The army under Peter I was formed from. Formation of the regular army under Peter I

Army of Peter I- a regular army created by the first Russian Emperor Peter I on the basis of the so-called troops that began to appear in Russia during the reign of his father. foreign regiments, taking into account the latest European achievements in this area. Replaced the irregular local troops, which were a feudal relic, and the Streltsy units, which opposed Peter I during the struggle for power and were then repressed by him. The army was staffed on the basis of conscription (compulsory service for nobles also remained until the mid-18th century). and so, Peter was the first

When the first infantry regiments of the regular army were formed in 1699, the regiment's staff consisted of 12 companies (there were no battalions yet). The regiment consisted of 1000-1300 personnel. The dragoon regiments consisted of 5 squadrons, 2 companies each. There were 800-1000 people in the dragoon regiment. In 1704, the infantry regiments were reduced to 9 companies - 8 fusilier companies and 1 grenadier company, consolidated into 2 battalions. At the same time, the number was established: in the infantry regiments - 1350 people, in the dragoon regiments - 1200 people. During the war, the available number of people in the regiments did not exceed 1000 people. In 1706-1707 Grenadier companies were removed from the infantry and dragoon regiments. The infantry regiments consisted of 8 companies; the dragoons continued to be ten companies strong. The grenadier companies were consolidated into separate grenadier infantry and dragoon regiments. In 1711, a new state was introduced, according to which an infantry regiment consisted of 2 battalions, and a battalion - of 4 companies. The regiment consisted of 40 staff officers and chief officers, 80 non-commissioned officers, 1,120 combat soldiers, 247 non-combatant soldiers. In total, the infantry regiment had 1,487 officers and soldiers. The dragoon regiment consisted of 5 squadrons, each squadron had 2 companies. The regiment consists of 38 staff officers and chief officers, 80 non-commissioned officers, 920 combat soldiers, 290 non-combatants. In total, the dragoon regiment had 1,328 officers and soldiers. It must be admitted that the staff of the infantry regiment was somewhat unsuccessful. The regiment is weak. Given the inevitable shortage in war, its actual strength was about 1,000 people; the two-battalion regiment organization limited the possibilities of tactical combinations. A three-battalion organization would be more flexible. The dragoon regiment was somewhat large compared to the infantry. On the other hand, the five-squadron composition of the regiment made it difficult to manage, and the number of companies in the squadron (2) was clearly insufficient. In 1712, the first artillery regiment was formed. It consisted of 1 bombardier, 6 gunners and 1 miner company, "engineer" and "pony" captains, second captains, lieutenants, second lieutenants, conductors and battery masters *. Thus, the regiment united artillery and engineering troops. * (Complete collection laws of the Russian Empire, ed. 1830, vol. IV.) The material part was stored in the arsenal. During the campaign, the guns were transported on horses, which were taken from the peasants as needed. In 1705, Peter issued a decree according to which regular riding and horse troops were introduced into the artillery. This achieved a permanent organizational unification in the artillery of people, equipment and horses. In Western European armies, such an order was established only in the middle of the 18th century. Peter I retained the regimental artillery that existed in the regiments of the “new system”; each infantry and dragoon regiment received two 3-pound cannons. The Russian army was ahead of the army in terms of the introduction of horse artillery Western Europe for half a century, if we consider Peter’s reform as the beginning of horse artillery. But from the previous presentation we saw that regimental artillery was already in the Reitar and Dragoon regiments of the “new system” even before Peter. The number of regiments remained the same in peacetime and war time. In 1699, as already noted, new 27 infantry and 2 dragoon regiments were formed. To this we must add the already existing 4 regular infantry regiments - Preobrazhensky, Semenovsky and the former regiments of the “new system” of Lefort and Gordon. Thus, by the beginning of the war with the Swedes in Russia there were 31 infantry and 2 dragoon regiments. In 1701, Boris Golitsyn formed 9 dragoon regiments. In 1702, from the regiments of the “new system” of the Novgorod and Kazan categories, the Apraksin Corps was created, consisting of 5 infantry and 2 dragoon regiments. In the same year, 4 infantry regiments were formed from former Moscow streltsy, and in 1704, 2 more infantry regiments were formed from streltsy. By 1706, another 10 infantry and 15 dragoon regiments had been formed. Thus, in 1706 there were a total of 2 guards, 48 ​​infantry and 28 dragoon regiments in the army. In 1710, the number of regiments was reduced to 2 guards and 32 infantry regiments due to the fact that the 16 infantry regiments located in Izhora land, were transferred to garrison regiments. The number of dragoon regiments increased to 38. The development of the Russian army under Peter I can be traced using the following table (data are given only for field troops). 1 Of these, 5 are grenadier regiments. 2 Of these, 3 are grenadier regiments. In addition to the listed field troops, Peter I also formed garrison troops. By 1724 there were 49 infantry and 4 dragoon regiments. Having captured the southwestern shores of the Caspian Sea, Peter I formed 9 new infantry regiments of the so-called Persian, or grassroots, corps to guard them. Consequently, if we take into account all the formations of the regular army, we can say that by the end of the first quarter of the 18th century in Russia there were 2 guards, 5 grenadiers, 40 field infantry, 9 infantry regiments of the Persian corps, 49 garrison infantry regiments, 3 grenadier dragoons, 30 dragoons field and 4 dragoon garrison regiments. In total there were 105 infantry and 37 dragoon regiments. The regular strength of the combat infantry was: field 59,480 people, Persian corps 11,160 people, garrison troops 60,760 people. Total infantry 131,400. There were cavalry: field 34,254 people, garrison 4,152. Total 38,406 people. The entire combat strength of the army numbered 170,000 people, and with non-combatants - 198,500 people. These figures do not take into account the personnel of the artillery regiment and central departments. The highest organizational units in the army were divisions, or generalships. Divisions included different numbers of infantry and cavalry regiments, depending on the tasks facing the divisions. The composition of the regiments was also inconsistent. In 1699, from the beginning of the formation of the army, three generalships were established - Golovin, Weide and Repnin, each of which included from 9 to 11 regiments. During the war, an intermediate formation between the regiment and the division was introduced - a brigade, which included 2 - 3 infantry or cavalry regiments. Several brigades made up a division. Thus, Peter did not create an organic unification of all branches of the army. There were no such formations in Western European armies. They first appeared only almost a hundred years later, in the army of the French bourgeois revolution of 1789 - 1794. The Cossack troops remained in the same organizational state, only their numbers decreased significantly as a result of losses in the war, after the betrayal of Mazepa and the Bulavin uprising on the Don. Instead of 50,000 Ukrainian Cossacks, by the end of the first quarter of the 18th century there were 15,000; Don Cossacks instead of 14,000 there were 5,000. The ratio of military branches in the army of Peter I compared to the pre-reform army changed dramatically. In the pre-reform army, infantry was only slightly superior in numbers to cavalry. It was not yet the main branch of the military. In Peter's army there were 131,400 infantry people, and only 38,406 cavalry people, i.e. 23 percent of the total number of troops. If we take the field troops, then even then the cavalry will be only 38 percent. Thus, by the end of the first quarter of the 18th century, the post-reform Russian army represented great strength- the regular troops alone had 170,000 combat personnel, and with non-combatant troops - 198,500 people. The Russian army was the largest army in Europe; the Prussian army alone by 1740 numbered 86,000 people, the Austrian and French had about 150,000 people by the end of the first quarter of the 18th century. The Russian army has become the most strong army in Europe not only in numbers, but also in moral and combat terms. Peter I adopted the most advanced weapon of that time for his army - a gun. The gun (fusil) - fusee, with a flintlock, was invented in 1640 in France. It was much more convenient to handle than a heavy musket with its long barrel. However, the range of the gun was less than that of the musket. The latter had an aiming range of up to 600 steps, but the gun hit only 300 steps. The accuracy of the gun was also less than that of the musket. But the gun had less weight. It was much faster in firing and easier to use. The relatively light weight of the gun made it possible to attach a bayonet to it, which solved the problem of creating universal firearms and bladed weapons. In the armies of Western Europe, the gun was considered mainly as a hunting weapon. There they preferred to arm the infantry with long-range and heavy muskets that did not have bayonets. The gun was appreciated primarily by the soldiers themselves. The military leadership for a long time did not want to introduce it into service with the army and defended the old models. At the end of the 17th century, the organizer of the French regular army, Minister of War Lavoie, even issued orders prohibiting the use of guns in the infantry, and demanded that army inspectors strictly monitor the implementation of these orders. The best European armies of that time, such as the French and Swedish, at the beginning of the 18th century were armed with muskets, and one third of the infantry were armed with pikes. Only a few fusilier regiments were formed, intended for a strong fire strike at short notice. Peter's merit lies in the fact that, earlier than any of his contemporaries, he understood the importance of a gun in the conditions of linear tactics and boldly introduced it into mass armament of the army. Peter did not immediately manage to rearm his army. Russian factories did not yet know how to make guns. In Western Europe, there was no mass production of guns and therefore it was impossible to immediately purchase the required number of them to arm the first formations of Peter the Great's regular army. In the regiments besieging Narva there were still many soldiers armed with muskets and even pikes. Only in subsequent years, with the establishment of rifle production in Russia, was the rearmament of the army completely completed. However, as a relic of the old distrust of the bayonet, at first the army still had swords in service with the infantry. They subsequently disappeared from service. Peter's cavalry - the dragoons - also received a gun, in addition to having a broadsword and two pistols. Such weapons made it possible to use cavalry on a wider scale than in the armies of Western Europe, where most cavalry did not have guns. Peter's dragoons, dismounted, could fight against the enemy, who consisted of all types of troops. This was the case near Kalisz, where Menshikov, having only dragoons, defeated the Polish-Swedish army, which consisted of all branches of the army; So it was with Lesnaya. There were dragoons in Western European armies, but they made up a small part of the cavalry and could perform limited tasks, With regard to cavalry, Peter managed to choose the most advanced of all existing types, capable of performing numerous tasks and corresponding to the conditions of the theater of military operations. Peter paid special attention to artillery. He created his own, original, perfect for his time samples of artillery pieces. Peter demanded from the artillery, along with firepower, great tactical mobility and agility. The regimental artillery (3-pounder) had good mobility. The regimental cannon weighed 9 pounds. The field artillery was also significantly lighter, but still did not have sufficient tactical mobility due to the unsuccessful design of the carriage. 6-pound guns weighed from 36 to 46 pounds; 12-pound guns with a carriage - 150 poods. To transport a 12-pound gun, at least 15 horses were required. If the carriage design had been more advanced, then only 6 horses would have been needed to move such a weapon. The 9-pound mortar already weighed 300 pounds, its mobility was low. According to the statement in 1723, the artillery listed: 1) siege - 120 18 - 24 pound guns, 40 5 - 9 pound mortars; 2) field - 21 guns 6 - 8 - 12-pounders; 3) regimental - 80 3-pound guns. It should be noted that the regimental and field artillery in the list apparently was not fully taken into account. According to the state, there were 2 guns per regiment, therefore, for 105 infantry and 37 dragoon regiments there should have been 284 guns of regimental artillery alone. There are mentions that during the war some infantry and dragoon regiments had more than two guns. For example, the grenadier regiment of Repnin's division had 12 "screw-mounted arquebuses". A powerful industrial base allowed Peter I to create strong artillery. Throughout the 18th century, Russian artillery remained the most numerous and technically advanced artillery in the world. Peter I great attention paid attention to the shape and quality of uniforms. The infantry and cavalry were dressed in caftans, green for the infantry, blue for the cavalry. The soldiers also had felt hats, cloth raincoats in inclement weather, stockings and shoes. It cannot be said that such uniforms were comfortable in the Russian climate. The soldiers suffocated in their thick cloth caftans in the summer and froze in the winter under their cloth cloaks. Peter put up with all this, apparently wanting to emphasize with new uniforms the difference between his army and the old, pre-reform Moscow army.
	Armed Forces of the USSR
	Armed Forces of the Russian Federation

Russian army before Peter

The introduction of troops of a foreign system changed the composition of the army: it ceased to be based on class. It was impossible to recruit only service people - landowners - into the soldier regiments. The soldiers were required to have constant service and constant exercise in military affairs; they could not be sent home in Peaceful time and convene only for military purposes. Therefore, they began to recruit soldiers into foreign regiments in the same way as later recruits.

Peter's transformations in military affairs

Thus, Peter inherited from his predecessors an army that, if not satisfying all the requirements of the military science of that time, was already adapted for further restructuring in view of new requirements.

In his “amusing” villages, Peter organized two regiments - Preobrazhensky and Semyonovsky - completely according to the foreign model. By 1692, these regiments were finally formed and trained. Preobrazhensky was headed by Colonel Yuri von Mengden, and Ivan Chambers was appointed colonel of Semyonovsky, “originally a Muscovite of the Shkot breed”.

Other regiments began to be formed based on the model of these regiments, and already in the first Azov campaign four regular regiments took part - Preobrazhensky, Semenovsky, Lefortovo and the transformed Butyrsky regiment.

The regiment was led by a colonel; According to the regulations, he must “as a captain in his company, have the same and even greater first respect for his regiment.” The lieutenant colonel assisted the regiment commander, the prime major commanded one battalion, the second major commanded another; Moreover, the first major was considered older than the second major and, in addition to command, had the responsibility to take care “whether the regiment is in good condition, both in the number of soldiers and in their weapons, ammunition and uniform.”

Artillery

The cavalry under Peter consisted of dragoon regiments; the artillery of Peter the Great's time consisted of 12-, 8-, 6- and 3-pound guns (a pound is equal to a cast iron cannonball with a diameter of 2 English inches (5.08 cm); the weight of a pound is exceeded by 20 spools (85.32 kg) , one-pound and half-pound howitzers, one-pound and 6-pound mortars (a pound is equal to 16.38 kg). This was inconvenient artillery for transportation: a 12-pound gun, for example, weighed 150 pounds with a carriage and limber, and was carried by 15 horses. Three-pound guns made up the regimental artillery; at first there were two such guns per battalion, and from 1723 they were limited to two per regiment. These regimental guns weighed about 28 pounds (459 kg). The range of the guns of those times was very small - about 150 fathoms (320 m) on average - and depended on the caliber of the gun.

From the gunners and grenades of former times, Peter ordered the formation of a special artillery regiment in 1700, and schools were established for the training of artillerymen: engineering and navigation in Moscow and engineering in St. Petersburg. Arms factories in Okhta and Tula, organized by Peter, produced artillery and guns for the army.

Garrison troops

Garrison troops in Russian imperial army were intended for garrison service in cities and fortresses in wartime. Created by Peter I in 1702 from city archers, soldiers, reiters and others. In 1720, the garrison troops consisted of 80 infantry and 4 dragoon regiments. In the 2nd half of the 19th century, they were transformed into local troops (garrison artillery - into fortress artillery).

Weapons and uniforms

Officer of the Life Guards Semenovsky Regiment from 1700 to 1720.

Grenadier of an infantry regiment from 1700 to 1732.

Fuseliers of infantry regiments from 1700 to 1720.

Historical description of clothing and weapons of Russian troops, with drawings, compiled by the highest order: in 30 volumes, in 60 books. / Ed. A. V. Viskovatova.- Part (T.) 2.- Ill. 166. Chief officer and staff officer of the Life Guards Preobrazhensky Regiment from 1700 to 1732.

The armament of each soldier consisted of a sword with a sword belt and a fusée. Fusee - a gun that weighed about 14 pounds; his bullet weighed 8 spools; the fusee castle was made of flint; In the necessary cases, a baguette - a five- or eight-inch triangular bayonet - was mounted on the fusee. The cartridges were placed in leather bags attached to a sling, to which a horny powder with gunpowder was also tied. Captains and sergeants, instead of fusees, were armed with halberds - axes on a three-arch shaft.

One of the companies in each regiment was called a grenadier, and a feature of its weapons were matchlock bombs, which the grenadier kept in a special bag; The grenadier's fuses were a little lighter and the soldiers could put their fuses on a belt behind their backs when throwing a bomb. The lower ranks of the artillery were armed with swords, pistols, and some with a special “mortar.” These "mortars" were something between a fusée and a small cannon attached to a fusée stock with a fusée lock; when firing from mortars, they had to be supported by a special halberd; The length of the mortar was 13 inches, and it fired a bomb the size of a pound cannonball. Each soldier was given a backpack for carrying things. Dragoons for foot combat were armed with a fusée, and for mounted combat - with a broadsword and a pistol.

Since 1700, a soldier's uniform consisted of a small flattened cocked hat, caftan, epancha, camisole and trousers. The hat was black, the brim was trimmed with braid, and a brass button was attached to the left side. When listening to orders from the elders, the younger ones took off their hat and held it under their left armpit. Soldiers and officers wore their hair long to the shoulder and powdered it with flour on ceremonial occasions.

The caftans of the infantrymen were made of green cloth, and those of the dragoons were made of blue, single-breasted, without a collar, with red cuffs. The caftan was knee-length and equipped with copper buttons; The cape for cavalry and infantry was made of red cloth and had two collars: it was a narrow cape that reached to the knees and provided poor protection from rain and snow; boots - long, with light bells - were worn only on guard duty and when marching, and ordinary shoes were stockings and blunt-toed greased heads with a copper buckle; Army soldiers had stockings Green colour, and among the Preobrazhentsy and Semyonovtsy after the Narva defeat - red, according to legend, in memory of the day when the former “amusing” regiments did not flinch, despite the general “embarrassment” under the onslaught of Charles XII.

The grenadiers of the guard differed from the fuseliers only in their headdress: instead of a triangular hat, they wore leather helmets with an ostrich feather. The cut of the officer's uniform was the same as that of the soldiers, only trimmed along the edges and sides with gold braid, the buttons were also gilded, and the tie, instead of black cloth, like the soldiers', was white linen. A plume of white and red feathers was attached to the hat. In full dress uniform, officers were required to wear powdered wigs on their heads. What distinguished an officer from a private was a white-blue-red scarf with silver tassels, and for a staff officer - with gold tassels, which was worn high on the chest, near the collar. The officers were armed with a sword and also had a protazan in the ranks, or, in those days, a “partazan” - a type of spear on a three-arch shaft. Grenadier officers had a light fusee on a gold belt instead of a protazan.

By the end of Peter's reign, the regular army numbered in its ranks more than 200 thousand soldiers of all branches of the military and over 100 thousand irregular Cossack cavalry and Kalmyk cavalry. For the 13 million population of Peter's Russia, it was a heavy burden to support and feed such a large army. According to the estimate drawn up in 1710, a little more than three million rubles were spent on the maintenance of the field army, garrisons and fleet, on artillery and other military expenses, while the treasury spent only a little over 800 thousand on other needs: the army absorbed 78% of the total expenditure budget .

To resolve the issue of financing the army, Peter ordered, by decree of November 26, 1718, to count the number of tax-paying population of Russia; all landowners, secular and church, were ordered to provide accurate information on how many male souls lived in their villages, including old people and infants. The information was then checked by special auditors. Then they accurately determined the number of soldiers in the army and calculated how many souls were counted in the census for each soldier. Then we calculated how much it costs per year full content soldier Then it became clear what tax should be imposed on every tax-paying soul in order to cover all the costs of maintaining the army. According to this calculation, for each tax-paying soul there were: 74 kopecks for the owning (serf) peasants, 1 ruble 14 kopecks for state peasants and single-lords; 1 ruble 20 kopecks per tradesman.

By decrees of January 10 and February 5, 1722, Peter outlined to the Senate the very method of feeding and maintaining the army, and proposed to “lay out the troops on the ground.” Military and foot regiments had to support them. In the newly conquered regions - Ingria, Karelia, Livonia and Estland - no census was carried out, and regiments were to be assigned to billet here, the feeding of which was entrusted to individual provinces that did not need constant military protection.

The Military Collegium compiled a list of regiments by locality, and for the cantonment itself, 5 generals, 1 brigadier and 4 colonels were sent - one to each province. Having received from the Senate for layout, and from the Military College - a list of regiments that were to be deployed in a given area, the sent headquarters officer, arriving in his district, had to convene the local nobility, announcing to them the rules of layout and inviting the layoutrs to assist. The regiments were distributed as follows: each company was assigned a rural district with such a population that there were 35 souls for each infantryman, and 50 souls of the male population for each horseman. The instructions ordered the dispatcher to insist on dispersing the regiments in special settlements, so as not to place them in peasant households and thus not cause quarrels between peasants in peasant households and thus not cause quarrels between peasants and inns. To this end, the planners had to persuade the nobles to build huts, one for each non-commissioned officer and one for every two soldiers. Each settlement had to accommodate at least a corporal and be located at such a distance from the other that a cavalry company would be deployed no further than 10 versts, a foot regiment no further than 5 versts, a cavalry regiment no further than 5 versts, a cavalry regiment no further than 100 versts, and a foot regiment no further than 50 versts. . In the middle of the company district, the nobility was ordered to build a company courtyard with two huts for the chief officers of the company and one for lower servants; In the center of the regiment's location, the nobles were obliged to build a courtyard for the regimental headquarters with 8 huts, a hospital and a barn.

Having positioned the company, the dispatcher handed over to the company commander a list of villages in which the company was located, indicating the number of households and the number of souls listed in each; The spreader handed another similar list to the landowners of those villages. In the same way, he compiled a list of villages in which the entire regiment was stationed, and handed it over to the regimental commander. The nobles of each province had to jointly take care of the maintenance of the regiments stationed in their area and for this purpose elect from among themselves a special commissar, who was entrusted with taking care of the timely collection of money for the maintenance of the regiments settled in a given area, and in general being responsible to the nobility as a clerk and intermediary of the class in relations with the military authorities. Since 1723, these elected zemstvo commissars have been given the exclusive right to collect poll taxes and arrears.

The regiment settled in this area not only lived at the expense of the population that supported it, but also, according to Peter’s plan, was supposed to become an instrument of local government: in addition to drill exercises, the regiment was assigned many purely police duties. The colonel and his officers were required to pursue thieves and robbers in their district, that is, the location of the regiment, keep the peasants of their district from escaping, catch those who fled, monitor fugitives coming to the district from the outside, eradicate tavern and smuggling, help forest wardens in pursuing illegal forest felling, send their people with the officials who are sent to the provinces from the governors, so that these people do not allow the officials to ruin the district inhabitants, and help the officials cope with the willfulness of the inhabitants.

According to the instructions, the regimental authorities had to protect the rural population of the district “from all taxes and insults.” V. O. Klyuchevsky writes about this:

In fact, these authorities, even against their will, themselves laid a heavy tax and resentment on the local population and not only on the peasants, but also on the landowners. Officers and soldiers were prohibited from interfering in the economic orders of landowners and in peasant work, in grazing regimental horses and domestic officers' and soldiers' livestock on common pastures where landowners and peasants grazed their livestock, the right of military authorities to demand in certain cases people for regimental work and carts for regimental parcels and, finally, the right of general supervision over order and security in the regimental district - all this was supposed to create constant misunderstandings between the military authorities and the inhabitants.

Obliged to monitor the payers of the poll tax that fed the regiment, the regimental authorities carried out this supervision in the most inconvenient way for the average person: if a peasant wanted to go to work in another district, he had to receive a letter of leave from the landowner or parish priest. With this letter, he went to the regimental yard, where the zemstvo commissar registered this letter of leave in the book. Instead of a letter, the peasant was given a special ticket signed and sealed by the colonel.

The supposed separate soldiers' settlements were not built anywhere, and those that were started were not completed, and the soldiers were housed in philistine courtyards. In one decree of 1727, introducing some changes in the collection of the poll tax, the government itself admitted all the harm from such placement of soldiers, it admitted that “The poor Russian peasants are going bankrupt and fleeing not only from the shortage of grain and the poll tax, but also from the disagreement of the officers with the zemstvo rulers, and the soldiers with the peasants”. Fights between soldiers and men were constant.

The burden of military billets became heaviest during periods of collecting the poll tax, which was collected by zemstvo commissars with military teams assigned to them “for anstaltu,” that is, for order, headed by an officer. The tax was usually paid in thirds, and three times a year the zemstvo commissars with military men traveled around villages and hamlets, making collections, collecting fines from defaulters, selling property to the poor, feeding at the expense of local population. “Each detour lasted two months: for six months of the year, villages and hamlets lived in panic, under oppression or in anticipation of armed collectors. Poor men are afraid of the mere entry and passage of officers and soldiers, commissars and other commanders; There are not enough peasant belongings to pay taxes, and the peasants not only sell livestock and belongings, but also pawn their children, while others flee separately; commanders, often replaced, do not feel such ruin; none of them thinks about anything else but about taking the last tribute from the peasant and currying favor with this,” says the opinion of Menshikov and others high ranks, presented to the Supreme Privy Council in 1726. The Senate in 1725 pointed out that “the zemstvo commissars and officers are so oppressed by the payment of per capita money that the peasants are not only forced to sell off their belongings and livestock, but many also give away the grain sown in the ground for next to nothing and therefore are necessarily forced to flee beyond other people’s borders.”.

The flight of peasants reached enormous proportions: in the Kazan province, in the area where one infantry regiment was settled, after less than two years of such military-financial management, the regiment was missing 13 thousand souls in its district, which was more than half of the revision souls obliged to support them.

Production to ranks and training

Promotion to ranks in Peter's army took place in strict gradual order. Each new vacancy was filled by the choice of officers of the regiment; the rank up to captain was approved by the commander of the “generalship”, that is, the corps - general-in-chief, and up to colonel - field marshal. Until 1724, patents for all ranks were issued under the signature of the sovereign himself. Promotion to the ranks of colonel and general depended on the sovereign. To prevent family ties, patronage, affection and friendship from leading people unfamiliar with military affairs into the officer ranks, Peter, by decree of 1714, decreed: “Since many are promoting their relatives and friends as officers from young people who do not know the basics of soldiering, for they did not serve in low ranks, and some served only for appearances for several weeks or months, so such people need a statement of how many such ranks there are since 1709, and henceforth a decree must be issued so that both noble breeds and others from outside should not be written down, which did not serve as soldiers in the guard." Peter often looked through the lists of persons promoted to rank himself.

In 1717, Peter demoted Lieutenant Colonel Myakishev “to Preobrazhensky Regiment to the bombardment company as a soldier because he got that rank through intrigue and not through service.”

The Tsar made sure that the nobles who entered the guards regiments as soldiers received a well-known military education in them, “decent for officers.”

In special regimental schools, young nobles (up to the age of 15) studied arithmetic, geometry, artillery, fortification, foreign languages. The officer's training did not stop after entering the service.

In the Preobrazhensky Regiment, Peter demanded that officers know “engineering.” For this purpose, in 1721, a special school was established at the regiment.

Having made the guards regiments like schools for studying everything that “a good officer should know,” the practice of studying abroad continued.

In 1716, the Military Regulations were published, which strictly defined the rights and obligations of the military during their service.

The results of Peter's reforms in the army

As a result of Peter's reforms, Russia received a permanent, regular, centrally supplied modern army, which subsequently for more than a century (before the Crimean War) successfully fought, including the armies of the leading European powers (Seven Years' War, Patriotic War of 1812). Also, the new army served as a means that allowed Russia to turn the tide of the fight against the Ottoman Empire, gain access to the Black Sea and spread its influence in the Balkans and Transcaucasia. However, the transformation of the army was part of a general course towards the absoluteization of the power of the monarch and the infringement of the rights of the most diverse social strata of Russian society. In particular, despite the abolition of the local system, the duty of service was not removed from the nobles, and the functioning of the industry necessary for the technical equipment of the army was ensured through the use of serf labor along with civilian labor.

Introduction

At all times the Russian state military service was a matter of honor for every citizen, and faithful service to one’s Fatherland was the highest meaning of a warrior’s life and service.

Loyalty to duty and oath, dedication, honor, decency, self-discipline - these are the traditions of the Russian military. They were rightfully valued by our fathers and grandfathers, who walked the fiery roads of the Great Patriotic War. But for Lately, desire to serve in the armed forces Russian Federation decreased slightly. It is difficult to say what this is connected with. In order to find out the reason for the current situation, it is advisable to consider the history of the formation of the armed forces of the Russian Federation.

From the above, the relevance of the following research topic follows: “The history of the creation of the armed forces of the Russian Federation.”

The purpose of the work is to study the history of the creation of the armed forces of the Russian Federation.

To achieve this goal, it is necessary to solve the following tasks:

Consider the history of formation Russian army during the reign of Peter I;

Explore the features of the development of the armed forces during the period Soviet Union;

Explore modern stage development of the armed forces of the Russian Federation.

The methodological basis of the study is the works of the following authors: V.O. Klyuchevsky, T.N. Nerovnya, T.M. Timoshina and others.

The history of the formation of the Russian army under Peter I

Special attention deserves the period of the Russian army under the reign of Peter I, because. at this moment the navy of the Russian Empire was created.

The beginning of the reform of the armed forces dates back to the second half of the 17th century. Even then, the first reiter and soldier regiments of the new system were created from datochny and “willing” people (i.e. volunteers). But there were still relatively few of them, and the basis of the armed forces was still made up of noble cavalry militia and streltsy regiments. Although the archers wore uniform uniforms and weapons, the monetary salary they received was insignificant. Basically, they served for the benefits provided to them for trade and crafts, and therefore were tied to permanent places of residence. The Streltsy regiments, neither in their social composition nor in their organization, could provide a reliable support for the noble government. They also could not seriously resist the regular troops of Western countries, and, consequently, they were not a sufficiently reliable tool for solving foreign policy problems.

Therefore, Peter 1, having come to power in 1689, was faced with the need to carry out radical military reform and form a massive regular army.

The core of the military reform were two guards (formerly “amusing”) regiments: Preobrazhensky and Semenovsky. These regiments, staffed mainly by young nobles, simultaneously became a school for officers for the new army. Initially, the emphasis was placed on inviting foreign officers to Russian service. However, the behavior of foreigners in the battle of Narva in 1700, when they, led by commander-in-chief von Krui, went over to the side of the Swedes, forced them to abandon this practice. Officer positions began to be filled primarily by Russian nobles. In addition to training officers from soldiers and sergeants of the guards regiments, personnel were also trained in the bombardier school (1698), artillery schools (1701 and 1712), navigation classes (1698) and engineering schools (1709) and the Naval academy (1715). It was also practiced to send young nobles to study abroad. The rank and file was initially made up of “hunters” (volunteers) and datochny people (serfs who were taken from the landowners). By 1705, the procedure for recruiting recruits was finally established. They were recruited one from every 20 peasant and township households every 5 years or every year - one from 100 households. Thus, a new duty was established - conscription for the peasantry and townspeople. Although the upper classes of the settlement - merchants, factory owners, factory owners, as well as the children of the clergy - were exempt from conscription. After the introduction of the poll tax and the census of the male population of the tax-paying classes in 1723, the recruitment procedure was changed. Recruits began to be recruited not from the number of households, but from the number of male tax-paying souls. The armed forces were divided into a field army, which consisted of 52 infantry (including 5 grenadier) and 33 cavalry regiments, and garrison troops. The infantry and cavalry regiments included artillery.

The regular army was maintained entirely at the expense of the state, was dressed in a uniform government uniform, armed with standard government weapons (before Peter 1, the militia nobles had weapons and horses, and the archers also had their own). The artillery guns were of the same standard caliber, which greatly facilitated the supply of ammunition. After all, earlier, in the XVI - XVII centuries, the cannons were cast individually by cannon makers, who serviced them. The army was trained according to uniform Military regulations and instructions. The total number of the field army by 1725 was 130 thousand people; the garrison troops, called upon to ensure order within the country, numbered 68 thousand people. In addition, to protect the southern borders, a land militia was formed consisting of several irregular cavalry regiments with a total number of 30 thousand people. Finally, there were also irregular Cossack Ukrainian and Don regiments and national formations (Bashkir and Tatar) with a total number of 105-107 thousand people.

The military command system has changed radically. Instead of numerous orders, between which the military administration had previously been fragmented, Peter 1 established a military board and an admiralty board to lead the army and navy. Thus, military control was strictly centralized. During the Russian-Turkish War of 1768-1774. under Empress Catherine II, a Military Council was created, which exercised general leadership of the war. In 1763, the General Staff was formed as a planning body for military operations. Direct control of troops in peacetime was carried out by division commanders. In the second half of the 18th century. the Russian army had 8 divisions and 2 border districts. The total number of troops by the end of the 18th century. increased to half a million people and they were fully provided with weapons, equipment and ammunition at the expense of domestic industry (it produced 25-30 thousand guns and several hundred artillery pieces per month).

In the second half of the 18th century. the army switched to barracks housing, i.e. barracks began to be built on a massive scale, into which troops settled. After all, at the beginning of this century, only the guards regiments had barracks, and the bulk of the troops were located in the houses of ordinary people. Constant conscription was one of the most difficult for the tax-paying classes. The army, which was recruited through conscription, reflected social structure society. Soldiers, emerging from serfdom from the landowner, became serfs of the state, obligated to lifelong service, later reduced to 25 years. The officer corps was noble. Although the Russian army was feudal in nature, it was still a national army, which sharply differed from the armies of a number of Western states (Prussia, France, Austria), where the armies were staffed by mercenaries interested only in receiving payment and robbery. Before this battle, Peter 1 told his soldiers that they were fighting “not for Peter, but for the Fatherland entrusted to Peter.”

In conclusion, we can say that only under the reign of Peter I the army became a permanent unit of the state, capable of protecting the interests of the fatherland.

As you know, the great sovereign Peter Alekseevich made many changes in our country. Historians can spend hours listing the innovations of the reformer tsar; they will also note that under Peter 1 the army was formed on the basis of a set of recruits.

Peter carried out a very serious military reform, which strengthened Russian Empire and contributed to the fact that our country and its army turned out to be stronger than the conqueror Charlemagne, which kept all of Europe at that time in fear.

But first things first.

Why was there a need to carry out army reform?

When Pyotr Alekseevich was crowned king together with his brother Ivan Alekseevich, the army in Russia was as follows:

1. Regular units include Streltsy regiments, Cossack formations and foreign mercenaries.
2. Of the temporary formations in the event of a military threat - local troops, which were collected from peasants and artisans by large feudal lords.

During the turbulent 17th century, our country experienced many military upheavals; in the end, it was saved from the Time of Troubles not only by the military courage of regular units, but also by the forces

Were there any attempts to create a regular army before Peter the Great?

Peter's father, Tsar Alexei Mikhailovich, also thought about a regular army, in which there would be conscription. However, his sudden death did not allow him to carry out all his military plans, although the king tried to partially bring them to life.

His eldest son and heir was seriously ill, governing the state was difficult for him, and he died soon after the death of his father.

The sister of Peter and John - the heirs to the throne - Princess Sofya Alekseevna, who actually usurped the power of her young brothers, relied on the archers. It was through the teaching of people loyal to Sophia that she actually received royal power.

However, the archers demanded privileges from her, and Sophia did not skimp on them. About her service faithful helpers they thought little, which is why the army of the Russian state at that time was relatively weak compared to the armies of other European states.

What did Peter do?

As you know, Peter the Great’s path to power was very difficult; his sister interfered with him, wanting him dead. As a result, the young king managed to win the battle with Sophia, brutally suppressing her supporters of the Streltsy.

The young sovereign dreamed of military victories, but where could they get them in a country that actually did not have a regular army?

Peter, with his characteristic ardor, zealously got down to business.

So, under Peter 1, the army was formed on the basis of completely new principles.

The tsar began by organizing his two “amusing regiments” - Preobrazhensky and Semyonovsky - according to the European model. They were commanded by foreign mercenaries. The shelves showed themselves with the best side during the Battle of Azov, so already in 1698 the old troops were completely disbanded.

In return, the king ordered the recruitment of new military personnel. From now on, conscription was imposed on every populated area of ​​the country. It was necessary to provide a certain number of young, physically strong men for their service to the Tsar and the Fatherland.

Military transformations

As a result, they managed to recruit about 40,000 people, who were divided into 25 infantry regiments and 2 cavalry regiments. The commanders were mostly foreign officers. The soldiers were trained very strictly and according to the European model.

Peter was impatient to go into battle with his new army. However, his first military campaign ended in defeat near Narva.

But the king did not give up. Under Peter 1, the army was formed on the basis of recruitment, and this became a condition for its success. In 1705, the tsar issued an order, according to which such recruitment was to become regular.

What was this service like?

The service for the soldiers was long and hard. The service life was 25 years. Moreover, for showing courage in battle, a simple soldier could rise to the rank of officer. Peter generally did not like lazy scions from rich families, so if he noticed that some dressed-up young nobleman was evading his official duties, he did not spare him.

Particular importance was given to the military training of the noble class, which was obliged to carry military service also 25 years old. In return for this service, the nobles received land plots from the state with the peasants.

What has changed?

Despite the fact that the population reacted negatively to the heavy conscription duty, trying in every possible way to avoid it (young people were sent to monasteries, assigned to other classes, etc.), the army of Peter I grew. At the moment when the Swedish king Charles decided to defeat our country, Peter already had 32 infantry regiments, 2 regiments of guards and 4 regiments of grenadiers. In addition, there were 32 special forces. This was about 60 thousand well-trained soldiers under the command of experienced officers.

Such an army was a huge force, which ensured the Russian sovereign his military victories in the near future.

Results of Peter's reform

As a result, by his death in 1725, the king created a whole war machine, which was distinguished by its power and effectiveness in military affairs. Of course, the creation of the army by Peter 1 is a huge merit of the sovereign. In addition, the tsar created special economic institutions that provided his army with the possibility of subsistence, created regulations for service, conscription, etc.

Representatives of all classes were required to serve in this army, including the clergy (priests performed their direct functions in it).

Thus, we can say with confidence that under Peter 1 the army was formed on the basis of universal recruitment. It was a strict and strong military system, a well-coordinated social mechanism that ensured the fulfillment of its main task - protecting the country from external threats in that turbulent time.

Seeing such an army, the Western powers simply lost the desire to fight with Russia, which ensured our country’s relatively successful development in subsequent centuries. In general, the army created by Peter, in its main features, existed until 1917, when it was destroyed under the onslaught of famous revolutionary events in our country.

Preparing to form a regular army, Peter paid great attention to the creation of officer cadres. The main basis for organizing the officer corps was the command cadres of the guards and soldier regiments. In 1697-1698, the staff of the officers of the Preobrazhensky, Semenovsky, 1st and 2nd Moscow elective regiments expanded significantly.

By 1699, non-commissioned officer and officers far exceeded the standard norms: for example, in the Preobrazhensky regiment there were 120 officers, in the Semenovsky regiment - 90, while the norm was 40 officers.

At the beginning of 1696, large-scale training of officers for the infantry from among the Russian nobles began. After 2 months of training, about 300 officers were distributed between the divisions of Repnin, Weide and Golovin. Following this, nobles from other cities were summoned and apprenticed.

Schools for training non-commissioned officers were created under the Preobrazhensky and Semenovsky regiments, and an artillery training team was organized under the bombardment company.

It should be noted that mercenaries at that time were commonplace for all European armies. Therefore, in Russia, simultaneously with the training of officers from Russian nobles, the practice of recruiting foreigners into the service was practiced. At the end of the 17th century, the Foreign Order recruited about 300 such officers. However, mercenaryism has not yet taken root in the Russian army, since the low military training of foreigners quickly became apparent.

Recruiting nobles into infantry regiments and training them in infantry formation were new phenomena in the history of the Russian army, since in the 17th century nobles were enrolled in soldier regiments only for misconduct, as punishment.

Peter harshly suppressed the reluctance of the nobles to serve in the army, study and submit to a new unknown discipline. Nobles hid from service on their estates or in monasteries. Nobles who evaded service lost money and were subjected to severe punishments. On July 9, 1699, Peter personally examined those included in the lists of those unfit for military service. Those who were really sick were given their resignations, but those who malingered were beaten with a whip and exiled to Azov.

Army organizational structure

Peter I successfully carried out the transformation of the entire army. The regular army received a clear system of organization, which was enshrined in the Military Regulations of 1716. The army of the Russian State consisted of three branches of troops: Infantry, Cavalry, Artillery.

Infantry is the main branch of the military. It was divided into guards, grenadiers and line. The organization of infantry regiments was based on the organization that existed in Russia since the end of the 17th century. Then it changed depending on changes in methods of warfare.

Initially, the infantry regiment consisted of 10 fusilier (rifle) companies, organized into 2 battalions.

In 1704, as a result of the combat experience gained, 1 grenadier company was introduced into the staff of the infantry regiment, and the number of ordinary fusilier companies was reduced to 8.

In 1708, the grenadier companies were withdrawn from the line infantry regiments and consolidated into separate grenadier regiments.

According to the states of 1711, the infantry regiments consisted of 1 grenadier and 7 fusilier companies, consolidated into 2 battalions. The strength of the regiment was constant in peacetime and war: the regiment consisted of 40 officers, 80 non-commissioned officers, 1367 privates (of which 247 were non-combatants). This was the staff of both the line and grenadier regiments.

Grenadier regiments were created on the eve of the decisive Poltava battles. They had great striking power, which was determined by the fact that each grenadier was armed not only with a rifle and bayonet, but also with hand grenades, and some with hand mortars. While a regular infantry regiment was armed with 4-6 guns, a grenadier regiment had up to 12 guns. The formation of the grenadier regiments was caused by the desire to increase the striking power of the army, to avoid the weakness of the linear order, which was the result of the uniform distribution of all forces along the front. Grenadier regiments were attached to divisions and moved to the most critical sectors in battle. The grenadier regiments consisted of 8 companies, organized into 2 battalions.

The main combat unit of the infantry was the regiment. It consisted of 2 battalions. Each battalion has 4 companies. Each company has 4 plutongs (platoons). The regiment was commanded by a colonel, his deputies were a lieutenant colonel, the battalion was commanded by a major, the company by a captain, and the plutong by a corporal. The captain's assistants: captain-lieutenant (staff captain), lieutenant and ensign, he was also the standard bearer.

Cavalry. In 1699-1700, Peter I restored the regiments of regular cavalry - dragoons, which from 1702 consisted of Danish people, and from 1705 they were staffed with recruits. The entire officer and non-commissioned officer corps of the cavalry was replenished with Russian people.

More advanced techniques for using cavalry were developed.

Composition of the Russian cavalry under Peter I:

1. Fusilier Dragoons

2. Dragoon Grenadiers

3. Dragoon garrison regiments

In 1709, Peter had up to 40,000 dragoon-type cavalry, that is, capable of operating both on horseback and on foot. The Russian cavalry could act independently, in large formations of 12,000 - 15,000 sabers, making deep raids behind enemy lines.

From 1701-1702, light horse artillery also appeared in the cavalry's arsenal.

The dragoon regiment consisted of 10 companies. From 1704 to 1709, each dragoon regiment also included 1 grenadier company. Every 2 dragoon companies made up 1 squadron. According to the staff of 1711, the dragoon regiment consisted of 38 officers, 80 non-commissioned officers, 1210 privates. The dragoons were armed with a flintlock rifle without a bayonet, a broadsword and 2 pistols.

Artillery. Peter I created a coherent organizational system for artillery. Artillery was divided into regimental, field, and siege fortress (garrison) artillery.

Under Peter, an end was put to the chaotic state of the material part of the artillery and uniformity of systems was established. For this purpose, identical drawings of guns were sent to foundries.

In 1701-1702, a scale of gun calibers and names by caliber were introduced. Instead of 20 - 25 different calibers, only 8 - 3, 4, 6, 8, 12 and 24 - pound guns and half-pound and one-pound howitzers were left. Peter I demanded from artillery, along with firepower, great tactical mobility and agility. Therefore, in the artillery workshop under the leadership of the Russian artillery engineer Vasily Korchmin, great work to lighten the guns by modernizing the carriage.

New rifled guns, guns with conical chambers, and new types of incendiary cannonballs were created. In Semenovskoe, work was carried out in great secrecy to create the first samples of a light long-range mortar. It was cast by Russian foundry masters Boris Volkov and Yakim Molyarov. Russian artillerymen were the first to explore the problem of manufacturing and using rifled weapons.

In 1705-1706, due to a change in war tactics (the army moved from sieges of fortresses to field battles), the main attention was paid to the development of field and regimental artillery. Artillery, according to Peter I, must maneuver during battle without losing interaction with infantry and cavalry.

A brilliant achievement of Russian military art was the creation of horse artillery. The regimental 3-pound guns and half-pound howitzers were lightened for it. All the service personnel were put on horses. Each dragoon regiment received 2 cannons and several mortars.

An important event in the history of the Russian army was the organization of the first artillery regiment in 1701. The regiment included 4 cannon companies with 12 bombards and 92 cannons, as well as 1 sapper company - this is how the Russian engineer troops were born.

In 1702, two-wheeled charging boxes were introduced for the first time, in which prepared charges and projectiles were placed. Until 1705, guns were transported by peasants recruited before the start of a military campaign. This order of transporting guns did not provide the necessary discipline and maneuverability in battle. Therefore, Peter I introduced permanent teams for transporting guns. The civilian servants of the artillery convoy were replaced by soldiers.

What was done by Peter in Russian artillery appeared in Western European armies only in the middle of the 18th century. Such measures as the introduction of horse artillery, the separation of regimental artillery from siege and fortress artillery, lightening guns in order to increase their maneuverability, and artillery battle formations first appeared in the Russian army.

The entire combat strength of the Russian army is 170,000 people, not counting the personnel of the artillery regiment and central departments and 28,500 non-combatant soldiers. The Russian army was the largest in Europe. The Prussian army in 1740 numbered 86,000 people, the Austrian and French - about 150,000, the Swedish - 144,000.

 

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