Start: November 19 End: February 2 Result: capture of the encircled Axis group

Sides:

Stalingrad offensive operation- strategic operation of Soviet troops in the Great Patriotic War. The goal is to defeat the enemy group operating in the Stalingrad direction (the main forces of Army Group B) and create conditions for the defeat of the entire southern wing of the Nazi troops. . Code name - "Uranus".

Conducted by troops of the Southwestern, Don and Stalingrad fronts (from January 1, 1943, renamed the Southern Front) from November 19, 1942 to February 2, 1943. The development of the operation was carried out by the General Staff and the Supreme Command Headquarters. The main contribution to the preparation of the offensive was made by Deputy Supreme Commander-in-Chief G.K. Zhukov and Chief of the General Staff A.M. Vasilevsky.

Operation Uranus has undergone major changes compared to the original plan, which involved encircling and eliminating 80-90 thousand enemy forces. The encircled group, numbering about 300 thousand people or more, suspended the offensive of the troops of the Don Front, and therefore the Soviet command was required to develop and introduce an additional operation into Operation Uranus - “Ring”, as well as take measures to neutralize enemy actions on the external front of the encirclement in December 1942.

The encirclement of the enemy group occurred from November 19 to 23 as a result of Soviet troops launching counter flank attacks: by the Southwestern Front with the active support of the right wing of the Don Front from the Serafimovich area from the bridgehead on the Don on November 19 and Stalingrad Front from the Sarpinskie Lakes area on November 20 in the general direction to Kalach-Sovetsky. During the 5-day encirclement, the 3rd Romanian Army and the 48th German Tank Corps were defeated; the German 4th Panzer Army and the Romanian 4th Army suffered significant losses; The 6th Field Army lost 73 thousand people killed, wounded and captured, including 39 thousand prisoners. As a result of the offensive, one of the largest groupings in the history of war was surrounded - 22 divisions and 160 separate units of the 6th and parts of the 4th tank armies with a total number of up to 330,000 people.

By the end of November, Soviet troops had created an external encirclement front and halved the area occupied by the encircled enemy. Further offensive was stopped by the stubborn resistance of the enemy, who thickened the battle formations by reducing the front and organized defense in positions prepared by Soviet troops in the summer of 1942.

On December 12, 1942, in order to release the encircled group from the Kotelnikovsky area, the Goth army group launched an offensive. Taking advantage of the great numerical superiority over the 51st Army, in particular, over the 4th Mechanized Corps, which took the brunt of the attack, it heavy fighting by December 19, it had advanced 40 km to the line of the Aksai River and was 80 km from the Stalingrad pocket. However, by December 19, the main forces of the 2nd Guards Army had already been deployed at the turn of the Myshkova River, sent by the Supreme High Command Staff to defeat the Goth group. This meant the failure of the unblocking strike. Until December 23, the Goth group, without encountering strong resistance from the deliberately retreating troops of the 4th Mechanized Corps, advanced to the line of the Myshkova River, 35–40 km from the encircled troops. On August 24, the 2nd Guards Army, in cooperation with the 51st Army, launched a counteroffensive. By December 31, the Goth group was completely defeated and thrown back 200-250 km.

From December 16 to 31, troops of the Southwestern Front, during Operation Little Saturn, defeated the 8th Italian Army and the Hollidt task force in the Middle Don, which were preparing to begin the relief of the encircled group together with the Goth group.

From January 10 to February 2, 1943, troops of the Don Front carried out Operation Ring to dissect and destroy the encircled group. As a result of this operation, the northern and southern enemy groups, separated from each other, capitulated on January 28 and February 2, 1943, respectively. 91,545 enemy soldiers and officers were captured, including 24 generals led by Field Marshal General F. Paulus. Another 16,800 were captured before Operation Ring began. Total number of prisoners taken at Stalingrad offensive operation German soldiers and officers - 232,000. In addition, up to 30,000 Romanian (from the 3rd Romanian Army) and about 60,000 Italian (from the 8th Italian Army) soldiers and officers were captured.

Operation Uranus ended in a crushing defeat of the Nazi troops, whose total losses for the first time during the Great Patriotic War significantly exceeded the losses of the Red Army, and irretrievable losses exceeded the irretrievable losses of the Red Army by more than 2 times. The defeat of the Nazi troops, carried out by Soviet troops, without significant superiority in forces, was a triumph of Soviet military art and marked a radical turning point in the course of the Great Patriotic War.

Operation Uranus created the preconditions for the successful conduct of Operation Little Saturn and the defeat of Italian and German troops in the Middle Don with the goal of defeating the entire Army Group B. During the Ostrogozh-Rossoshansky operation from January 13 to 27, the 2nd Hungarian and the remnants of the 8th Italian army were defeated. Over 120 thousand people were destroyed and captured. Even further north, the remnants of the Hungarian troops and the main forces of the 2nd German Army (9 divisions from the 3rd Army Corps) fell into the Voronezh-Kastornensky cauldron. From January 24 to February 2, they were defeated, over 100 thousand German soldiers died or were captured. The defeat and mass surrender began even before the group was completely surrounded. The remnants of several divisions (totaling about 20 thousand people) went for a breakthrough, but only a few thousand managed to escape from the encirclement by mid-February. Thus, the entire Army Group B was defeated.

Notes

1. Isaev A.V. Stalingrad. There is no land for us beyond the Volga. - M.: Yauza, Eksmo, 2008.
2. http://militera.lib.ru/h/isaev_av8/14.html
3. http://www.soldat.ru/doc/casualties/book/chapter5_10_1.html#5_10_9 Quote error Invalid tag : The name "" is defined multiple times for different contents
4. http://militera.lib.ru/h/isaev_av8/15.html
5. http://ru.wikipedia.org/wiki/Italian_campaign_in_USSR_(1941-1943)
6. The classification has been removed: Losses of the Armed Forces of the USSR in wars, hostilities and military conflicts: Stat. research / G. F. Krivosheev, V. M. Andronikov, P. D. Burikov. - M.: Military Publishing House, 1993. P. 178-182, 369-370. ISBN 5-203-01400-0
7. http://www.victory.mil.ru/war/oper/120.html
8. Samsonov A. M. “Battle of Stalingrad”
9. Military encyclopedic Dictionary. "Military Publishing House" 1986, 2nd ed. Page 768
10. « The Headquarters entrusted the leadership of the preparation of the operation on the ground for the Southwestern and Don Fronts to G.K. Zhukov, and for the Stalingrad Front to the Chief of the General Staff» Samsonov A. M. “The Battle of Stalingrad” M.: “Science” 3rd edition. page 338. Note. During the life of J.V. Stalin, the main merit in the development of the Stalingrad offensive operation was attributed to him (to verify this, it is enough to compare, say, the corresponding chapters of textbooks: “History of the USSR” (edited by Nechkina M.V.), M.: Uchpedgiz , 1949, and for example “History of the USSR” (edited by Shestakov A.V.), M.: Uchpedgiz, 1962.). Also in the early 60s. the version that “walked through the pages of history” was that the “idea of ​​encirclement” was born on October 6 at the command of the Stalingrad Front, i.e. A. I. Eremenko and N. S. Khrushchev himself (member of the Military Council of the front). This is refuted by A.M. Vasilevsky, pointing out that on October 6, at the command post of the Stalingrad Front, he conveyed to the front command the plan for the upcoming counteroffensive (see Military Historical Journal, 1965, No. 10, Art. 20). G.K. Zhukov notes that the development and planning of a strategic operation, which was “Uran,” was within the competence of the SVGK and the General Staff and, in principle, could not be carried out by the front command.
11. "Stalingrad. History lessons." M.: Progress publishing house. 1976. p. 279 (data from F. Paulus).
12. Beevor E. “Stalingrad”.: Smolensk - Rusich. 1999
13. Irreversible losses of the Red Army amounted to 155 thousand people, sanitary losses - 303 thousand people. The irretrievable losses of the Wehrmacht in the Stalingrad cauldron alone are about 300 thousand people; irretrievable losses only by prisoners of the Wehrmacht and allies in the Stalingrad offensive operation - over 300,000 people; total according to Soviet data - over 800 thousand people.

counter-offensive of troops of three Soviet fronts: Southwestern (general N.F. Vatutin), Stalingrad (general A.I. Eremenko) and Don (general K.K. Rokossovsky) to encircle and destroy the enemy group of troops in the Volga interfluve and Don in the fall of 1942. In the spring of 1942, enemy troops broke through the Soviet front and reached the Don in July. A threat was created to Stalingrad and the North Caucasus. Stalingrad was the most important strategic point and major industrial area. In addition, for both the Nazis and Soviet citizens, Stalingrad was a symbolic city. A. Hitler said more than once that Stalingrad was his destiny, and he must take it. In August 1942, Nazi troops crossed the Don. Soldiers of the 62nd Army Gen. IN AND. Chuikov, 64th Army General. M.S. Shumilov, divisions under the command of generals A.I. Rodimtseva, L.I. Gurtiev heroically defended the city. German command was forced to withdraw the 4th Tank Army from the Caucasus direction and transfer it to Stalingrad. On August 23, 1942, German troops launched a new offensive with the goal of capturing Stalingrad with simultaneous attacks by the 6th and 4th armies in converging directions. On August 23, the Germans reached the Volga, and on September 13 they began the assault on Stalingrad. The most stubborn resistance Soviet troops forced the Germans to stop attacks and go on the defensive. The German command decided not to launch any more offensives in order to more thoroughly prepare “for the second Russian winter,” accumulate forces and go on the offensive again in the spring of 1943. In operational order No. 1 of the main command of the Nazi German ground forces dated October 14, 1942 it was said: “The Russians themselves, during last fights were seriously weakened and would not be able to have in the winter of 1942/43 the same large forces that they had last winter." But this was not so. By the fall of 1942, the enemy no longer had absolute superiority on the Soviet-German front, offensive the capabilities of the German Wehrmacht were thoroughly undermined.In the first half of September 1942, a plan for an offensive operation of Soviet troops in the Stalingrad area, codenamed “Uranus,” arose at the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command and the General Staff.

The operation plan was developed in detail with the involvement of the commanders of the military branches in this work, as well as taking into account the proposals of the commanders of the fronts in the Stalingrad direction. In the summer of 1942, in the area of ​​the Middle Don, Stalingrad and further south along the Sarpinsky lakes, the main forces of Army Group B operated: troops of the 8th Italian, 3rd and 4th Romanian armies and the 6th and 4th tank armies of the Germans . This group consisted of more than a million people, 675 tanks and assault guns, more than 10 thousand guns and mortars. Army Group B was supported by the 4th Air Fleet and the 8th Air Corps. When choosing decisive strikes, it was taken into account that the main enemy grouping was in the Stalingrad area - the 6th and 4th German tank armies, and its flanks on the middle reaches of the Don and south of Stalingrad were covered mainly by Italian and Romanian troops, which had relatively low equipment and combat effectiveness . Main role The Southwestern Front was to play in Operation Uranus. The troops of the Southwestern Front launched attacks from bridgeheads on the right bank of the Don in the Serafimovich and Kletskaya areas. The Stalingrad Front advanced from the Sarpinsky Lakes region. Strike groups of both fronts were supposed to unite in the area of ​​Kalach - Sovetsky Farm and thereby complete the encirclement of the main enemy forces (6th and 4th German armies) near Stalingrad. Next, separate troops of the Southwestern Front from the bridgeheads southwest of Serafimovich and in the Kletskaya area were supposed to break through the defenses of the 3rd Romanian Army and go to the rear of the Stalingrad group in order to cut off all its routes to retreat. Thus, the Southwestern Front and Stalingrad created an outer ring of encirclement of the enemy group. The Don Front carried out auxiliary operations, and it created an inner ring of encirclement of the enemy in the small bend of the Don. In the first half of November, in deep secrecy, large forces of Soviet troops were drawn up to Stalingrad, and huge flows of military cargo were transferred. On the eve of the battle, the balance of forces was approximately the same, with the exception of the slight superiority of the Soviet side in tanks. On November 19, 1942, the troops of the Southwestern Front and the right wing of the Don Front went on the offensive, and on November 20, the troops of the Stalingrad Front. On November 23, the main forces of the 6th Army and 4th Tank Armies (330 thousand people) were surrounded. On November 16, the troops of the South-Western and Voronezh fronts, by attacking Morozovsk and Kantemirovka, thwarted the German plans to relieve the siege of Stalingrad. Attempts to organize supplies for German troops by air failed. On January 26, the encircled group of enemy troops was divided into two parts by Soviet troops, after which mass surrender began. On January 31, 1943, the commander of the 6th Army, Field Marshal F. von Paulus, surrendered. In total, 91 thousand people were captured. National mourning was declared in Germany.

Zhukov. Ups, downs and unknown pages life of Grand Marshal Gromov Alex

Operation Uranus

Operation Uranus

The operation conceived by Zhukov was codenamed “Uranus”. During the preparations, a new Southwestern Front was created under the command of General N.F. Vatutin. The Stalingrad Front became the Don Front under the command of K.K. Rokossovsky, and the former South-Eastern Front became the Stalingrad Front under the command of General A.I. Eremenko.

“Uranus” was prepared in deep secrecy. Even the front commanders did not know the details until almost the last moment. In most reports, the offensive was called “resettlement”, and the commanders were listed under pseudonyms - Vasiliev (Stalin), Konstantinov (Zhukov), Mikhailov (Vasilevsky) ...

And Soviet troops continued to fight for every piece of Volga land, exhausting and exterminating the enemy.

Zhukov recalled this time in the following way: “September 13, 14, 15 were difficult, too difficult days for the Stalingrad residents. The enemy, regardless of anything, broke through the ruins of the city, step by step, closer and closer to the Volga. It seemed that people were about to give up. But as soon as the enemy rushed forward, our glorious soldiers of the 62nd and 64th armies shot him point-blank. The ruins of the city became a fortress. However, every hour there was less and less strength left.

A turning point in these difficult and, as at times it seemed, last hours was created by the 13th Guards Division of A.I. Rodimtsev. After crossing to Stalingrad, she immediately counterattacked the enemy. Her blow was completely unexpected for the enemy. On September 16, A.I. Rodimtsev’s division recaptured Mamayev Kurgan. The Stalingraders were helped by air strikes under the command of A.E. Golovanov and S.I. Rudenko, as well as attacks and artillery shelling from the north by troops of the Stalingrad Front against parts of the 8th Army Corps of the Germans.

It is necessary to pay tribute to the soldiers of the 24th, 12th Guards and 66th armies of the Stalingrad Front, the pilots of the 16th Air Army and long-range aviation, who, regardless of any casualties, provided invaluable assistance to the 62nd and 64th armies of the South-Eastern front in holding Stalingrad."

Many Soviet soldiers distinguished themselves in the battles for Stalingrad. You can remember Sergeant Yakov Pavlov, who defended that very house, who became a living legend, the commander of the machine gun company, Captain Ruben Ruiz Ibarruri (son of the leader of the Communist Party of Spain Dolores Ibarruri), Vasily Zaitsev, sniper of the 62nd Army, Alexander Kuznetsov, commander of the rifle battalion, pilot Gabriel Ignashkin, captain Sergei Pavlov, commander of a tank company, senior sergeant Georgy Khachin, gunner of a separate artillery brigade, lieutenant Eduard Utukin, commander of a rifle platoon...

Zhukov reproached Marshal Chuikov for the fact that in his memoirs he “did not consider it necessary to pay tribute to his comrades in arms - the soldiers of the 1st, 24th and 66th armies of the Stalingrad Front, the 16th Air Army and long-range aviation, those who, regardless without any casualties, provided invaluable assistance to Stalingrad in this difficult time.”

And here’s what a German officer from Paulus’s army wrote about the Battle of Stalingrad: “At the same time, parts of our corps suffered huge losses, repelling the fierce attacks of the enemy in September, who tried to break through our cut-off positions from the north. The divisions located in this area were exsanguinated; as a rule, 30–40 soldiers remained in the companies.”

At a moment of calm, Zhukov, Eremenko, Khrushchev, Golovanov, Gordov and Moskalenko gathered at the command post of the 1st Guards Army to discuss the situation around Stalingrad and further actions.

Zhukov didn’t even say too much there: “Since the Supreme Commander warned me about keeping the projected plan for a large counter-offensive in the strictest secrecy, the conversation was mainly about strengthening the troops of the South-Eastern and Stalingrad fronts. To A.I. Eremenko’s question about the plan for a more powerful counterattack, I, without shying away from the answer, said that the Headquarters would carry out counterattacks significantly in the future greater strength, but so far there is neither the strength nor the means for such a plan.”

In preparing Operation Uranus, Zhukov tried to take into account the shortcomings of the recent counteroffensive near Moscow. Where it was planned to deliver the main attacks, artillery was concentrated, capable of suppressing the enemy’s defenses and dealing with his tanks. Huge masses of troops and equipment regrouped in an atmosphere of deep secrecy. Thirty thousand cars and almost one and a half thousand railway cars were involved. German intelligence did not detect what was happening, and by mid-November the regrouping was completed. And the enemy consoled himself with the confidence that “the Russians were seriously weakened during the last battles and would not be able to have the same forces in the winter of 1942/43 as they had last winter.”

I worked with Eremenko for two days. Personally examined the enemy positions in front of the 51st and 57th armies. I worked in detail with division and corps commanders and army commanders on the upcoming tasks regarding Uranus. The check showed: Tolbukhin’s preparations for “Uran” are going better... I ordered to conduct combat reconnaissance and, based on the information obtained, clarify the battle plan and the army commander’s decision...

The two rifle divisions given by Headquarters (87th and 315th) to Eremenko had not yet been loaded, since they had not yet received transport and horses.

Only one of the mechanized brigades has arrived so far.

Things are going badly with supplies and the supply of ammunition. The troops have very few shells for Uranus.

The operation will not be prepared by the deadline. Ordered to prepare for November 15, 1942.

It is necessary to immediately supply Eremenko with 100 tons of antifreeze, without which it will be impossible to throw the mechanical units forward; quickly send the 87th and 315th rifle divisions; urgently deliver warm uniforms and ammunition to the 51st and 57th armies with arrival to the troops no later than November 14, 1942.

If Eremenko and Vatutin’s air preparation for the operation is unsatisfactory, then the operation will end in failure. The experience of the war with the Germans shows that an operation against the Germans can only be won if we have air superiority. In this case, our aviation must perform three tasks:

The first is to concentrate the actions of our aviation in the area of ​​​​the offensive of our strike units, suppress German aviation and firmly cover our troops.

The second is to pave the way for our advancing units by systematically bombing the German troops facing them.

Third, pursue the retreating enemy troops through systematic bombing and assault operations in order to completely disrupt them and prevent them from gaining a foothold. the nearest frontiers defense

If Novikov thinks that our aviation is now not able to carry out these tasks, then it is better to postpone the operation for a while and accumulate more aviation.

Talk to Novikov and Vorozheikin, explain this matter to them and tell me your general opinion.

1. For last days in the Ivanov (Eremenko - A.G.) and Fedorov (Vatutin) sectors, the approach of new enemy reserves was not established; only internal regroupings and a pull-up of army reserves closer to the front line were detected, in particular the Romanian tank division in the Romanenko sector. Small groups of tanks are installed 5–6 kilometers from the front line of defense; apparently, with these groups of tanks the enemy is strengthening the defense of its front line. The enemy sets up wire on the front line and creates minefields.

Antifreeze has not yet been delivered; all cars are filled with vodka. There are also no winter oils and grease. Many units, especially reinforced artillery, did not receive warm uniforms.

2. Today, all units of Fedorov have reached their original areas and are working on their tasks. Now everyone is working on organizing the rear, speeding up the delivery of ammunition, fuel and food.

In the period from 9 to 12.11, enemy aircraft systematically attacked areas where Fedorov’s units were concentrated. Since 12.11, aviation activity has sharply weakened. From a survey of prisoners captured in various sectors of the Fedorov Front, it was established that there was no talk among the enemy troops about our impending resettlement; apparently, the enemy did not reveal our grouping and our intentions.

3. Based on the state of the units and the progress of preparations for Ivanov and Fedorov, the resettlement date can be set on November 18 or 19. I don’t think it’s advisable to postpone it any longer. Please let me know about your decision and relocation deadline.

4. 14 and 15.11 I will check the progress of preparations with Chistyakov and Batov. On the evening of the 16th I plan to be in Moscow. Mikhailov from Ivanov will arrive at Fedorov on November 16 at 12 o’clock.

You can set the day of relocation of Fedorov and Ivanov at your discretion, and then report to me about it upon arrival in Moscow. If you have the idea that one of them should begin relocation earlier or later by one or two days, then I authorize you to resolve this issue at your discretion...

Zhukov proposed that the forces of the Southwestern Front and the 65th Army of the Don Front go on the offensive on November 19, and the Stalingrad Front on November 20. Firstly, this made it possible to smooth out the difference in the distance that troops moving from different points had to overcome, and secondly, it was supposed to mislead the enemy. Stalin agreed.

And on November 17, the Supreme Commander summoned Zhukov to Headquarters and ordered him to organize a diversionary operation in the Moscow direction with the forces of the Kalinin and Western Fronts.

During the preparation of Operation Uranus, Zhukov was twice on the verge of death. Both times - during flights.

“Before reaching Moscow, I felt that the plane was suddenly making a turn and descending. I decided that we had apparently veered off course. However, a few minutes later, A.E. Golovanov drove the car to land in an area unfamiliar to me. We landed safely.

– Why did they park the car here? – I asked Golovanov.

- Be grateful that you were near the airfield, otherwise you might have fallen off.

- What's the matter?

“Icing.”

And once, during an urgent flight to Moscow on Stalin’s orders, the plane carrying Zhukov miraculously did not crash into a brick pipe. “The flight to Moscow was not bad, but on the approach to Moscow the visibility did not exceed one hundred meters. Over the radio, the pilot was given a command from the Air Force flight department to go to an alternate airfield. In this case, we were probably late for the Kremlin, where the Supreme Commander was waiting for us.

Taking full responsibility upon myself, I ordered the pilot E. Smirnov to land at the Central Airfield and remained in his cockpit. Flying over Moscow, we suddenly saw the neck of a factory chimney 10–15 meters from the left wing. I looked at Smirnov, he, as they say, without batting an eyelid, raised the plane a little higher and after 23 minutes led it to land.

– It seems that we have happily come out of the situation about which they say “it’s a disaster”! - I said when we landed.

“Anything can happen in the air if the flight crew ignores weather conditions,” he answered smiling.

- My fault! “I said to the pilot, shaking his hand firmly.”