For some reason, it is believed that in June 1941, no less than 5 million Wehrmacht soldiers crossed the border with the USSR. This common myth is easily refuted.

The strength of the Wehrmacht in June 1941 reached:

7,234 thousand people (Müller–Hillebrandt) including:

1. Active Army – 3.8 million people.

2. Army Reserve – 1.2 million people.

3 . Air Force – 1.68 million people

4. SS troops – 0.15 million people

Explanation:

The reserve army, numbering 1.2 million people, did not participate in the aggression against the USSR. It was intended for military districts in Germany itself.

Civilian Hiwis—counted in total number stated above. At the beginning of the Second World War they did not actively participate in battles.

WHERE WERE THE WEHRMACHT TROOPS LOCATED?

The Wehrmacht in June 1941 had about 700,000 soldiers in France, Belgium and Holland in case of an Allied landing.

In the remaining occupation zones—Norway, Austria, Czechoslovakia, the Balkans, Crete, Poland—no less than almost 1,000,000 soldiers were taken from the Wehrmacht.

Riots and uprisings broke out regularly and to maintain order it was necessary a large number of Wehrmacht troops in the occupied territories

General Rommel's African Corps had about 100,000 people. The total number of Wermath troops in the Middle East region reached 300,000 people.

HOW MANY VERMATH SOLDIERS CROSSED THE BORDER WITH THE USSR?

Müller-Hillebrandt, in his book " Ground Army Germany 1933-1945" gives the following figures for forces in the East:

1. In army groups (i.e. “North”, “Center” “South” - author’s note) - 120.16 divisions - 76 infantry, 13.16 motorized, 17 tank, 9 security, 1 cavalry, 4 light , 1st Mountain Rifle Division - the “tail” of 0.16 divisions arose due to the presence of formations that were not consolidated into divisions.

2. The OKH has 14 divisions behind the front of the army groups. (12 infantry, 1 mountain rifle and 1 police)

3. The Civil Code reserve includes 14 divisions. (11 infantry, 1 motorized and 2 tank)

4. In Finland - 3 divisions (2 mountain rifle, 1 motorized, another 1 infantry arrived at the end of June, but we will not count it)

And in total - 152.16 divisions, out of 208 divisions formed by the Wehrmacht. These include 99 infantry, 15.16 motorized, 19 tank, 4 light, 4 mountain rifle, 9 security, 1 police and 1 cavalry divisions, including SS divisions.

Really active army

According to Müller-Hillebrandt, of the 3.8 million active army, 3.3 million people were concentrated for operations in the East.

If we look at Halder’s “War Diary”, we will find that he defines the total number of the active army as 2.5 million people.

In fact, the figures are 3.3 million people. and 2.5 million people do not strongly contradict each other, since in addition to the divisions themselves in the Wehrmacht (as in any other army), there were a sufficient number of units listed in the active army but essentially non-combat (builders, military doctors, etc., etc. ).

3.3 million Müller-Hillebrandt includes both combat and non-combat units, and 2.5 million people. Galdera - only combat units. So we will not be much mistaken if we assume the number of Wehrmacht and SS combat units on the eastern front at the level of 2.5 million people.

Halder determined the number of combat units that could participate in hostilities against the USSR in June at 2.5 million people.

LEVELED FORMATION

Before the attack on the USSR, the German army had a clearly defined echelon formation.

The first, shock echelon - army groups "North", "Center" "South" - included 120 divisions, incl. 3.5 motorized SS divisions.

The second echelon - the operational reserve, so to speak - was located directly behind the fronts of the army groups and consisted of 14 divisions.

The third echelon is the reserve of the main command, which also includes 14 divisions.

That is, the attack came in three streams.

WEHRMACHT ALLIES

Most of them entered the war later than Germany and their participation at the very beginning was limited to only a few divisions.

Later, in 42-43, the number of the allied contingent of Dastigal was 800,000 people.

Most of the Allied troops were on the Eastern Front in 1943

RESULTS

In June 1941, 2.5 million soldiers crossed the border with the USSR. They were opposed by 1.8 million soldiers of the Red Army.

Directive No. 1 only supplemented the order to bring the troops to full combat readiness... but the generals sabotaged it.

On June 20, they sent most of the flying squadrons on vacation, and on June 21, most of the combat units went on a “weekend” with festivities, etc.

In aviation, tanks and other weapons, the Red Army was many times superior to the Wehrmacht.

The myth of the overwhelming superiority of the Wehrmacht can be considered destroyed.

Details

The ISRAELI newspaper Vesti published sensational material about 150 thousand. Jewish soldiers and officers who fought in Hitler's army.

The term "Mischlinge" in the Reich was used to describe people born from mixed marriages of Aryans with non-Aryans. The racial laws of 1935 distinguished between "Mischlinge" of the first degree (one of the parents is Jewish) and the second degree (grandparents are Jewish). Despite the legal "taint" of people with Jewish genes and despite the blatant propaganda, tens of thousands of "Mischling" lived quietly under the Nazis. They were routinely drafted into the Wehrmacht, Luftwaffe and Kriegsmarine, becoming not only soldiers, but also part of the generals at the level of commanders of regiments, divisions and armies.

Hundreds of "Mischlinge" were awarded Iron Crosses for their bravery. Twenty soldiers and officers of Jewish origin were awarded the highest military award of the Third Reich - the Knight's Cross. However, many Wehrmacht veterans complained that their superiors were reluctant to introduce them to orders and delayed promotion in rank, keeping in mind their Jewish ancestors.

For a long time, the Nazi press published a photograph of a blue-eyed blond man in a helmet. Under the photo it said: “The ideal German soldier.” This Aryan ideal was Wehrmacht fighter Werner Goldberg (with a Jewish dad).

Wehrmacht Major Robert Borchardt received the Knight's Cross for the tank breakthrough of the Soviet front in August 1941. He was then sent to Rommel's Afrika Korps. Near El Alamein he was captured by the British. In 1944 he was allowed to come to England to reunite with his Jewish father. In 1946, Borchardt returned to Germany, telling his Jewish dad: “Someone has to rebuild our country.” In 1983, shortly before his death, he told German schoolchildren: “Many Jews and half-Jews who fought for Germany in World War II believed that they should honestly defend their Fatherland by serving in the army.”

Colonel Walter Hollander, whose mother was Jewish, received Hitler’s personal letter, in which the Fuhrer certified the Aryanity of this halakhic Jew (Halacha is traditional Jewish legislation, according to which a Jew is considered to be born of a Jewish mother - K.K.). The same certificates of “German blood” were signed by Hitler for dozens of high-ranking officers of Jewish origin.

During the war, Hollander was awarded the Iron Cross of both degrees and a rare insignia - the Golden German Cross. In 1943, he received the Knight's Cross when his anti-tank brigade destroyed 21 Soviet tanks on the Kursk Bulge in one battle.

When he was given leave, he went to the Reich via Warsaw. It was there that he was shocked by the sight of the Jewish ghetto being destroyed. Hollander returned to the front broken. Personnel officers wrote in his personal file: “too independent and poorly controlled,” and canceled his promotion to the rank of general.

Who were the Wehrmacht's "Mischlinge": victims of anti-Semitic persecution or accomplices of the executioners?

Life often put them in absurd situations. One soldier with the Iron Cross on his chest came from the front to the Sachsenhausen concentration camp to visit his Jewish father there. The SS officer was shocked by this guest: “If it weren’t for the award on your uniform, you would quickly end up with me where your father is.”

And here is the story of a 76-year-old resident of Germany, one hundred percent Jewish. In 1940, he managed to escape from occupied France using forged documents. Under new German name he was drafted into the Waffen-SS - selected combat units. “If I served in the German army, and my mother died in Auschwitz, then who am I - a victim or one of the persecutors? - he often asks himself. - The Germans, feeling guilty for what they did, do not want to hear about us. The Jewish community also turns away from people like me. After all, our stories contradict everything that is commonly believed to be the Holocaust.”

In 1940, all officers with two Jewish grandparents were ordered to leave military service. Those who were tainted with Jewishness only by one of their grandfathers could remain in the army in ordinary positions.

But the reality was different: these orders were not carried out. Therefore, they were repeated once a year to no avail. There were frequent cases when German soldiers, driven by the laws of “front-line brotherhood,” hid “their Jews” without handing them over to the party and punitive authorities.

There are 1,200 known examples of "mischlinge" service in the Wehrmacht - soldiers and officers with immediate Jewish ancestors. A thousand of these front-line soldiers had 2,300 Jewish relatives killed - nephews, aunts, uncles, grandfathers, grandmothers, mothers and fathers.

In January 1944, the Wehrmacht personnel department prepared a secret list of 77 high-ranking officers and generals “mixed with the Jewish race or married to Jews.” All 77 had Hitler's personal certificates of "German blood". Among those listed are 23 colonels, 5 major generals, 8 lieutenant generals and two full generals.

This list could be supplemented by one of the sinister figures of the Nazi regime - Reinhard Heydrich, the Fuhrer's favorite and head of the RSHA, who controlled the Gestapo, criminal police, intelligence and counterintelligence. All his life (fortunately short) he struggled with rumors about his Jewish origin.

Heydrich was born in 1904 in Leipzig into the family of the director of the conservatory. Family history says that his grandmother married a Jew shortly after the birth of the father of the future chief of the RSHA. As a child, older boys beat Reinhard, calling him a Jew.

It was Heydrich who held the Wannsee Conference in January 1942 to discuss the “final solution to the Jewish question.” His report stated that the grandchildren of a Jew were treated as Germans and were not subject to reprisals. They say that one day, returning home drunk to smithereens at night, he turned on the light, saw his image in the mirror and shot him twice with a pistol with the words: “You vile Jew!”

A classic example of a “hidden Jew” in the elite of the Third Reich can be considered Air Field Marshal Erhard Milch. His father was a Jewish pharmacist.

Due to his Jewish origin, he was not accepted into the Kaiser's military schools, but the outbreak of the First World War gave him access to aviation. Milch ended up in the division of the famous Richthoffen, met young Goering and distinguished himself at headquarters, although he himself did not fly airplanes. In 1929 he became general director Lufthansa is the national air carrier. The wind was already blowing towards the Nazis, and Milch provided free planes for the leaders of the NSDAP.

This service is not forgotten. Having come to power, the Nazis declare that Milch’s mother did not lead sex life with her Jewish husband, and Erhard's true father is Baron von Beer. Goering laughed for a long time about this: “Yes, we made Milch a bastard, but an aristocratic bastard.” Another aphorism by Goering about Milch: “In my headquarters, I myself will decide who is Jewish and who is not!”

After the war, Milch served nine years in prison. Then, until the age of 80, he worked as a consultant for the Fiat and Thyssen concerns.

The vast majority of Wehrmacht veterans say that when they joined the army, they did not consider themselves Jews. These soldiers tried to refute Nazi race talk with their courage. Hitler's soldiers, with triple zeal at the front, proved that Jewish ancestors did not prevent them from being good German patriots and staunch warriors.

There is an opinion that the Germans are a punctual people, and therefore the control system of the fascist army differed from other armies in the world in its ideal precision and accuracy. But is this statement true? Let's figure it out.

Leader German people Hitler held many different positions. He was the leader of the party, the Reich Chancellor, the President of Germany, the Minister of War, the Supreme Commander of the Wehrmacht, and the Commander-in-Chief of the Army. Stalin had something similar. He was general secretary Central Committee, Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars, Supreme Commander-in-Chief.

But no matter what capacity Joseph Stalin acted in, all the levers of power converged in his secretariat. Any reports, reports, denunciations ended up on the desk of the assistant leader of the peoples, Poskrebyshev. He processed the information, reported to his boss and received appropriate instructions. And Hitler had a separate office for each of his positions. In total, the Fuhrer had five such structures, and each of them had its own apparatus of employees.

It is quite understandable that each such structure strived for leadership. She gave orders and instructions on behalf of the leader of the German people and was not interested in the orders and instructions of the other four structures. All this gave rise to chaos, confusion and bickering between employees of different administrative apparatuses.

The control system of the armed forces of Nazi Germany worked on a similar principle. Every army in the world has a brain - General base. And in the fascist army there was not one, but three brains, that is, three General Staffs absolutely independent from each other. The ground forces, air force and navy had their own General Staffs, and each of them planned their own military actions. There were also SS troops who reported only to Himmler, who reported directly to the Fuhrer.

It is quite understandable that the three General Staffs and the command of the SS troops could not thoroughly coordinate their actions. Each proceeded from personal departmental interests and tried to wage the war that was convenient only for him. Each command authority planned its operations and deployed its own command and control systems. All this had the most negative impact on the conduct of both offensive and defensive military operations.

Stalin had nothing like this. Its control system was simple and efficient. The front was considered the main organizational unit. At the beginning of the Great Patriotic War, five Soviet fronts operated against Germany; at the end of the war there were ten. At the head of each front was a commander with his own staff. It was the front commander who led the combat operations of the combined arms, tank armies and aviation. Therefore, both ground forces and aviation acted according to a single plan.

This organization of leadership made it possible to control tanks, artillery, aviation, and infantry from a single center. If, for example, infantry with artillery and tanks are in deep defense, and aviation is leading air battles, then all front-line assets are directed to support its actions, according to the order of the commander. And if rifle divisions and tank corps move forward, and aviation is not needed, then communications, transport, fuel reserves and everything else work for the attackers.

The fascist army had a completely different control system. If in some area of ​​​​combat operations the pilots had huge reserves of fuel, and the tank crews had almost none, then there was no mechanism capable of providing such information, much less taking the surplus from the aviation and transferring it to the tank unit. And all because the ground forces had their own commanders, and the aviation had their own. And they did not obey each other in any way. Therefore, the issue of transferring fuel could only be resolved through the Fuhrer.

The commander of the army group of ground forces had to contact Hitler's headquarters, and there he could be asked to wait a few hours until the Supreme Commander of the Wehrmacht decided on some other issues. Then, having received the information, Hitler had to contact Goering and give him the order to allocate surplus fuel to the tank unit. Goering, in turn, had to contact the commander of the air fleet and give him the order. The latter had to give the order to the squadron commander, and only after that the tankers’ fuel tankers would be refueled.

Yes, discipline and order are evident, but who needs them in difficult combat conditions, when the situation changes hourly. True, there was a second option. The tank unit commander could directly contact the air unit commander and ask for help with fuel. But exactly ask, and applicants are often refused.

From this it is clear that in the fascist army the land, air, naval and SS commanders had to negotiate with each other, like traders at a market. Is this a military approach? Could the Nazis have won with such a control system? And this was the case everywhere – in Africa, Greece, Italy, France.

But we must give Adolf Hitler his due. He thought about how to properly and effectively organize the interaction of three mutually independent General Staffs. And, in the end, I came up with it. Above these headquarters, he placed two more headquarters, but made it so that they were also not subordinate to each other. The headquarters of the Supreme High Command of the Wehrmacht, headed by Field Marshal Keitel, and the headquarters of the operational leadership of the Wehrmacht, headed by Colonel General Jodl, appeared. All this led to even greater confusion in the fascist army.

The new headquarters, trying to prove their necessity, began to interfere in military operations on individual fronts, sending orders and directives, often contradicting the orders and directives of the General Staffs. As a result, disputes began to arise between competing headquarters. They became increasingly bitter as the situation on the Eastern Front worsened.

Any comparisons with the Soviet management system are not in favor of Germany. Here it should also be taken into account that the SS troops were not at all subordinate to all these accumulations of headquarters. And their forces were impressive: the SS cavalry division “Florian Geyer”, the SS division “Adolf Hitler”, the SS mountain rifle division “Skanderbeg”, the motorized division “Reichsführer SS”, the SS division “Totenkopf”, the SS grenadier division.

In total, there were 43 such divisions, and among them were tank, cavalry, infantry, mountain rifle, etc. Himmler even had the 6th SS Panzer Army under his command. Also under the personal control of the Reichsführer SS there were 50 Volkssturm divisions. In total he commanded 93 divisions. This entire armada fought on the fronts, but had nothing to do with the General Staffs and ignored their orders. By the way, the SS men fought very bravely, but the losses in their ranks were the greatest.

Thus, the fascist army with its control system could not resist the clear, simple and perfectly organized Stalinist system. A huge number of German headquarters could not find each other common language. In fact, all these military structures lived among themselves in the same way as the cardinal’s guards lived with the royal musketeers from Dumas’s novel. Each structure rowed everything for itself and supplied only itself. That is, the German army consisted of hostile clans. And how could she win in such a situation?

At the end of the war, even Goebbels recognized the superiority of the Soviet control system over the German one. He declared that the German pyramids of orders and instructions destroyed Germany. Who would argue with the Minister of Propaganda? Indeed, the German army simply drowned in confusion and chaos. It could not resist a more progressive system and suffered a complete collapse.

The Third Reich was preparing for an attack on the USSR very thoroughly; by the time the war began, a group of the armed forces of the Reich and the armed forces of Germany’s satellite countries, which had no analogues until that time, was concentrated on the borders of the Soviet Union. To defeat Poland, the Reich used 59 divisions; in the war with France and its allies - Holland, Belgium, England - it deployed 141 divisions; 181 divisions were concentrated to attack the USSR, this together with the allies. Berlin made serious preparations for war, literally in a few years transforming its armed forces from one of the weakest armies in Europe, because according to the Versailles agreements, Germany was allowed to have only 100 thousand. army, without combat aircraft, heavy artillery, tanks, powerful navies, universal conscription, in the best army peace. This was an unprecedented transformation, of course, influenced by the fact that in the period before the Nazis came to power, with the help of the “financial international” it was possible to preserve the military potential of industry and then quickly militarize the economy. The officer corps was also preserved, passing on its experience to new generations.

The myth that “intelligence reported on time.” One of the most persistent and dangerous myths, which was created under Khrushchev, and even more strengthened during the years of the Russian Federation, is the legend that intelligence has repeatedly reported on the date of the start of the war, but “stupid”, or in another version “enemy of the people” “Stalin brushed aside these reports, believing more in his “friend” Hitler. Why is this myth dangerous? He creates the opinion that if the army had been brought into full combat readiness, it would have been possible to avoid the situation when the Wehrmacht reached Leningrad, Moscow, Stalingrad, they say, it would have been possible to stop the enemy at the border. Moreover, it does not take into account the geopolitical realities of that time - the USSR could be accused of armed provocation, as in 1914, when Russian empire began mobilization and was accused of “starting a war,” Berlin received a reason to start a war. There was a possibility that we would have to forget about the creation of the “Anti-Hitler Coalition.”

There were intelligence reports, but there is a very big “But” - in the spring of 1941, the intelligence of the People’s Commissariats of State Security and Defense literally bombarded the Kremlin with reports about the “final and firmly established” date for the start of the invasions of the Reich troops. At least 5-6 such dates were reported. April, May, and June dates were reported about the Wehrmacht invasion and the start of the war, but they all turned out to be misinformation. So, contrary to the myths about the War, no one ever reported the date of June 22. The Reich troops should have learned about the hour and day of the invasion only three days before the war, so the directive stating the date of the invasion of the USSR reached the troops only on June 19, 1941. Naturally, not a single intelligence officer had time to report this.

The same famous “telegram” from R. Sorge that “an attack is expected early in the morning of June 22 along a wide front” is a fake. Its text differs sharply from real similar ciphergrams; Moreover, no responsible government leader would take any serious action on the basis of such reports, even if it comes from a reliable informant. As already mentioned, Moscow received such messages regularly. Already in our years, on June 16, 2001, the organ of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation “Red Star” published the materials of a round table dedicated to the 60th anniversary of the beginning of the Great Patriotic War, where there were confessions from SVR Colonel Karpov: “Unfortunately, this is a fake that appeared in Khrushchev’s times . Such “fools” are simply launched...” That is, the lie that Soviet intelligence knew everything and reported the day and hour of the start of the invasion was launched by N. Khrushchev when he “debunked” the cult of personality.

Only after the Wehrmacht received the directive of June 19, various “defectors” began to cross the border and signals went through the border service to Moscow.

Intelligence also made a mistake in the size of the Wehrmacht troop group, which was supposedly thoroughly revealed by Soviet intelligence officers. The total strength of the Reich's armed forces was determined by Soviet intelligence to be 320 divisions; in reality, at that time the Wehrmacht had 214 divisions. It was believed that the Reich's forces were divided equally in the western and eastern strategic directions: 130 divisions each, plus 60 in reserve, the rest in other directions. That is, it was not clear where Berlin would direct its attack - it was logical to assume that it would be against England. A completely different picture would have emerged if intelligence had reported that out of 214 Reich divisions, 148 were concentrated in the East. Soviet intelligence was unable to track the process of increasing the power of the Wehrmacht in the east. According to USSR intelligence data, the Wehrmacht grouping in the east from February to May 1941 increased from 80 to 130 divisions, a significant build-up of forces, but at the same time it was believed that the Wehrmacht grouping against England had doubled. What conclusions could be drawn from this? One could assume that Berlin was preparing for an operation against England, which it had been planning to do for a long time and was actively spreading disinformation about it. And in the east they strengthened the group to more reliably cover the “rear”. Wasn't Hitler planning a war on two fronts? This is unequivocal suicide for Germany. And a completely different picture would have emerged if the Kremlin had known that in February, out of all 214 German divisions, there were only 23 in the east, and by June 1941 there were already 148.

True, there is no need to create another myth, that intelligence is to blame for everything, it worked, collected information. But we must take into account the fact that she was still young, in comparison with Western intelligence services, she did not have enough experience.

Another myth is that Stalin is to blame for incorrectly determining the main direction of attack of the German armed forces - the most powerful group of the Red Army was concentrated in the Kiev Special Military District (KOVO), believing that this was where the main attack would be. But, firstly, this is a decision of the General Staff, and secondly, according to intelligence reports, the Wehrmacht command deployed at least 70 divisions, including 15 tank divisions, against the KOVO and the Odessa Military District (OVO), and against the Western Special Military District (ZOVO) German command concentrated 45 divisions, of which only 5 were tank divisions. And according to the initial developments of the Barbarossa plan, Berlin planned the main attack precisely in the southwestern strategic direction. Moscow proceeded from the available data; we are now able to put all the pieces of the puzzle together. In addition, in southern Poland, south of Lublin, at the beginning of June 1941, there were actually 10 tank and 6 motorized divisions of the Wehrmacht and SS troops. And therefore, opposing them with 20 tank and 10 motorized divisions of KOVO and OVO was a completely correct step by our command. True, the problem is that our reconnaissance missed the moment when 5 tank and 3 motorized divisions of Heins Guderian’s 2nd Panzer Group were transferred to the Brest area in mid-June. As a result, 9 tank and 6 motorized divisions of Germany were concentrated against the Western Special Military District, and 5 tank divisions and 3 motorized divisions remained against KOVO.

The Wehrmacht group in the east consisted of 153 divisions and 2 brigades, plus reinforcement units; they were distributed mainly across theaters of military operations: from Norway to Romania. In addition to the German troops, large forces of the armed forces of Germany's allied countries were concentrated on the borders with the Soviet Union - Finnish, Romanian and Hungarian divisions, a total of 29 divisions (15 Finnish and 14 Romanian) and 16 brigades (Finnish - 3, Hungarian - 4, Romanian - 9).

The main striking power of the Wehrmacht was represented by tank and motorized divisions. What were they? In June 1941, there were two types of tank divisions: tank divisions with a tank regiment of two battalions, they had 147 tanks - 51 light tank Pz.Kpfw. II (according to the Soviet classification T-2), 71 medium tanks Pz.Kpfw. III (T-3), 20 medium tanks Pz.Kpfw. IV (T-4) and 5 command tanks without weapons. A tank division with a tank regiment of three battalions could be armed with German or Czechoslovak tanks. The tank division, equipped with German tanks, had: 65 T-2 light tanks, 106 T-3 and 30 T-4 medium tanks, as well as 8 command tanks, for a total of 209 units. The tank division, equipped mainly with Czechoslovak tanks, had: 55 T-2 light tanks, 110 light Czechoslovak Pz.Kpfw tanks. 35(t) or Pz.Kpfw. 38(t), 30 T-4 medium tanks and 14 Pz.Kpfw command tanks. 35(t) or Pz.Kpfw. 38(t), total – 209 units. We must also take into account the fact that most of the T-2 and Pz.Kpfw tanks. 38(t) had time to modernize, their frontal armor of 30 and 50 mm was now not inferior in armor protection to medium tanks T-3 and T-4. Plus, the quality of sighting devices is better than in Soviet tanks. According to various estimates, in total the Wehrmacht had approximately 4,000 tanks and assault guns, with the allies - more than 4,300.

But we must take into account that a Wehrmacht tank division is not only tanks. Tank divisions were reinforced: 6 thousand motorized infantry; 150 artillery barrels, along with mortars and anti-tank guns; a motorized sapper battalion that could equip positions, set up minefields or clear minefields, and organize a crossing; A motorized communications battalion is a mobile communications center based on cars, armored cars or armored personnel carriers that could provide stable control of division units on the march and in battle. According to the staff, the tank division had 1963 units of vehicles, tractors (trucks and tractors - 1402 and cars - 561), in some divisions their number reached up to 2300 units. Plus 1,289 motorcycles (711 units with sidecars) in the state, although their number could also reach 1,570 units. Therefore, tank divisions were organizationally an excellently balanced combat unit, which is why the organizational structures of this formation of the 1941 model, with minor improvements, were preserved until the end of the war.

Tank divisions and motorized divisions were reinforced. Motorized divisions differed from ordinary Wehrmacht infantry divisions by the complete motorization of all units and subunits of the division. They had two regiments of motorized infantry instead of 3 infantry in the infantry division, two light howitzer battalions and one heavy artillery division in the artillery regiment instead of 3 light and 1 heavy in the infantry division, plus they had a motorcycle rifle battalion, which was not in standard infantry division. Motorized divisions had 1900–2000 cars and 1300–1400 motorcycles. That is, tank divisions were reinforced with additional motorized infantry.

The German armed forces were the first among other armies in the world not only to understand the need to have self-propelled artillery to support their infantry, but also to be the first to put this idea into practice. The Wehrmacht had 11 divisions and 5 separate batteries of assault guns, 7 divisions of self-propelled tank destroyers, and another 4 batteries of 150-mm self-propelled heavy infantry guns were transferred to the Wehrmacht tank divisions. The assault gun units supported the infantry on the battlefield; this made it possible not to divert tank units from the tank divisions for these purposes. Divisions of self-propelled tank destroyers became the highly mobile anti-tank reserve of the Wehrmacht command.

The Wehrmacht infantry divisions numbered 16,500–16,800 people, but you need to know that, contrary to military myths, all the artillery of these divisions was horse-drawn. In the Wehrmacht infantry division, there were 5,375 horses on staff: 1,743 riding horses and 3,632 draft horses, of which 2,249 draft horses belonged to the artillery regiment of the unit. Plus high level motorization - 911 cars (of which 565 are trucks and 346 are cars), 527 motorcycles (201 units with a sidecar). In total, the German armed forces, concentrated on the borders of the Soviet Union, had more than 600,000 vehicles various types and more than 1 million horses.

Artillery

Traditionally, the artillery of the German Armed Forces was strong: up to a quarter of the guns of German divisions were guns with a caliber of 105–150 mm. Organizational structure Wehrmacht military artillery made it possible to provide significant reinforcement of infantry units in battle. Thus, the infantry regiments had 150-mm heavy field guns. This provided the German infantry with a significant advantage in battle. When firing direct fire with shells weighing 38 kg, 150 mm guns could quickly suppress enemy firing points, clearing the way for advancing units. Divisional artillery could support infantry and motorized regiments with a division of light 105-mm howitzers, while the commanders of the Wehrmacht infantry and motorized divisions still had a heavy howitzer division of 150-mm howitzers at their disposal, and the commanders of tank divisions had at their disposal a mixed heavy division of 105-mm guns and 150 mm howitzers.

The tank and motorized divisions also had air defense guns: according to the staff, the division had a company of ZSU (18 units), these were self-propelled anti-aircraft guns based on half-track tractors, armed with single-barreled or quadruple 20-mm anti-aircraft guns. The company was part of the anti-tank fighter division. The ZSU could fire both stationary and on the move while on the march. Plus anti-aircraft divisions with 8-12 88-mm Flak18/36/37 anti-aircraft guns, which, in addition to fighting the enemy air force, could fight enemy tanks, performing anti-tank functions.

To strike the Red Army, the Wehrmacht command also concentrated significant forces of the Reserve of the Main Command of the Ground Forces (RGK): 28 artillery divisions (12 105-mm heavy guns in each); 37 divisions of heavy field howitzers (12 150 mm units each); 2 mixed divisions (6 211 mm mortars and three 173 mm guns each); 29 heavy mortar divisions (9 211 mm mortars in each division); 7 motorized heavy artillery divisions (9 149.1 mm heavy guns in each division); 2 heavy howitzer divisions (four 240 mm heavy Czechoslovak howitzers in each division); 6 anti-tank fighter divisions (36 37-mm Pak35/36 anti-tank guns in each); 9 separate railway batteries with 280 mm naval guns (2 guns per battery). Almost all of the RGK's artillery was concentrated in the direction of the main attacks, and all of it was motorized.

To ensure comprehensive preparation for combat operations, the Wehrmacht strike groups included: 34 artillery instrumental reconnaissance divisions, 52 separate engineer battalions, 25 separate bridge-building battalions, 91 construction battalions and 35 road-building battalions.

Aviation: 4 Luftwaffe air fleets, plus Allied aviation, were concentrated to strike the USSR. In addition to 3,217 bombers and fighters, the Reich Air Force had 1,058 reconnaissance aircraft, which played a vital role in supporting the actions of ground forces and the German Navy. Plus 639 transport aircraft and communications aircraft. Of the 965 German single-engine Bf.109 Messerschmitt fighters, almost 60% were aircraft of the new Bf.109F modification; they surpassed in speed and climb rate not only the old Soviet I-16 and I-153 fighters, but also the new ones, only "Yak-1" and "LaGG-3" entered into the Red Army Air Force.

The Reich Air Force had big amount units and communications and control units, which made it possible to maintain their high controllability and combat effectiveness. The German Air Force included anti-aircraft divisions that provided air defense for ground forces and rear facilities. Each anti-aircraft division included air surveillance, warning and communications units, logistics and technical support units. They were armed with 8-15 anti-aircraft divisions with 88-mm Flak18/36/37 anti-aircraft guns, 37-mm and 20-mm Flak30 and Flak38 anti-aircraft automatic guns, including quadruple installations of 20-mm Flakvierling38/1 automatic guns. At the same time, the Air Force anti-aircraft divisions interacted well with ground forces, often moving directly along with them.

In addition to the armed forces themselves, the striking power was reinforced by numerous auxiliary paramilitary forces, such as the Speer Transport Corps, the Todt Organization, the National Socialist Automobile Corps and the Reich Labor Service. They carried out logistical, technical and engineering support tasks for the Wehrmacht. There were many volunteers from Western and of Eastern Europe, which were not formally at war with the USSR.

To summarize, it must be said that this military machine at that time had no equal. It was not for nothing that Berlin, London and Washington believed that the USSR would not withstand the blow and would fall within 2-3 months. But we miscalculated once again...

Sources:
Isaev A.V. Unknown 1941. The stopped blitzkrieg. M., 2010.
Pykhalov I. The Great Slandered War. M., 2005.
Pykhalov I. The great slandered leader. Lies and truth about Stalin. M., 2010.
http://nvo.ng.ru/history/2011-06-10/1_2ww.html
http://militera.lib.ru/h/tippelskirch/index.html
http://ru.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Barbarossa
http://ru.wikipedia.org/wiki/Great_Patriotic_War
http://vspomniv.ru/nemetskie.htm
http://www.sovross.ru/modules.php?name=News&file=article&sid=588260
http://waralbum.ru/
http://ww2history.ru/artvermaht
http://www.airpages.ru/lw_main.shtml
http://putnikost.gorod.tomsk.ru/index-1271220706.php

The top of Nazi Germany set as its goal the creation of the most strong army in the world. In 1935, Germany introduced universal conscription for men between 18 and 45 years of age. The service life was first determined at 1 year, then at 2 years.

The Treaty of Versailles was trampled upon, and at the same time all obstacles to the growth of the Wehrmacht were removed, whose soldiers were brought up in the spirit of undisguised anti-communism, contempt for other peoples, and worship of force.

Back in 1934, along with the powers of the President, the powers of the Commander-in-Chief of the German Empire were transferred to Hitler, which were directly exercised by the Minister of War (Minister of the Reichswehr, and since 1935 - Minister of the Wehrmacht). Hitler introduced an oath of allegiance to every soldier and officer of the Wehrmacht in personal loyalty to him and readiness to sacrifice himself for the sake of its unconditional observance. In 1934, this oath was introduced for all government employees. The military-political department of the ministry had command and coordination functions in relation to the headquarters of various troops: ground, air, sea.

In order to further concentrate military power in his hands, Hitler abolished the War Ministry in 1938 as an intermediate authority between him and the army, turning it from a military-political department into his personal headquarters of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces (OKW), the central body of which became the headquarters of the operational manuals.

The commanders-in-chief of the ground, air and naval forces with their general staffs were directly subordinate to the Supreme Commander-in-Chief. A special role in the system of military bodies was played by the General Staff of the Ground Forces (OKH), which was numerically superior to the OKW, which was explained by the enormous importance of the ground forces in the Second World War. After the first major defeat of Hitler's troops near Moscow in November 1941, Hitler took command of the ground forces with their general staff. Since 1939, the newly created Council of Ministers for Defense of the Empire began to appoint “national defense commissioners” to all military districts, who were supposed to coordinate the work of all military and civilian institutions in order to successfully solve “defense” problems.

Hitler also created a powerful intelligence apparatus of the Reich Secret Service, the main object of which, immediately after the Nazis came to power, was the Soviet Union. Intelligence centers working against the USSR were organized at the German embassy in Moscow, at the University of Koenigsberg, large monopolies, etc. In 1941, a special headquarters for the management of intelligence and sabotage work in the USSR was formed. He was in charge of 60 schools, which trained agents for intelligence and sabotage activities. The overall management of military intelligence, counterintelligence and sabotage activities was in the hands of the Intelligence Directorate (Abwehr). The Department of Foreign Armies of the East, created under the General Staff of the Ground Forces, also carried out reconnaissance and subversive activities against the USSR.

From the moment of its creation, Hitler's army became an important element of the apparatus for suppressing opponents of fascism. Back in 1936, on the basis of Hitler’s special order “On the Use of Weapons by the Army,” it was allowed to use it to suppress “internal unrest.” The SS troops carried out a policy of terror and established a fascist " new order"by massacres, executions in the occupied territories in close cooperation with the active army.

In March 1938, the independent state of Austria was annexed to Germany. The next victim of fascist aggression was Czechoslovakia. As a result of the Munich Agreement, concluded in September 1938 by England, France and Nazi Germany, Czechoslovakia lost a significant part of its territory, annexed to the Reich. It was a rout independent state without military action, which was followed in 1939 by the military occupation of the country. In September 1939, Poland was captured by the Nazis. In July 1940, German troops occupied Paris, followed by new victories for the aggressor.

By the time of the attack on the USSR, Germany controlled vast territories of Central and Eastern, and most of Western and Northern Europe. In her hands was the coast of the Baltic Sea, a significant part of France. The powerful military-economic base of the occupied states was put at the service of Hitler's Germany, whose goal was proclaimed to be “the defense of civilization from the threat of Bolshevism,” and in fact, the destruction of the USSR.

Fascist Germany, together with its allies and satellites, fielded an army of 5 million (German, Italian, Romanian and other troops), armed with 3,500 tanks, 4,900 aircraft, etc., against the Soviet state.

During the Second World War, in which 61 states participated, more than 50 million people were killed, 11 million were destroyed in fascist concentration camps, 95 million became disabled. The main burden of the war was borne on its shoulders by the Soviet Union, which for 4 years waged the Great Patriotic War, which cost (according to unspecified data) 30 million lives of its citizens. Soviet Union belongs a vital role in the defeat of the fascist war machine, and with it one of the most reactionary and aggressive states laying claim to world domination in human history.