THE USSR. Thanks to his instincts and personal qualities, he was able to hold on as head of the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs for 28 years. No one else has been able to repeat this. It was not for nothing that he was considered diplomat No. 1. Although he also had mistakes in his career. This person will be discussed in the article.

Basic biography facts

Andrei Gromyko was born on July 5, 1909 in the village of Starye Gromyki (the territory of modern Belarus). He came from a poor family, and at the age of 13 he began to earn a living by helping his father. Education of a future diplomat:

• seven-year school;
• vocational school (Gomel);
• Staroborisovsky Agricultural College;
• Economic Institute (Minsk);
• postgraduate studies at the Academy of Sciences of the BSSR;
• received an academic degree from the Institute of Economics of the USSR Academy of Sciences.

To work in the department of the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs, Andrei Gromyko, whose biography is being considered, met two main requirements. Namely, he was of peasant-proletarian origin and spoke a foreign language.

Thus began his career in diplomacy. Already in 1939, Andrei Andreevich was appointed adviser to the USSR mission in the USA from 1939 to 1943. From 1943 to 1946 he was appointed Soviet ambassador to the United States. In addition, he took Active participation in diplomatic relations with Cuba, preparations for the three world wars (Potsdam, Yalta). The diplomat had a direct relationship with

Participation in the UN

Soviet politician Andrei Andreevich Gromyko was one of those who stood at the origins of the UN in post-war period. It is his flourish that stands under the Charter of the international organization. He was a participant and later the head of the USSR delegation at sessions of the UN General Assembly.

In the Security Council, the diplomat had which he used to defend the foreign policy interests of the USSR.

Work at the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Andrei Gromyko was the head of the USSR Foreign Ministry from 1957 to 1985. During this time, he contributed to the negotiation process on, among other things, the reduction of nuclear tests.

Due to his tough style in conducting diplomatic negotiations, the diplomat began to be called “Mr. No” in the foreign press. Although he himself noted that in negotiations he had to hear negative answers from his opponents much more often.

The diplomat experienced the greatest difficulties in working at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs under Khrushchev, who was not satisfied with the lack of flexibility in Andrei Andreevich’s negotiations. The situation changed under Brezhnev's leadership of the country. They have developed trusting relationship. This period is considered the heyday of the influence of diplomat No. 1 on state and party affairs of the USSR.

Until the end of his life Gromyko studied state affairs. He retired in 1988 and died less than a year later.

Involvement in the Cuban Missile Crisis

By 1962, the confrontation between the USSR and the USA had reached its climax. This period was called To a certain extent, what happened was related to the position of the diplomat. Andrei Gromyko held negotiations on this issue with John Kennedy, but, not having reliable information, the Soviet statesman could not conduct them at the proper level.

The essence of the conflict between the two superpowers of that time was the USSR's deployment of its nuclear-powered missiles on Cuban territory. The weapons were placed off the coast of the United States and classified as “top secret.” Therefore, Andrei Andreevich, whose biography is being reviewed, knew nothing about Gromyko’s operation.

After the United States provided images confirming that the Soviet Union was indeed using Cuban territory to create a military threat against the United States, a decision was made to implement a “quarantine.” This meant that all ships within a certain distance from Cuba were subject to inspection.

The Soviet Union decided to remove the missiles, and the threat of nuclear war was removed. The world lived in anticipation of war for 38 days. The resolution of the Cuban missile crisis led to detente in relations between East and West. Has begun new period in international relations.

In honor of this politician, as Andrey Andreevich Gromyko, a street and school in the city of Vetka (Belarus) are named. And in Gomel, a bronze bust was erected to him. By 2009, compatriots issued a postage stamp dedicated to the diplomat.

There are a number of unconfirmed facts about the diplomat’s activities:

• in 1985, at a meeting of the Politburo, it was Andrei Andreevich who proposed the candidacy of Mikhail Gorbachev for the highest post in the country, but after 1988 he began to regret his decision;
• he expressed his motto in diplomacy in one phrase: “Better ten years of negotiations than one day of war”;
• despite the strong Belarusian accent in pronunciation, the statesman knew English perfectly, as evidenced by the memoirs of translator Viktor Sukhodrev;
• from 1958 to 1987 he was the editor-in-chief of the monthly International Affairs.

Many will object to me if they say that the last Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR was not Gromyko, but Shevardnadze. In principle, this is true, but Andrei Gromyko was the last only because he died during the Soviet era. The Soviet Union ceased to exist 2.5 years after his death. After the collapse of the Union, Shevardnazde became the president of independent Georgia, replacing Zviad Gamsakhurdia in this post. Gromyko was raised from the depths folk life a powerful and terrible process of changing the political elite, which began after the forces of the national bourgeoisie, pressing from below on the imperial power, in alliance with the liberal intelligentsia, without finding a compromise, brought down the state. It was then that their unexpected heirs came to light in the person of peasant children, sons of priests, small entrepreneurs, the lower layers of the bureaucracy and the intelligentsia. According to Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, Gromyko was “a great diplomat of the Soviet era.”

On the recommendation of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Belarus, Gromyko, together with several comrades, was accepted into graduate school at the Academy of Sciences of the BSSR, which was created in Minsk and trained economists of a wide profile. At the end of 1934, 25-year-old Gromyko was transferred to Moscow. After defending his PhD thesis on US agriculture in 1936, Gromyko was sent to the Agricultural Research Institute Russian Academy of Agricultural Sciences as a senior researcher. During his graduate studies and work on his dissertation, Gromyko studied in depth English language. At the end of 1938, Andrei Andreevich became the scientific secretary of the Institute of Economics of the USSR Academy of Sciences, and also taught political economy to students at the Moscow Institute of Engineers municipal construction. It was planned to send Gromyko to work as a scientific secretary at the Far Eastern Branch of the Academy of Sciences.

In addition to working at the Institute of Economics in 1937-1939, Gromyko did a lot of self-education, continued to study economics using materials from Soviet and foreign publications, studied English, gave lectures to workers and collective farmers, participated in shooting competitions and fulfilled the norm for receiving the Voroshilov Shooter badge ", tried to enter an aviation school and become a military pilot, but was not accepted due to his age. In his memoirs “Memorable,” published in 1988, Gromyko did not mention a word about the repressions of the 1930s, but his biography, published in 2002, edited by the then Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation Igor Ivanov, states that it was with the repressions and purges The People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs is responsible for the sharp turn in Gromyko's fate.


At the beginning of 1939, Gromyko was invited to the commission of the Central Committee of the party, chaired by Molotov and Malenkov. The commission selected new workers from among the communists who could be sent to diplomatic work. In the second half of the 1930s, as a result Stalin's repressions There was a shortage of personnel in the apparatus of the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs. New employees were recruited into the People's Commissariat staff, for whom two main requirements were presented: peasant-proletarian origin and at least some knowledge of a foreign language. Under the current conditions, Gromyko’s candidacy was an ideal fit for the personnel department of the People’s Commissariat of Foreign Affairs of the USSR: he spoke English and read English literature fluently, which he confidently demonstrated. I was captivated by his education, youth, a certain “rusticism” and the pleasant soft Belarusian accent with which Gromyko spoke until his death. Gromyko’s heroic height, 185 cm, also attracted attention. “I became a diplomat by accident,” Andrei Andreevich explained to his son many years later. - The choice could have fallen on another guy from among the workers and peasants, and this is already a pattern. Malik, Zorin, Dobrynin and hundreds of others came to diplomacy with me in the same way.”

Taking into account Andrei Andreevich's lack of necessary knowledge and experience in military affairs, one of Gromyko's informal mentors in the diplomatic sphere was the head of the Foreign Relations Department of the General Staff Armed Forces USSR, employee of the Main Intelligence Directorate, Lieutenant General Alexander Vasiliev. When Gromyko led the Soviet delegation to the conference at Dumbarton Oaks, Washington, USA, in 1944 to create the United Nations, Lieutenant General Vasiliev was his adviser on military issues.
Andrei Gromyko was Foreign Minister for 28 years, from 1957 to 1985. According to the Cold War theory, essentially proclaimed by Winston Churchill to the applause of Harry Truman, it turns out that Gromyko was a “Cold War” minister; they tried to demonize him with the help of the propaganda label “Mr. No.”

“Mr. No” did not arise as a result of the minister’s “constant refusals” to agree to Western proposals. This simply did not happen. This image is the product of a special kitchen for developing images that were tried on for it.
The political, diplomatic and military confrontation between the USSR and the USA in the fall of 1962, known in history as the Cuban Missile Crisis, is to some extent connected with Gromyko’s position in negotiations with American President John Kennedy. Negotiations on resolving the Caribbean crisis in its most acute stage, according to the memoirs of Soviet diplomat and intelligence officer Alexander Feklisov, were carried out outside the official diplomatic channel. An informal connection between the leaders of the great powers, Kennedy and Khrushchev, was established through the so-called “Scali-Fomin channel,” which involved: on the American side, the president’s younger brother, Justice Minister Robert Kennedy, and his friend, ABC television journalist John Scali, and on the Soviet side, career intelligence officers of the KGB apparatus Alexander Feklisov (operational pseudonym in 1962 - “Fomin”), KGB resident in Washington, and his immediate superior in Moscow, Lieutenant General Alexander Sakharovsky.

The operation of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the USSR to place Soviet missiles with atomic charges on the island of Cuba in the Western Hemisphere off the coast of the United States was planned and carried out under the heading “top secret”. In order to maintain secrecy, Khrushchev, according to the memoirs of diplomat Feklisov, took an unprecedented step: the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs and its head Gromyko were not informed of the military operation off the coast of America. Neither the ambassador nor the military attaché at the USSR Embassy in Washington had information about the events taking place. Under these conditions, Gromyko was not able to provide American President Kennedy with reliable information about the deployment of Soviet ballistic and tactical missiles with nuclear warheads on the island of Cuba.


On June 10, 1968, a year after the Six-Day War in the Middle East and the resulting rupture of relations between the USSR and Israel, the CPSU Central Committee received a joint letter from the leadership of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the KGB of the USSR, signed by Gromyko and Andropov, with a proposal to allow Jews to emigrate. Based on humanistic considerations and the desire to strengthen the international authority of the USSR, Gromyko made efforts to soften the Soviet Union's policy regarding repatriation to Israel in the late 1960s and early 1970s. Andropov, who did not take any “national interests” or the prestige of the state on the world stage seriously, achieved the introduction of a procedure under which Soviet Jews leaving for permanent residence in Israel were required to reimburse the costs of their studies at Soviet universities. Gromyko objected, convincing the Soviet leadership that such a decision, which violated human rights, would entail a heavy blow to the foreign policy reputation of the USSR. Only a few years later Andropov became convinced that Gromyko was right; the decision “on compensation for studies” was not officially canceled, but was seemingly forgotten and in practice ceased to be implemented.

Interestingly, in the late 70s, Turkey announced that it was considering closing the passage through the Bosphorus to the Mediterranean for Soviet warships.


In response to this statement, Comrade Andrei Andreevich Gromyko (Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR from 1957 to 1985) told American journalists at a cocktail party in the White House that the USSR Black Sea Fleet would only need a couple of salvos of missiles to pass into the Mediterranean. As a result of this, in addition to the Bosphorus, two more passages to the Mediterranean will appear, but, alas, there will be no Istanbul. After these words, Turkey never again raised the issue of closing the Bosphorus to Soviet warships.


Gromyko personally conducted the most difficult negotiations in the USA and the UN, and most often flew across the Atlantic. He negotiated with American diplomats more and more willingly than with anyone else. It was noted that Gromyko did not like to visit Japan, since in the Land of the Rising Sun all negotiations invariably turned to the dead-end problem of the “northern territories.” During his 28-year career, Gromyko never visited Africa, Australia or Latin America(except Cuba). I visited India only once.

Gromyko took a direct part in preparing the first official visit of the US President to Moscow on May 22-30, 1972, the signing of the Treaty between the USSR and the USA on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Defense Systems (AB Treaty) during the meeting between Brezhnev and Nixon, Temporary Agreement between the USSR and the USA on Certain Measures in the Field of Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (SALT-1), Fundamentals of Relations between the USSR and the USA. Gromyko prepared the first official visit of the Soviet leader to the United States on June 18-26, 1973, where Brezhnev signed an agreement with Nixon on the prevention of nuclear war, the non-use of nuclear weapons, and the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty. Gromyko also prepared negotiations between Brezhnev and US President Ford on November 23-24, 1974 in the Vladivostok region, which resulted in the signing of a joint Soviet-American Statement, in which the parties confirmed their intention to conclude a new agreement on SALT for the period until the end of 1985. With the participation of Gromyko, on June 18, 1979 in Vienna, Brezhnev and US President Carter signed the Treaty between the USSR and the USA on the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (SALT-2 Treaty).

Gromyko was the first representative Soviet leadership, who made an official visit to Italy (April 1966) - before this, relations with Italy, as one of the main countries participating in the Hitler coalition, were strained by the Soviet Union.


The tough style of diplomatic negotiations of his predecessor Vyacheslav Molotov greatly influenced the corresponding style of Gromyko. Andrei Andreevich began negotiations only after thorough preparation, having thoroughly delved into the essence of the matter. Important preparatory stage he considered the selection of materials for negotiations, did it on his own in order to be aware of important details at any moment of the discussion - this quality allowed him to dominate over a less experienced and sophisticated interlocutor. Avoiding improvisation, Gromyko followed the instructions he had previously drawn up for himself. He was prone to protracted negotiations, he could carry on them for many hours, without rushing anywhere, without losing sight or memory of anything. On the table in front of Gromyko there was a folder with directives, but Andrei Andreevich opened it only if it was about technical details, for example in disarmament issues, and it was necessary to check the numbers. Gromyko kept the rest of the necessary information in his mind, which distinguished him favorably from his American counterparts, who read important passages from pieces of paper taken from bulging folders

Gromyko’s main foreign policy mistake was the introduction Soviet troops to Afghanistan Adviser to American President Carter Zb. Brzezinski would later say: “Now the Soviets will get their Vietnam.”

After Suslov’s death in early 1982, Gromyko, according to published materials, tried through Andropov to find out the possibility of moving to the vacated position of “second person” in the informal party hierarchy of the USSR. At the same time, he proceeded from the probable prospect of the “second person” eventually becoming “first”. In response, Andropov cautiously referred to Brezhnev’s exceptional competence in personnel matters, but after Brezhnev’s death, having become General Secretary, Andropov nevertheless appointed Gromyko First Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR. Gromyko held this post from March 1983 to July 1985. KGB Chairman V. Kryuchkov, in his book “Personal Affair...”, recalls his conversation with Gromyko in January 1988. Then Andrei Andreevich mentioned that in 1985, after Chernenko’s death, his colleagues in the Politburo offered him to take the post Secretary General The Central Committee of the CPSU, however, Gromyko refused in favor of Gorbachev.

After Chernenko’s death, at the March Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee on March 11, 1985, Gromyko proposed Gorbachev’s candidacy for the post of General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee - in fact, the first person of the state. According to the testimony of Gromyko’s grandson Alexei Anatolyevich, referring to his grandfather’s story, on that day the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR decisively took the floor first at a meeting of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee and gave a brief positive characterization M. S. Gorbachev and nominated him to the highest post in the state, which was supported by his colleagues. Subsequently, observing what was happening in the USSR, Gromyko regretted his choice. Observing the destructive processes that had begun in the country, Gromyko sadly remarked about Gorbachev’s nomination in 1988: “Maybe it was my mistake.”

Andrei Andreevich Gromyko died on July 2, 1989 from complications associated with the rupture of an abdominal aortic aneurysm, despite an emergency operation to replace this vital blood vessel. He did not live until his 80th birthday by only 3 days.

Belarusian Postage Stamp, dedicated to the 100th anniversary of the birth of A.A. Gromyko
Gromyko indeed became the last Soviet foreign minister. Initially, it was announced in Soviet officialdom that Gromyko would be buried on Red Square, near the Kremlin wall, but taking into account the will of the deceased and at the request of his relatives, the funeral took place at the Novodevichy cemetery. This was the last state funeral when it came to the Kremlin necropolis; since then, the question of a funeral on Red Square has never been raised again.


"Mr. No" face
A.A. Gromyko worked under six general secretaries of the CPSU Central Committee for exactly 50 years (1939-1989)! And although Western politicians and journalists called him “Mr. No,” the London newspaper “The Times” wrote about him in September 1981: “Andrei Gromyko may be the most informed foreign minister in the world.” He was respected.

The Soviet diplomat, USSR Ambassador to the USA and Great Britain, Minister of Foreign Affairs, member of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee, Chairman of the Supreme Council Andrei Andreevich Gromyko was well known not only in our country, but also abroad.

Andrey Andreevich, what is your strongest impression from childhood?

When I was a kid, I once heard from my grandmother unusual word. I don’t remember what I did wrong, but she threatened me with her finger and said:
"Oh, you're a democrat! Why are you being naughty?" This happened before the revolution, under the tsar, and she, who knew from hearsay that “democrats” were put in prison and sent to hard labor, decided to intimidate me with this “terrible” word.

You met with almost all post-war US presidents. What was your most unforgettable meeting?

Back in 1945, at a conference in San Francisco, I had the opportunity to meet John Kennedy. He, a popular correspondent, approached me with a request to give him an interview.
Kennedy the journalist did not behave in an intrusive manner; he posed questions in the form as if own reasoning. Then he paused and rather asked with his eyes: do I have any comments on the issue raised? I liked this style. Kennedy retained it later.

Andropov invited you to become not only the Minister of Foreign Affairs, but also the Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Council, that is, the head of the Soviet state. Why did you refuse then?

Because he knew: Andropov himself would soon want to become Chairman of the Presidium. And not because of vanity, but because of the nature of the post of General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee. This is not a government post. The most important state affairs, especially international ones, would sooner or later require the signature of the first person of the Soviet Union.

It is believed that it was you who nominated Gorbachev for the post of Secretary General. Is this really true?

Yes, at the March (1985) Plenum of the Central Committee, on behalf of the Politburo, I made a proposal to elect Mikhail Sergeevich Gorbachev as General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and justified this proposal. The Plenum unanimously adopted a positive decision.

Do you regret helping Gorbachev get this position?

No, I don't regret it. I supported not just Gorbachev, but big changes. We needed an active leader.

Did he live up to your expectations?

The sovereign's hat turned out to be not for Senka, not for Senka!

In Western newspapers you were called "Mr. No". Is it because you used this word so often during negotiations and did not compromise?

They heard my “no” much less often than I heard their “know”, because we put forward much more proposals. In their newspapers they called me “Mr. No” because I did not allow myself to be manipulated. Whoever sought this wanted to manipulate the Soviet Union. We are a great power, and we will not allow anyone to do this!

Now our top political leadership is proud to have abandoned its position of power in international relations...

There is nothing to be proud of here. Peace is a blessing, but not at any cost, and especially not at the expense of one’s own people. If you are proud of your pacifism, do not sit in the chair of the leader of a great power. Be proud at home, in your yard, in your region, but do not harm your state.
I have never fawned over Westerners. We have figures who, as if through clenched teeth and bashfully, defend their own interests. Oh, how not to offend America! We won't get far this way.

I never envied anyone, did not participate in any intrigue, and tried to maintain equal relations with everyone. Diplomacy is a delicate matter. How many times have I been prevented from working! Without exaggeration I will say it a million times!

For example?

For example, Khrushchev was completely out of place at a reception, turning purple, shouting towards foreign diplomats and journalists: “We will bury you!” At the same time, it was difficult to understand what he meant. NATO propaganda naturally exploited this incident to fuel the myth of the Soviet military threat. There was a lot of damage.
Serious diplomacy does not allow buffoonery. And Khrushchev behaved like a real buffoon.

Today many politicians behave like buffoons. For some, this has become the norm of behavior. They probably think that people won’t forget their idiotic antics, just as they don’t forget Khrushchev’s shoe...

It's better to be forgotten than to be called a fool.

What do you consider your greatest personal success?

The consolidation and inviolability of borders in Europe is the main result of my activities as Minister of Foreign Affairs. I think these boundaries will remain. Of course, some changes may occur over the years. If European countries They will abandon the Helsinki agreements and begin to violate them, then territorial conflicts will begin on European soil, old ones will disintegrate and new coalitions will be created. War will come to Europe again.

You never spoke about the USSR's complete renunciation of nuclear weapons. Why?

If we ditch our nuclear weapons, the West will not give up theirs.

But the arms race took away enormous funds from us, which we could, like Japan, invest in truly what the people need production?

Yes, the arms race took a lot of energy. And yet we could not force the Americans to conduct serious disarmament negotiations with us if we lagged behind them. Then the United States would stop taking us into account.

Did you have any enemies?

I have always had two opponents - time and the ignorance of people who were raised to the pinnacle of power by circumstances. Part of the party elite held intrigues, denunciations, and trips to each other in high esteem.

And who in the Kremlin, in your opinion, was a special intriguer, besides Stalin, of course?

Of those with whom I had to work, I put Vyshinsky in first place. He killed many people, but his life was also ruined. Khrushchev loved to pit people against each other. Brezhnev had no taste for intrigue. The removal of Khrushchev was not a conspiracy, it became a necessity, since Nikita Sergeevich lost control of himself and began to destroy the country’s economy and the party. Let's say, suddenly, violating the necessary procedures, he transferred Crimea to Ukraine.

You believed that our troops should not leave Eastern Europe. How did you explain this?

It is impossible to leave the center of Europe, it would be a mistake of a strategic nature, this is our front line of defense, it must be strengthened, not abandoned. My actions stemmed from this. We agreed only to a symbolic reduction of troops in Central Europe. As long as NATO exists.

So you told the West that the Soviet military presence in Europe would remain as long as NATO existed?

How could it be otherwise, we will leave, and war machine, created to threaten us, will remain? Eastern Europe- the sphere of our interests, not the USA and NATO.

Why were you against the unification of Germany?

There are issues that only time can resolve. I did everything to ensure that the GDR was not absorbed by the Federal Republic of Germany. If the United States and its allies had taken our proposal to dissolve NATO and the Warsaw War seriously and agreed to neutralize Germany, then a basis would have arisen for discussing the issue of unification.

The UN supported the bombing of Yugoslavia. It turns out that this international organization, designed to preserve peace, has outlived its usefulness?

The UN will bury itself if it turns into the handmaiden of any one social system or one military-political bloc.

In your memoirs you told a lot interesting facts from international life, but for some reason they didn’t touch upon it at all domestic policy. Afraid to reveal state secrets?

You love catchy words and sensations, but I cannot put on public display something that has been kept under seven seals for many years.
In general, I believe that the economic and especially financial power of capitalism exceeds ours. American capitalism has entangled the globe. Only we can resist this, and perhaps also China, countries rich in raw materials and strong militarily.

What forecast can you make about our relationship with America?

The changing balance of power in favor of the Americans allows them to make many moves. Most likely, they will demand unilateral disarmament from us in exchange for mythical help that will never come. It must be remembered that America will not give us any gifts, either before or now. All our successes in relations with the USA and countries Western Europe will depend on ourselves, the state of our economy, and therefore the pace of its development.

How do you feel about the changes taking place in Russia?

The right thing has been started; we have needed reforms for a long time. But it is not a society of private ownership of the main means of production that needs to be created. There will be no modernization of our country on the basis of wild capitalism; the West got rid of it long ago. We may have a ridiculous society where people's lives will be poisoned.

We still live in conditions of leaderism, although it has appeared to us in a new guise. The situation with collegiality in management is poor. Old lessons are forgotten, new mentors are in fashion, often from the West.

What is your basic life principle?

You should never be discouraged. People die physically, but never spiritually. You have to believe.

Gromyko Andrey Andreevich- Soviet diplomat and statesman, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR, Doctor of Economics.

Born on July 5 (18), 1909 in the village of Starye Gromyki, now Vetkovsky district, Gomel region (Belarus), in the peasant family of Andrei Matveevich Gramyko-Burmakov (1876–1933) and Olga Evgenievna Bekarevich (1884–1948). From the age of 13 I went with my father to earn money. After graduating from a seven-year school (1923), he studied at a vocational school and technical school in the city of Gomel.

In 1932 he graduated from the Minsk Agricultural Institute and entered graduate school. In 1934, as part of a group of graduate students, he was transferred to Moscow. In 1936, he graduated from graduate school at the All-Union Scientific Research Institute of Agricultural Economics in Moscow, defending his dissertation for the degree of Candidate of Economic Sciences. Since 1936, senior researcher, then scientific secretary of the Institute of Economics of the USSR Academy of Sciences.

Since 1939 in diplomatic work. Brilliant career Gromyko in 1939–1957 was associated with powerful political upheavals in the country, to which he himself had no direct connection. In 1939, head of the department of American countries of the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs of the USSR. In 1939–1943, advisor to the USSR Embassy in the USA. In 1943–1946, the USSR Ambassador to the USA and part-time envoy to Cuba. Later – permanent representative of the USSR to the UN (1946–1948), deputy (1946–1949) and first deputy (1949–1952, 1953–1957) Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR, USSR Ambassador to Great Britain (1952–1953).

In 1957, Gromyko’s book “Export of American Capital” was published, which allowed the Academic Council of the Moscow state university named after M.V. Lomonosov, award Gromyko the degree of Doctor of Economics.

In February 1957, Gromyko was appointed Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR (he held this post for 28 years). Having come to diplomacy from science, Gromyko remained an outsider in the party hierarchy, having not been “tested” by party work. Top management needed him as a competent specialist, as an official. At the same time, among the officials who filled the top of the party hierarchy, he remained a diplomat. Gromyko assessed the situation relatively soberly, but, trying not to conflict with figures who had real power, he usually gave in when his opinion differed from the position of key members of the Politburo, primarily the leaders of the KGB and the USSR Ministry of Defense.

By decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR dated July 17, 1969, Andrei Andreevich Gromyko was awarded the title of Hero of Socialist Labor with the Order of Lenin and the Hammer and Sickle gold medal.

In 1973–1988, member of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee. Gromyko was a member of the narrow leadership of the Politburo and became a symbol of Soviet foreign policy in the 1960s and 1970s. For his intransigence, he received the nickname “Mr. NO” in the USA. An impenetrable mask shackled the face of the cautious diplomat and politician. Under Gromyko’s leadership, the main agreements of “détente” were developed; he opposed interference in Afghan war. In 1983–1985, he simultaneously served as First Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR.

By decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR dated July 17, 1979, Andrei Andreevich Gromyko was awarded the Order of Lenin and the second gold medal “Hammer and Sickle”.

Gromyko supported the nomination of M.S. Gorbachev to power and proposed his candidacy for the post of General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee. His vote as the most authoritative member of the Politburo was decisive. M.S. Gorbachev sought to personally lead foreign policy, and therefore in June 1985 he replaced Gromyko with E.A. Shevardnadze as Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR. As gratitude for his support, in 1985 Gromyko took the post of Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR (1985–1988).

Since October 1988 - retired.

In 1952–1956, a candidate member of the CPSU Central Committee, in 1956–1959 and 1961–1989, a member of the CPSU Central Committee. In 1946–1950 and 1958–1989, deputy of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR.

Gromyko - author scientific works on questions international relations, chairman of the commission at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR for the publication of diplomatic documents, member of the editorial commission of labor on the history of diplomacy. Author of the autobiographical book “Andrei Gromyko. Memorable" (1988).

On July 2, 1985, Eduard Shevardnadze took office as Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR. The “dilettante” decided to recall some of the minister’s Soviet colleagues.

Vyacheslav Mikhailovich Molotov (party pseudonym, real name- Scriabin) was born on February 25 (March 9), 1890 in the Kukarka settlement, Kukarka district, Vyatka province (now the city of Sovetsk Kirov region) in the family of Mikhail Prokhorovich Scriabin, clerk of the trading house of merchant Yakov Nebogatikov.

V. M. Molotov spent his childhood years in Vyatka and Nolinsk. In 1902-1908 he studied at the 1st Kazan Real School. In the wake of the events of 1905, he joined the revolutionary movement, and in 1906 he joined the RSDLP. In April 1909, he was first arrested and exiled to the Vologda province.

After serving his exile, in 1911 V. M. Molotov came to St. Petersburg, passed the exams for a real school as an external student and entered the economics department Polytechnic Institute. From 1912, he collaborated with the Bolshevik newspaper Zvezda, then became secretary of the editorial board of the newspaper Pravda, and a member of the St. Petersburg Committee of the RSDLP. During the preparation of the publication of Pravda, I met I.V. Stalin.

After the arrest of the RSDLP faction in the IV State Duma in 1914, he hid under the name Molotov. Since the autumn of 1914, he worked in Moscow to recreate the party organization destroyed by the secret police. In 1915, V. M. Molotov was arrested and exiled to the Irkutsk province for three years. In 1916 he escaped from exile and lived illegally.

V. M. Molotov met the February Revolution of 1917 in Petrograd. He was a delegate to the VII (April) All-Russian Conference of the RSDLP (b) (April 24-29, 1917), a delegate to the VI Congress of the RSDLP (b) from the Petrograd organization. He was a member of the Russian Bureau of the Central Committee of the RSDLP (b), the Executive Committee of the Petrograd Council and the Military Revolutionary Committee, which led the overthrow of the Provisional Government in October 1917.

After the establishment of Soviet power, V. M. Molotov was in leading party work. In 1919, he was chairman of the Nizhny Novgorod provincial executive committee, and later became secretary of the Donetsk provincial committee of the RCP (b). In 1920 he was elected secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party (Bolsheviks) of Ukraine.

In 1921-1930, V. M. Molotov served as Secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks. Since 1921, he was a candidate member of the Politburo of the Party Central Committee, and in 1926 he became a member of the Politburo. He actively participated in the fight against the internal party opposition and became one of the close associates of I.V. Stalin.

In 1930-1941, V. M. Molotov headed the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR, and at the same time, since May 1939, he was the People's Commissar of Foreign Affairs of the USSR. An entire era in the Soviet Union is associated with his name. foreign policy. V. M. Molotov’s signature is on the non-aggression treaty with Nazi Germany of August 23, 1939 (the so-called “Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact”), assessments of which were and remain ambiguous.

It fell to V. M. Molotov to inform the Soviet people about the attack of Nazi Germany on the USSR on June 22, 1941. The words he said then: “Our cause is just. The enemy will be defeated. Victory will be ours,” went down in the history of the Great Patriotic War 1941−1945.

It was Molotov who informed the Soviet people about the attack of Nazi Germany

During the war years, V. M. Molotov held the posts of First Deputy Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR, Deputy Chairman of the State Defense Committee of the USSR. In 1943 he was awarded the title of Hero of Socialist Labor. V. M. Molotov took an active part in organizing and holding the Tehran (1943), Crimean (1945) and Potsdam (1945) conferences of the heads of government of the three allied powers - the USSR, the USA and Great Britain, at which the main parameters of the post-war structure of Europe were determined.

V. M. Molotov remained as head of the NKID (from 1946 - the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs) until 1949, again heading the ministry in 1953-1957. From 1941 to 1957, he simultaneously held the position of First Deputy Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars (since 1946, the Council of Ministers) of the USSR.

At the June plenum of the CPSU Central Committee in 1957, V. M. Molotov spoke out against N. S. Khrushchev, joining his opponents, who were condemned as an “anti-party group.” Together with its other members, he was removed from the leadership of the party and removed from all government posts.

In 1957-1960, V. M. Molotov was the USSR Ambassador to the Mongolian People's Republic, in 1960-1962 he headed the Soviet representative office in the International Agency for atomic energy in Vienna. In 1962 he was recalled from Vienna and expelled from the CPSU. By order of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs of September 12, 1963, V. M. Molotov was released from work in the ministry due to his retirement.

In 1984, with the sanction of K.U. Chernenko, V.M. Molotov was reinstated in the CPSU while maintaining his party experience.

V. M. Molotov died in Moscow on November 8, 1986 and was buried at the Novodevichy cemetery.

Andrei Yanuaryevich Vyshinsky, a descendant of an old Polish noble family, a former Menshevik, who signed the order for the arrest of Lenin, it would seem, was doomed to fall into the millstones of the system. Surprisingly, instead, he himself came to power, holding the positions of: Prosecutor of the USSR, Prosecutor of the RSFSR, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Rector of Moscow State University.

He owed this largely to his personal qualities, because even his opponents often note his deep education and outstanding oratorical abilities. It is for this reason that Vyshinsky’s lectures and court speeches have always attracted the attention of not only the professional legal community, but also the entire population. His performance was also noted. Already as Minister of Foreign Affairs, he worked from 11 a.m. until 4-5 a.m. the next day.

This is what contributed to his contribution to legal science. At one time, his works on criminology, criminal procedure, theory of state and law, and international law were considered classics. Even now, the concept of sectoral division of the legal system developed by A. Ya. Vyshinsky lies at the foundation of modern Russian jurisprudence.

As Minister, Vyshinsky worked from 11 a.m. until 4-5 a.m. the next day

But nevertheless, A. Ya. Vyshinsky went down in history as the “chief Soviet prosecutor” at the trials of the 1930s. For this reason, his name is almost always associated with the period of the Great Terror. The “Moscow trials” undoubtedly did not comply with the principles of a fair trial. Based on circumstantial evidence, the innocent were sentenced to death or long prison terms.

He was also characterized as an “inquisitor” by the extrajudicial form of sentencing in which he participated—the so-called “two,” officially the Commission of the NKVD of the USSR and the Prosecutor of the USSR. The defendants in this case were deprived of even a formal trial.

However, let me quote Vyshinsky himself: “It would be a big mistake to see the prosecutor’s office’s accusatory work as its main content. The main task of the prosecutor’s office is to be a guide and guardian of the rule of law.”

As Prosecutor of the USSR, his main task was the reform of the prosecutorial and investigative apparatus. The following problems had to be overcome: low education of prosecutors and investigators, staff shortages, bureaucracy, and negligence. As a result, a unique system of supervision over compliance with the law was formed, which the prosecutor's office remains at the present time.

The direction of Vyshinsky’s actions was even of a human rights nature, as far as this was possible in the conditions of totalitarian reality. For example, in January 1936, he initiated a review of cases against collective farmers and representatives of rural authorities convicted of theft in the early 30s. Tens of thousands of them were released.

Less well known are activities aimed at supporting Soviet defense. In numerous speeches and writings, he defended the independence and procedural powers of lawyers, often criticizing his colleagues for neglecting the defense. However, the declared ideals were not realized in practice, if we recall, for example, the “troikas”, which were the opposite of the adversarial process.

The diplomatic career of A. Ya. Vyshinsky is no less interesting. IN last years During his life, he served as the permanent representative of the USSR to the UN. In his speeches, he expressed authoritative opinions on many areas of international politics and international law. His speech on the adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights is well known - Vyshinsky foresaw problems with the implementation of the proclaimed rights, which are only now being noticed in the scientific and professional community.

The personality of Andrei Yanuaryevich Vyshinsky is ambiguous. On the one hand, participation in punitive justice. On the other hand, scientific and professional achievements, strong personal qualities, and the desire to achieve the ideal of “socialist legality.” It is they who force even Vyshinsky’s most fierce opponent to recognize in him that bearer of the highest values ​​- “a man of his craft.”

We can conclude that it is possible to be one under totalitarianism. This was confirmed by A. Ya. Vyshinsky.

Born into a family of railway workshop workers. After the family moved to Tashkent, he studied first at the gymnasium and then at the secondary school.

In 1926 he graduated from the Faculty of Law of Moscow State University named after M.V. Lomonosov and the Faculty of Agriculture of the Institute of Red Professorships.

Since 1926 - in the justice authorities, in 1926-1928 he worked as a prosecutor in Yakutia. Since 1929 - at scientific work. In 1933-1935 he worked in the political department of one of the Siberian state farms. After the publication of a number of notable articles, he was invited to the Institute of Economics of the USSR Academy of Sciences. Since 1935 - in the apparatus of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks (Department of Science). As Leonid Mlechin reports, at one of the meetings on scientific issues, Shepilov “allowed himself to object to Stalin.” Stalin suggested that he back down, but Shepilov stood his ground, as a result of which he was expelled from the Central Committee and spent seven months without work.

Since 1938 - Scientific Secretary of the Institute of Economics of the USSR Academy of Sciences.

In the first days of the war, he volunteered to go to the front as part of the Moscow militia, although he had a “reservation” as a professor and the opportunity to go to Kazakhstan as director of the Institute of Economics. From 1941 to 1946 - in the Soviet Army. He worked his way up from a private to major general, head of the Political Department of the 4th Guards Army.

In 1956, Khrushchev achieved the removal of Molotov from the post of Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR, installing his comrade-in-arms Shepilov in his place. On June 2, 1956, by decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, Shepilov was appointed Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR, replacing Vyacheslav Mikhailovich Molotov in this post.

In June 1956, the Soviet Foreign Minister toured the Middle East for the first time in history, visiting Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, and Greece. During negotiations in Egypt with President Nasser in June 1956, he gave secret consent to the USSR to sponsor the construction of the Aswan Dam. At the same time, Shepilov, by the nature of his previous activities, not being a professional international affairs specialist, was impressed by the truly “pharaonic” reception that the then President of Egypt Nasser gave him, and upon returning to Moscow, he managed to convince Khrushchev to speed up the establishment of relations with the Arab countries of the Middle East in counterweight to normalization of relations with Israel. It should be taken into account that during the Second World War, almost the entire political elite of the Middle East countries collaborated with Hitler’s Germany in one way or another, and Nasser himself and his brothers then studied at German higher military educational institutions.

Represented the USSR's position on the Suez crisis and the uprising in Hungary in 1956. He headed the Soviet delegation at the London Suez Canal Conference.

Contributed to the normalization of Soviet-Japanese relations: in October 1956, a joint declaration was signed with Japan, ending the state of war. The USSR and Japan exchanged ambassadors.

In its speech at the 20th Congress, the CPSU called for the forcible export of socialism outside the USSR. At the same time, he participated in the preparation of Khrushchev’s report “On the Cult of Personality and Its Consequences,” but the prepared version of the report was significantly changed.

Shepilov called for the forced export of socialism outside the USSR

When Malenkov, Molotov and Kaganovich tried to remove Khrushchev at a meeting of the Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee in June 1957, presenting him with a whole list of accusations, Shepilov suddenly also began to criticize Khrushchev for establishing his own “cult of personality,” although he was never a member of this group. As a result of the defeat of the group of Molotov, Malenkov, Kaganovich at the Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee that followed on June 22, 1957, the formulation “anti-party group of Molotov, Malenkov, Kaganovich and Shepilov who joined them” was born.

There is another, less literary-spectacular explanation for the origins of the formulation using the word “aligned”: a group that would consist of eight members would be awkward to call a “breakaway anti-party group”, since it turned out to be a clear majority, and this would be obvious even to readers of Pravda. To be called "factional schismatics", there had to be no more than seven members of the group; Shepilov was eighth.

It sounds more reasonable to assume that, unlike the seven members of the “anti-party group” - members of the Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee, Shepilov was defined as a “joiner”, since, as a candidate member of the Presidium, he did not have the right to a decisive vote in the voting.

Shepilov was relieved of all party and government posts. Since 1957 - director, since 1959 - deputy director of the Institute of Economics of the Academy of Sciences of the Kyrgyz SSR, in 1960-1982 - archaeographer, then senior archaeographer at the Main Archival Directorate under the USSR Council of Ministers.

Since the cliché “and Shepilov, who joined them,” was actively discussed in the press, a joke appeared: “The longest surname is And Shepilov, who joined them”; when a half-liter bottle of vodka was divided “for three,” the fourth drinking companion was nicknamed “Shepilov,” etc. Thanks to this phrase, the name of the party functionary was recognized by millions of Soviet citizens. Shepilov’s own memoirs are polemically entitled “Non-Aligned”; they are sharply critical of Khrushchev.

Shepilov himself, according to his memoirs, considered the case fabricated. He was expelled from the party in 1962, reinstated in 1976, and in 1991 reinstated in the USSR Academy of Sciences. Retired since 1982.

Of all the Russian and Soviet foreign ministers, only one, Andrei Andreevich Gromyko, served in this post for a legendary length of time - twenty-eight years. His name was well known not only in the Soviet Union, but also far beyond its borders. His position as Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR made him famous throughout the world.

The diplomatic fate of A. A. Gromyko was such that for almost half a century he was at the center of world politics and earned the respect of even his political opponents. In diplomatic circles he was called the “patriarch of diplomacy”, “the most informed foreign minister in the world.” His legacy, although Soviet era remained far behind, and is still relevant today.

A. A. Gromyko was born on July 5, 1909 in the village of Starye Gromyki, Vetkovsky district, Gomel region. In 1932 he graduated from the Economic Institute, in 1936 - postgraduate studies at the All-Russian Research Institute of Agricultural Economics, Doctor of Economics (since 1956). In 1939 he was transferred to the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs (NKID) of the USSR. By this time, as a result of repressions, almost all the leading cadres of Soviet diplomacy had been destroyed, and Gromyko began to quickly make his career. At just under 30 years old, a native of the Belarusian hinterland with a PhD in Economics, almost immediately after joining the NKID, received the responsible post of head of the Department of American Countries. It was an unusually steep rise, even for those times when careers were created and destroyed overnight. No sooner had the young diplomat settled into his new apartments on Smolenskaya Square than he was summoned to the Kremlin. Stalin, in the presence of Molotov, said: “Comrade Gromyko, we intend to send you to work at the USSR Embassy in the USA as an adviser.” Thus, A. Gromyko became an adviser to the embassy in the United States for four years and at the same time an envoy to Cuba.

In 1946-1949 deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR and at the same time in 1946-1948. fast. Representative of the USSR to the UN, 1949-1952. and 1953-1957 first deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR, in 1952-1953. USSR Ambassador to Great Britain, in April 1957 Gromyko was appointed Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR and served in this post until July 1985. Since 1983, First Deputy Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers. In 1985-1988 Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR.

The diplomatic talent of Andrei Andreevich Gromyko was quickly noticed abroad. The authority of Andrei Gromyko, recognized by the West, was of the highest standard. In August 1947, Times magazine wrote: "As the Soviet Union's permanent representative on the Security Council, Gromyko does his job with breathtaking competence."

At the same time, with light hand Western journalists, Andrei Gromyko, as an active participant in the Cold War, became the owner of a whole series of unflattering nicknames like “Andrei the Wolf”, “robot misanthrope”, “man without a face”, “modern Neanderthal”, etc. Gromyko became well known in international circles with his always dissatisfied and gloomy expression, as well as extremely unyielding actions, for which he received the nickname “Mr. No”. Regarding this nickname, A. A. Gromyko noted: “They heard my “no” much less often than I heard their “know,” because we put forward much more proposals. In their newspapers they called me “Mr. No” because I did not allow myself to be manipulated. Whoever sought this wanted to manipulate the Soviet Union. We are a great power and we won’t allow anyone to do this!”

Thanks to his intransigence, Gromyko received the nickname "Mr. No"

However, Willy Brandt, Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany, noted in his memoirs: “I found Gromyko a more pleasant interlocutor than I imagined him from the stories about this sarcastic “Mr. No.” He gave the impression of a correct and imperturbable person, reserved in a pleasant Anglo-Saxon manner. He knew how to make it clear in an unobtrusive manner how much experience he had.”

A. A. Gromyko adhered extremely firmly to the approved position. “The Soviet Union on the international stage is me,” thought Andrei Gromyko. - All our successes in the negotiations that led to the conclusion of important international treaties and agreements are explained by the fact that I was confidently firm and even adamant, especially when I saw that they were talking to me, and therefore to the Soviet Union, from a position of strength or playing in "cat and mouse". I never fawned over Westerners and after being hit on one cheek, I did not turn the other. Moreover, I acted in such a way that my overly obstinate opponent would have a hard time.”

Many did not know that A. A. Gromyko had a delightful sense of humor. His remarks could include pointed comments that came as a surprise during tense moments when receiving delegations. Henry Kissinger, coming to Moscow, was constantly afraid of eavesdropping by the KGB. Once, during a meeting, he pointed to a chandelier hanging in the room and asked the KGB to make him a copy of American documents, since the Americans’ copying equipment was “out of order.” Gromyko answered him in the same tone that chandeliers were made during the reign of the tsars and they could only contain microphones.

Among the most important achievements, Andrei Gromyko singled out four points: the creation of the UN, the development of agreements on the limitation of nuclear weapons, the legalization of borders in Europe and, finally, the recognition by the United States of the role of a great power for the USSR.

Few people today remember that the UN was conceived in Moscow. It was here in October 1943 that the Soviet Union, the United States and Great Britain declared that the world needed an international security organization. It was easy to declare, but difficult to do. Gromyko stood at the origins of the UN; the Charter of this organization bears his signature. In 1946, he became the first Soviet representative to the UN and at the same time deputy and then first deputy minister of foreign affairs. Gromyko was a participant and subsequently the head of our country’s delegation at 22 sessions of the UN General Assembly.

“The question of questions,” the “super task,” as A. A. Gromyko himself put it, was for him the process of negotiations to control the arms race, both conventional and nuclear. He went through all the stages of the post-war disarmament epic. Already in 1946, on behalf of the USSR, A. A. Gromyko made a proposal for a general reduction and regulation of weapons and a ban on the military use of atomic energy. Gromyko considered the Treaty Banning Atmospheric Tests of Nuclear Weapons, signed on August 5, 1963, to be a source of special pride. outer space and under water, negotiations on which have dragged on since 1958.

A. A. Gromyko considered consolidating the results of World War II to be another priority of foreign policy. This is, first of all, a settlement around West Berlin, the formalization of the status quo with the two German states, Germany and the GDR, and then pan-European affairs.

The historical agreements of the USSR (and then Poland and Czechoslovakia) with Germany in 1970-1971, as well as the 1971 quadripartite agreement on West Berlin, required enormous strength, persistence and flexibility from Moscow. How great the personal role of A. A. Gromyko in the preparation of these fundamental documents for peace in Europe is evident from the fact that to develop the text of the Moscow Treaty of 1970, he held 15 meetings with Chancellor W. Brandt’s adviser E. Bar and the same number with the minister Foreign Affairs V. Sheel.

It was they and the previous efforts that cleared the way for détente and the convening of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. The significance of the Final Act signed in August 1975 in Helsinki had a global scale. It was, in essence, a code of conduct for states in key areas of relations, including military-political. The inviolability of post-war borders in Europe was secured, to which A. A. Gromyko attached special importance, and the preconditions were created for strengthening European stability and security.

It was thanks to the efforts of A. A. Gromyko that all the i’s were dotted between the USSR and the USA during the Cold War. In September 1984, at the initiative of the Americans, a meeting between Andrei Gromyko and Ronald Reagan took place in Washington. These were Reagan's first negotiations with a representative of the Soviet leadership. Reagan recognized the Soviet Union as a superpower. But another statement became even more significant. Let me remind you of the words spoken by the herald of the myth of the “evil empire” after the end of the meeting in the White House: “The United States respects the status of the Soviet Union as a superpower... and we have no desire to change it social system" Thus, Gromyko's diplomacy obtained from the United States official recognition of the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of the Soviet Union.

Thanks to Gromyko, relations between the USSR and the USA were stabilized

Andrei Gromyko carried in his memory many facts that had been forgotten by wide circles of the international community. “Can you imagine,” Andrei Gromyko told his son, “it’s none other than the polished Macmillan, the Prime Minister of Great Britain. Since this was at the height of the Cold War, he makes attacks on us. Well, I would say that the usual UN cuisine is working, with all its political, diplomatic and propaganda techniques. I sit and think about how to respond to these attacks on occasion, during debates. Suddenly, Nikita Sergeevich, who was sitting next to me, bends down and, as I first thought, was looking for something under the table. I even moved away a little so as not to disturb him. And suddenly I see him pull out his shoe and start pounding it on the surface of the table. Frankly speaking, my first thought was that Khrushchev felt ill. But after a moment I realized that our leader was protesting in this way, seeking to embarrass MacMillan. I became all tense and, against my will, began to bang on the table with my fists - after all, I had to somehow support the head of the Soviet delegation. I didn’t look in Khrushchev’s direction, I was embarrassed. The situation was truly comical. And what’s surprising is that you can make dozens of smart and even brilliant speeches, but in decades no one will remember the speaker, Khrushchev’s shoe will not be forgotten.

As a result of almost half a century of practice, A. A. Gromyko developed for himself the “golden rules” of diplomatic work, which, however, are relevant not only for diplomats:

- it is absolutely unacceptable to immediately reveal all your cards to the other side, to want to solve the problem in one fell swoop;

— careful use of summits; poorly prepared, they do more harm than good;

- you cannot allow yourself to be manipulated either by crude or sophisticated means;

— Success in foreign policy requires a realistic assessment of the situation. It is even more important that this reality does not disappear;

— the most difficult thing is to consolidate the real situation through diplomatic agreements and international legal formalization of a compromise;

- constant struggle for initiative. In diplomacy, initiative is The best way protection of state interests.

A. A. Gromyko believed that diplomatic activity is hard work, requiring those who engage in it to mobilize all their knowledge and abilities. The task of a diplomat is “to fight to the end for the interests of his country, without harming others.” “To work across the entire range of international relations, to find useful connections between seemingly separate processes,” this thought was a kind of constant in his diplomatic activity. “The main thing in diplomacy is compromise, harmony between states and their leaders.”

In October 1988, Andrei Andreevich retired and worked on his memoirs. He passed away on July 2, 1989. “The State, the Fatherland is us,” he liked to say. “If we don’t do it, no one will.”

Born on January 25, 1928 in the village of Mamati, Lanchkhuti district (Guria).

Graduated from Tbilisi Medical College. In 1959 he graduated from Kutaisi Pedagogical Institute. A. Tsulukidze.

Since 1946, at Komsomol and party work. From 1961 to 1964 he was the first secretary of the district committee of the Communist Party of Georgia in Mtskheta, and then the first secretary of the Pervomaisky district party committee of Tbilisi. In the period from 1964 to 1972 - First Deputy Minister for the Protection of Public Order, then - Minister of Internal Affairs of Georgia. From 1972 to 1985 - First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Georgia. In this post, he carried out a highly publicized campaign against the shadow market and corruption, which, however, did not lead to the eradication of these phenomena.

In 1985-1990 - Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR, from 1985 to 1990 - member of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee. Deputy of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR 9–11 convocations. In 1990-1991 - people's deputy THE USSR.

In December 1990, he resigned “in protest against the impending dictatorship” and in the same year left the ranks of the CPSU. In November 1991, at the invitation of Gorbachev, he again headed the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs (called at that time the Ministry of Foreign Relations), but after the collapse of the USSR a month later this position was abolished.

Shevardnadze was one of Gorbachev's associates in pursuing the policy of perestroika

In December 1991, the Minister of Foreign Relations of the USSR E. A. Shevardnadze was one of the first among the leaders of the USSR to recognize the Belovezhskaya Agreements and the upcoming demise of the USSR.

E. A. Shevardnadze was one of M. S. Gorbachev’s associates in pursuing the policy of perestroika, glasnost and détente.

Sources

1. http://firstolymp.ru/2014/05/28/andrej-yanuarevich-vyshinskij/
2. http://krsk.mid.ru/gromyko-andrej-andreevic

A. A. Gromyko is a man whose name is associated with the golden age of Soviet politics. A favorite of Stalin and Brezhnev, not so revered by Khrushchev and Gorbachev, the diplomat really played a noticeable role on the political stage of the 20th century. The biography of Andrei Andreevich Gromyko, nicknamed Mister No in the West, is full of fateful moments. It was partly due to his efforts that the Cuban Missile Crisis did not escalate into nuclear Armageddon.

From the Belarusian hinterland

The story about A. A. Gromyko should begin with his father. Andrei Matveevich was a descendant of an impoverished noble family, by nature inquisitive and partly an adventurer. In his youth, at the height of Stolypin’s reforms, he ventured to Canada to earn money. After his return, he was recruited to fight the Japanese. Having seen the world and learned to speak a little English, the father passed on his accumulated experience to his son and told many amazing stories about military everyday life and battles, the life and traditions of overseas peoples.

After a turbulent youth, Andrei Matveevich returned to his native village of Starye Gromyki, located near Gomel (Belarus). He married Olga Bakarevich, and they had four sons and a daughter. The first-born Andrei was born on July 18, 1909. The guy was accustomed to work from childhood. As a teenager, he and his father worked part-time in the surrounding villages, doing agricultural work and timber rafting. At the same time, I studied eagerly.

Who are you, Mr. No?

You can often hear that Andrei Andreevich Gromyko has a different real name. In fact, his last name is Gromyko. However, in some regions of Belarus, representatives of individual families were given nicknames to distinguish different branches of the same family. Andrei Andreevich’s family nickname, “inherited” from his father, is Burmakov. But it is not reflected in official documents, but was used among fellow villagers.

Study combined with politics

Andrei Gromyko studied diligently and willingly. After graduating from the seven-year school, he moved from his native land to Gomel to continue his studies at a vocational technical school. Practical knowledge were useful to the rural boy later at the Staroborisovsky Agricultural Technical School, where the responsible Komsomol member becomes the secretary of the youth organization.

After graduating from technical school in 1931, Andrei decides to continue his studies and enters the Minsk Economic Institute. Here in the biography of Andrei Gromyko an event occurs that predetermines his career. At the age of 22, he was accepted into the ranks of the Communist Party and was immediately elected secretary of the party cell. A few years later, thanks to the recommendations of the Central Committee, Gromyko was admitted as a graduate student to higher education. scientific body BSSR - Academy of Sciences. In 1934 he was transferred to Moscow, where the talented scientist two years later defended his dissertation, the topic of which was US agriculture.

Peasant Diplomat

The repressions of the late 30s finally crippled the diplomatic departments of the USSR. As witnesses note, the Ministry of Internal Affairs experienced a colossal staff shortage. This is evidenced by one of Andrei Gromyko’s quotes: “I became a diplomat by accident. They could have chosen any other guy from among the peasants and workers. Thus, Zorin, Malik, Dobrynin and others came to diplomacy with me.” Indeed, in 1939, a special commission headed by Molotov recruited, in fact, random people who owned at least a little foreign languages and had an impeccable worker-peasant origin.

Diamond in the Rough

However, regarding Andrei Gromyko, his enrollment as a diplomat can hardly be called an accident. He had already established himself as an proactive party worker, a scientist well versed in US topics, and, in addition, was fluent in English. Smart, young, well-built, with soft, intelligent manners, but a strong character, Gromyko became a favorite first of Molotov, and later of Stalin himself.

In 1939, Andrei Gromyko was tasked with taking a fresh look at the actions and position of the United States regarding the impending World War II. He was sent to the United States as an adviser to Plenipotentiary Envoy Maxim Litvinov, and when the latter lost confidence, Gromyko became a full-fledged ambassador in 1943. The connections developed in those years made it possible to conduct a more productive dialogue between the two “poles of power” - the USSR and the USA.

Creation of the UN

Andrei Andreevich, like no one else, is involved in the creation and gaining the authority of such an organization as important for stability in the world as the UN. In his books, Andrei Gromyko describes in detail how much effort was made to form an interethnic body, the decision of which is still listened to by all countries of the planet.

In the period 1946-1949, A. A. Gromyko was the first Soviet representative to the UN Security Council. In negotiations with Western colleagues, a clear structure of the organization was developed, and countries with the right of veto were identified. By the way, due to the frequent use of a veto in matters of principle, journalists dubbed the politician Mister No.

Creation of Israel

One of the main milestones in the biography of Andrei Andreevich Gromyko was his participation in the actual implementation of the plan for the division of Palestinian territories, which ultimately led to the birth of the state of Israel. After the start of the implementation of post-war plans to separate the Palestinian Arabs and Jews (mostly who emigrated to these lands from Europe), the world community was faced with contradictions that tore these peoples apart. As a result, the two-state plan is on the verge of collapse.

Despite the decisions of the young intergovernmental body - the UN - Great Britain (which controlled Palestine) and the United States, due to the outbreak of armed confrontation, sought to “freeze” the creation of new countries. Unexpectedly, Gromyko spoke out for the recognition of Israel and Arab Palestine, undoubtedly expressing Stalin’s point of view. In his speech at the plenary session of the Second Session of the UN General Assembly on the eve of the vote on the question of Palestine on November 26, 1947, he confirmed and justified the USSR’s intention to support the “majority plan.” According to the diplomat, the latter was the only possible variant solutions to the Palestinian problem.

Thus, a talented politician was able to so competently and reasonably criticize the positions of Britain and the United States on the Palestinian issue that the population of these countries believed that the measures taken by national governments were insufficient. In turn, the Jews, inspired by the moral support of the political colossus - the USSR, announced the creation of Israel in 1948. Today in this country Andrei Andreevich Gromyko is considered national hero, despite subsequent tense relations between countries (but not peoples).

Politician with a capital P

A. A. Gromyko was not an impeccable politician, but he was able to learn from mistakes. A serious puncture occurred in 1950. As the first deputy head of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, he endorsed an agreement with China regarding the exchange rate of the yuan and the ruble without consultation with the Kremlin. Stalin, who was jealous of international affairs, especially regarding the PRC, “exiled” Andrei Andreevich to London as ambassador for arbitrariness. After the death of Joseph Vissarionovich, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was headed by Molotov. He returned Gromyko to Moscow to his previous position.

In 1957, Khrushchev appointed Andrei Gromyko as Minister of Foreign Affairs. Nikita Sergeevich was distinguished by his explosive temperament, including on the international stage. The head of the Foreign Ministry had to show miracles of diplomacy in order to smooth out conflicts and misunderstandings that arose with foreign colleagues after Khrushchev’s next attacks.

The negotiator's talent was especially evident during the Cuban Missile Crisis. In 1962, Khrushchev ordered the secret delivery of nuclear missiles to Cuba. Gromyko initially did not approve of this idea, considering it an adventure. The Americans learned about the plans of the Soviet leadership, which led to counteractions on their part. Andrei Andreevich’s personal acquaintance with Kennedy and respect from some American politicians made it possible to maintain dialogue in the most tense moments and not slide into a nuclear confrontation. A compromise was found: the USSR removed the missiles, and the United States abandoned the seizure of Cuba and closed some of the bases in Turkey. In total, the diplomat worked as head of the Foreign Ministry for 28 years - this is a record in recent history.

Brief biography of Andrei Andreevich Gromyko:

• 07/18/1909 - birth;
• 1931 - admission to the Institute of Economics;
• 1934 - transfer to Moscow;
• 1939 - joining the Ministry of Foreign Affairs;
• 1939-1943 - adviser in the USA;
• 1943-1946 - Ambassador to the USA;
• 1946-1948 - Plenipotentiary Representative to the UN Security Council;
• 1949-1957 - First Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs (1952-1953 - Ambassador to Great Britain);
• 1957-1985 - head of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs;
• 03/11/1985 - nominated by M.S. Gorbachev to the post of General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee;
• 1985-1988 - Chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Armed Forces;
• 07/2/1989 - date of death.

Family

Mister No's personal life was quite happy. As a student, the future diplomat met Lidiya Grinevich in Minsk. They got married, and in 1932 the young couple had a son, Anatoly, who later became a famous academician. In 1937, a daughter was born, who was named Emilia.

The role of Lydia Dmitrievna in the fate of her husband is difficult to overestimate. Perhaps, without her participation, Andrei Andreevich would not have progressed so far. The strong-willed woman followed her husband everywhere and remained an unquestioned authority for him, whose advice the politician listened to. It is not for nothing that she is compared to Raisa Gorbacheva, who also influenced the country’s politics through her husband.