Soviet operations

"Uranus"

The operation to defeat German troops at Stalingrad. It was assumed that the forces of the Southwestern (General N.F. Vatutin), Don (General K.K. Rokossovsky) and Stalingrad (General A.I. Eremenko) fronts would strike the Germans in converging directions with the aim of encircling them in the area between the Volga and Don and, subsequently, complete destruction. It was carried out on November 19-23, 1942 (counteroffensive near Stalingrad).

"Little Saturn"(formerly "Saturn")

The Middle Don offensive operation, carried out on December 16-30, 1942, during the counter-offensive of Soviet troops near Stalingrad by the forces of the South-Western and left flank of the Voronezh Front. Initially, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command planned the offensive operation "Saturn", but it was concluded that there were not enough forces for this operation. Therefore, the plans of the Soviet command were adjusted - the goals and scale of the operation were reduced. The adjusted plan was called “Little Saturn”. The objectives of the operation were the defeat of the enemy who had taken positions on the middle Don, as well as the subsequent attack on Rostov-on-Don, captured by German troops.

"Ring"

Soviet offensive operation carried out on January 10 - February 2, 1943. The goal was to destroy the group of German troops surrounded near Stalingrad (6th field and 4th tank German armies under the overall command of General F. Paulus). This was planned to be achieved by cutting the enemy group into two parts and eliminating them separately. On January 10, a round-the-clock offensive was launched; on January 26, I. Chistyakov’s 21st Army and V.I.’s 62nd Army marched towards each other. Chuikov united in the Mamayev Kurgan area. On January 31, 1943, the southern group (led by F. Paulus) surrendered, and on February 2, the northern group of Germans surrendered.

"Spark"

Operation by breakthrough (and not withdrawal!!! It is very important) blockade of Leningrad. It was carried out on January 12-18, 1943 by troops of the Volkhov (Army General K.A. Meretskov) and Leningrad (General L.A. Govorov) fronts. As a result, Soviet troops united in the Sinyavino area and managed to create a “corridor” 8-11 km wide.

"Kutuzov"

An offensive operation that resulted in the liberation of Orel on August 5, 1943. The Western (Colonel General V.D. Sokolovsky), Bryansk (Colonel General M.M. Popov) and Central (Army General K.K. Rokossovsky) fronts took part.

"[Commander] Rumyantsev"

The offensive operation, which resulted in the liberation of Belgorod on August 5 and Kharkov on August 23, 1943, was carried out by Stepnoy (Colonel General I.S. Konev), Voronezh (Army General N.F. Vatutin) and South-Western (Colonel General R. J. Malinovsky) fronts.

In honor of the liberation of Orel and Belgorod, on August 5, 1943, the first salute of the entire war (122 guns) was given in Moscow.

"Rail War", "Concert"

Guerrilla operations in August-September (October) 1943, with the help of which railway transportation behind enemy lines was disorganized for a long time.

"January Thunder" (Krasnoselsko-Ropshinskaya operation / Neva-2)

The offensive operation of the Soviet troops of the Leningrad Front against the 18th German Army, which was besieging Leningrad. Part of the Leningrad-Novgorod strategic operation. It was carried out from January 14 to January 30, 1944. As a result of the operation, the troops of the Leningrad Front threw the enemy back to a distance of 60-100 km. from the city, liberated Krasnoe Selo, Ropsha, Krasnogvardeisk, Pushkin, Slutsk and, in cooperation with the troops of the Volkhov Front, completely liberated Leningrad from the enemy blockade. This was announced before the final completion of the operation. January 27, 1944

"Bagration"

The offensive of Soviet troops in the summer of 1944, as a result of which not only all of Belarus, but also part of Lithuania and Poland was liberated.

German operations

"Barbarossa"(directive no. 21)

Plan for Germany's attack on the USSR. Approved by A. Hitler on December 18, 1940. Named in honor of the Holy Roman Emperor FrederickI Barbarossa ("Redbeard"), who ruled inXIIV. The plan provided for waging a “lightning war” (blitzkrieg) against the USSR in three main directions - to Leningrad (Army Group North), Moscow (Army Group Center) and Kyiv (Army Group South). In a short time, using mainly flank tank attacks, it was planned to defeat the main forces of the Red Army and reach the Arkhangelsk-Astrakhan line.

"Ost"("East")

A master plan developed before the war. Contained a program of colonization and Germanization of the territories occupied by the Reich.

"Typhoon"

German offensive operation, the purpose of which was to capture Moscow. Due to the fierce resistance of the Red Army near Smolensk, Leningrad, Kiev, Odessa, it was not carried out by the beginning of autumn, as originally planned by the German command. The offensive was launched only on September 30, 1941 by Army Group Center under the command of Field Marshal F. von Bock.

"Kremlin"

A German operation to disinform the Soviet political leadership and military command, carried out in the spring of 1942, with the goal of convincing that the main goal of the Germans during the spring-summer campaign of 1942 would still be the capture of Moscow. In fact, A. Hitler considered the strategic goal of the upcoming campaign to be a large-scale offensive in the southern direction with the goal of capturing the Lower Volga and the Caucasus.

"Winter Storm"("Winter Gewitter")

The operation to relieve the German group encircled near Stalingrad (6th Army of F. Paulus). Conducted by the commander of Army Group Don, Field Marshal E. von Manstein, on December 12-19 (20), 1942, it ended in failure. However, Manstein still managed to get a significant part of the 4th Tank Army out of encirclement and prevent the capture of Rostov-on-Don by Soviet troops in January 1943, which could have put the entire Army Group “A” operating in the Caucasus in a difficult situation.

"Citadel"

German offensive operation in the Kursk Bulge area. In February 1943, as a result of the offensive of the Soviet troops of the Voronezh Front on the Upper Don, 3 enemy armies were defeated, and the Kursk Bulge was formed, wedged deeply into German positions. The plan for Operation Citadel provided for “cutting off” the Kursk Bulge with attacks by German troops from the north (Army Group Center under Field Marshal G. von Kluge) and from the south (Army Group South under Field Marshal E. von Manstein), encircling the Soviet troops and destroy them.

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On November 19, 1942, the Red Army's counteroffensive near Stalingrad began (Operation Uranus). The Battle of Stalingrad is one of the greatest battles in the Great Patriotic War and the Second World War. The military chronicle of Russia has a huge number of examples of courage and heroism, the valor of soldiers on the battlefield and the strategic skill of Russian commanders. But even in their example, the Battle of Stalingrad stands out.

For two hundred days and nights on the banks of the great rivers Don and Volga, and then at the walls of the city on the Volga and directly in Stalingrad itself, this fierce battle continued. The battle took place over a vast area of ​​about 100 thousand square meters. km with a front length of 400 - 850 km. More than 2.1 million soldiers took part in this titanic battle on both sides at different stages of the fighting. In terms of significance, scale and ferocity of hostilities, the Battle of Stalingrad surpassed all the world battles that preceded it.

This battle includes two stages. The first stage was the Stalingrad strategic defensive operation, it lasted from July 17, 1942 to November 18, 1942. At this stage, in turn, we can distinguish: defensive operations on the distant approaches to Stalingrad from July 17 to September 12, 1942 and the defense of the city itself from September 13 to November 18, 1942. There were no long pauses or truces in the battles for the city; battles and skirmishes went on continuously. For the German army, Stalingrad became a kind of “graveyard” for their hopes and aspirations. The city crushed thousands of enemy soldiers and officers. The Germans themselves called the city “hell on earth,” “Red Verdun,” and noted that the Russians were fighting with unprecedented ferocity, fighting to the last man. On the eve of the Soviet counteroffensive, German troops launched the 4th assault on Stalingrad, or rather its ruins. On November 11, 2 tank and 5 infantry divisions were thrown into battle against the 62nd Soviet Army (by this time it consisted of 47 thousand soldiers, about 800 guns and mortars and 19 tanks). By this point, the Soviet army was already divided into three parts. A hail of fire fell on the Russian positions, they were flattened by enemy aircraft, and it seemed as if there was nothing alive there anymore. However, when the German chains went on the attack, Russian riflemen began to mow them down.

By mid-November, the German offensive had run out of steam in all major directions. The enemy was forced to decide to go on the defensive. This completed the defensive part of the Battle of Stalingrad. The Red Army troops solved the main problem by stopping the powerful advance of the Nazis in the Stalingrad direction, creating the preconditions for a retaliatory strike by the Red Army. During the defense of Stalingrad, the enemy suffered heavy losses. The German armed forces lost about 700 thousand people killed and wounded, about 1 thousand tanks and assault guns, 2 thousand guns and mortars, more than 1.4 thousand combat and transport aircraft. Instead of maneuver warfare and rapid advancement, the main enemy forces were drawn into bloody and furious urban battles. The German command's plan for the summer of 1942 was thwarted. On October 14, 1942, the German command decided to transfer the army to strategic defense along the entire Eastern Front. The troops were given the task of holding the front line; offensive operations were planned to continue only in 1943.

It must be said that the Soviet troops also suffered huge losses in personnel and equipment at this time: 644 thousand people (irrecoverable - 324 thousand people, sanitary - 320 thousand people, over 12 thousand guns and mortars, approximately 1400 tanks, more than 2 thousand aircraft.

The second period of the Battle of the Volga is the Stalingrad strategic offensive operation (November 19, 1942 - February 2, 1943). The Headquarters of the Supreme High Command and the General Staff in September-November 1942 developed a plan for the strategic counter-offensive of Soviet troops near Stalingrad. The development of the plan was led by G.K. Zhukov and A.M. Vasilevsky. On November 13, the plan, codenamed "Uranus", was approved by Headquarters under the chairmanship of Joseph Stalin. The Southwestern Front under the command of Nikolai Vatutin received the task of delivering deep blows to enemy forces from bridgeheads on the right bank of the Don from the Serafimovich and Kletskaya areas. The group of the Stalingrad Front under the command of Andrei Eremenko advanced from the Sarpinsky Lakes region. The offensive groups of both fronts were supposed to meet in the Kalach area and take the main enemy forces near Stalingrad into an encirclement ring. At the same time, the troops of these fronts created a ring of external encirclement in order to prevent the Wehrmacht from releasing the Stalingrad group with attacks from the outside. The Don Front, under the leadership of Konstantin Rokossovsky, launched two auxiliary strikes: the first from the Kletskaya area to the southeast, the second from the Kachalinsky area along the left bank of the Don to the south. In the areas of the main attacks, due to the weakening of secondary areas, a 2-2.5-fold superiority in people and a 4-5-fold superiority in artillery and tanks was created. Due to the strictest secrecy of the development of the plan and the secrecy of the concentration of troops, strategic surprise of the counteroffensive was ensured. During defensive battles, the Headquarters was able to create a significant reserve that could be thrown on the offensive. The number of troops in the Stalingrad direction was increased to 1.1 million people, about 15.5 thousand guns and mortars, 1.5 thousand tanks and self-propelled guns, 1.3 thousand aircraft. True, the weakness of this powerful group of Soviet troops was that about 60% of the troops were young recruits who had no combat experience.

The Red Army was opposed by the German 6th Field Army (Friedrich Paulus) and 4th Panzer Army (Herman Hoth), the Romanian 3rd and 4th Armies of Army Group B (commander Maximilian von Weichs), which numbered more than 1 million. soldiers, about 10.3 thousand guns and mortars, 675 tanks and assault guns, more than 1.2 thousand combat aircraft. The most combat-ready German units were concentrated directly in the Stalingrad area, participating in the assault on the city. The flanks of the group were covered by Romanian and Italian divisions, which were weaker in terms of morale and technical equipment. As a result of the concentration of the main forces and means of the army group directly in the Stalingrad area, the defensive line on the flanks did not have sufficient depth and reserves. The Soviet counter-offensive in the Stalingrad area would be a complete surprise for the Germans; the German command was confident that all the main forces of the Red Army were tied up in heavy fighting, were bleeding and did not have the strength and material means for such a large-scale attack.

On November 19, 1942, after a powerful 80-minute artillery preparation, the troops of the Southwestern and Don Fronts went on the attack. By the end of the day, the Southwestern Front units had advanced 25–35 km; they had broken the defenses of the 3rd Romanian Army in two areas: southwest of Serafimovich and in the Kletskaya area. In fact, the 3rd Romanian was defeated, and its remnants were covered from the flanks. On the Don Front the situation was more difficult: Batov’s advancing 65th Army met fierce enemy resistance, by the end of the day it had advanced only 3-5 km and was unable to break through even the enemy’s first line of defense.

On November 20, after artillery preparation, units of the Stalingrad Front went on the attack. They broke through the defenses of the 4th Romanian Army and by the end of the day they had covered 20-30 km. The German command received news of the advance of Soviet troops and the breakthrough of the front line on both flanks, but there were virtually no large reserves in Army Group B. By November 21, the Romanian armies were completely defeated, and the tank corps of the Southwestern Front were uncontrollably rushing towards Kalach. On November 22, tankers occupied Kalach. Units of the Stalingrad Front were moving towards the mobile formations of the Southwestern Front. On November 23, formations of the 26th Tank Corps of the Southwestern Front quickly reached the Sovetsky farm and linked up with units of the 4th Mechanized Corps of the Northern Fleet. The 6th field and the main forces of the 4th Tank Army were encircled: 22 divisions and 160 separate units with a total number of about 300 thousand soldiers and officers. The Germans had never experienced such a defeat during World War II. On the same day, in the area of ​​​​the village of Raspopinskaya, the enemy group capitulated - more than 27 thousand Romanian soldiers and officers surrendered. It was a real military disaster. The Germans were stunned, confused, they did not even think that such a catastrophe was possible.

On November 30, the operation of Soviet troops to encircle and block the German group in Stalingrad was generally completed. The Red Army created two encirclement rings - external and internal. The total length of the outer ring of the encirclement was about 450 km. However, Soviet troops were unable to immediately cut through the enemy group in order to complete its liquidation. One of the main reasons for this was the underestimation of the size of the encircled Stalingrad Wehrmacht group - it was assumed that it numbered 80-90 thousand people. In addition, the German command, by reducing the front line, were able to consolidate their battle formations, using the already existing positions of the Red Army for defense (their Soviet troops occupied in the summer of 1942).

After the failure of the attempt to release the Stalingrad group by Army Group Don under the command of Manstein - December 12-23, 1942, the encircled German troops were doomed. The organized “air bridge” could not solve the problem of supplying the encircled troops with food, fuel, ammunition, medicine and other means. Hunger, cold and disease decimated Paulus's soldiers. From January 10 to February 2, 1943, the Don Front conducted the offensive Operation Ring, during which the Stalingrad Wehrmacht group was eliminated. The Germans lost 140 thousand soldiers killed, and about 90 thousand more surrendered. This concluded the Battle of Stalingrad.

On November 19, 1942, Soviet troops launched Operation Uranus to encircle the Stalingrad Wehrmacht group. As a result, 300 thousand German troops ended up in the cauldron. Despite desperate attempts by Nazi troops to break out of the encirclement, they failed to do so. The Germans capitulated, more than 90 thousand soldiers and officers were taken prisoner, including the commander of the 6th Army, Field Marshal Friedrich Paulus. At Stalingrad, Nazi Germany suffered a crushing defeat. This battle changed the course of World War II. Read about how the Red Army managed to achieve strategic success in the material from RT.

• Nazi prisoners on the streets of Stalingrad
• RIA News

“People were just falling from the sky. They fell to the ground from above and again found themselves in the Stalingrad hell,” 94-year-old Hans-Erdmann Schönbeck, who was surrounded by the Red Army at the end of 1942, told Der Spiegel. A former Wehrmacht soldier recalled how his fellow soldiers tried to climb aboard a plane flying away from the battlefield.

German soldiers and officers called the battle for Stalingrad hell on Earth and the Red Verdun (meaning the unsuccessful offensive of the Kaiser's troops on the French positions in 1916 ). The Nazi soldiers, who had not known serious defeats, were amazed at the capabilities demonstrated by the Workers 'and Peasants' Red Army (RKKA).

Soviet troops defeated the invaders during Operation Uranus. Marshal Alexander Vasilevsky in his book “The Work of a Whole Life” argued that the code names for all strategic operations of the Red Army were personally invented by the People’s Commissar of Defense Joseph Stalin.

The counteroffensive began on November 19, 1942 with successful attacks on Romanian positions located on the flanks of the Stalingrad group. On November 23, 1942, the most combat-ready German units fell into the Red Army cauldron, and on February 2, 1943, the commander of the 6th Army, Field Marshal Friedrich Paulus, capitulated.

• The commander of the 6th Army of the Wehrmacht, Field Marshal Friedrich Paulus, captured by Soviet troops
• RIA News
• Georgy Lipskerov

"No step back!"

The Battle of Stalingrad began on July 17, 1942 after Wehrmacht troops crossed the Chir River. The 6th Army of General Friedrich Paulus was supposed to cover the left flank of the Nazi troops operating in the North Caucasus from counterattacks. The capture of Stalingrad as an important transport hub was intended to ensure German success in the south of the USSR.

Having lost industrially rich Ukraine, in the summer of 1942 the Soviet Union found itself in a difficult situation. On July 28, 1942, Joseph Stalin signed the famous order No. 227, which prohibited even forced retreat and was popularly called “Not a Step Back.”

Initially, in the Stalingrad direction, the Wehrmacht concentrated 14 divisions numbering about 270 thousand people from Army Group B. Subsequently, the group for the capture of Stalingrad was increased to 1 million.

In the second half of July, about 160 thousand Soviet troops resisted the Nazis. The Red Army was inferior to the enemy troops in tanks, artillery and aircraft. As a result of the regrouping in November, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command (SHC) increased the number of troops in the Stalingrad area to 800 thousand people.

Thus, before the start of Operation Uranus, the Red Army was unable to concentrate forces superior to the enemy on the front, the length of which was up to 850 km. Moscow was still under threat of attack, and the Supreme Command decided not to risk a massive transfer of troops from Central Russia.

• Joseph Stalin
• globallookpress.com

In conditions of a lack of human and material resources, non-standard actions were required to defeat the Wehrmacht at Stalingrad. According to the Russian Ministry of Defense, one of the main keys to the success of Uran was brilliantly conducted reconnaissance operations to disinformation the Nazi command.

Red herring

Back in March 1942, Headquarters were aware that Hitler had given his generals the task of occupying the southern part of the USSR, masking preparations for the next attack on Moscow. At the same time, the Soviet leadership realized that the Wehrmacht had enough forces to launch an attack on the capital if the positions of the Red Army in Central Russia weakened.

Also on topic

On the eve of the celebration of the 75th anniversary of the victory of the Red Army in the Battle of Stalingrad, the Russian Ministry of Defense declassified archival materials...

As General Sergei Shtemenko recalled, in the summer of 1942, “the Soviet command did not have the opportunity to ensure decisive action to defeat the advancing enemy group in a short time.”

The reason for the lack of reserves, as the Russian Ministry of Defense explains, was not only the need to defend Moscow, but also the frequent offensive operations initiated by Stalin.

The situation at Stalingrad was largely saved by Soviet intelligence. In 1942, the Abwehr (German military intelligence and counterintelligence agency) received a lot of disinformation information of an operational-strategic nature. The headquarters sought to hide from the Nazis the fact of the concentration of Red Army units in the Stalingrad area.

For this purpose, a diversionary operation called “Mars” was carried out. Soviet intelligence officers had to convince the German generals that the Red Army under the command of Georgy Zhukov would launch a large-scale counteroffensive in the Rzhev area (200 km west of Moscow), and not near Stalingrad.

According to the Russian Ministry of Defense, if the disinformation activities had not achieved their goal, Operation Uranus could have ended in failure. A Nazi victory in the Battle of Stalingrad would have led to Turkey and Japan entering the war against the USSR and the inevitable defeat of the Soviet Union.

Intelligence officers and analysts of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces knew that the Germans were monitoring Zhukov’s movements. Its appearance on certain sectors of the front was interpreted as a sign of intensified actions of the Red Army. The famous commander skillfully fulfilled his assigned role, and this helped to confuse the Nazi command.

“Zhukov was appointed by Stalin to manage the Central Front in order to mislead the Germans about the real plans of the USSR,” explained Mikhail Myagkov, chairman of the scientific council of the Russian Military Historical Society (RVIO), in a conversation with RT. “The Wehrmacht knew about the authority of Marshal Zhukov and, of course, had to assume that since such a strong commander was placed at the head of the Central Front, it meant that the main forces of the Red Army would be located there.”

• Army General Georgy Konstantinovich Zhukov (left)
• RIA News
• Peter Bernstein

The operation near Rzhev under the leadership of Zhukov really began in the second half of November 1942. However, it was not as large-scale as the Abwehr expected, and pursued the same strategic plan as Uranus.

The fact that the Headquarters managed to outwit the Germans is evidenced by the erroneous forecasts of the Wehrmacht commanders. In particular, the head of the “Foreign Armies of the East” department of the General Staff of the German Ground Forces, Reinhard Gehlen, was confident that the Red Army would deliver the main blow in the fall to the 9th Army of the “Center” group, which was located just near Rzhev.

“On the German Eastern Front it is becoming more and more convincingly confirmed that the point of application of the main efforts of the upcoming operation is in the sector of Army Group Center.<…>The enemy’s preparations for the offensive in the south are not being carried out so intensively as to believe that a major operation in the south in the near future will begin simultaneously with the expected offensive against Army Group Center, Gehlen reported on November 6, 1942.

The head of intelligence of the 9th Army, Colonel Georg Buntrock, reported in a report received by the headquarters of Army Group Center: “The enemy is preparing for a major offensive against the 9th Army, intending to strike from the eastern and western sides of the (Rzhevsky) trapezoid...”

Buntrock believed that the Red Army was going to “encircle the troops located in it (the trapezoid), destroy the 9th Army, break through the front line, eliminate Army Group Center and consolidate the victory with a triumphant advance to Smolensk and taking it by storm.”

Classified "Uranus"

In a conversation with RT, Mikhail Myagkov noted that the Soviet command made every effort to classify Operation Uranus. According to the expert, the cost of defeating the Red Army at Stalingrad was too high. The Soviet army had to deliver a powerful and completely unexpected blow.

“A radio silence regime was introduced, troop movements were carried out at night, documents about the start of the counteroffensive were written by hand, and not dictated by the drivers. It was also decided to make a diversionary maneuver in the form of an offensive operation on the Central Front. The Wehrmacht was misinformed about the Red Army’s offensive plans and did not expect a serious blow on the Southern Front,” said Myagkov.

The expert believes that the Headquarters came to the right conclusion, deciding that it was at Stalingrad that a radical turning point in the war with Germany would be made. Success directly on the battlefields of the Red Army was achieved thanks to the improvement of the military training system. The German group was surrounded by trained and well-armed soldiers.

“The experience gained by the Soviet army during two years of war also played a role, and, importantly, the army learned to interact between different branches and types of troops,” Myagkov explained.

According to the expert, due to the fact that the Soviet army held back the enemy’s onslaught for quite a long time, the rear was significantly strengthened, the production of weapons was established, and new formations were formed.

• Soviet soldiers storm a house in Stalingrad, February 1943
• RIA News
• Georgy Zelma

“Enough forces were accumulated for a decisive counter-offensive, when Soviet soldiers and officers, remembering the shed blood of their comrades, broke the enemy and reached from Stalingrad to Berlin itself. The bet of the Soviet leadership turned out to be correct, and victory on the southern front really brought success in the war as a whole,” Myagkov concluded.

The Great Patriotic War and the Second World War. And it began with a successful Red Army offensive, codenamed “Uranus”.

Prerequisites

The Soviet counteroffensive at Stalingrad began in November 1942, but the preparation of the plan for this operation at the High Command Headquarters began in September. In the fall, the German march to the Volga faltered. For both sides, Stalingrad was important both in a strategic and propaganda sense. This city was named after the head of the Soviet state. Stalin once led the defense of Tsaritsyn against the Whites during the Civil War. Losing this city, from the point of view of Soviet ideology, was unthinkable. In addition, if the Germans had established control over the lower Volga, they would have been able to stop the supply of food, fuel and other important resources.

For all the above reasons, the counteroffensive at Stalingrad was planned with particular care. The situation at the front was favorable to the process. The parties switched to trench warfare for some time. Finally, on November 13, 1942, the counteroffensive plan, codenamed “Uranus,” was signed by Stalin and approved at Headquarters.

Original plan

How did the Soviet leaders want to see the counteroffensive at Stalingrad? According to the plan, the Southwestern Front, under the leadership of Nikolai Vatutin, was to strike in the area of ​​​​the small town of Serafimovich, occupied by the Germans in the summer. This group was ordered to break through at least 120 kilometers. Another shock formation was the Stalingrad Front. The Sarpinsky lakes were chosen as the place of his attack. Having traveled 100 kilometers, the front armies were supposed to meet the Southwestern Front near Kalach-Sovetsky. Thus, the German divisions located in Stalingrad would be surrounded.

It was planned that the counteroffensive at Stalingrad would be supported by auxiliary attacks from the Don Front in the area of ​​Kachalinskaya and Kletskaya. Headquarters tried to determine the most vulnerable parts of the enemy formations. In the end, the strategy of the operation began to consist in the fact that the Red Army’s strikes were delivered to the rear and flank of the most combat-ready and dangerous formations. It was there that they were least protected. Thanks to good organization, Operation Uranus remained a secret for the Germans until the day it began. The surprise and coordination of the actions of the Soviet units played into their hands.

Enemy encirclement

As planned, the Soviet counteroffensive at Stalingrad began on November 19. It was preceded by a powerful artillery barrage. Before dawn, the weather changed sharply, which made adjustments to the command’s plans. Thick fog did not allow aircraft to take off, as visibility was extremely low. Therefore, the main emphasis was placed on artillery preparation.

The first to come under attack was the 3rd Romanian Army, whose defenses were broken through by Soviet troops. The Germans were in the rear of this formation. They tried to stop the Red Army, but failed. The defeat of the enemy was completed by the 1st Tank Corps under the leadership of Vasily Butkov and the 26th Tank Corps by Alexei Rodin. These units, having completed their task, began to advance towards Kalach.

The next day, the offensive of the divisions of the Stalingrad Front began. During the first 24 hours, these units advanced 9 kilometers, breaking through enemy defenses on the southern approaches to the city. After two days of fighting, three German infantry divisions were defeated. The success of the Red Army shocked and embarrassed Hitler. The Wehrmacht decided that the blow could be smoothed out by regrouping forces. In the end, after considering several options, the Germans transferred two more tank divisions, previously operating in the North Caucasus, to Stalingrad. Paulus, until the very day when the final encirclement took place, continued to send victorious reports to his homeland. He stubbornly repeated that he would not leave the Volga and would not allow his 6th Army to be blockaded.

On November 21, the 4th and 26th Southwestern Fronts reached the village of Manoilin. Here they made an unexpected maneuver, turning sharply to the east. Now these units were moving straight to the Don and Kalach. The advance of the Red Army tried to delay the 24th Wehrmacht, but all its attempts led to nothing. At this time, the command post of Paulus's 6th Army was urgently relocated to the village of Nizhnechirskaya, for fear of being caught by an attack by Soviet soldiers.

Operation Uranus once again demonstrated the heroism of the Red Army. For example, the advance detachment of the 26th Tank Corps in tanks and vehicles crossed the bridge across the Don near Kalach. The Germans turned out to be too careless - they decided that a friendly unit equipped with captured Soviet equipment was moving towards them. Taking advantage of this connivance, the Red Army soldiers destroyed the relaxed guards and took up a perimeter defense, awaiting the arrival of the main forces. The detachment held its position despite numerous enemy counterattacks. Finally, the 19th Tank Brigade broke through to it. These two formations jointly ensured the crossing of the main Soviet forces rushing to cross the Don in the Kalach area. For this feat, commanders Georgy Filippov and Nikolai Filippenko were deservedly awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.

On November 23, Soviet units took control of Kalach, where 1,500 soldiers of the enemy army were captured. This meant the actual encirclement of the Germans and their allies who remained in Stalingrad and between the Volga and Don rivers. Operation Uranus was successful in its first stage. Now 330 thousand people who served in the Wehrmacht had to break through the Soviet ring. Under the circumstances, the commander of the 6th Panzer Army, Paulus, asked Hitler for permission to break through to the southeast. The Fuhrer refused. Instead, the Wehrmacht forces, which were located near Stalingrad but were not encircled, were united into the new Army Group Don. This formation was supposed to help Paulus break through the encirclement and hold the city. The trapped Germans had no choice but to wait for outside help from their compatriots.

Unclear Prospects

Although the start of the Soviet counteroffensive at Stalingrad led to the encirclement of a significant part of the German forces, this undoubted success did not at all mean that the operation was over. The Red Army soldiers continued attacks on enemy positions. The Wehrmacht group was extremely large, so Headquarters hoped to break through the defenses and divide it into at least two parts. However, due to the fact that the front had noticeably narrowed, the concentration of enemy forces became significantly higher. The Soviet counteroffensive near Stalingrad slowed down.

Meanwhile, the Wehrmacht prepared a plan for Operation Wintergewitter (which translates as “Winter Storm”). Its goal was to ensure the elimination of the encirclement of the 6th Army under the leadership of the Blockade. Army Group Don was supposed to break through. The planning and execution of Operation Wintergewitter was entrusted to Field Marshal Erich von Manstein. The main striking force of the Germans this time was the 4th Panzer Army under the command of Hermann Hoth.

"Wintergewitter"

At turning points of the war, the scales tip first to one side or the other, and until the last moment it is completely unclear who will be the winner. This was the case on the banks of the Volga at the end of 1942. The beginning of the counteroffensive of Soviet troops near Stalingrad remained with the Red Army. However, on December 12, the Germans tried to take the initiative into their own hands. On this day, Manstein and Goth began to implement the Wintergewitter plan.

Due to the fact that the Germans delivered their main attack from the area of ​​​​the village of Kotelnikovo, this operation was also called Kotelnikovskaya. The blow was unexpected. The Red Army understood that the Wehrmacht would try to break the blockade from the outside, but an attack from Kotelnikovo was one of the least considered options for developing the situation. The first on the path of the Germans, trying to come to the rescue of their comrades, was the 302nd Infantry Division. She was completely distracted and disorganized. So Hoth managed to create a gap in the positions occupied by the 51st Army.

On December 13, the 6th Panzer Division of the Wehrmacht attacked positions occupied by the 234th Tank Regiment, which was supported by the 235th Separate Tank Brigade and the 20th Anti-Tank Artillery Brigade. These formations were commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Mikhail Diasamidze. Also nearby was the 4th mechanized corps of Vasily Volsky. Soviet groups were located near the village of Verkhne-Kumskoye. The fighting of Soviet troops and Wehrmacht units for control over it lasted six days.

The confrontation, which went on with varying success on both sides, almost ended on December 19. The German group was reinforced with fresh units coming from the rear. This event forced the Soviet commanders to retreat to the Myshkova River. However, this five-day delay in the operation also played into the hands of the Red Army. While the soldiers were fighting for every street in Verkhne-Kumskoye, the 2nd Guards Army was brought into this area nearby.

Critical moment

On December 20, the army of Hoth and Paulus was separated by only 40 kilometers. However, the Germans, trying to break the blockade, had already lost half of their personnel. The advance slowed and eventually stopped. Goth's powers are gone. Now, to break through the Soviet ring, the help of the encircled Germans was needed. The plan for Operation Wintergewitter in theory included an additional plan, Donnerschlag. It consisted in the fact that the blocked 6th Army of Paulus had to go to meet the comrades who were trying to break the blockade.

However, this idea was never realized. It was all about the same order from Hitler “never leave the fortress of Stalingrad.” If Paulus had broken through the ring and united with Goth, he would, of course, have left the city behind him. The Fuhrer considered this turn of events a complete defeat and disgrace. His ban was ultimatum. Surely, if Paulus had fought his way through the Soviet ranks, he would have been tried in his homeland as a traitor. He understood this well and did not take the initiative at the most crucial moment.

Manstein's retreat

Meanwhile, on the left flank of the attack by the Germans and their allies, Soviet troops were able to resist powerfully. The Italian and Romanian divisions fighting on this section of the front retreated without permission. The flight took on an avalanche-like character. People left their positions without looking back. Now the path to Kamensk-Shakhtinsky on the banks of the Northern Donets River was open for the Red Army. However, the main task of the Soviet units was occupied Rostov. In addition, strategically important airfields in Tatsinskaya and Morozovsk, which were necessary for the Wehrmacht for the rapid transfer of food and other resources, became exposed.

In this regard, on December 23, the commander of the operation, Manstein, gave the order to retreat in order to protect the communications infrastructure located in the rear. The 2nd Guards Army of Rodion Malinovsky took advantage of the enemy’s maneuver. The German flanks were stretched and vulnerable. On December 24, Soviet troops re-entered Verkhne-Kumsky. On the same day, the Stalingrad Front went on the offensive towards Kotelnikovo. Hoth and Paulus were never able to connect and provide a corridor for the retreat of the encircled Germans. Operation Wintergewitter was suspended.

Completion of Operation Uranus

On January 8, 1943, when the situation of the surrounded Germans finally became hopeless, the command of the Red Army presented an ultimatum to the enemy. Paulus had to capitulate. However, he refused to do this, following the orders of Hitler, for whom failure at Stalingrad would have been a terrible blow. When Headquarters learned that Paulus insisted on his own, the Red Army offensive resumed with even greater force.

On January 10, the Don Front began the final liquidation of the enemy. According to various estimates at that time, about 250 thousand Germans were trapped. The Soviet counteroffensive at Stalingrad had been going on for two months, and now a final push was needed to complete it. On January 26, the encircled Wehrmacht group was divided into two parts. The southern half was in the center of Stalingrad, the northern half was in the area of ​​the Barrikady plant and the tractor plant. On January 31, Paulus and his subordinates surrendered. On February 2, the resistance of the last German detachment was broken. On this day, the counteroffensive of Soviet troops near Stalingrad ended. The date, in addition, became the final one for the entire battle on the banks of the Volga.

Results

What were the reasons for the success of the Soviet counteroffensive at Stalingrad? By the end of 1942, the Wehrmacht ran out of fresh manpower. There was simply no one left to throw into battle in the east. The remaining strength was exhausted. Stalingrad became the extreme point of the German offensive. In the former Tsaritsyn it choked.

The key to the entire battle was the beginning of the counteroffensive at Stalingrad. The Red Army, through several fronts, was able to first encircle and then eliminate the enemy. 32 enemy divisions and 3 brigades were destroyed. In total, the Germans and their Axis allies lost about 800 thousand people. The Soviet numbers were also colossal. The Red Army lost 485 thousand people, of which 155 thousand were killed.

During the two and a half months of encirclement, the Germans did not make a single attempt to break out of the encirclement from the inside. They expected help from the “mainland,” but the lifting of the blockade by Army Group Don outside failed. Nevertheless, in the time given, the Nazis established an air evacuation system, with the help of which about 50 thousand soldiers (mostly the wounded) escaped from the encirclement. Those who remained inside the ring either died or were captured.

The plan for the counteroffensive at Stalingrad was successfully carried out. The Red Army turned the tide of the war. After this success, the gradual process of liberating the territory of the Soviet Union from Nazi occupation began. In general, the Battle of Stalingrad, for which the counter-offensive of the Soviet armed forces was the final chord, turned out to be one of the largest and bloodiest battles in human history. The fighting in the burned, bombed and ravaged ruins was further complicated by the winter weather. Many defenders of their homeland died from the cold climate and the diseases it caused. Nevertheless, the city (and after it the entire Soviet Union) was saved. The name of the counteroffensive at Stalingrad - "Uranus" - is forever inscribed in military history.

Reasons for the defeat of the Wehrmacht

Much later, after the end of World War II, Manstein published memoirs, in which he described in detail his attitude towards the Battle of Stalingrad and the Soviet counter-offensive under it. He blamed Hitler for the death of the encircled 6th Army. The Fuhrer did not want to surrender Stalingrad and thus cast a shadow on his reputation. Because of this, the Germans first found themselves in a cauldron, and then completely surrounded.

The armed forces of the Third Reich had other complications. Transport aviation was clearly not enough to provide the surrounded divisions with the necessary ammunition, fuel and food. The air corridor was never fully used. In addition, Manstein mentioned that Paulus refused to break through the Soviet ring towards Hoth precisely because of a lack of fuel and fear of suffering a final defeat, while also disobeying the Fuhrer’s order.

The Great Patriotic War

Counteroffensive at Stalingrad

Meeting of the Military Council of the Stalingrad Front: from left to right - N.S. Khrushchev, A.I. Kirichenko, Secretary of the Stalingrad Regional Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) A.S. Chuyanov. and front commander Colonel General Eremenko A.I. Stalingrad. 1942

For Nazi Germany, the end of 1942, despite the seizure of large territories, was characterized by a deterioration in the economic, political and military situation. The military situation of Nazi Germany worsened due to the failure of strategic plans for the summer campaign of 1942. During the defensive operations, all enemy plans to defeat the Red Army and capture the Caucasus with its oil sources were thwarted. The offensive capabilities of the German armed forces on the Soviet-German front were exhausted. The strike forces were weakened. The front of the advancing armies turned out to be stretched, there were no large operational reserves.

By the beginning of the counteroffensive near Stalingrad, in the zone from Upper Mamon to Astrakhan, our troops were opposed by an enemy group, which included: the 6th field and 4th tank armies of the fascist German army, the 8th army of fascist Italy, the 3rd and 4th Army, 6th Army and 4th Cavalry Corps of Royal Romania. The enemy troops consisted of more than a million people (of which 660 thousand people were in combat units), about 700 tanks, 10,300 guns and mortars of all calibers (including field guns - up to 5 thousand, anti-tank guns - 2.5 thousand, mortars of caliber 81 mm and above - 2.7 thousand) and more than 1,200 aircraft. Although the enemy troops suffered heavy losses in previous battles, they still retained the ability to resist stubbornly. The main enemy forces occupied a tactical defense. There were only 6 divisions in the operational reserve. The vast majority of Nazi divisions were drawn into the fight for Stalingrad. The weakest areas of defense were on the flanks of the enemy’s Stalingrad group. The Romanian troops defended here, which were weaker armed and trained, and the majority of their personnel did not share the aggressive aspirations of both the Nazi ruling clique and their sold-out fascist and pro-fascist rulers.

Red Army soldiers are fighting among the ruins of a destroyed workshop in Stalingrad. November 1942

By the second half of November 1942, Soviet troops near Stalingrad were united into three fronts: Southwestern, Don, Stalingrad. In total, at the beginning of the counteroffensive, the fronts had ten combined arms, one tank and four air armies. Our troops did not have a significant overall superiority in forces and means. In terms of the number of people, the forces were almost equal: we had 1 million 70 thousand fighters, in the enemy troops - 1 million 11 thousand people. In tanks and artillery, the superiority of the Red Army was insignificant and amounted to 1.3: 1, and in terms of the number of aircraft we were somewhat inferior to the enemy. In the directions of the main attacks, our command was able to create a significant superiority of forces and means. In the counteroffensive at Stalingrad, Soviet troops had to solve a difficult problem. Its difficulty was explained primarily by the relatively unfavorable balance of forces. Therefore, the fronts and armies experienced great difficulty in creating strike groups; the fronts were not able to allocate a sufficient number of forces to their reserves, and the creation of second echelons in them turned out to be completely impossible. However, it should be noted that the situation at the beginning of the counteroffensive near Stalingrad was incomparably more favorable than at the beginning of the counteroffensive near Moscow. A powerful means of developing operational success appeared on the fronts in the form of tank and mechanized corps.

The goal of the counteroffensive at Stalingrad was to defeat the enemy’s main strategic grouping, wrest the initiative from the enemy’s hands and begin a radical change in the course of the Great Patriotic War and the entire Second World War in favor of the Soviet Union and all progressive forces of the world. In accordance with this goal, according to the plan of the Supreme High Command, the troops of the Southwestern, Don and Stalingrad fronts were supposed to break through the enemy’s defenses in a number of sectors and, developing an attack in converging directions towards Kalach - Sovetsky, encircle and destroy the main enemy group near Stalingrad. The following tasks were assigned to the fronts: Southwestern Front under the command of Lieutenant General N.F. Vatutina was supposed to deliver the main blow with the left wing, defeat the formations of the 3rd Romanian Army, and develop an offensive towards Kalach-Sovetsky.

Soviet mechanized unit during the offensive at Stalingrad. November 1942

The counteroffensive began on November 19, 1942 with attacks from the Southwestern and Don Fronts. The next day, the troops of the Stalingrad Front began hostilities. The Southwestern Front, with the forces of the 5th Tank and 21st armies, went on the offensive at 8:50 a.m. after 80 minutes of artillery preparation. In three hours of battle, the rifle divisions captured the first position of the main defense line. After that, from 13 to 14 hours, the 1st and 36th tank corps of the 5th tank army and the 4th tank corps of the 21st army were introduced into reflection. The tank corps quickly completed the breakthrough of the enemy's main defense line and rushed into the operational depth. Following the tank corps, the 6th and 3rd Guards Cavalry Corps entered the breakthrough. By the end of the day, the troops of the shock group of the Southwestern Front advanced with rifle divisions to a distance of 10–19 km, and tank corps – to 18–35 km. Having completed the breakthrough of the enemy’s defenses, the troops of all three fronts continued to develop the offensive in operational depth, tank and mechanized corps advanced with great success, sometimes advancing a distance of up to 60–70 km in a day. This was how the enemy was surrounded.

Along with the creation of the internal encirclement front, significant forces of the Southwestern and Stalingrad fronts were put forward to organize the external front: part of the forces of the 1st Guards Army, as well as the 6th Cavalry Corps and rifle divisions of the 5th Tank Army, reached the Chir River. The 4th Cavalry Corps and the bulk of the rifle divisions of the 51st Army advanced to the line of the Aksai River. Subsequently, a fierce struggle by our troops unfolded to eliminate the encircled enemy and strengthen the position on the external front.

Thus, as a result of the combat operations of our troops at the first stage of the operation, the enemy’s defenses were broken through, the encirclement of his main forces was completed, and favorable conditions were created for their subsequent destruction. A 273,000-strong group of Nazi troops found themselves surrounded. In addition, during the fighting, the 3rd Army of Royal Romania, consisting of fifteen divisions, was defeated, of which four divisions were captured in the Raspopinskaya area. The formations of the 6th Army and 4th Cavalry Corps of the 4th Romanian Army also suffered major defeats south of Stalingrad. In December 1942, Soviet troops repelled an attempt by the German command to release the Stalingrad group with the help of units of the Goth army group.

Red Army soldiers with an accordion celebrate victory in the Battle of Stalingrad on the Square of Fallen Fighters in liberated Stalingrad. January1943

The liquidation of the encircled enemy group was entrusted to the troops of the Don Front (commander - Lieutenant General K.K. Rokossovsky). The front consisted of seven combined arms armies; the air offensive was supported by the forces of the air army. According to the plan of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, in this operation, called “Ring”, the troops of the Don Front were supposed to deliver the main blow from west to east, given that in the western part of the ledge there were enemy troops who suffered the greatest losses, and their defense was less prepared . The main blow was delivered by the forces of the 65th Army (commander - Lieutenant General P.I. Batov) and the 21st Army (commander - Major General I.M. Chistyakov). The 57th and 64th armies attacked from the south in the direction of Voroponovo station. The 24th, 66th and 62nd armies attacked Gorodishche from the north and from the Stalingrad area. The delivery of these strikes was supposed to lead to the dismemberment of the encircled enemy group and its destruction in parts.

To avoid unnecessary bloodshed, the commander of the Don Front, Colonel General K.K. Rokossovsky and the representative of the Headquarters, Colonel General of Artillery N.N. On January 8, 1943, Voronov presented an ultimatum to the commander of the encircled troops, Field Marshal Paulus. This ultimatum was humane, preserved life and did not humiliate the dignity of those surrounded. However, it was not accepted. Then, on January 10, 1943, Soviet troops launched a decisive offensive. Overcoming fierce enemy resistance, the troops of the 21st Army on January 26 in the area west of Mamayev Kurgan united with the troops of the 62nd Army. The encircled enemy troops were pressed to the Volga and cut into two parts. On January 31, the southern strike force was captured along with Field Marshal Paulus and his headquarters. On February 2, after a strong artillery fire strike, the northern group also laid down its arms. During Operation Ring alone, 91 thousand people were captured, incl. 2,500 officers and 24 generals.

The great historical battle of Stalingrad ended in complete victory for the Soviet armed forces. The victory in the Battle of Stalingrad laid the foundation for a radical change in the Great Patriotic War.

Gabriel Tsobekhia