On November 19, 1942, the Soviet counteroffensive began near Stalingrad

On November 19, 1942, the Red Army counteroffensive began at Stalingrad ( Operation Uranus). The Battle of Stalingrad is one of the greatest battles in the Great Patriotic War and the Second World War. The military chronicle of Russia has a huge number of examples of courage and heroism, the valor of soldiers on the battlefield and the strategic skill of Russian commanders. But even in their example, the Battle of Stalingrad stands out.

For 200 days and nights on the banks of the great rivers Don and Volga, and then at the walls of the city on the Volga and directly in Stalingrad itself, this fierce battle continued. The battle took place over a vast area of ​​about 100 thousand square meters. km with a front length of 400 - 850 km. More than 2.1 million soldiers took part in this titanic battle on both sides at different stages of the fighting. In terms of significance, scale and ferocity of hostilities, the Battle of Stalingrad surpassed all previous battles in world history.

This battle includes two stages.

First stage- Stalingrad strategic defensive operation, it lasted from July 17, 1942 to November 18, 1942. At this stage, in turn, we can distinguish: defensive operations on the distant approaches to Stalingrad from July 17 to September 12, 1942 and the defense of the city itself from September 13 to November 18, 1942. There were no long pauses or truces in the battles for the city; battles and skirmishes went on continuously. For the German army, Stalingrad became a kind of “graveyard” for their hopes and aspirations. The city crushed thousands of enemy soldiers and officers. The Germans themselves called the city “hell on earth,” “Red Verdun,” and noted that the Russians were fighting with unprecedented ferocity, fighting until last person. On the eve of the Soviet counteroffensive, German troops launched the 4th assault on Stalingrad, or rather its ruins. On November 11, 2 tank and 5 infantry divisions were thrown into battle against the 62nd Soviet Army (by this time it consisted of 47 thousand soldiers, about 800 guns and mortars and 19 tanks). By this point, the Soviet army was already divided into three parts. A hail of fire fell on the Russian positions, they were flattened by enemy aircraft, and it seemed as if there was nothing alive there anymore. However, when the German chains went on the attack, Russian riflemen began to mow them down.

German soldier with Soviet PPSh, Stalingrad, spring 1942. (Deutsches Bundesarchiv/German Federal Archive)

By mid-November, the German offensive had run out of steam in all major directions. The enemy was forced to decide to go on the defensive. That's it for the defensive part. Battle of Stalingrad was finished. The Red Army troops solved the main problem by stopping the powerful advance of the Nazis in the Stalingrad direction, creating the preconditions for a retaliatory strike by the Red Army. During the defense of Stalingrad, the enemy suffered heavy losses. The German armed forces lost about 700 thousand people killed and wounded, about 1 thousand tanks and assault guns, 2 thousand guns and mortars, more than 1.4 thousand combat and transport aircraft. Instead of maneuver warfare and rapid advancement, the main enemy forces were drawn into bloody and furious urban battles. The German command's plan for the summer of 1942 was thwarted. On October 14, 1942, the German command decided to transfer the army to strategic defense along the entire Eastern Front. The troops were given the task of holding the front line; offensive operations were planned to continue only in 1943.

Stalingrad in October 1942, soviet soldiers are fighting at the Red October plant. (Deutsches Bundesarchiv/German Federal Archive)

Soviet soldiers advance through the ruins of Stalingrad, August 1942. (Georgy Zelma/Waralbum.ru)

It must be said that the Soviet troops also suffered huge losses in personnel and equipment at this time: 644 thousand people (irrecoverable - 324 thousand people, sanitary - 320 thousand people, over 12 thousand guns and mortars, approximately 1400 tanks, more than 2 thousand aircraft.

October 1942. A Junkers Ju 87 dive bomber over Stalingrad. (Deutsches Bundesarchiv/German Federal Archive)

Ruins of Stalingrad, November 5, 1942. (AP Photo)

Second period of the Battle of the Volga- Stalingrad strategic offensive(November 19, 1942 – February 2, 1943). The Headquarters of the Supreme High Command and the General Staff in September-November 1942 developed a plan for the strategic counter-offensive of Soviet troops near Stalingrad. The development of the plan was led by G.K. Zhukov and A.M. Vasilevsky. On November 13, the plan, codenamed "Uranus", was approved by Headquarters under the chairmanship of Joseph Stalin. The Southwestern Front, under the command of Nikolai Vatutin, received the task of delivering deep attacks on enemy forces from bridgeheads on the right bank of the Don from the Serafimovich and Kletskaya areas. The group of the Stalingrad Front under the command of Andrei Eremenko advanced from the Sarpinsky Lakes region. The offensive groups of both fronts were supposed to meet in the Kalach area and take the main enemy forces near Stalingrad into an encirclement ring. At the same time, the troops of these fronts created a ring of external encirclement in order to prevent the Wehrmacht from releasing the Stalingrad group with attacks from the outside. The Don Front, under the leadership of Konstantin Rokossovsky, launched two auxiliary strikes: the first from the Kletskaya area to the southeast, the second from the Kachalinsky area along the left bank of the Don to the south. In the areas of the main attacks, due to the weakening of secondary areas, a 2-2.5-fold superiority in people and a 4-5-fold superiority in artillery and tanks was created. Due to the strictest secrecy of the development of the plan and the secrecy of the concentration of troops, strategic surprise of the counteroffensive was ensured. During defensive battles, the Headquarters was able to create a significant reserve that could be thrown on the offensive. The number of troops in the Stalingrad direction was increased to 1.1 million people, about 15.5 thousand guns and mortars, 1.5 thousand tanks and self-propelled guns, 1.3 thousand aircraft. True, the weakness of this powerful group of Soviet troops was that about 60% of the troops were young recruits who had no combat experience.

The Red Army was opposed by the German 6th Field Army (Friedrich Paulus) and 4th Panzer Army (Herman Hoth), the Romanian 3rd and 4th Armies of Army Group B (commander Maximilian von Weichs), which numbered more than 1 million. soldiers, about 10.3 thousand guns and mortars, 675 tanks and assault guns, more than 1.2 thousand combat aircraft. The most combat-ready German units were concentrated directly in the Stalingrad area, participating in the assault on the city. The flanks of the group were covered by Romanian and Italian divisions, which were weaker in terms of morale and technical equipment. As a result of the concentration of the main forces and means of the army group directly in the Stalingrad area, the defensive line on the flanks did not have sufficient depth and reserves. The Soviet counteroffensive in the Stalingrad area would be a complete surprise for the Germans, German command it was confident that all the main forces of the Red Army were tied up in heavy fighting, were bleeding and did not have the strength and material resources for such a large-scale attack.

The advance of German infantry on the outskirts of Stalingrad, late 1942. (NARA)

Autumn 1942, a German soldier hangs the flag of Nazi Germany on a house in the center of Stalingrad. (NARA)

On November 19, 1942, after a powerful 80-minute artillery barrage, Operation Uranus began. Our army launched an offensive with the aim of encircling the enemy in the Stalingrad area. A turning point in the history of the Great Patriotic War and the Second World War was beginning.

At 7 o'clock 30 min. With a salvo of Katyusha rocket launchers, artillery preparation began. The troops of the Southwestern and Don Fronts went on the attack. By the end of the day, the Southwestern Front units advanced 25-35 km; they broke the defenses of the 3rd Romanian Army in two areas: southwest of Serafimovich and in the Kletskaya area. In fact, the 3rd Romanian was defeated, and its remnants were covered from the flanks. On the Don Front the situation was more difficult: Batov’s advancing 65th Army met fierce enemy resistance, by the end of the day it had advanced only 3-5 km and was unable to break through even the enemy’s first line of defense.

Soviet riflemen fire at Germans from behind a pile of rubble during a street battle on the outskirts of Stalingrad, early 1943. (AP Photo)

On November 20, after artillery preparation, units of the Stalingrad Front went on the attack. They broke through the defenses of the 4th Romanian Army and by the end of the day they had covered 20-30 km. The German command received news of the advance of Soviet troops and the breakthrough of the front line on both flanks, but there were virtually no large reserves in Army Group B.

By November 21, the Romanian armies were completely defeated, and the tank corps of the Southwestern Front were uncontrollably rushing towards Kalach.

On November 22, tankers occupied Kalach. Units of the Stalingrad Front were moving towards the mobile formations of the Southwestern Front.

On November 23, formations of the 26th Tank Corps of the Southwestern Front quickly reached the Sovetsky farm and linked up with units of the 4th Mechanized Corps of the Northern Fleet. The 6th field and the main forces of the 4th Tank Army were encircled: 22 divisions and 160 separate units with a total number of about 300 thousand soldiers and officers. The Germans had never experienced such a defeat during World War II. On the same day, in the area of ​​​​the village of Raspopinskaya, the enemy group capitulated - more than 27 thousand Romanian soldiers and officers surrendered. It was a real military disaster. The Germans were stunned, confused, they did not even think that such a catastrophe was possible.

Soviet soldiers in camouflage suits on the roof of a house in Stalingrad, January 1943. (Deutsches Bundesarchiv/German Federal Archive)

On November 30, the operation of Soviet troops to encircle and block the German group in Stalingrad was generally completed. The Red Army created two encirclement rings - external and internal. The total length of the outer ring of the encirclement was about 450 km.

However, Soviet troops were unable to immediately cut through the enemy group in order to complete its liquidation. One of the main reasons for this was the underestimation of the size of the encircled Stalingrad Wehrmacht group - it was assumed that it numbered 80-90 thousand people. In addition, the German command, by reducing the front line, were able to consolidate their battle formations, using the already existing positions of the Red Army for defense (their Soviet troops occupied in the summer of 1942).

German troops pass through a destroyed generator room in the industrial area of ​​Stalingrad, December 28, 1942. (AP Photo)

German troops in devastated Stalingrad, early 1943. (AP Photo)

After the failure of the attempt to release the Stalingrad group by Army Group Don under the command of Manstein - December 12-23, 1942, the encircled German troops were doomed. The organized “air bridge” could not solve the problem of supplying the encircled troops with food, fuel, ammunition, medicine and other means. Hunger, cold and disease decimated Paulus's soldiers.

A horse against the background of the ruins of Stalingrad, December 1942. (AP Photo)

From January 10 to February 2, 1943, the Don Front conducted the offensive Operation Ring, during which the Stalingrad Wehrmacht group was eliminated. The Germans lost 140 thousand soldiers killed, and about 90 thousand more surrendered. This concluded the Battle of Stalingrad.

Ruins of Stalingrad - by the end of the siege, almost nothing remained of the city. Airplane photo, late 1943. (Michael Savin/Waralbum.ru)

Samsonov Alexander

Start: November 19 End: February 2 Result: capture of the encircled Axis group

Sides:

Stalingrad offensive operation- strategic operation of Soviet troops in the Great Patriotic War. The goal is to defeat the enemy group operating in the Stalingrad direction (the main forces of Army Group B) and create conditions for the defeat of the entire southern wing of the Nazi troops. . Code name - "Uranus".

Conducted by troops of the Southwestern, Don and Stalingrad fronts (from January 1, 1943, renamed the Southern Front) from November 19, 1942 to February 2, 1943. The development of the operation was carried out by the General Staff and the Supreme Command Headquarters. The main contribution to the preparation of the offensive was made by Deputy Supreme Commander-in-Chief G.K. Zhukov and Chief of the General Staff A.M. Vasilevsky.

Operation Uranus has undergone major changes compared to the original plan, which involved encircling and eliminating 80-90 thousand enemy forces. The encircled group, numbering about 300 thousand people or more, suspended the offensive of the troops of the Don Front, and therefore the Soviet command was required to develop and introduce an additional operation into Operation Uranus - “Ring”, as well as take measures to neutralize enemy actions on the external front of the encirclement in December 1942.

The encirclement of the enemy group occurred from November 19 to 23 as a result of Soviet troops delivering flank counter attacks: by the Southwestern Front with the active support of the right wing of the Don Front from the Serafimovich area from the bridgehead on the Don on November 19 and the Stalingrad Front from the Sarpinskie Lakes area on November 20 in the general direction on Kalach-Sovetsky. During the 5-day encirclement, the 3rd Romanian Army and the 48th German Tank Corps were defeated; the German 4th Panzer Army and the Romanian 4th Army suffered significant losses; The 6th Field Army lost 73 thousand people killed, wounded and captured, including 39 thousand prisoners. As a result of the offensive, one of the largest groupings in the history of war was surrounded - 22 divisions and 160 separate units of the 6th and parts of the 4th tank armies with a total number of up to 330,000 people.

By the end of November, Soviet troops had created an external encirclement front and halved the area occupied by the encircled enemy. Further offensive was stopped by the stubborn resistance of the enemy, who thickened the battle formations by reducing the front and organized defense in positions prepared by Soviet troops in the summer of 1942.

On December 12, 1942, in order to release the encircled group from the Kotelnikovsky area, the Goth army group launched an offensive. Taking advantage of the great numerical superiority over the 51st Army, in particular, over the 4th Mechanized Corps, which took the main blow, with heavy fighting, by December 19, it advanced 40 km to the line of the Aksai River and was 80 km from the Stalingrad pocket . However, by December 19, the main forces of the 2nd Guards Army had already been deployed at the turn of the Myshkova River, sent by the Supreme High Command Staff to defeat the Goth group. This meant the failure of the unblocking strike. Until December 23, the Goth group, without encountering strong resistance from the deliberately retreating troops of the 4th Mechanized Corps, advanced to the line of the Myshkova River, 35–40 km from the encircled troops. On August 24, the 2nd Guards Army, in cooperation with the 51st Army, launched a counteroffensive. By December 31, the Goth group was completely defeated and thrown back 200-250 km.

From December 16 to 31, troops of the Southwestern Front, during Operation Little Saturn, defeated the 8th Italian Army and the Hollidt task force in the Middle Don, which were preparing to begin the relief of the encircled group together with the Goth group.

From January 10 to February 2, 1943, troops of the Don Front carried out Operation Ring to dissect and destroy the encircled group. As a result of this operation, the northern and southern enemy groups, separated from each other, capitulated on January 28 and February 2, 1943, respectively. 91,545 enemy soldiers and officers were captured, including 24 generals led by Field Marshal General F. Paulus. Another 16,800 were captured before Operation Ring began. Total number of prisoners taken in the Stalingrad offensive operation German soldiers and officers - 232,000. In addition, up to 30,000 Romanian (from the 3rd Romanian Army) and about 60,000 Italian (from the 8th Italian Army) soldiers and officers were captured.

Operation Uranus ended in a crushing defeat of the Nazi troops, whose total losses for the first time during the Great Patriotic War significantly exceeded the losses of the Red Army, and irretrievable losses exceeded the irretrievable losses of the Red Army by more than 2 times. The defeat of the Nazi troops, carried out by Soviet troops, without significant superiority in forces, was a triumph of Soviet military art and marked a radical turning point in the course of the Great Patriotic War.

Operation Uranus created the preconditions for the successful conduct of Operation Little Saturn and the defeat of Italian and German troops in the Middle Don with the goal of defeating the entire Army Group B. During the Ostrogozh-Rossoshansky operation from January 13 to 27, the 2nd Hungarian and the remnants of the 8th Italian army were defeated. Over 120 thousand people were destroyed and captured. Even further north, the Voronezh-Kastornensky cauldron included the remnants of the Hungarian troops and the main forces of the 2nd German Army (9 divisions from the 3rd Army Corps). From January 24 to February 2, they were defeated, over 100 thousand German soldiers died or were captured. The defeat and mass surrender began even before the group was completely surrounded. The remnants of several divisions (totaling about 20 thousand people) went for a breakthrough, but only a few thousand managed to escape from the encirclement by mid-February. Thus, the entire Army Group B was defeated.

Notes

1. Isaev A.V. Stalingrad. There is no land for us beyond the Volga. - M.: Yauza, Eksmo, 2008.
2. http://militera.lib.ru/h/isaev_av8/14.html
3. http://www.soldat.ru/doc/casualties/book/chapter5_10_1.html#5_10_9 Quote error Invalid tag : The name "" is defined multiple times for different contents
4. http://militera.lib.ru/h/isaev_av8/15.html
5. http://ru.wikipedia.org/wiki/Italian_campaign_in_USSR_(1941-1943)
6. The classification has been removed: Losses of the Armed Forces of the USSR in wars, hostilities and military conflicts: Stat. research / G. F. Krivosheev, V. M. Andronikov, P. D. Burikov. - M.: Military Publishing House, 1993. P. 178-182, 369-370. ISBN 5-203-01400-0
7. http://www.victory.mil.ru/war/oper/120.html
8. Samsonov A. M. “Battle of Stalingrad”
9. Military Encyclopedic Dictionary. "Military Publishing House" 1986, 2nd ed. Page 768
10. « The Headquarters entrusted the leadership of the preparation of the operation on the ground for the Southwestern and Don Fronts to G.K. Zhukov, and for the Stalingrad Front to the Chief of the General Staff» Samsonov A. M. “The Battle of Stalingrad” M.: “Science” 3rd edition. page 338. Note. During the life of J.V. Stalin, the main merit in the development of the Stalingrad offensive operation was attributed to him (to verify this, it is enough to compare, say, the corresponding chapters of textbooks: “History of the USSR” (edited by Nechkina M.V.), M.: Uchpedgiz , 1949, and for example “History of the USSR” (edited by Shestakov A.V.), M.: Uchpedgiz, 1962.). Also in the early 60s. the version that “walked through the pages of history” was that the “idea of ​​encirclement” was born on October 6 at the command of the Stalingrad Front, i.e. A. I. Eremenko and N. S. Khrushchev himself (member of the Military Council of the front). This is refuted by A.M. Vasilevsky, pointing out that on October 6, at the command post of the Stalingrad Front, he conveyed to the front command the plan for the upcoming counteroffensive (see Military Historical Journal, 1965, No. 10, Art. 20). G.K. Zhukov notes that the development and planning of a strategic operation, which was “Uran,” was within the competence of the SVGK and the General Staff and, in principle, could not be carried out by the front command.
11. "Stalingrad. History lessons." M.: Progress publishing house. 1976. p. 279 (data from F. Paulus).
12. Beevor E. “Stalingrad”.: Smolensk - Rusich. 1999
13. Irreversible losses of the Red Army amounted to 155 thousand people, sanitary losses - 303 thousand people. The irretrievable losses of the Wehrmacht in the Stalingrad cauldron alone are about 300 thousand people; irretrievable losses only by prisoners of the Wehrmacht and allies in the Stalingrad offensive operation - over 300,000 people; total according to Soviet data - over 800 thousand people.

Second World War Utkin Anatoly Ivanovich

Operation Uranus

Operation Uranus

No one expected Chuikov to be more resilient than godfathers plan "Uranus". From planning itself they moved on to the stage of dislocation and deployment of forces. The directions of the strikes were determined. From the north - in the direction southwest of Serafimovich. From the south - to the area southwest of the Krivaya and Chira rivers. The goal of the northerners (Southwestern Front) is to destroy the third Romanian army and break out to Kalach. The main thing: on the third day of the offensive, close ranks with the troops of the Stalingrad Front near the village of Sovetsky. The task of the Stalingrad Front is to attack from Lake Sarpa, destroy the 6th Romanian Corps and turn to the north-west (Soviet), where they will close ranks with their brothers in arms (South-Western Front). And then, finally, rush to save Stalingrad. The Don Front was intended to move forward from the villages of Kletskaya and Kalashinskaya in the general direction to the Vertyachiy farmstead in order to encircle and destroy the enemy in the bend of the Don. Then find cooperation with the Southwestern Front for the final encirclement of the entire Stalingrad group. The Southwestern Front was ordered to cover more than 100 kilometers within three days; to the Stalingrad Front - more than 80 kilometers in two days; in the rear of the enemy, it was necessary to block his supply lines along the Chir River, etc. According to the Uranus plan, the main burden fell on the Southwestern Front, which was supposed to mainly encircle the enemy group between the Volga and Don.

The Wehrmacht is becoming a weaker side; a sober perception of events required this recognition. The German army still pays tribute to the habit of methodical effort, but its meaning is becoming increasingly obscure. Perhaps, if common sense prevailed, it would be worth thinking about leaving inhospitable lands. A winter on Chir or even Mius might have maintained the dynamics of the invasion force. At this point, German military talent would have to admit that the Soviet Union was not showing tangible and growing signs of weakness as the Battle of Stalingrad progressed and, if one really wanted to believe that “the last battalion will decide the matter,” then this battalion - as it became increasingly clear , will not necessarily be German. But the Nazi regime rested not on national common sense, but on the pathos of omnipotence. The leaders of the Third Reich could not abandon the doctrine of racial superiority; this would have been their political suicide. But it was even more suicidal to praise and hope for victory where loss of control and overexertion created a vacuum that the defending side did not fail to fill.

The most attractive German illusion is “the Russians are losing even more.” Perhaps this was true in specific areas. But on the grand canvas of history, a huge people with a sacrificial nature was just beginning to enter a state of revealing internal dynamics, extracting unprecedented energy from growing hatred of a self-confident enemy. This people began to demonstrate with crystal clarity their sense of national self-preservation. The frustrated despair of the first year of war gives way to a murderous and irreversible determination to give everything and survive. Probably Hitler, in principle, was incapable of soberly assessing other peoples and the pathos that possessed these peoples. And those standing nearby were either indoctrinated, selfish, or cowardly.

As the English historian A. Clark writes, “in Stalingrad, what was at stake was not only the willpower of the Russians, but the worldwide assessment of German power. To leave the battlefield would be an admission of defeat, which, perhaps, was acceptable for a distantly calculating military professional, but was absolutely unthinkable for the “cosmic orientation of world political forces.” Impossible for the crude nationalism of the Nazi rulers.

Paulus contributed to his downfall by cheerfully presenting figures and facts that were not an adequate assessment of the current situation. Something more was required than the Roman calm of Scipio Africanus, who burned his ships. The Wehrmacht still possessed colossal strength, but it had already begun to lose its life-saving connection with reality. Paulus wanted to look like a calm demigod on the brink of an abyss, but he did so at the risk of half a million soldiers. Paulus constantly overestimated the size of the mass of troops controlled by Chuikov. This created a feeling among the leaders of the Reich that the 6th Army was carrying out a grandiose mission, tying such large Russian formations to itself. Paulus constantly emphasized that his military machine was crushing the huge mass of Soviet troops. This provided additional justification for supporters of the concept of “staying on the Volga until the end,” since if the 6th Army absorbs all the living forces of the Red Army, then the question of the latter’s offensive actions disappears. This argument alone was enough to “sit on the Volga” as best method exclude a Soviet counter-offensive.

Racial arrogance ruled out close interaction between Paulus and his Balkan and Italian allies. The Romanians covering the flanks of the 6th Army were organized on the model of the French division of the First World War and armed with weapons captured by the Germans from the French in 1940. The few anti-tank guns were hopelessly outdated. Only in October 1942 did the Romanians receive 75 mm guns (six per division). All German observers noted that the Romanians were building good dugouts for officers, but poor defensive structures for the bulk of the troops.

What did the battle of intellects say? To be fair, it should be said that already at the end of August Gehlen presented to the German high command an analysis of possible Russian initiatives. According to the head of military intelligence, there were five of them:

Gaining control over the city of Stalingrad;

Attack on the flank of the German sixth army with further advance to Rostov;

Attack on the German flank in the area of ​​Serafimovich and Korotoyak;

Attack on Voronezh;

Attack in a western direction from Astrakhan.

On October 13, Gehlen expressed the view that none of the potentially possible Russian offensive operations would begin before the autumn thaw. However, he noted the accumulation of Soviet troops, “possibly for operations against the Don front.” German aerial reconnaissance confirmed the fact of the accumulation of Soviet troops north of the Don.

Gradually, front-line intelligence officers began to show unrest. On October 27, intelligence lieutenant Karl Ostarhild addressed the two leading figures of the 6th Army, Generals Paulus and Schmidt, with his warnings about the dangers from the gathering forces of the enemy. The lieutenant collected various types of intelligence data for several weeks, he interviewed prisoners of war, looked at aerial reconnaissance photographs, listened to radio intercepts, and observed the front line. As a result, he came to the conclusion that “a large number of troops and weapons are concentrated in the Kletskaya area... This shock army, armed to the teeth, with impressive numbers... Its offensive plans extend all the way to the Black Sea.” Paulus, who did not react outwardly, asked for additional information. And he asked if all this was known to his army intelligence. Schmidt warned the young officer that it was better to answer such a question in the affirmative. Ostarhild said that it is known, but in less detail. Then Paulus told his concerned interlocutors that he would ask for additional reserves. After Paulus's departure, the disappointed Ostarhild returned to his cards. It was not clear to him whether the leadership of the 6th Army understood the meaning of his warnings.

Defectors reported the arrival of large reinforcements of the Red Army not only on the Don - in the north, but also south of Stalingrad, opposite the German 4th Army - in Beketovka and near Lake Tsatsa. Romanian intelligence also expressed concern. Around the tenth of October, Romanian units finally gained a foothold in positions covering the flanks of the 6th Army. Almost immediately, Romanian intelligence discovered concentrations of Red Army forces. The Romanian commander took his concerns to Vinnitsa, to Werwolf, to Hitler. In parallel, on October 27, the Romanian commander, General Dumitrescu, sent a report to Weichs, which noted the increased number of Don crossings from the Soviet front, constant attacks from the Soviet side, which could easily be interpreted as a search for a weak point in the Romanian positions, and words from prisoners of war about arriving reinforcements. Paulus sent reconnaissance planes into the sky, they did not report anything sensational, and Paulus, who flew to Weichs, did not express much alarm. It should be taken into account that the Romanians, who also took over the former Italian sector, “oversaw” twenty kilometers of remote steppe with each division - a very loose wall. Nevertheless, the Germans did not express concern and tried to reassure their Romanian ally.

From his headquarters in Golubinka, Paulus addressed his troops, trying to sum up the results and outline the prospects. "1. The summer and autumn offensive ended successfully with the capture of Stalingrad... The Sixth Army played a significant role in controlling the Russian troops. The actions of the leadership and troops during the offensive will go down in history as a page full of glory. 2. Winter is approaching, and the Russians will try to take advantage of its onset. 3. It is unlikely that the Russians will fight with the same strength as they did last winter.” Paulus' headquarters “positively identified” the presence in Kletskaya of “three new infantry divisions with tanks; one new armored, one new motorized and two new infantry formations.” Near Blinov there are “two new infantry formations with several tanks.” But the Soviet offensive will be no stronger than the numerous attempts to advance that the Wehrmacht had repelled without much difficulty in the past.

Why did General Paulus, an experienced staff member and commander, ignore serious warnings? First of all, one should take into account the psychological burden weighing on him. He lost a huge number of soldiers without fully completing the task assigned to him. Perhaps, in hindsight, he thought about the need to capture Stalingrad with all his might back in September. He certainly relied unduly on the OKH and the headquarters of the "B" armies as an omniscient leadership thinking about his flanks. He could not have imagined in advance the extent of the weakness of the allied Romanian and Italian troops. Not knowing the future, he gave too much great importance"Germany, which looks at us." Germany could not believe the carelessness of one of its best generals.

Paulus was irritated by criticism similar to the harsh statements of the Luftwaffe generals. On November 1, Freiherr von Richthofen approached him with the same arrogant criticisms that affected Paulus’s pride. “The real explanation (for the lack of success. - A.U.) is the fatigue of both the troops and the command, as well as rigid army conservatism, which accepts as the norm the presence of one thousand soldiers at the front where twelve thousand are supposed to be, which leads the generals only to complacently announce their orders.” Paulus did not take these indirect and direct reproaches very easily from air force, who were losing control in the air, did not bring in enough supplies and at the same time harshly judged the soldiers who were holding out in the Stalingrad catacombs with all their strength.

Unlike many German military leaders, the commander of the air fleet, General Richthofen, did everything possible to slow down the concentration of Soviet troops. His planes bombed Serafimovich and Kletskaya, he tried in every possible way to disrupt the movement of trains along the only railway line serving to supply the Russian armies. His pilots saw that the Russians on pontoons were crossing the Don, which was just beginning to freeze. In his diary we read about the anxiety that consumed him. “November 12th. The Russians are resolutely making their preparations for offensive actions against the Romanians... Their reserves are already concentrated. I wonder when the offensive will begin?... The guns are already taking up combat positions. I can only hope that the Russians don’t punch too many holes in our defenses!”

Intuition did not let down the evil genius of German propaganda - Goebbels. On November 15, the official newspaper Das Reich published his article, which was very different from the prevailing bravado. One gets the impression that Goebbels gradually began to prepare the Germans for news that was not always triumphant. For the first time, the Minister of Propaganda says that “national existence is at stake. And there is no turning back." Even Army Chief of Staff Zeitzler allowed himself a pessimistic note: “If we cannot find a solution now, when the Russians are experiencing real difficulties due to the Volga being blocked by ice, then we will never be able to find it.”

And the preparations of the Soviet side were already in full swing. Heavily loaded trains with equipment and people thundered from the direction of Moscow and the Urals. More than two hundred thousand people arrived. The 5th Tank Army arrived, ten rifle divisions, one tank and two cavalry corps, twenty artillery regiments, and six Katyusha regiments moved south. Ten thousand cavalry horses, hundreds of tanks - 900 new T-34s, and heavy artillery arrived along the single-track route. 115 Katyusha divisions, 110 air regiments - 1,100 aircraft, half of the country's artillery reserve arrived. A huge force was gathering. The unloading points were Serafimovich and Kletskaya - 200 and 160 kilometers northwest of Stalingrad. The soldiers took the oath at the regimental banners, and the recruits received weapons. IN free time they sang a lot. Demoralized troops do not sing.

The problem of preparation was complicated by the fact that both the Southwestern and Don Fronts had, as already mentioned, only one railway line and all preparations for the battle hung in the balance: any successful German pilot could drop bombs on the real life line of the huge front. The South-Eastern and Ryazan-Ural directions of the railway took on the main burden of transportation. Axes and shovels were driven into the ground that was beginning to freeze, and the construction of additional branches began. In the area around Stalingrad, drivers of 27 thousand trucks were now revving their wheels, cursing the pliable black soil. It was at this time that Stalin asked Churchill for trucks.

Ultimately, the troops were consolidated into four tank corps, three mechanized corps and fourteen independent tank brigades. And all this on a front of seventy kilometers, which represents the greatest density of troops in all campaigns that have taken place so far on the Soviet-German front.

Zhukov brought troops to the city, and the city froze in vague anticipation. “Sometimes the silence was more discouraging than the roar of explosions over a city that seemed extinct. But the city continued to watch, although no one could distinguish night from day. Even during these short periods of silence, every factory, every destroyed house gazed at everything around them. The all-seeing eyes of the snipers watched the slightest movement, any maneuver of the enemy. Supply groups, loaded with mines and shells, hurried along the trenches zigzagging between the ruins. From the heights of the upper floors, artillery observers monitored the area. In the basements, commanders bent over maps, assistants typed on typewriters, transmitted messages, and gave instructions to the soldiers. Miners busy with their dangerous work, dug underground passages, trying to find the enemy’s passages.”

Outside the city, Rokossovsky and Eremenko built three lines of defense. Their third partner - the commander of the Southwestern Front (63rd, 21st, 5th Tank, 17th Aviation Army) was Lieutenant General Vatutin. Its front included the best, proven units from the Don and Voronezh fronts. General Stelmakh, one of the best artillery officers, became Vatutin’s chief of staff. The commander of the tank army is General Romanenko, who back in 1940 spoke to the command of the Red Army about breakthrough operations, which met German tanks head-on throughout 1941. At Vatutin’s request, General Krasovsky became the commander of his aviation.

General Batov took command of the 4th Tank Army. Naturally, the first question to the chief of staff of the army was the question of the size of his army. He replied that his army could rightfully be called a “four-tank” army, since it had exactly four tanks. But not for long. At night, trains with Ural armor thundered through the stations, and this time the homeland threw all its forces into battle. And the young tank crews looked with curiosity at the ineradicable glow on the horizon. Stalingrad was burning and facing death. Batov took a place on Rokossovsky’s extreme right flank; his task was perhaps the most important in the entire balance of power. Nearby stood the 24th Army of Galanin and the 66th Army of Zhadov.

But will the city survive? Chuikov moved to the fourth (in seven weeks) command post. This time it was built extensively in the shape of the letter T in the depths of a large cliff, behind the 284th division, with exits to the Volga, covered with a ten-meter thickness of earth. But his army was melting away. There were fierce hand-to-hand battles. The few surviving people of Zholudev joined the 118th regiment of Colonel Ivan Lyudnikov, as did the remnants of Gurtiev’s 308th division. Only seven thousand defenders came to Stalingrad in these difficult days. And Chuikov knew that Paulus was preparing a new offensive aimed at the industrial zone. The famous Austrian division “Hoch und Deutschmeister” arrived to him, and was tasked with breaking through to the “Barricades”. Chuikov reorganized his forces, but the Trans-Volga artillery support began to weaken. She began to move in an unknown direction. Something was happening nearby. Anticipation hung in the air.

Colonel Lyudnikov openly, without any code, spoke about his incredible difficulties to Chuikov (without calling him by name). He promised help, but somehow not firmly. And Lyudnikov could understand the army commander - nascent ice floes were floating along the Volga, ships in this ice situation could not carry out regular voyages. The left bank was losing its saving significance. The invasion of the “pioneers” who burned out the basements weakened the heroic garrison. They also had their own heroes. Among them is "Roller" - a group of four desperate fighters, whose exploits were passed down from mouth to mouth. But all this was of little consolation. On November 14, Chuikov reported to the front command: “Not a single ship has arrived. Supplies have been reduced for three days in a row. Reinforcements are not arriving, and our troops are experiencing an acute shortage of ammunition and food... Drifting ice has completely cut off communications with the left bank.”

The crossing took 5 hours instead of peaceful 50 minutes due to German aviation. Nascent ice floes floated along the Volga; this, as already mentioned, threatened to completely paralyze the passage through the Volga. But the track engineers have already established the battle above and below fifty pontoon bridges. It was necessary to hurry, the north wind already promised freezing. Until November 15, the crossings were operated only at night, but then - due to pressing time - the flow began at all times of the day. And yet, at night, cars and tanks walked without lights, and during the day they carefully camouflaged themselves from air surprises. It was decided that Batov’s tanks, which were solving the main task of a quick breakthrough and encirclement in a five-kilometer offensive zone, would be followed by troops on trucks - a new feature of this mechanized war. Tolbukhin broke through the front along the 25-kilometer offensive zone. Rudenko's 16th Aviation Army will cover Batov's tanks from above. Perhaps for the first time in this war, we seriously studied the decisive interaction of armor and duralumin. Tanks and cavalry were called the “echelon of development of success.” Their speed and accuracy were everything.