The 13th century Mongol army was a terrible instrument of war. It was, without a doubt, the best military organization in the world during this period. It consisted mainly of cavalry, accompanied by engineering troops. Historically, the Mongol army and military art followed the ancient military traditions of the steppe nomads. Under Genghis Khan, the Mongols brought ancient stereotypes to perfection. Their strategy and tactics were the culmination of the development of the cavalry armies of the steppe peoples - the best ever known.

In ancient times, the Iranians boasted the strongest cavalry in the world: the Parthias and Sassanids in Iran, as well as the Alans in the Eurasian steppes. The Iranians made a distinction between heavy cavalry, armed with sword and spear as their main weapons, and light cavalry, armed with bow and arrow. The Alans mainly depended on heavy cavalry. Their example was followed by the East German tribes associated with them - the Goths and Vandals. The Huns, who invaded Europe in the 5th century, were primarily a nation of archers. Due to the superiority of the Alan and Hun cavalry, the mighty Roman Empire found itself helpless when faced with the gradual onslaught of the steppe peoples. After the settlement of the Germans and Alans in the western part of the Roman Empire and the formation of the German states, the example of the Alan cavalry was followed by medieval knights. On the other hand, the Mongols developed and perfected Hunnic equipment and devices. But Alan traditions also played an important role in Mongol military art, as the Mongols used heavy cavalry in addition to light cavalry.

When assessing the Mongol military organization, the following aspects should be considered: 1. people and horses; 2. weapons and equipment; 3. training; 4. organization of the army; 5. strategy and tactics.

1. People and horses.“Horse culture” is the main feature of the life of the steppe nomads and the basis of their armies. Ancient authors who describe the lifestyle of the Scythians, Alans and Huns, as well as medieval travelers who dealt with the Mongols, present essentially the same picture of nomadic society. Any nomad is a born cavalryman; boys begin to ride horses in early childhood; every young man is an ideal rider. What is true of the Alans and Huns is also true of the Mongols. In addition, the Mongols were stronger. This was partly explained by the remoteness of their country and the very insignificant, during this period, softening influence of more cultured peoples; partly due to a more severe climate than in Turkestan, Iran and Southern Rus', where the Iranians lived.

In addition to this, every steppe Mongol or Turk is a born intelligence officer. During nomadic life, visual acuity and visual memory regarding every detail of the landscape develop in highest degree. As Erendzhen Khara-Davan notes, even in our time “ a Mongol or Kyrgyz notices a person trying to hide behind a bush, at a distance of five or six miles from the place where he is. It is able to detect the smoke of a fire in a parking lot or the steam of boiling water from afar. At sunrise, when the air is transparent, he is able to distinguish the figures of people and animals at a distance of twenty-five miles" Thanks to their powers of observation, the Mongols, like all true nomads, have a deep knowledge of climatic and seasonal conditions, water resources and vegetation of steppe countries.

The Mongols - at least those who lived in the 13th century - were endowed with amazing endurance. They could remain in the saddle for many days in a row with a minimum of food.

The Mongolian horse was a valuable companion for the rider. He could cover long distances with short breaks and subsist on tufts of grass and leaves he found along the way. The Mongol took good care of his horse. During the campaign, the rider changed from one to four horses, riding each in turn. The Mongolian horse belonged to a breed known to the Chinese since ancient times. In the second century BC. both the Chinese and the Huns became acquainted with the breed of Central Asian horses used by the Iranians. The Chinese highly valued these horses, and the Chinese envoy to Central Asia told the emperor that the best horses were sires of “heavenly stallions.” Many Central Asian horses were imported to China and, presumably, also to Mongolia. Mongolian horses of the 13th century were apparently hybrids. The Mongols attached special importance not only to the breed, but also to the color of horses. Whites were considered sacred. Each division of the imperial guard used horses of a special color; the warriors of the bagatur detachment, for example, rode black horses. This sheds light on Batu’s order to the population of the Ryazan principality at the beginning of the Russian campaign to give the Mongols a tenth of “the whole.” A tenth of the horses were to be selected separately for each color: black, tan, bay and piebald were mentioned.194

2. Weapons and equipment. The bow and arrow were the standard weapon of the Mongol light cavalry. Each archer usually carried two bows and two quivers. The Mongolian bow was very wide and belonged to a complex type; it required at least one hundred and sixty-six pounds of draw weight, which was more than an English longbow; its striking distance ranged from 200 to 300 steps.

The heavy cavalry warriors were armed with a saber and a spear, and in addition - a battle ax or mace and a lasso. Their defensive weapons consisted of a helmet (originally made of leather, and later of iron) and a leather cuirass or chain mail. The horses were also protected by leather headplates and armor that protected the upper torso and chest. The saddle was made durable and suitable for long-distance riding. Strong stirrups provided good support for the rider holding the bow.

During winter campaigns, the Mongols wore fur hats and fur coats, felt socks and heavy leather boots. After conquering China, they wore silk underwear year-round. Each Mongol warrior had with him a supply of dried meat and milk, a leather jug ​​for water or kumiss, a set for sharpening arrows, an awl, a needle and thread.

Before Genghis Khan, the Mongols did not have artillery. They became acquainted with siege mechanisms in China and met them again in Central Asia. The mechanisms used by the Mongols were mainly of the Near Eastern type and had a range of 400 meters. Those that threw blocks or stones at a high trajectory worked with a heavy counterweight (like trebuchets in the West). Devices for throwing spears (ballistae) were much more accurate.

3. Training. Preparation for camp life began for any Mongol in early childhood. Each boy or girl had to adapt to the seasonal migration of the clan, tending its herds. Horseback riding was considered not a luxury, but a necessity. Hunting was an additional activity that, if the herd was lost, could become necessary for survival. Every Mongolian boy began to learn to hold a bow and arrow in his hands at the age of three.

Hunting was also considered an excellent training school for adult warriors, as we know from the hunting statute included in the Great Yasa. Yasa's rules regarding large hunting make it clear that this activity played the role of army maneuvers.

« Anyone who must fight must be trained in the use of weapons. He must be familiar with stalking in order to know how hunters approach the game, how they maintain order, how they surround the game depending on the number of hunters. When they begin the chase, they must first send scouts to get information. When (the Mongols) are not engaged in war, they must indulge in hunting and train their army to do so. The goal is not persecution as such, but the training of warriors who must gain strength and become proficient in handling the bow and other exercises"(Juvaini, section 4).

The beginning of winter was defined as the big hunting season. Orders were previously sent to the troops attached to the headquarters of the Great Khan, and to the horde or to the camps of the princes. Each army unit was required to provide a certain number of men for the expedition. The hunters deployed like an army - with a center, right and left flanks, each of which was under the command of a specially appointed leader. Then the imperial caravan - the Great Khan himself with his wives, concubines and food supplies - headed towards the main hunting theater. Around the vast territory designated for hunting, which covered thousands of square kilometers, a roundup circle was formed, which gradually narrowed over a period of one to three months, driving the game to the center where the Great Khan awaited. Special envoys reported to the khan on the progress of the operation, the availability and number of game. If the circle was not properly guarded and any game disappeared, the commanding officers - thousanders, centurions and foremen were personally responsible for this and were subjected to severe punishment. Finally, the circle closed, and the center was cordoned off with ropes around a ten-kilometer circumference. Then the khan rode into the inner circle, which by this time was full of various stunned, howling animals, and began shooting; he was followed by the princes, and then the ordinary warriors, each rank firing in turn. The massacre continued for several days. Finally, a group of old men approached the khan and humbly begged him to grant life to the remaining game. When this was accomplished, the surviving animals were released from the circle in the direction of the nearest water and grass; the dead were collected and counted. Each hunter, according to custom, received his share.

4. Organization of the army. The two main features of Genghis Khan's military system - the imperial guard and the decimal system of army organization - have already been discussed by us. A few additional points need to be made. The Guard, or horde troops, existed before Genghis Khan in the camps of many nomadic rulers, including the Khitans. However, never before has it been so closely integrated with the army as a whole as it happened under Genghis Khan.

Additionally, each member of the imperial family who was given an allotment had his own guard troops. It should be remembered that a certain number of yurts or families were associated with the horde of each member of the imperial family who was the owner of the plot. From the population of these yurts, any khatun or any prince had permission to recruit troops. These horde troops were under the command of a military commander (noyon), appointed by the emperor as manager of the allotment, or by the prince himself in the case when he occupied high position in the army. Presumably, a unit of such troops, depending on its size, was considered a battalion or squadron of one of the “thousands” of regular service troops, especially when the prince himself had the rank of thousand and himself commanded this thousand.

In conventional army troops, smaller units (tens and hundreds) usually corresponded to clans or groups of clans. A thousand-strong unit could be a combination of clans or a small tribe. In most cases, however, Genghis Khan created every thousand unit from warriors belonging to various clans and tribes. Ten-thousandth connection ( Tumen) almost always consisted of various social units. Perhaps this, at least in part, was the result of the conscious policy of Genghis Khan, who tried to make large army units loyal to the empire rather than to the old clans and tribes. In accordance with this policy, the leaders of large formations - thousanders and temniks - were appointed personally by the emperor, and Genghis Khan’s principle was the promotion of every talented individual, regardless of social origin.

Soon, however, a new trend became apparent. The head of a thousand or ten thousand, if he had a capable son, could try to transfer his position to him. Similar examples were frequent among the commanders of the horde troops, especially when the commander was a prince. There are known cases of transfer of office from father to son. However, such an action required the personal approval of the emperor, which was not always given.

The Mongolian armed forces were divided into three groups - the center, the right and the left. Since the Mongols always pitched their tents facing south, the left hand signified the eastern group and the right hand the western group. Special officers ( yurtchi) were appointed to plan the disposition of troops, the direction of movement of armies during campaigns and the location of camps. They were also responsible for the activities of intelligence officers and spies. The position of chief yurtchi can be compared to the position of chief quartermaster in modern armies. Cherbi had commissariat services as their duty.

During the reign of Genghis Khan, the entire military organization was under constant supervision and inspection by the emperor himself, and the Great Yasa recommended this to future emperors.

« He ordered his heirs to personally check the troops and their weapons before the battle, supply the troops with everything necessary for the campaign and observe everything, down to the needle and thread, and if any warrior did not have the necessary thing, then he was to be punished"(Makrizi, section 18).

The Mongol army was united from top to bottom by iron discipline, to which both officers and ordinary soldiers obeyed. The head of each unit was responsible for all his subordinates, and if he himself made a mistake, then his punishment was even more severe. Discipline and training of troops and a line system of organization kept the Mongol army in constant readiness for mobilization in the event of war. And the imperial guard - the heart of the army - was in a state of readiness even in peacetime.

5. Strategy and tactics. Before the start of a major campaign, a kurultai met to discuss the plans and goals of the war. It was attended by the heads of all major army formations, they received necessary instructions from the emperor. Scouts and spies arriving from the country chosen as the target of attack were questioned, and if the information was insufficient, then new scouts were sent to collect additional information. Then the territory where the army was to concentrate before the march was determined, and the pastures along the roads along which the troops would march.

Much attention was paid to propaganda and psychological treatment of the enemy. Long before the troops reached the enemy country, secret agents stationed there tried to convince religious dissenters that the Mongols would establish religious toleration; the poor, that the Mongols will help them in the fight against the rich; rich merchants that the Mongols would make the roads safer for trade. Everyone was promised peace and safety if they surrendered without a fight, and terrible punishment if they resisted.

The army entered enemy territory in several columns, carrying out operations at some distance from each other. Each column consisted of five parts: the center, the right and left hands, the rear guard and the vanguard. Communication between the columns was maintained through messengers or smoke signals. When an army advanced, an observation contingent was posted at every major enemy fortress, while mobile units hurried forward to engage the enemy field army.

The main goal of the Mongol strategy was to encircle and destroy the main enemy army. They tried to achieve this goal - and usually succeeded - using the big hunt tactic - the ring. Initially, the Mongols surrounded a large territory, then gradually narrowed and compacted the ring. The ability of the commanders of individual columns to coordinate their actions was amazing. In many cases, they gathered forces to achieve the main goal with the precision of a clockwork mechanism. Subedai's operations in Hungary can be considered a classic example of this method. If the Mongols, when confronted with the main enemy army, were not strong enough to break through its lines, they pretended to retreat; in most cases, the enemy took this for a disorderly flight and rushed forward in pursuit. Then, taking advantage of their maneuvering skills, the Mongols suddenly turned back and closed the ring. A typical example of this strategy was the Battle of Liegnitz. At the Battle of the River Sit, the Russians were surrounded before they could mount any serious counterattack.

The Mongol light cavalry was the first to enter the battle. She wore down the enemy with constant attacks and retreats, and her archers hit the enemy ranks from a distance. The movements of the cavalry in all these maneuvers were directed by their commanders with the help of pennants, and at night lanterns of various colors were used. When the enemy was sufficiently weakened and demoralized, heavy cavalry was rushed into battle against the center or flank. The shock of her attack usually broke resistance. But the Mongols did not consider their task completed, even after winning the decisive battle. One of the principles of Genghis Khan's strategy was to pursue the remnants of the enemy army until its final destruction. Since one or two tumens in this case were quite enough to completely stop the enemy’s organized resistance, other Mongol troops were divided into small detachments and began to systematically plunder the country.

It should be noted that since their first Central Asian campaign the Mongols had acquired quite effective technique siege and final assault on fortified cities. If a long siege was expected, a wooden wall was erected around the city at some distance from the city in order to prevent supplies from outside and cut off the garrison from communication with the local army outside the city territory. Then, with the help of prisoners or recruited local residents, the ditch around the city wall was filled with fascines, stones, earth and whatever was at hand; siege mechanisms were brought into a state of readiness to bombard the city with stones, containers filled with resin and spears; Ram installations were pulled close to the gate. Eventually, in addition to the engineering corps, the Mongols began to use infantry troops in siege operations. They were recruited from residents of foreign countries that had previously been conquered by the Mongols.

The high mobility of the army, as well as the endurance and frugality of the soldiers, greatly simplified the task of the Mongol quartermaster service during campaigns. Each column was followed by a camel caravan with the minimum necessary. Basically, the army was expected to live off the conquered land. It can be said that in every major campaign the Mongol army had a potential base of necessary supplies in front rather than in its rearguard. This explains the fact that, according to Mongol strategy, the capture of large enemy territories was also considered a profitable operation, even if the armies were small. As the Mongols advanced, their army grew by using the population of the conquered country. Urban artisans were recruited for service in engineering troops or for the manufacture of weapons and tools; peasants had to supply labor for the siege of fortresses and the movement of carts. Turkic and other nomadic or semi-nomadic tribes, previously subordinate to hostile rulers, were accepted into the Mongol brotherhood in arms. From them, regular army units were formed under the command of Mongol officers. As a result, more often than not the Mongol army was numerically stronger at the end than on the eve of the campaign. In this regard, it can be mentioned that by the time of the death of Genghis Khan, the Mongol army itself consisted of 129,000 fighters. Its numbers have probably never been greater. Only by recruiting troops from the countries they conquered could the Mongols subjugate and control such vast territories. The resources of each country were, in turn, used to conquer the next.

The first European to fully understand the dark significance of the organization Mongol army and gave its description was the monk John of Plano Carpini. Marco Polo described the army and its operations during the reign of Kublai Kublai. In modern times, until recently, it attracted the attention of not many scientists. The German military historian Hans Delbrück completely ignored the Mongols in his History of the Art of War. As far as I know, the first military historian who tried - long before Delbrück - to adequately assess the courage and ingenuity of the Mongol strategy and tactics was the Russian Lieutenant General M.I. Ivanin. In 1839 - 40 Ivanin took part in Russian military operations against the Khiva Khanate, which resulted in defeat. This campaign was waged against the semi-nomadic Uzbeks of Central Asia, i.e. against a background reminiscent of Genghis Khan's Central Asian campaign, which stimulated Ivanin's interest in the history of the Mongols. His essay “On the Military Art of the Mongols and Central Asian Peoples” was published in 1846. In 1854, Ivanin was appointed Russian commissar responsible for relations with the internal Kyrgyz horde and thus had the opportunity to collect more information about the Turkic tribes of Central Asia. Later he returned to his historical studies; in 1875, after his death, a revised and expanded edition of the book he wrote was published. Ivanin's work was recommended as a textbook for students of the Imperial Military Academy.

Only after the First World War did Western military historians turn their attention to the Mongols. In 1922, an article by Henri Morel appeared on the Mongol campaign of the 13th century. in the French Military Review. Five years later Captain B.H. Liddell Hart dedicated the first chapter of his book “Great Military Leaders Unvarnished” to Genghis Khan and Subedei. At the same time, a study of the “period of the great campaigns of the Mongols” was recommended by the head of the British General Staff to the officers of the mechanized brigade. During 1932 and 1933 squadron chief K.K. Volker published a series of articles about Genghis Khan in the Canadian Defense Quarterly. In revised form, they were later published in the form of a monograph entitled “Genghis Khan” (1939). In Germany, Alfred Pawlikowski-Cholewa published a study on the military organization and tactics of Central Asian horsemen in an appendix to the Deutsche Kavaleri Zeitung (1937) and another on Eastern armies in general in Beitrag zur Geschichte des Naen und Fernen Osten ( 1940) William A. Mitchell, in his Essays on World Military History, which appeared in the United States in 1940, devoted as much space to Genghis Khan as to Alexander the Great and Caesar. So, paradoxically, interest in Mongolian tactics and strategy was revived during the era of tanks and aircraft. "Isn't it Is there a lesson here for modern armies? » – asks Colonel Liddell Hart. From his point of view, " the armored vehicle or light tank looks like a direct successor to the Mongolian horseman.... Further, the aircraft seem to have the same properties to an even greater extent, and maybe in the future they will be the heirs of the Mongolian horsemen" The role of tanks and airplanes in World War II revealed that Liddell Hart's predictions were at least partially correct. The Mongol principle of mobility and aggressive force still seems to be correct, despite all the differences between the world of nomads and modern world technological revolution.

During Tatar-Mongol invasion Two medieval concepts of warfare collided. Relatively speaking, European and Asian. The first is focused on close combat, when the outcome of the battle is decided in hand-to-hand combat. Naturally, the battle was fought using the entire range of close combat weapons. Throwing weapons and ranged combat were auxiliary. The second concept, on the contrary, focused on remote combat. The enemy was exhausted and exhausted by continuous shelling, after which it collapsed in hand-to-hand combat. The main thing here was maneuverable distance combat. The Mongol army of the era of conquest brought this tactic to perfection.

Many people like to compare the Mongolian bow with the ancient Russian one. Proving that Old Russian was no worse than Mongolian or, on the contrary, inferior to it in everything. From a constructive point of view, the main difference between the Old Russian bow was the absence of horn pads. This, all other things being equal, made it less powerful. Subsequently, under Mongolian influence, the design of the Russian bow underwent changes, and these linings were added to it. They were called valances. However, the advantage of the Mongolian bow was not overwhelming. The Old Russian bow was also complex, made from two types of wood, tendons and bone. I lost, but not much.

The main bladed melee weapon of the Mongol warriors was the saber. Mongolian sabers included the sabers of conquered peoples, so it is difficult to single out any specific type of saber and call it Mongolian. In general, Mongol sabers had a slight bend (like all sabers of that time), could have a guard in the form of a crosshair or in the form of a disk. The length was about a meter.

Along with sabers, broadswords, swords and combat knives were widely used.
The Mongols used battle axes, maces and six-feathers as short polearm melee weapons.Like bladed weapons, polearms had a wide variety of designs.

Long polearms were represented by spears and palm trees. The spear tips could be elongated triangular, rhombic, laurel-leaf or peak-shaped. Often the tip had a hook to pull the enemy off the horse. The palm was a spear with a long knife-like tip.

A wide strip of steppes and deserts from the Gobi to the Sahara runs across Asia and Africa, separating the territories of European civilization from China and India, the centers of Asian culture. On these steppes, the unique economic life of the nomads has been partially preserved to this day.
This steppe expanse, with a huge scale of operational lines, with original forms of labor, leaves an original Asian imprint on.
The most typical representatives of the Asian method of warfare were the Mongols in the 13th century, when they were united by one of the greatest conquerors - Genghis Khan.

The Mongols were typical nomads; the only work they knew was that of a watchman, a shepherd of countless herds that moved across the Asian expanse from north to south and back, depending on the seasons. The nomad’s wealth is all with him, all in reality: it is mainly cattle and small valuable movables/silver, carpets, silks collected in his yurt.

There are no walls, fortifications, doors, fences or locks that would protect the nomad from attack. Protection, and even then only relative, is provided by the wide horizon and deserted surroundings. If peasants, due to the bulkiness of the products of their labor and the impossibility of concealing them, always gravitate toward firm power, which alone can create sufficiently secure conditions for their labor, then nomads, whose entire property can so easily change its owner, are a particularly favorable element for despotic rule. forms of concentration of power.

General military service, which appears as a necessity at high economic development state, is the same necessity at the infant stages of labor organization. Nomadic people, in which everyone capable of bearing arms would not be ready to immediately defend his herd with arms in hand, could not exist. Genghis Khan, in order to have a fighter in every adult Mongol, even forbade the Mongols to take other Mongols as servants.

These nomads, natural horsemen, brought up in admiration of the authority of the leader, very skilled in small wars, with general military service included in their morals, represented excellent material for creating, during the Middle Ages, an army superior in number and discipline. This superiority became obvious when brilliant organizers - Genghis Khan or Tamerlane - were at the head.

Technology and organization.

Just as Mohammed managed to weld urban merchants and Bedouins of the desert into one whole in Islam, so the great organizers of the Mongols knew how to combine the natural qualities of a nomadic shepherd with everything that the urban culture of that time could give to the art of war.
The onslaught of the Arabs threw many cultural elements into the interior of Asia. These elements, as well as everything that Chinese science and technology could provide, were introduced by Genghis Khan to the Mongol art of war.

There were Chinese scientists on Genghis Khan's staff; Writing was imposed on the people and the army. The patronage that Genghis Khan provided to trade reached a level that testifies, if not to the importance of the bourgeois urban element in this era, then to a clear desire for development and the creation of such.
Genghis Khan paid great attention to the creation of safe trade routes, distributed special military detachments along them, organized stage hotels at each crossing, and established a post office; issues of justice and a vigorous fight against robbers were in the first place. When cities were captured, craftsmen and artists were removed from the general slaughter and moved to newly created centers.

The army was organized according to the decimal system. Particular attention was paid to the selection of managers. The authority of the chief was supported by such measures as a separate tent for the commander of a dozen, an increase in his salary 10 times that of an ordinary soldier, the creation at his disposal of a reserve of horses and weapons for his subordinates; in the event of a rebellion against an appointed superior - not even a Roman decimation, but the total destruction of the rebels.

Strict discipline made it possible to demand, in necessary cases, the execution of extensive fortification works. Near the enemy, the army strengthened its bivouac for the night. The guard service was organized excellently and was based on the detachment of guard cavalry detachments, sometimes several hundred miles ahead, and on frequent patrols, day and night, of all surrounding areas.

Siege art of the Mongol armies

Siege art shows that at the time of their heyday the Mongols were in a completely different relationship with technology than later, when Crimean Tatars They felt powerless against any wooden Moscow prison and were afraid of the “fiery battle.”

Fachines, tunnels, underground passages, filling up ditches, creating gentle slopes on strong walls, earthen bags, greek fire, bridges, the construction of dams, floods, the use of battering machines, gunpowder for explosions - all this was well known to the Mongols.

During the siege of Chernigov, the Russian chronicler notes with surprise that the Mongol catapults threw stones weighing over 10 pounds over several hundred steps. European artillery achieved such a battering effect only at the beginning of the 16th century. And these stones were delivered from somewhere far away.
During operations in Hungary, we encounter a battery of 7 catapults among the Mongols, which worked in maneuver warfare, when forcing a river crossing. Many strong cities in Central Asia and Russia, which, according to medieval concepts, could only be taken by famine, were taken by the Mongols by storm after 5 days of siege work.

Mongol strategy.

Great tactical superiority makes war easy and profitable. Alexander the Great dealt the final blow to the Persians mainly using the means that the conquest of the rich Asia Minor coast gave him.

The father conquered Spain to obtain funds to fight Rome. Julius Caesar, capturing Gaul, said - war must feed war; and, indeed, the wealth of Gaul not only allowed him to conquer this country without burdening the budget of Rome, but also created for him the material basis for the subsequent civil war.

This view of war as a profitable business, as an expansion of the base, as an accumulation of forces in Asia was already the basis of the strategy. A Chinese medieval writer points out that the main feature that determines good commander, the ability to maintain an army at the expense of the enemy.
While European strategic thought, in the person of Bülow and Clausewitz, based on the need to overcome resistance, from the great defensive capacity of its neighbors, came to the idea of ​​a basis that feeds the war from the rear, of the culminating point, the limit of any offensive, of the weakening force of the scope of the offensive, Asian strategy I saw an element of strength in the spatial duration of the offensive.

The more the attacker advanced in Asia, the more herds and all kinds of movable wealth he captured; with low defensive capability, the losses of the attacker from the resistance encountered were less than the increase in the strength of the attacking army from the local elements drawn in and co-opted by it. The military elements of the neighbors were half destroyed, and half were placed in the ranks of the attacker and quickly assimilated into the existing situation.

The Asian offensive was an avalanche of snow, growing with every step of the movement.” In the army of Batu, the grandson of Genghis Khan, who conquered Rus' in the 13th century, the percentage of Mongols was negligible—probably no more than five; the percentage of fighters from the tribes conquered by Genghis ten years before the invasion probably did not exceed thirty. About two-thirds represented Turkic tribes, which were immediately invaded east of the Volga and carried with them the debris. In the same way, in the future, Russian squads formed a noticeable part of the Golden Horde militia.

The Asian strategy, given the enormous scale of distances, in the era of the dominance of predominantly pack transport, was unable to organize proper transportation from the rear; The idea of ​​​​transferring bases to areas that lay ahead, only fragmentarily flickering in the European strategy, was fundamental to Genghis Khan.
The base ahead can only be created through the political disintegration of the enemy; the widespread use of means located behind the enemy’s front is possible only if we find like-minded people in his rear. Hence the Asian strategy required a far-sighted and cunning policy; all means were good to ensure military success.

The war was preceded by extensive political intelligence; they did not skimp on bribes or promises; all possibilities of pitting some dynastic interests against others, some groups against others, were used. Apparently, a major campaign was undertaken only when there was a conviction that there were deep cracks in the neighbor’s state body.

The need to satisfy the army with a small supply of food that could be taken with them, and mainly with local funds, left a certain imprint on the Mongol strategy. The Mongols could only feed their horses pasture. The poorer the latter was, the faster and on a wider front it was necessary to strive to absorb space.
All the profound knowledge possessed by the nomads about the times of the year when, under different latitudes, the grass reaches its greatest nutritional value, about the relative wealth of grass and water in different directions, must have been used by the Mongol strategy to make possible these movements of the masses, which undoubtedly included over one hundred thousand horses. Other stops in operations were directly dictated by the need to exercise the bodies of the weakened horse train after passing through a hungry area.

The concentration of forces for a short time on the battlefield was impossible if the point of contact was located in an area poor in resources. Reconnaissance of local resources was mandatory before each campaign. Overcoming space in large masses, even within one's own boundaries, required careful preparation. It was necessary to advance forward detachments that would guard the pasture in the intended direction and drive away the nomads who were not taking part in the campaign.

Tamerlane, planning an invasion of China from the west, 8 years before the campaign, prepared a stage for himself on the border with it, in the city of Ashir: several thousand families with 40 thousand horses were sent there; arable land was expanded, the city was fortified and vast food reserves began to be collected. During the campaign itself, Tamerlane sent sowing grain for the army; the harvest on the fields cultivated for the first time in the rear was supposed to facilitate the army’s return from the campaign.

The tactics of the Mongols are very similar to the tactics of the Arabs. The same development of throwing combat, the same desire to divide the battle formation into separate parts, to conduct combat from the depths.
In large battles there is a clear division into three lines; but each line was also divided, and thus Tamerlane’s theoretical requirement - to have 9 echelons in depth - may not be far from practice.

On the battlefield, the Mongols sought to encircle the enemy in order to give a decisive advantage to throwing weapons. This encirclement was easily obtained from a wide marching movement; the width of the latter allowed the Mongols to spread exaggerated rumors about the size of the advancing army.

The Mongol cavalry was divided into heavy and light. Light-horse fighters were called Cossacks. The latter fought very successfully on foot. Tamerlane also had infantry; infantrymen were among the best paid soldiers and played a significant role in sieges, as well as in fighting in mountainous areas. When crossing vast spaces, the infantry was temporarily mounted on horses.

Source - Svechin A.A. The evolution of the art of war, vol.1. M.-L., 1927, p. 141-148

The nomadic horsemen of Mongolia, through successive conquests beginning in the twelfth century and continuing over several generations, created the world's largest land empire. During these conquests, the Mongols fought most of the world powers of medieval Asia and Europe and were victorious in most cases. Their empire was built entirely on military victories achieved by an army unlike any other in the world. Most opponents considered them invincible. Their advance on Europe was stopped only by the death of the ruling dynasty. Potential contenders for the throne went home with their troops and never returned.

Mongol army

The Mongols were nomadic shepherds and hunters who spent their lives riding on steppe horses. WITH early childhood They learned to ride in the saddle and use weapons, especially compound bows. Every healthy man under 60 years of age was required to take part in hunting and war. The armies of the united Mongol tribes consisted of the entire adult male population.

They fought under a strict code of discipline. All production was collective. Leaving a comrade in battle was punishable by death. This discipline, along with skillful leadership, well-organized intelligence collection and organization, transformed the Mongol troops from a mass of horsemen into a real army.

The Mongol army was organized according to the decimal system, with units of ten, one hundred, one thousand and ten thousand men. The number of men in the units probably rarely approached the actual numbers due to casualties and attrition. A unit of ten thousand men was a major fighting unit, like a modern division, capable of supporting a fight on its own. Individual soldiers were identified primarily with the thousand-man unit of which they were part, the equivalent of a modern regiment. The true Mongol tribes fielded their own Thousands. The vanquished, such as the Tatars and Merkits, were separated and distributed among other units so that they could not pose an organized threat to the ruling dynasty.

Genghis Khan created a personal guard unit of ten thousand people. This unit was recruited throughout the tribe, and it was a high honor to be included in it. At the beginning of its existence, it was a form of holding noble hostages. Then it became members of the household and the source of the ruling class of the growing empire.

At first, Mongol soldiers received no pay other than spoils of war. Promotions were based on merit. When the rate of conquest slowed, a new payment system was introduced. Later, officers were given the opportunity to transfer their posts by inheritance.

Each soldier went on a campaign with approximately five horses, which allowed for their rapid replacement and rapid advancement. Until the advent of mechanized armies in the twentieth century, no army had moved as fast as the Mongol army.

The Mongols fought primarily as light cavalry archers (without armor), using compound bows. It was a compact weapon with impressive range and penetration. They hired Chinese and Middle Easterners as siege engineers. Infantry, garrison troops and heavy cavalry (in armor) with spears came from the armies of conquered peoples.

Mongol tactics

The Mongol armies relied on small arms, the ability to move quickly, and a reputation for ruthlessness that preceded them. All of their opponents moved much slower and more deliberately. The Mongols sought to divide the enemy forces and crush their units with massive archery. They sought to encircle the enemy and achieve local superiority in numbers. They injured the horses, and the horses threw off their riders, making them more vulnerable.

The Mongol light cavalry could not withstand the rapid advance of the heavy cavalry, so they feigned flight, drawing the knights into grueling charges that left them vulnerable. The fleeing Mongols quickly turned back and turned into pursuers. They excelled in ambushes and surprise attacks. Mongol commanders made extensive use of scouts and synchronized troop movements to catch the enemy at a disadvantage.

The Mongols also made extensive use of intimidation tactics. If the population of one city was killed after being taken, it became very likely that the next city would surrender without a fight. This is proven by the fact that when the Mongol armies approached, the cities surrendered one after another.

Tactics and strategy of the Mongol army during the reign of Genghis Khan

Marco Polo, who lived for many years in Mongolia and China under Kublai Khan, gives the following assessment of the Mongol army: “The armament of the Mongols is excellent: bows and arrows, shields and swords; they are the best archers of all nations.” Riders who grew up riding horses from an early age. They are amazingly disciplined and persistent warriors in battle, and in contrast to the discipline created by fear, which in some eras dominated European standing armies, for them it is based on a religious understanding of the subordination of power and on tribal life. The endurance of the Mongol and his horse is amazing. During the campaign, their troops could move for months without transporting food supplies and fodder. For the horse - pasture; he doesn’t know oats or stables. An advance detachment of two to three hundred strength, preceding the army at a distance of two marches, and the same side detachments performed the tasks of not only guarding the enemy’s march and reconnaissance, but also economic reconnaissance - they let them know where the best food and watering places were.

Nomadic pastoralists are generally distinguished by their deep knowledge of nature: where and at what time the grass reaches great wealth and greater nutritional value, where the water pools are better, at which stages it is necessary to stock up on provisions and for how long, etc.

The collection of this practical information was the responsibility of special intelligence, and without it it was considered unthinkable to begin an operation. In addition, special detachments were deployed whose task was to protect feeding areas from nomads not taking part in the war.

The troops, unless strategic considerations prevented this, lingered in places where there was plenty of food and water, and forced a forced march through areas where these conditions were not available. Each mounted warrior led from one to four clockwork horses, so he could change horses during a campaign, which significantly increased the length of the transitions and reduced the need for halts and days. Under this condition, marching movements lasting 10-13 days without days were considered normal, and the speed of movement of the Mongol troops was amazing. During the Hungarian campaign of 1241, Subutai once walked 435 miles with his army in less than three days.

The role of artillery in the Mongol army was played by the then extremely imperfect throwing weapons. Before the Chinese campaign (1211-1215), the number of such vehicles in the army was insignificant and they were of the most primitive design, which, by the way, put it in a rather helpless position in relation to the fortified cities encountered during the offensive. The experience of the mentioned campaign brought major improvements to this matter, and in the Central Asian campaign we already see in the Mongolian army an auxiliary Jin division serving a variety of heavy combat vehicles, which were used mainly during sieges, including flamethrowers. The latter threw various flammable substances into the besieged cities, such as burning oil, the so-called “Greek fire”, etc. There are some hints that during the Central Asian campaign the Mongols used gunpowder. The latter, as is known, was invented in China much earlier than its appearance in Europe, but it was used by the Chinese mainly for pyrotechnic purposes. The Mongols could have borrowed gunpowder from the Chinese and also brought it to Europe, but if this was the case, then it apparently did not have to play a special role as a weapon of war, since in fact firearms neither the Chinese nor the Mongols had it. As a source of energy, gunpowder was used mainly in rockets, which were used during sieges. The cannon was undoubtedly an independent European invention. As for gunpowder itself, the assumption expressed by G. Lam that it might not have been “invented” in Europe, but brought there by the Mongols, does not seem incredible.”

During sieges, the Mongols used not only the artillery of that time, but also resorted to fortification and mine art in their primitive form. They knew how to produce floods, made tunnels, underground passages, etc.

The war was usually conducted by the Mongols according to the following system:

1. A kurultai was convened, at which the issue of the upcoming war and its plan was discussed. There they decided everything that was necessary to form an army, how many soldiers to take from each ten tents, etc., and also determined the place and time for the collection of troops.

2. Spies were sent to the enemy country and “tongues” were obtained.

3. Military operations usually began in early spring (depending on the state of pasture, and sometimes depending on climatic conditions) and autumn, when horses and camels good body. Before the opening of hostilities, Genghis Khan gathered all the senior commanders to listen to his instructions.

The supreme command was exercised by the emperor himself. The invasion of the enemy's country was carried out by several armies in different directions. From the commanders receiving such a separate command, Genghis Khan demanded to present a plan of action, which he discussed and usually approved, only in rare cases introducing his own amendments to it. After this, the performer is given complete freedom of action within the limits of the task given to him in close connection with the headquarters of the supreme leader. The emperor was personally present only during the first operations. As soon as he was convinced that the matter was well established, he provided the young leaders with all the glory of brilliant triumphs on the battlefields and within the walls of conquered fortresses and capitals.

4. When approaching significant fortified cities, private armies left an observation corps to monitor them. Supplies were collected in the surrounding area and, if necessary, a temporary base was set up. Usually the main forces continued the offensive, and the observation corps, equipped with machines, began to invest and siege.

5. When a meeting in the field with an enemy army was foreseen, the Mongols usually adhered to one of the following two methods: either they tried to attack the enemy by surprise, quickly concentrating the forces of several armies to the battlefield, or, if the enemy turned out to be vigilant and surprise could not be counted on, they directed their forces in such a way as to achieve a bypass of one of the enemy flanks. This maneuver was called "tulugma". But, alien to the template, the Mongol leaders, in addition to the two indicated methods, also used various other operational techniques. For example, a feigned flight was carried out, and the army with great skill covered its tracks, disappearing from the eyes of the enemy until he fragmented his forces and weakened security measures. Then the Mongols mounted fresh clockwork horses and made a quick raid, appearing as if from underground before the stunned enemy. In this way, the Russian princes were defeated in 1223 on the Kalka River. It happened that during such a demonstrative flight, the Mongol troops dispersed so as to envelop the enemy from different sides. If it turned out that the enemy was staying focused and prepared to fight back, they released him from the encirclement in order to later attack him on the march. In this way, in 1220, one of the armies of Khorezmshah Muhammad, which the Mongols deliberately released from Bukhara, was destroyed.

Prof. V.L. Kotvich, in his lecture on the history of Mongolia, notes the following military “tradition” of the Mongols: to pursue a defeated enemy until complete destruction. This rule, which formed a tradition among the Mongols, is one of the indisputable principles of modern military art; but in those distant times this principle was not used at all in Europe universal recognition. For example, the knights of the Middle Ages considered it beneath their dignity to chase after an enemy who had cleared the battlefield, and many centuries later, in the era of Louis XVI and the five-step system, the winner was ready to build a “golden bridge” for the vanquished to retreat. From everything that has been said above about the tactical and operational art of the Mongols, it is clear that among the most important advantages of the Mongol army, which ensured its victory over others, its amazing maneuverability should be noted.

In its manifestation on the battlefield, this ability was the result of the excellent individual training of the Mongol horsemen and the preparation of entire units of troops for rapid movements and evolutions with skillful application to the terrain, as well as the corresponding dressage and equestrian strength; in the theater of war, the same ability was an expression, first of all, of the energy and activity of the Mongol command, and then of such organization and training of the army, which achieved unprecedented speed in carrying out marches and maneuvers and almost complete independence from the rear and supply. It can be said without exaggeration about the Mongol army that during campaigns it had a “base with it.” She went to war with a small and unwieldy, mostly pack, train of camels, and sometimes drove herds of cattle with her. Further provisions were based solely on local funds; If funds for food could not be collected from the population, they were obtained through round-ups. Mongolia of that time, economically poor and sparsely populated, would never have been able to withstand the stress of continuous great wars of Genghis Khan and his heirs if the country had fed and supplied its army. The Mongol, who cultivated his belligerence on animal hunting, also looks at war partly as hunting. A hunter who returns without prey, and a warrior who demands food and supplies from home during a war, would be considered “women” in the Mongols’ minds.

To be able to rely on local resources, it was often necessary to conduct an offensive on a broad front; This requirement was one of the reasons (regardless of strategic considerations) why the private armies of the Mongols usually invaded an enemy country not in a concentrated mass, but separately. The danger of being defeated piecemeal in this technique was compensated by the speed of maneuvering of individual groups, the ability of the Mongols to evade battle when it was not part of their calculations, as well as the excellent organization of reconnaissance and communications, which was one of the characteristic features of the Mongol army. Under this condition, she could, without great risk, be guided by the strategic principle, which was later formulated by Moltke in the aphorism: “To move apart, to fight together.”

In the same way, i.e. With the help of local means, the advancing army could meet its needs for clothing and means of transportation. The weapons of that time were also easily repaired through local resources. The heavy “artillery” was carried by the army, partly in disassembled form; there were probably spare parts for it, but if there were a shortage of such, of course, there was no difficulty in making them from local materials by our own carpenters and blacksmiths. Artillery “shells,” the production and delivery of which is one of the most difficult tasks of supplying modern armies, were available locally at that time in the form of ready-made millstone stones, etc. or could have been extracted from associated quarries; in the absence of both, stone shells were replaced with wooden logs from plant tree trunks; to increase their weight they were soaked in water. During the Central Asian campaign, the bombardment of the city of Khorezm was carried out in this primitive way.

Of course, one of the important features that ensured the ability of the Mongol army to do without communications was the extreme endurance of men and horses, their habit of the most severe hardships, as well as the iron discipline that reigned in the army. Under these conditions, large detachments passed through waterless deserts and crossed the highest mountain ranges, which were considered impassable by other peoples. With great skill, the Mongols also overcame serious water obstacles; crossings of large and deep rivers were made by swimming: property was stored on reed rafts tied to the tails of horses, people used waterskins (sheep's stomachs inflated with air) to cross. This ability to not be embarrassed by natural adaptations gave Mongol warriors the reputation of some kind of supernatural, devilish creatures to whom the standards applied to other people are inapplicable.

The papal envoy to the Mongol court, Plano Carpini, apparently not devoid of observation and military knowledge, notes that the victories of the Mongols cannot be attributed to their physical development, in respect of which they are inferior to the Europeans, and the large number of the Mongol people, who, on the contrary, quite few in number. Their victories depend solely on their superior tactics, which are recommended to Europeans as a model worthy of imitation. “Our armies,” he writes, “should be governed on the model of the Tatars (Mongols) on the basis of the same such harsh military laws.

The army should in no way be fought in one mass, but in separate detachments. Scouts must be sent in all directions. Our generals must keep their troops day and night in combat readiness, since the Tatars are always vigilant like devils." Next, Carpini will teach various tips of a special nature, recommending Mongolian methods and skills. All the military principles of Genghis Khan, says one of the modern researchers, were new not only in the steppe, but also in the rest of Asia, where, according to Juvaini, completely different military orders prevailed, where autocracy and abuses of military leaders became customary and where the mobilization of troops required several months of time, since the command staff never maintained readiness of the required number of soldiers.

It is difficult to reconcile with our ideas about a nomadic army as a gathering of irregular gangs with the strict order and even the external gloss that dominated Genghis’s army. From the above articles by Yasa, we have already seen how strict her requirements were for constant combat readiness, punctuality in the execution of orders, etc. Setting out on a campaign found the army in a state of impeccable readiness: nothing was missed, every little thing was in order and in its place; the metal parts of weapons and harness are thoroughly cleaned, the storage containers are filled, and an emergency supply of food is included. All this was subject to strict inspection by superiors; omissions were severely punished. Since the Central Asian campaign, the armies had Chinese surgeons. When the Mongols went to war, they wore silk underwear (Chinese chesucha) - this custom has survived to this day due to its property of not being penetrated by an arrow, but being drawn into the wound along with the tip, delaying its penetration. This occurs when injured not only by an arrow, but also by a bullet from a firearm. Thanks to this property of silk, an arrow or bullet without a shell was easily removed from the body along with the silk fabric. So simply and easily the Mongols performed the operation of removing bullets and arrows from a wound.

Once the army or its main mass was concentrated before the campaign, it was inspected by the supreme leader himself. At the same time, he knew how, with his characteristic oratorical talent, to admonish the troops on the campaign with short but energetic words. Here is one of these parting words, which he pronounced before the formation of a punitive detachment, once sent under the command of Subutai: “You are my commanders, each of you is like me at the head of the army! You are like precious ornaments of the head. You are a collection of glory, you are indestructible, like a stone! And you, my army, surrounding me like a wall and leveled like the furrows of a field! Listen to my words: during peaceful fun, live with one thought, like the fingers of one hand; during an attack, be like a falcon that rushes at a robber; in During peaceful play and entertainment, swarm like mosquitoes, but during battle, be like an eagle on prey!

One should also pay attention to the widespread use that secret reconnaissance received from the Mongols in the field of military affairs, through which, long before the opening of hostile actions, the terrain and means of the future theater of war, weapons, organization, tactics, the mood of the enemy army, etc., are studied to the smallest detail. d. This preliminary reconnaissance of potential enemies, which in Europe began to be systematically used only in recent times historical times, in connection with the establishment of a special corps of the general staff in the armies, Genghis Khan was placed at an extraordinary height, reminiscent of the one at which things stand in Japan at the present time. As a result of this deployment of intelligence services, for example in the war against the Jin state, Mongol leaders often showed better knowledge of local geographical conditions than their opponents operating in their own country. Such awareness was for the Mongols big chance for success. Likewise, during the Central European campaign of Batu, the Mongols amazed the Poles, Germans and Hungarians with their familiarity with European conditions, while the European troops had almost no idea about the Mongols.

For the purposes of reconnaissance and, incidentally, to disintegrate the enemy, “all means were considered suitable: the emissaries united the dissatisfied, persuaded them to betray with bribery, instilled mutual distrust among the allies, created internal complications in the state. Spiritual (threats) and physical terror was used against individuals.”

In carrying out reconnaissance, the nomads were extremely helped by their ability to firmly retain local signs in their memory. Secret reconnaissance, begun in advance, continued continuously throughout the war, for which numerous spies were involved. The role of the latter was often played by traders, who, when the army entered an enemy country, left the Mongol headquarters with a supply of goods in order to establish relations with the local population.

Mentioned above were the raid hunts that were organized by the Mongol troops for food purposes. But the significance of these hunts was far from being limited to this one task. They also served as an important means for the combat training of the army, as established by one of the articles of Yasa, which reads (Article 9): “In order to maintain the combat training of the army, a big hunt should be organized every winter. For this reason, it is forbidden to kill anyone from March to October deer, goats, roe deer, hares, wild donkeys and some species of birds."

This example of the widespread use of animal hunting among the Mongols as a military educational and educational means is so interesting and instructive that we consider it not superfluous to give more detailed description the conduct of such a hunt by the Mongol army, borrowed from the work of Harold Lamb.

“The Mongolian raid hunt was the same regular campaign, but not against people, but against animals. The entire army took part in it, and its rules were established by the khan himself, who recognized them as inviolable. Warriors (beaters) were forbidden to use weapons against animals, and letting an animal slip through the chain of beaters was considered a disgrace. It was especially hard at night. A month after the start of the hunt, a huge number of animals found themselves herded inside a semicircle of beaters, grouping around their chain. They had to perform real guard duty: light fires, post sentries. Even the usual " pass." It was not easy to maintain the integrity of the line of outposts at night in the presence of the front excited mass of representatives of the four-legged kingdom, the burning eyes of predators, to the accompaniment of the howling of wolves and the growls of leopards. The further, the more difficult. Another month later, when the mass of animals was already beginning to feel that she was being pursued by enemies, it was necessary to increase vigilance even more. If a fox climbed into any hole, she had to be driven out of there at all costs; the bear, hiding in a crevice between the rocks, had to be driven out by one of the beaters without harming it. It is clear how favorable such a situation was for young warriors to display their youth and prowess, for example when a lone boar armed with terrible fangs, and even more so when a whole herd of such enraged animals rushed in a frenzy at the chain of beaters.”

Sometimes it was necessary to make difficult crossings across rivers without breaking the continuity of the chain. Often the old khan himself appeared in the chain, observing the behavior of people. For the time being, he remained silent, but not a single detail escaped his attention and, at the end of the hunt, evoked praise or censure. At the end of the drive, only the khan had the right to be the first to open the hunt. Having personally killed several animals, he left the circle and, sitting under a canopy, watched the further progress of the hunt, in which the princes and governors labored after him. It was something like the gladiatorial competitions of Ancient Rome.

After the nobility and senior ranks, the fight against animals passed to junior commanders and ordinary warriors. This sometimes continued for a whole day, until finally, according to custom, the khan’s grandchildren and young princes came to him to ask for mercy for the surviving animals. After this, the ring opened and the carcasses began to be collected.

At the end of his essay, G. Lamb expresses the opinion that such a hunt was an excellent school for warriors, and the gradual narrowing and closing of the ring of riders, practiced during its course, could be used in a war against an encircled enemy.

Indeed, there is reason to think that the Mongols owe a significant part of their belligerence and prowess to animal hunting, which instilled in them these traits from an early age in everyday life.

Taking together everything that is known regarding the military structure of the empire of Genghis Khan and the principles on which his army was organized, one cannot help but come to the conclusion - even completely independent of the assessment of the talent of his supreme leader as a commander and organizer - about the extreme fallacy of a fairly widespread view , as if the campaigns of the Mongols were not campaigns of an organized armed system, but chaotic migrations of nomadic masses, who, when meeting with the troops of cultural opponents, crushed them with their overwhelming numbers. We have already seen that during the military campaigns of the Mongols, the “popular masses” remained calmly in their places and that victories were won not by these masses, but regular army, which was usually outnumbered by its enemy. It is safe to say that, for example, in the Chinese (Jin) and Central Asian campaigns, which will be discussed in more detail in the following chapters, Genghis Khan had no less than double enemy forces against him. In general, the Mongols were extremely few in relation to the population of the countries they conquered - according to modern data, the first 5 million out of about 600 million of all their former subjects in Asia. In the army that set out on a campaign in Europe, there were about 1/3 of the total composition of pure Mongols as the main core. Military art in its highest achievements in the 13th century was on the side of the Mongols, which is why in their victorious march through Asia and Europe not a single people was able to stop them, to oppose them with something higher than they had.

“If we compare the great penetration into the depths of the enemy disposition of the armies of Napoleon and the armies of the no less great commander Subedei,” writes Mr. Anisimov, “then we must recognize in the latter significantly greater insight and greater leadership genius. Both of them, leading in different time their armies were faced with the task of correctly resolving the issue of rear, communications and supplying their hordes. But only Napoleon was unable to cope with this task in the snows of Russia, and Subutai solved it in all cases of isolation thousands of miles from the core of the rear. In the past, covered by centuries, as in much later times, when large and distant wars were started, the question of feeding the armies was first raised. This issue was complicated to the extreme in the Mongol cavalry armies (over 150 thousand horses). The light Mongol cavalry could not drag behind them the cumbersome convoys, which always hampered movement, and inevitably had to find a way out of this situation. Even Julius Caesar, when conquering Gaul, said that “war should feed war” and that “the capture of a rich region not only does not burden the conqueror’s budget, but also creates a material basis for subsequent wars.”

Quite independently, Genghis Khan and his commanders came to the same view of the war: they looked at the war as a profitable business, expanding the base and accumulating forces - this was the basis of their strategy. A Chinese medieval writer points to the ability to maintain an army at the expense of the enemy as the main sign that defines a good commander. The Mongol strategy saw the duration of the offensive and the capture of large areas as an element of strength, a source of replenishment of troops and supplies. The more the attacker advanced into Asia, the more herds and other movable wealth he captured. In addition, the vanquished joined the ranks of the victors, where they quickly assimilated, increasing the strength of the winner.

The Mongol offensive represented an avalanche, growing with every step of movement. About two-thirds of Batu's army were Turkic tribes roaming east of the Volga; When storming fortresses and fortified cities, the Mongols drove prisoners and mobilized enemies in front of them like “cannon fodder.” The Mongol strategy, given the enormous scale of distances and the dominance of predominantly pack transport on “ships of the desert” - indispensable for quick transitions behind cavalry through roadless steppes, deserts, rivers without bridges and mountains - was unable to organize proper transportation from the rear. The idea of ​​​​transferring the base to the areas that lay ahead was the main one for Genghis Khan. The Mongol cavalry always had a base with them. The need to be content primarily with local resources left a certain imprint on the Mongol strategy. Quite often, the speed, impetuosity and disappearance of their army were explained by the direct need to quickly reach favorable pastures, where the horses, weakened after passing through hungry areas, could fatten their bodies. Of course, prolongation of battles and operations in places where there were no food supplies was avoided.

In conclusion of the essay on the military structure Mongol Empire It remains to say a few words about its founder as a commander. That he possessed a truly creative genius is clearly evident from the fact that he was able to create an invincible army out of nothing, basing it on the creation of ideas that were recognized by civilized humanity only many centuries later. A continuous series of celebrations on the battlefields, the conquest of cultural states that had more numerous and well-organized armed forces compared to the Mongol army, undoubtedly required more than organizational talent; This required the genius of a commander. Such a genius is now unanimously recognized by representatives of military science as Genghis Khan. This opinion is shared, by the way, by the competent Russian military historian General M.I. Ivanin, whose work “On the art of war and the conquests of the Mongol-Tatars and Central Asian peoples under Genghis Khan and Tamerlane,” published in St. Petersburg in 1875. , was accepted as one of the manuals on the history of military art in our Imperial Military Academy.

The Mongol Conqueror did not have so many biographers and, in general, such enthusiastic literature as Napoleon had. Only three or four works were written about Genghis Khan, and then mainly by his enemies - Chinese and Persian scientists and contemporaries. In European literature, his due as a commander began to be given only in recent decades, dispelling the fog that covered him in previous centuries. Here is what a military specialist, French Lieutenant Colonel Renck, says about this:

“We should finally discard the current opinion according to which he (Genghis Khan) is presented as the leader of a nomadic horde, blindly crushing oncoming peoples in his path. Not a single national leader was more clearly aware of what he wants, what he can. Enormous practical common sense and the correct judgment was made the best part his genius... If they (the Mongols) always turned out to be invincible, then they owed this to the courage of their strategic plans and the infallible clarity of their tactical actions. Of course, in the person of Genghis Khan and his galaxy of commanders, military art reached one of its highest peaks."

Of course, it is very difficult to make a comparative assessment of the talents of great commanders, and even more so provided that they worked in different eras, under various states of military art and technology and under a wide variety of conditions. The fruits of the achievements of individual geniuses are, it would seem, the only impartial criterion for evaluation. In the Introduction, a comparison was made from this point of view of the genius of Genghis Khan with the two generally recognized greatest commanders - Napoleon and Alexander the Great - and this comparison was quite rightly decided not in favor of the latter two. The empire created by Genghis Khan not only surpassed the empire of Napoleon and Alexander many times over in space and survived for a long time under his successors, reaching under his grandson, Kublai, an extraordinary size, unprecedented in world history, 4/5 of the Old World, and if it fell , then not under the blows of external enemies, but due to internal decay.

It is impossible not to point out one more feature of the genius of Genghis Khan, in which he surpasses other great conquerors: he created a school of commanders, from which came a galaxy of talented leaders - his associates during life and the successors of his work after death. Tamerlane can also be considered a commander of his school. As is known, Napoleon failed to create such a school; the school of Frederick the Great produced only blind imitators, without a spark of original creativity. As one of the techniques used by Genghis Khan to develop an independent leadership gift in his employees, we can point out that he provided them with a significant amount of freedom in choosing methods for carrying out the combat and operational tasks given to them.