1984, he was drafted into the army by the Pervomaisky district military registration and enlistment office of Moscow. In the Republic of Afghanistan - since November 1984. During a combat operation on December 11, 1984, his reconnaissance company entered into battle with the enemy. During the battle, the fighters of the squad, led by Aseev, attacked the enemy and broke into his positions. Sergei died in battle. For the courage and courage shown during the performance of a combat mission, he was awarded the Order of the Red Star (posthumously). He was buried in the village of Kalinka, Skopinsky district.

    TSYGANOV Alexey Vladimirovich , private, BMP gunner-operator, b. 01/25/1965 in the village. Shekshema, Sharya district, Kostroma, region. Russian. He studied at the Kolpino ship repair school.
    In Arms. The forces of the USSR were called up on November 3, 1983 by the Zhdanovsky RVK in Leningrad.
    In Rep. Afghanistan since Apr. 1984.
    Participated in 9 combat operations.
    He proved himself to be a brave and courageous warrior.
    12/11/1984 reconnaissance, the company in which he served fought with pr-com. Ts. fought fearlessly and skillfully.
    He incapacitated several rebels with machine gun fire.
    Died on the battlefield.

    He was buried in his native village.

    TUKHTAEV Tuimurod Mukhsinovich , private, rifleman, b. 02/18/1966 on ter. collective farm "Aini" Gijduvan district Bukhara, region. Uzbek SSR. Uzbek. Studied at the Samarkand Cooperative Institute.
    In Arms. The forces of the USSR were called up on 12.4.84 by the Bagishamal RMC in Samarkand.
    In Rep. Afghanistan from Sept. 1984.
    12/11/1984 during combat operations in our area. point Ishan acted in the combat formation of a reconnaissance company.
    Having blocked the village, the company began combing it, but was met by heavy fire from the rebels.
    As part of a group of three people, T. came close to the duct, from behind which the fire was being fired, and used grenades to destroy the fire. point.
    During the battle, he was the first to break into the house where the rebels were and opened fire on them.
    He died in this battle.
    Load hord. Red Star (posthumously).
    Buried at home.

  • Dead:

    Deputy commander of the ORB for technical affairs, Major Anatoly Petrovich Yashchenko;
    - deputy commander of the RDR for the Airborne Forces, Lieutenant Kelekhsaev Sergey Aleksandrovich;
    - squad commander Sergeant Petrov Vasily Nikolaevich;
    - squad commander Sergeant Shilov Dmitry Yurievich;
    - senior intelligence officer junior sergeant Kapriyanidi Georgis Ivanovich;
    - senior intelligence officer junior sergeant Dancha Ivan Ivanovich;
    - radiotelegraph operator Private Nikolai Anatolyevich Sorokin.



  • And almost everything is in mountainous areas

    Kandahar Province, Kandahar, 173 OSN, 1987. Original photo
    Scouts of the 173rd separate special forces detachment on a combat exit somewhere east of Kandahar. Pashtun tents are visible in the background, and in front of the scouts in the shadows lie some suitcases and other things that cannot be identified. The scouts are wearing unloading vests (it looks like these are Chinese “chi-coms”), which could hold 6 equipped magazines for a machine gun, 4 grenades, and three additionally have a belt bandoleer underneath for ten VOG-25 grenades of a PG-25 under-barrel grenade launcher.

    From left to right: Captain Kravchenko Andrey Vasilyevich, deputy commander of the 3rd company, senior lieutenant Khamzin Anvar Gumerovich (awarded the Order of Lenin, the Order of the Red Banner, the Order of the Red Star), senior sergeant of the 3rd company Sergei Zatemov, commander of the 3rd company, captain Prokopchuk Konstantin Viktorovich (died 04/21/1987, awarded two Orders of the Red Banner and the Order of the Red Star).

    Original photo
    In the photo: deputy commander of the security company, senior lieutenant Leonid Igorevich Polyakov, at the outpost of the second drilling station, which produces drinking water for the Kabul garrison, organized near the Ministry of Defense of Afghanistan, surrounded by the “service” dogs of the outpost - on the left is a shepherd dog brought from the USSR by someone from employees of the drilling rig, and on the right is a local mongrel, nailed to the outpost.

    Dogs were brought from the USSR by military personnel and employees of the Soviet Army, many local homeless stray dogs came to our units, becoming there for allowance. Basically, they were companions and were used for guard duty, which they performed much better than conscripts, notifying with their barking the approach of uninvited guests. Soviet outposts were built in an open field and were often fenced only with reinforced concrete pillars with barbed wire strung on them, which was not a serious obstacle for the enemy if the guard service was poorly organized. Dogs perfectly filled these gaps in the organization of guarding outposts. After the withdrawal of troops, a huge number of dogs remained in Afghanistan.

    Kabul Province, Kabul, 1351 OBO, 1985. Original photo
    In the photo: at the outpost of the second drilling station, which produces drinking water for the Kabul garrison, organized near the Ministry of Defense of Afghanistan, on the left is the deputy commander of the security company, Senior Lieutenant Leonid Igorevich Polyakov, on the right is the commander of the security platoon, Senior Lieutenant Viktor Felikov.

  • The photos are colorful, lively...thank you...the difficulty of the war in Afghanistan from 79-89 was also that the majority fought with the USSR, that is, if they were some separate gang formations of radical fanatics like the Taliban (by the way, the Taliban also different, and very different) then this would be half the trouble, but since any invasion by third-party states under any pretext, even the most reliable one, is perceived by the Islamic world as capture, occupation, uninvited invasion, intervention, etc., etc.. .then, accordingly, those who were in no way a member of any groups at all are taking up arms, and there..., peacefully herding some sheep, for example, if you watch the documentary films... already 20 years later, what do local residents think about the war, then in Afghanistan it turns out that almost every 4th person shot at our people, and everyone calmly talks about it... now all of these storytellers are civilians, they bake flatbreads, sell behind the counter, work as taxi drivers, etc., etc.... you will never think that 20 years ago they were evil mujahideen... for example, for me, the word mujahideen basmach or dushman was always associated with some bastard terarugs
    flaying our soldiers on occasion, such lawless Basmachi... but in fact, almost the entire population was ready to take up arms, and when most of the country is ready to take up arms, it is not easy to fight, this is the difficulty of this idea wars

    Click to expand...

    If only the Americans had not poured money, weapons, instructors into this war... the complexity would have been much less...
    And if Russia now put in 10% of the effort spent by the United States, the Americans would be pouring out of Avgan....

  • Nangarhar Province, Jalalabad, 66 Motorized Rifle Brigade, 1985.
    The company has the command of the 9th company.
    From left to right – platoon commander Lt. Loskutov (?), commander of the 9th company Lt. Lt. Aliskerov A., platoon commander Lt. Voronkin S.V., platoon commander Lt. Nazarov (?).

    In the camp of the Afghan opposition, at Pakistani bases, with the participation of American and Pakistani advisers, they developed a plan: to take the border town of Khost, create an alternative government there to Kabul, with all the ensuing consequences.

    Our command conceived Operation Highway with the goal of unblocking the Gardez-Khost highway and restoring the food supply to the city's population.

    A gang of dushmans is moving from Pakistan to Afghan territory.

    The Afghan dushmans strongly resembled the Central Asian Basmachi of the 20s and 30s.
    During the operation, which took place from November 23, 1987 to January 10, 1988, the road was unblocked. On December 30, the first convoy with food arrived in Khost. Checkpoints were set up at key heights along the highway.

    However, the Dushman thugs and their American and Pakistani patrons did not accept this situation, and sent their best forces to eliminate the checkpoints, and the Dushman special detachment “Black Stork” was sent to the height 3234 occupied by the 9th company of the 345th Guards Separate Parachute Regiment "

    According to legend, this detachment consisted of criminals who had to atone for their guilt before Allah with the blood of infidels. In fact, these were Pakistani special forces dressed in Dushman rags, who, due to their ethnicity, spoke Pashto. That day they wore black uniforms with rectangular black, yellow and red stripes on the sleeves.

    At half past four on the day of January 7, 1988, the dushmans began shelling height 3234. Corporal Fkdotov was killed during the shelling. The rocket was fired from the branch it was under. Under cover of fire from recoilless rifles, mortars and rocket launchers, the bandits approached our positions at a distance of 220 meters. With the onset of dusk, under the cover of massive fire, the dushmans rushed to attack from two directions.

    After 50 minutes the attack was repulsed. The dushmans could not get closer than 60 meters to the main positions. 10-15 dushmans were killed, about 30 were wounded. Junior sergeant Vyacheslav Alexandrov died during the attack.

    The Dushmans' fire was concentrated on the position of Alexandrov, who fired from a Utes heavy machine gun.

    Vyacheslav gave the order to his fighters Obyedkov and Kopyrin to take cover behind the position, while he continued to fire and repelled three enemy attacks.

    Slava Alexandrov shortly before the battle.

    The second assault began at 17.35. The dushmans concentrated their efforts where the Utyos machine gun they had just destroyed stood. But this assault was repulsed.

    During this assault, machine gunner Andrei Melnikov took the brunt of the attack. For a long time, Andrei Melnikov managed to repel numerous enemy attacks with targeted fire and frequent changes of positions. When Andrei ran out of ammunition, the wounded paratrooper managed to throw a grenade into the thick of the militants, but he himself died from an enemy mine exploding. The fragment, having pierced the Komsomol card, a photograph of his wife and daughter, went straight into the heart.

    From the memoirs of the sergeant of the 2nd platoon of the 9th company S. Yu. Borisov, made by him immediately after the battle at height 3234 (based on the book by Yuri Mikhailovich Lapshin - deputy commander of the 345th RPD in 1987-89, “Afghan Diary”).
    “All the attacks of the dushmans were well organized. Other platoons of the company came to our aid and replenished our supply of ammunition. There was a lull, or rather the shooting calmed down. But a strong wind rose, it became very cold. I went down under the rock, where the comrades who had just arrived were .
    At this time, the worst and most terrible attack began. It was light from the explosions of “granikov” (grenades from RPG-7). The Dushmans fired heavily from three directions. They calculated our positions and fired concentrated fire from grenade launchers at the place where Melnikov was with a machine gun. The spirits fired five or six grenades there. He came running down already dead. He fell dead without saying a word. From the very beginning of the battle, he fired from a machine gun, both from our direction and from the one where he received his mortal wound.

    Jr. I ordered Sergeant V.V. Peredelsky to carry all the grenades upstairs, to the stone where all our comrades were. After which he took a grenade and rushed there. Having encouraged the guys to hold on, he himself began to fire.
    The spirits have already approached 20-25 meters. We fired at them almost point-blank. But we didn’t even suspect that they would crawl even closer to a distance of 5-6 meters and from there they would start throwing grenades at us. We simply could not shoot through this pothole, near which there were two thick trees. At that moment we no longer had grenades. I stood next to A. Tsvetkov and the grenade that exploded under us was fatal for him. I was wounded in the arm and leg.
    There were many wounded, they were lying, and we could do nothing to help them. There were four of us left: me, Vladimir Shchigolev, Viktor Peredelsky and Pavel Trutnev, then Zurab Menteshashvili came running to help. We already had two magazines left for each of us, and not a single grenade. There was even no one to equip the stores. At this most terrible moment, our reconnaissance platoon came to our aid, and we began to pull out the wounded. Private Igor Tikhonenko covered our right flank for all 10 hours and conducted targeted fire from a machine gun. Perhaps, thanks to him and Andrei Melnikov, the “spirits” were not able to get around us on the right side. Only at four o'clock did the spirits realize that they could not take this hill. Having taken their wounded and dead, they began to retreat.
    On the battlefield we later found a grenade launcher, shots for it in different places, and three hand grenades without rings. Apparently, when they tore the rings, the checks remained in the heat. Perhaps these three grenades were literally not enough for the rebels to crush our resistance.
    There was a lot of blood everywhere, apparently they had heavy losses. All the trees and stones were riddled with holes; no living space was visible. The shanks from the "grain" were sticking out in the trees.
    I have not yet written about “The Cliff,” which the “spirits” literally turned into a piece of scrap metal with bullets and shrapnel. We fired from it until the very last minute. One can only guess how many enemy there were. According to our estimates, no less than two or three hundred."

    In total, from eight in the evening to three in the morning, the dushmans went to attack the heights nine times.

    Our artillery provided significant assistance to the defenders, the fire of which was directed under Dushman’s bullets by artillery spotter Senior Lieutenant Ivan Babenko, who was in the positions of the 9th company.

    At a critical moment, the reconnaissance platoon of Senior Lieutenant Alexei Smirnov arrived and delivered ammunition, which made it possible to launch a counterattack and finally decided the outcome of the battle.

    Alexey Smirnov, a graduate of the RVVDKU, led a group of reconnaissance officers that came to the aid of Viktor Gagarin’s platoon.

    The Mujahideen realized that they would not be able to take this mountain. Having taken the wounded and dead, they began to retreat. Pakistani helicopters were waiting for them in a nearby gorge. However, just as they were about to take off, the Tornadoes hit them, and most of the squad was destroyed.

    In the 9th company, six paratroopers were killed, twenty-eight were injured, nine of them seriously. Junior Sergeant Alexandrov and Private Melnikov were posthumously awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.

    The photo shows the awards ceremony for the soldiers of the 9th company.

    Film "9th Company"
    Many facts in it were distorted. So, the events in the film take place in 1989, and not in 1988, as it actually happened. Also, the losses of the Soviet army in this battle according to the film are almost 100%, while in reality 6 out of 39 people died. The most serious distortion of facts (ALMOST CRIMINAL) is that in the film the paratroopers were “forgotten” at the height and took on the battle alone, without any command or support.
    Another distortion is that the battle took place in the highlands, in the snow, and not in the sand, as in the film. The editor-in-chief of the magazine "Combat Brotherhood", a veteran of the War in Afghanistan, Nikolai Starodymov criticized Bondarchuk's film, saying that "the film showed a situation not just that was not there - which in principle could not have happened."

    After the battle, two fighters received the title of "Heroes of the Soviet Union" posthumously.
    This is junior sergeant Vyacheslav Alexandrov and private Andrei Melnikov (in the first photo).
    Eternal glory to the dead...

  • The military conflict in Afghanistan, which began more than thirty years ago, remains the cornerstone of world security today. The hegemonic powers, in pursuit of their ambitions, not only destroyed a previously stable state, but also crippled thousands of destinies.

    Afghanistan before the war

    Many observers, describing the war in Afghanistan, say that before the conflict it was an extremely backward state, but some facts are kept silent. Before the confrontation, Afghanistan remained a feudal country in most of its territory, but in large cities such as Kabul, Herat, Kandahar and many others, there was a fairly developed infrastructure; these were full-fledged cultural and socio-economic centers.

    The state developed and progressed. There was free medicine and education. The country produced good knitwear. Radio and television broadcast foreign programs. People met in cinemas and libraries. A woman could find herself in public life or manage a business.

    Fashion boutiques, supermarkets, shops, restaurants, and a host of cultural entertainment existed in the cities. The outbreak of the war in Afghanistan, the date of which is interpreted differently in sources, marked the end of prosperity and stability. The country instantly turned into a center of chaos and destruction. Today, power in the country has been seized by radical Islamist groups who benefit from maintaining unrest throughout the territory.

    Reasons for the start of the war in Afghanistan

    To understand the true reasons for the Afghan crisis, it is worth remembering history. In July 1973, the monarchy was overthrown. The coup was carried out by the king's cousin Mohammed Daoud. The general announced the overthrow of the monarchy and appointed himself president of the Republic of Afghanistan. The revolution took place with the assistance of the People's Democratic Party. A course of reforms in the economic and social sphere was announced.

    In reality, President Daoud did not carry out reforms, but only destroyed his enemies, including the leaders of the PDPA. Naturally, discontent in the circles of the communists and the PDPA grew, they were constantly subjected to repression and physical violence.

    Social, economic, and political instability in the country began, and external intervention by the USSR and the USA served as an impetus for even more massive bloodshed.

    Saur revolution

    The situation was constantly heating up, and already on April 27, 1987, the April (Saur) Revolution took place, organized by the country’s military units, the PDPA and the communists. New leaders came to power - N. M. Taraki, H. Amin, B. Karmal. They immediately announced anti-feudal and democratic reforms. The Democratic Republic of Afghanistan began to exist. Immediately after the first jubilations and victories of the united coalition, it became clear that there was discord between the leaders. Amin did not get along with Karmal, and Taraki turned a blind eye to this.

    For the USSR, the victory of the democratic revolution came as a real surprise. The Kremlin was waiting to see what would happen next, but many prudent Soviet military leaders and apparatchiks understood that the start of the war in Afghanistan was just around the corner.

    Participants in the military conflict

    Just a month after the bloody overthrow of the Daoud government, new political forces were mired in conflicts. The Khalq and Parcham groups, as well as their ideologists, did not find common ground with each other. In August 1978, Parcham was completely removed from power. Karmal, together with his like-minded people, travels abroad.

    Another setback befell the new government—the implementation of reforms was hampered by the opposition. Islamist forces are uniting into parties and movements. In June, armed uprisings against the revolutionary government began in the provinces of Badakhshan, Bamiyan, Kunar, Paktia and Nangarhar. Despite the fact that historians call 1979 the official date of the armed conflict, hostilities began much earlier. The year the war in Afghanistan began was 1978. The civil war was the catalyst that pushed foreign countries to intervene. Each of the megapowers pursued its own geopolitical interests.

    Islamists and their goals

    Back in the early 70s, the organization “Muslim Youth” was formed in Afghanistan. Members of this community were close to the Islamic fundamentalist ideas of the Arab “Muslim Brotherhood”, their methods of struggle for power, including political terror. The primacy of Islamic traditions, jihad and suppression all kinds of reforms that contradict the Koran - these are the main provisions of such organizations.

    In 1975, Muslim Youth ceased to exist. It was absorbed by other fundamentalists - the Islamic Party of Afghanistan (IPA) and the Islamic Society of Afghanistan (IAS). These cells were led by G. Hekmatyar and B. Rabbani. Members of the organization were trained to conduct military operations in neighboring Pakistan and were sponsored by the authorities of foreign countries. After the April Revolution, opposition societies united. The coup in the country became a kind of signal for military action.

    Foreign support for radicals

    We must not lose sight of the fact that the start of the war in Afghanistan, the date of which in modern sources is 1979-1989, was planned as much as possible by foreign powers participating in the NATO bloc and some If earlier the American political elite denied involvement in the formation and financing of extremists, then The new century has brought some very interesting facts to this story. Former CIA employees left a lot of memoirs in which they exposed the policies of their own government.

    Even before the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the CIA financed the mujahideen, set up training bases for them in neighboring Pakistan and supplied the Islamists with weapons. In 1985, President Reagan personally received a mujahideen delegation at the White House. The most important US contribution to the Afghan conflict was the recruitment of men throughout the Arab world.

    Today there is information that the war in Afghanistan was planned by the CIA as a trap for the USSR. Having fallen into it, the Union had to see the inconsistency of its policies, deplete its resources and “fall apart.” As we see, this is what happened. In 1979, the start of the war in Afghanistan, or rather, the introduction of a limited contingent became inevitable.

    USSR and support for the PDPA

    There are opinions that the USSR prepared the April Revolution for several years. Andropov personally supervised this operation. Taraki was a Kremlin agent. Immediately after the coup, friendly assistance from the Soviets to brotherly Afghanistan began. Other sources claim that the Saur Revolution was a complete surprise for the Soviets, albeit a pleasant one.

    After the successful revolution in Afghanistan, the USSR government began to monitor events in the country more closely. The new leadership, represented by Taraki, showed loyalty to friends from the USSR. KGB intelligence constantly informed the “leader” about instability in the neighboring region, but the decision was made to wait. The USSR took the beginning of the war in Afghanistan calmly, the Kremlin was aware that the opposition was sponsored by the States, it did not want to give up the territory, but the Kremlin did not need another Soviet-American crisis. Nevertheless, I did not intend to stand aside; after all, Afghanistan is a neighboring country.

    In September 1979, Amin killed Taraki and proclaimed himself president. Some sources indicate that the final discord in relation to former comrades occurred due to President Taraki’s intention to ask the USSR to send in a military contingent. Amin and his associates were against it.

    Soviet sources claim that the Afghan government sent them about 20 requests to send troops. The facts state the opposite - President Amin was opposed to the introduction of the Russian contingent. A resident in Kabul sent information about the US attempts to drag the USSR into the USSR. Even then, the leadership of the USSR knew that Taraki and the PDPA were residents of the States. Amin was the only nationalist in this company, and yet they did not share with Taraki the $40 million paid by the CIA for the April coup, this was the main reason for his death.

    Andropov and Gromyko didn’t want to listen to anything. In early December, KGB General Paputin flew to Kabul with the task of persuading Amin to call on USSR troops. The new president was relentless. Then on December 22 an incident occurred in Kabul. Armed “nationalists” burst into a house where USSR citizens lived and cut off the heads of several dozen people. Having impaled them on spears, the armed “Islamists” carried them through the central streets of Kabul. The police who arrived at the scene opened fire, but the criminals fled. On December 23, the government of the USSR sent a message to the government of Afghanistan, informing the president that Soviet troops would soon be in Afghanistan in order to protect the citizens of their country. While Amin was thinking about how to dissuade the troops of his “friends” from invading, they had already landed at one of the country’s airfields on December 24. The start date of the war in Afghanistan is 1979-1989. - will open one of the most tragic pages in the history of the USSR.

    Operation Storm

    Units of the 105th Airborne Guards Division landed 50 km from Kabul, and the KGB special forces unit “Delta” surrounded the presidential palace on December 27. As a result of the capture, Amin and his bodyguards were killed. The world community gasped, and all the puppeteers of this idea rubbed their hands. The USSR was hooked. Soviet paratroopers captured all major infrastructure facilities located in major cities. Over 10 years, more than 600 thousand Soviet soldiers fought in Afghanistan. The year the war in Afghanistan began was the beginning of the collapse of the USSR.

    On the night of December 27, B. Karmal arrived from Moscow and announced the second stage of the revolution on the radio. Thus, the beginning of the war in Afghanistan is 1979.

    Events of 1979-1985

    After the successful Operation Storm, Soviet troops captured all major industrial centers. The Kremlin's goal was to strengthen the communist regime in neighboring Afghanistan and push back the dushmans who controlled the countryside.

    Constant clashes between Islamists and SA troops led to numerous civilian casualties, but the mountainous terrain completely disoriented the fighters. In April 1980, the first large-scale operation took place in Panjshir. In June of the same year, the Kremlin ordered the withdrawal of some tank and missile units from Afghanistan. In August of the same year, a battle took place in the Mashhad Gorge. SA troops were ambushed, 48 soldiers were killed and 49 were wounded. In 1982, on the fifth attempt, Soviet troops managed to occupy Panjshir.

    During the first five years of the war, the situation developed in waves. The SA occupied the heights, then fell into ambushes. The Islamists did not carry out full-scale operations; they attacked food convoys and individual units of troops. The SA tried to push them away from large cities.

    During this period, Andropov had several meetings with the President of Pakistan and members of the UN. The representative of the USSR stated that the Kremlin was ready for a political settlement of the conflict in exchange for guarantees from the United States and Pakistan to stop funding the opposition.

    1985-1989

    In 1985, Mikhail Gorbachev became the first secretary of the USSR. He was constructive, wanted to reform the system, and outlined a course for “perestroika.” The protracted conflict in Afghanistan slowed down the process of resolving relations with the United States and European countries. There were no active military operations, but still Soviet soldiers died on Afghan territory with enviable regularity. In 1986, Gorbachev announced a course for a phased withdrawal of troops from Afghanistan. In the same year, B. Karmal was replaced by M. Najibullah. In 1986, the leadership of the SA came to the conclusion that the battle for the Afghan people was lost, since the SA could not take control of the entire territory of Afghanistan. January 23-26 A limited contingent of Soviet troops conducted their last Operation Typhoon in Afghanistan in the Kunduz province. On February 15, 1989, all troops of the Soviet army were withdrawn.

    Reaction of world powers

    After the media announcement of the seizure of the presidential palace in Afghanistan and the murder of Amin, everyone was in a state of shock. The USSR immediately began to be viewed as a total evil and an aggressor country. The outbreak of the war in Afghanistan (1979-1989) for European powers signaled the beginning of the Kremlin’s isolation. The President of France and the Chancellor of Germany personally met with Brezhnev and tried to persuade him to withdraw his troops, Leonid Ilyich was adamant.

    In April 1980, the US government authorized $15 million in aid to Afghan opposition forces.

    The United States and European countries called on the world community to ignore the 1980 Olympics taking place in Moscow, but due to the presence of Asian and African countries, this sporting event still took place.

    The Carter Doctrine was drawn up during this period of strained relations. Third world countries overwhelmingly condemned the actions of the USSR. On February 15, 1989, the Soviet state, in accordance with agreements with UN countries, withdrew its troops from Afghanistan.

    Outcome of the conflict

    The beginning and end of the war in Afghanistan are conditional, because Afghanistan is an eternal hive, as its last king said about his country. In 1989, a limited contingent of Soviet troops “organized” crossed the border of Afghanistan - this was reported to the top leadership. In fact, thousands of prisoners of war of the SA soldiers, forgotten companies and border detachments that covered the retreat of that same 40th Army remained in Afghanistan.

    Afghanistan, after a ten-year war, was plunged into absolute chaos. Thousands of refugees fled their country to escape the war.

    Even today the exact number of Afghan deaths remains unknown. Researchers voice a figure of 2.5 million dead and wounded, mostly civilians.

    During the ten years of war, the SA lost about 26 thousand soldiers. The USSR lost the war in Afghanistan, although some historians claim the opposite.

    The economic costs of the USSR in connection with the Afghan war were catastrophic. $800 million was allocated annually to support the Kabul government, and $3 billion to arm the army.

    The outbreak of the war in Afghanistan marked the end of the USSR, one of the world's largest powers.

    On May 15, 1988, the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan began. The operation was led by the last commander of the limited contingent, Lieutenant General Boris Gromov. Soviet troops have been in the country since December 25, 1979; they acted on the side of the government of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan.

    The decision to send Soviet troops into Afghanistan was made on December 12, 1979 at a meeting of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee and formalized by a secret resolution of the CPSU Central Committee. The official purpose of the entry was to prevent the threat of foreign military intervention. The Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee used repeated requests from the leadership of Afghanistan as a formal basis.

    A limited contingent of Soviet troops (OKSV) found themselves directly drawn into the civil war that was flaring up in Afghanistan and became its active participant.

    The armed forces of the government of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan (DRA) on the one hand and the armed opposition (Mujahideen, or dushmans) on the other took part in the conflict. The struggle was for complete political control over the territory of Afghanistan. During the conflict, the dushmans were supported by military specialists from the United States, a number of European NATO member countries, as well as Pakistani intelligence services.
    December 25, 1979 The entry of Soviet troops into the DRA began in three directions: Kushka-Shindand-Kandahar, Termez-Kunduz-Kabul, Khorog-Fayzabad. The troops landed at the airfields of Kabul, Bagram, and Kandahar.

    The Soviet contingent included: the command of the 40th Army with support and service units, four divisions, five separate brigades, four separate regiments, four combat aviation regiments, three helicopter regiments, one pipeline brigade, one logistics brigade and some other units and institutions.

    The presence of Soviet troops in Afghanistan and their combat activities are conventionally divided into four stages.

    1st stage: December 1979 - February 1980 Entry of Soviet troops into Afghanistan, placing them in garrisons, organizing the protection of deployment points and various objects.

    2nd stage: March 1980 - April 1985. Conducting active combat operations, including large-scale ones, together with Afghan formations and units. Work to reorganize and strengthen the armed forces of the DRA.

    3rd stage: May 1985 - December 1986. The transition from active combat operations mainly to supporting the actions of Afghan troops by Soviet aviation, artillery and sapper units. Special forces units fought to stop the delivery of weapons and ammunition from abroad. The withdrawal of 6 Soviet regiments to their homeland took place.

    4th stage: January 1987 - February 1989. Participation of Soviet troops in the Afghan leadership’s policy of national reconciliation. Continued support for the combat activities of Afghan troops. Preparing Soviet troops for the return to their homeland and implementing their complete withdrawal.

    On April 14, 1988, with the mediation of the UN in Switzerland, the foreign ministers of Afghanistan and Pakistan signed the Geneva Agreements on a political settlement of the situation in the DRA. The Soviet Union pledged to withdraw its contingent within a 9-month period, starting on May 15; The United States and Pakistan, for their part, had to stop supporting the Mujahideen.

    In accordance with the agreements, the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan began on May 15, 1988. On February 15, 1989, Soviet troops completely withdrew from Afghanistan. The withdrawal of the troops of the 40th Army was led by the last commander of the limited contingent, Lieutenant General Boris Gromov.

     


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