Features of the Austro- Hungarian army in WWI.

After the failure of the offensive attempt of our Northern and Western fronts at Lake Naroch in March 1916, there was a lull on the Russian (Eastern) front.
By decision of the conference of the Entente powers in Chantilly (March 1916), the start of the offensive on the French front was scheduled for July 1, and on the Russian front - for June 15, 1916.
The directive of the Russian Headquarters of the High Command of April 24, 1916 ordered a Russian offensive on all three fronts (Northern, Western and Southwestern).
“At the end of March, the Northern and Western Fronts had 1,220 thousand bayonets and sabers versus 620 thousand for the Germans, the Southwestern Front had 512 thousand versus 441 thousand for the Austro-Hungarians and Germans. The double superiority in forces north of Polesie also dictated the direction of the main attack. It was to be carried out by troops of the Western Front, and auxiliary attacks by the Northern and Southwestern Fronts.
The main blow was supposed to be delivered by the forces of the Western Front (Commander General A.E. Evert) from the Molodechno region to Vilno. Most of the reserves and heavy artillery were transferred to Evert. Another part was allocated to the Northern Front (Commander General A.N. Kuropatkin) for an auxiliary strike from Dvinsk - also to Vilno. The Southwestern Front (Commander General A.A. Brusilov) was ordered to attack Lutsk-Kovel, on the flank of the German group, to meet the main attack of the Western Front.” (M.V. Oskin “Brusilovsky breakthrough”).

It is interesting that the ONLY front commander who spoke out FOR THE OFFENSIVE at the meeting at Russian Headquarters was the commander-in-chief of the Southwestern Front, General A. A. Brusilov. Both Evert and Kuropatkin opposed the offensive and emphasized that they could not vouch for its success.
Let us emphasize that main reason Such “timidity” of the commanders of the Northern and Western Fronts was that German troops stood against the Evert (ZF) and Kuropatkin (SF) fronts, and mainly Austrian-Hungarian troops stood in front of the Brusilov Front (SWF).
An “inferiority complex” in front of the German army then, unfortunately, permeated the consciousness of the majority of Russian generals and officers. The reason for this was the terrible defeats from the Germans in three East Prussian disasters, Mackensen's Gorlitsky breakthrough and the Great Retreat of 1915.
On the contrary, the Russian army did not have any “complexes” or special respect for the troops of Austria-Hungary.
A year and a half of war showed that our army was fighting the Austro-Hungarian troops quite successfully, even despite its great backwardness (and from them too) in heavy artillery, machine guns and many other issues of combat support for troops.
Before talking about the Lutsk breakthrough, we should dwell in more detail on the peculiarities of the organization, structure and moral climate in the army of Austria-Hungary.

The Austro-Hungarian ground forces on the eve of the First World War consisted of:
All-imperial army. It was staffed by both halves of the empire and was subordinate to the general imperial minister of war.
Landwehr, which was divided into Austrian and Hungarian. The Austrian Landwehr was recruited only in the territory of Cisleithania. The Hungarian Landwehr were recruited in Transleithania.
Landsturm. Convened in war time and was also divided into Austrian and Hungarian parts.
The army was recruited by conscription. The conscription age was 21 years. The service period was: a) for those conscripted into the general imperial army, 3 years of service, 7 years in the army reserve, 2 years in the Landwehr reserve, b) for those conscripted into the Landwehr, 2 years of service and 10 years in the Landwehr reserve.

It is easy to see that the organization of the troops of the Danube Empire largely imitated the army of the German Empire.

“A distinctive feature of the Austro-Hungarian army was its interethnic composition. The army was recruited according to the territorial system. The entire territory of the country was divided into 105 recruiting districts, each of which recruited one infantry regiment of the imperial army.
The regiments were distributed by nationality as follows:
Hungarian - 19, German - 16, Czech - 15, Polish - 9, Serbo-Croatian - 9, Romanian - 7, Slovakian - 4 and Slovenian - 2, counting 50% or more of the designated nationality in these regiments.

As you can see, the national composition of the army of Austria-Hungary was quite varied. The 35 regiments were dominated by Hungarians and Germans. And it was these regiments that showed the greatest combat effectiveness on the Eastern Front during the First World War.
But units staffed by Slavs (and especially Serbs and Czechs) showed extremely low combat effectiveness and often surrendered.

One of these episodes is described by General B. Gerua. The case takes place in December 1914, in Galicia:
“On the morning of the 6th, unexpected and joyful news came: Voronezh residents attacked the enemy located opposite them at dawn, broke through the front, captured local artillery and numerous prisoners, entire battalions with all their commands.
Soon these gray-blue columns of Austrians, almost without an escort, appeared in the village where the division headquarters stood. They walked cheerfully and cheerfully, mocking and exchanging jokes with the Russian soldiers who poured out to look at the living trophies.
All these prisoners, without exception, turned out to be Czechs.

The Voronezh success was of minor tactical significance, since the division did not take any part in this regimental enterprise and did not develop what it had before in the general pursuit that followed.
caught on a short front of one regiment.
This did not prevent the division headquarters, with General Kuznetsov and Colonel B.K. Kazanovich at the head, from conveying to the top about this operation by telegram in the colors of special pathos: the victory fell on the day of the Voronezh regimental holiday and on the day of the Sovereign’s name day. The taken guns and prisoners were thrown at the feet of His Majesty in the form of a birthday gift, and the battle was depicted as The best way celebrate the regimental holiday.
This telegram, quickly transmitted to the Headquarters of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief (Baranovichi), arrived there during the Tsar’s visit to it.
After the usual on December 6th church service- now in the camp church - the dispatch was presented to the Sovereign by Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich.
The high birthday boy, touched by this pleasant coincidence of the victory with the day of his Angel, in a reply telegram expressed gratitude to the regiment - the birthday boy, and congratulated his commander, Colonel Enwald, with the Knight of the Order of St. George 4th century ...

But how could an attack by one regiment take place, on its own, under the sole pretext of a military celebration of the day of the regimental saint, Nicholas the Pleasant?
The official story, which became immediately known, stated that Enwald asked by telephone on the night of the 6th for permission to carry out an attack on his site, vouching for success. The division headquarters objected and hesitated, but Enwald insisted.
In the end, he was allowed to do so, and full responsibility for the enterprise was given to him.
The result exceeded Enwald's own expectations and delighted the division headquarters.

But a few days after the fight, another version of the original case was leaked.
Late in the evening of December 5, several Czech soldiers ran across the front of the Voronezh regiment.
They reported that they were envoys of the Czech regiment, which was taking a position against the Voronezh residents. “If you attack us before dawn,” they said, “the regiment will not offer any resistance, and the officers and soldiers will surrender.

Enwald had to decide whether to trust this gesture of Slavic brotherhood, conveyed through the lips of defectors, or to refrain from the understandable temptation of easy victorious laurels?
We know what decision the Voronezh commander made and carried out.
And also the fact that, without refraining from this temptation, he still skillfully refrained from reporting preliminary negotiations with the Czech defectors to the division headquarters. The day of St. Nicholas the Ugodnik could not have come at a more opportune time, and the Wonderworker, the famous Russian Patron of Holy Rus', thanked the wise Envald and his Voronezh residents for their resourcefulness.”

As we see, an entire regiment of Czechs, with all their officers, surrendered to the Voronezh regiment without a fight at all.
Of course, it was possible to fight SUCH an enemy without straining too much. This bravura picture is slightly spoiled by the outright fraud on the part of the regiment commander and division commander in relation to his own superiors, but this, alas, was commonplace in the Russian army.

To our regret, among the Austrian troops there were COMPLETELY other units.
After just three days, the Voronezh residents, “relaxed” by the Czechs, were suddenly attacked by the Hungarians, “the best troops in the Austrian army,” according to B. Gerua.
And this is what came out of it:
“...on the left is a cavalry group riding back to the rear: the commander of the 2nd division of the 31st artillery brigade, Colonel Vevern, surrounded by his officers; Bloody streams flow down Vevern's face from under his cap; on the right - a stretcher is being carried to the rear, on which lies someone's body, covered with an officer's overcoat.
This is the commander of the 6th battery, Captain Drossi, my recent student at the Officer Artillery School, a lively and capable officer. I ask: “Are you wounded?” “No way, he was killed.”

Vevern explained to me in a shocked voice: the Hungarians crushed the Voronezhites, the division was defenseless in the first line, the officers fired back with revolvers, two batteries were pulled back, but the 6th battery had to be abandoned, removing the locks from the guns.
During this short battle, poor Drossi was killed, and Vevern and some other officers were wounded by small fragments of shrapnel.
While I was listening to this short and unpleasant story, the commander of the 3rd company of Kozlovtsev, Captain Kalishev, ran out towards me from the dense thickets along the opposite slope of the height, as soon as I had time to dismount. The first battalion carried out my order, which gave it
freedom to attack according to the situation, and his left flank company, the 3rd, managed to descend on the other side of the pass.
There, Kalishev feverishly explained to me, she came across our battery, which was already in control of the Austrians. What will I order you to do?
I ordered the only thing necessary and possible: to immediately attack these Austrians and return the battery. The iron had to be struck while it was hot, while these were the first Austrians on the battery.
“You can’t waste a minute,” I told Kalishev and added: “recapture the battery, go with bayonets, and I promise you George.” With God blessing!".
It was very fortunate that it was Kalishev who accidentally ended up with his company in this area during these anxious moments. He was an officer of outstanding courage, who had already received several wounds since the beginning of the war, within 3 months, which, having healed, he immediately returned to duty.
Kalishev dashingly grabbed his saber from its scabbard and ran back to the company. Almost immediately, in the thickets that hid his small figure, his “hurray” was heard, supported by the company. I knew that she advanced with bayonets without firing a shot and that some 100-150 steps separated her from the battery.
In the distance, to the left, gunfire could be heard, probably near Voronezh. To the right, where the remaining three companies of the first battalion should now be located, not a sound came from the forest. I mounted again and rode in this direction.
Soon I was met at the edge of the forest by the battalion commander, Lieutenant Colonel V.P. Pyanov-Kurkin (then still a captain) - also an excellent combat officer, courageous, decisive and managerial. He reported to me that his blow came just in time: the Hungarians climbed up the ridge through the forest and came out to the edge.
A few more minutes, and they could have begun to spread into the right flank of our division and across the gap between the two advancing corps.
The Kozlovtsy attack took the Hungarians by surprise, they wavered and were driven out of the forest, losing prisoners (including the battalion commander), wounded and killed. Several Hungarians were still lying on the ground; one - pierced to death with a bayonet. The work of the butts was also visible. The battlefield, one might say, was still breathing from the recent hand-to-hand combat...

In general, everything ended well: Kalishev drove the Hungarians away from the battery, capturing prisoners.
The appearance of the Kozlovtsev on the ridge and on the approaches to it and their attack stopped the enemy’s advance and destroyed his plan.
Meanwhile, at the beginning he promised a lot: the Voronezh people were taken by surprise and had to hastily reform from a marching column into a battle formation, turning 90° to the side of the open flank. The batteries were in the middle of the column and therefore immediately found themselves in the first line and were attacked. While we were able to retreat, allocate reserves in depth and organize positional defense, the situation for us was critical. It was during this chaotic time that we were forced to abandon the 6th battery.
The noises of battle gradually died down to the right, at the front of the neighboring corps. As for the Voronezh residents to the left, they, having caught on a number of heights, stopped and repulsed further enemy attacks with fire. The division headquarters sent General Savvich from his stationary “far away” to correct and organize things in this sector. Savvich, in his position as a brigade commander, played the role of an active combat assistant to the clerical division chief and was invariably sent to where the situation deteriorated and became threatening.

Savvich saw with his own eyes, by the way, the attack of the 3rd company of the Kozlovtsy on our 6th battery, which was captured by the Hungarians.
Subsequently this came in handy, as we will see; but even more important was the wise foresight of Kalishev, who handed over the battery to the artillerymen against receipt. To receive it at nightfall, only non-commissioned officers and bombardiers arrived with gun locks (it seemed strange that they did not send an officer).
Kalishev insisted on issuing him a written certificate that the guns had been accepted into in perfect order as they were left - without locks. This piece of lined paper, torn from someone's notebook, and the uncertain lines of a semi-literate artillery non-commissioned officer (fireworker) Kozlovtsy, in general, and Kalishev, in particular, were then obliged, in the following days and even months, to restore the truth around this sad episode with the battery...

This ends the presentation of a small military story that included two improvisations: the attack of the Voronezh people on December 6 with the kind assistance of the Czechs and the attack of the Hungarians on December 9 on the flank of the Voronezh people. This second improvisation almost cost the 31st dearly
division and its neighbors on the right. The timely, albeit willful, attack of the Kozlovsky regiment saved the situation, or, in any case, was a valuable tactical contribution to the sum of the efforts that saved the situation.”

Unfortunately, this was not without direct fraud.
This is what the former commander of the Kozlovsky regiment B. Gerua recalled about this:

“Let’s now see how these facts were presented at division headquarters and what came of it.
The first messengers of events in the Voronezh regiment sector on that memorable morning of December 9 were members of a mounted group of artillery officers whom I met at the top riding to the rear...
They reported that the Austrians had attacked the division and that the officers had repulsed it with revolver fire. The bloody face of the division commander, Colonel Vevern, was a living illustration.
But obviously one circumstance was left out of the story: that the 6th battery did not have time to pick up and move into the depths of the hastily formed battle formation and that this battery was actually abandoned, with the locks and sights taken away...
It is quite possible that on the way to division headquarters the artillerymen had already received information that the battery had been recaptured. One way or another, they kept silent about this episode.

Division headquarters immediately compiled an enthusiastic report on the heroic behavior of the officers of the 2nd Division. The telegram quickly ran upstairs and on the same day was reported to the Emperor, who continued to remain at the Commander-in-Chief Headquarters.
The Tsar responded to this report as impulsively as three days before he responded to the birthday attack of the Voronezh residents. In his response telegram of gratitude, the Emperor congratulated all the officers of the 2nd Division of the 31st Artillery Brigade as Knights of St. George.
Among those who received the white cross in this accelerated manner, without the Duma, was the officer who during the battle was in the parks, several miles from the battlefield, and did not even have an idea about its progress. He then wore his cross in embarrassment, under the ironic glances of the officers of the 31st Infantry Division.
When the division headquarters received a follow-up report from the commander of the Kozlovsky regiment about the attack of the 1st battalion, which rescued our 6th battery from the hands of the enemy, this report made an unpleasant impression.
To certify what had happened meant for the division chief, corps commander, etc. to reject the artillerymen’s version or make a significant amendment to it. How to do this now, after the Highest Resolution and the extraordinary reward of the officers of the 2nd Division for saving all three of its batteries?
They decided simply: to throw a clerical veil over the case of the Kozlovsky regiment - as if it never existed...
Savvich subsequently had a lot of trouble forcing Kuznetsov and Kazanovich to lift this veil when the division headquarters received my representations to Georgy from the commander of the 1st battalion, Kurkin, and the commander of the 3rd company, Kalishev.
After all, I almost congratulated the latter with the Knight of St. George, sending him to the attack.
Fortunately, both officers eventually received the coveted crosses they deserved. The receipt of the artillery non-commissioned officers was very useful here.”

Russian military agents in Austria-Hungary, on the eve of the First World War, compiled a detailed report on the military-political characteristics and national characteristics armies of the dual empire.
Some of its pages are still of considerable interest today.
Let's summarize them:
“Characteristics of the Austro-Hungarian Army.

According to the testimony of completely competent persons who observed this army in Lately, it is well trained, brought up under strict discipline and has a relatively young and dedicated command staff; Shooting is especially well established in the army. The troops are equipped with all the latest technical equipment. devices. Multi-tribal mass of the lower. rank is united to a large extent only mechanically, but this unification rests on the foundations of strict discipline and on the art of the Austrians in smoothing out national differences. However, the absence in this army of a specific idea of ​​the homeland, the weak connection between the general mass of soldiers and officers, national discord and multilingualism are very unfavorable factors for it and, under certain conditions, even dangerous...

National antipathies and politics penetrated deeply into the officers. environment, which instills a lot of discord in it, despite the traditional custom of officers addressing each other, regardless of rank, as “you.” More united are the gentlemen. officers, least of all artillery and technical officers. troops, where Jews serve in significant numbers.
Recently, among officers, especially of Slavic nationalities, there has been a noticeable socialism. direction, which management is struggling with through strict certifications that allow senior positions only people who are completely trustworthy; this system gradually produces a type of careerist officer that is undesirable for business.
The attitude of officers towards the lower. rank strict, often cruel; There are cases of torture of soldiers. Lower ranks are afraid, but do not like officers...
The non-commissioned officer issue is a subject of special concern for the military department, which in every possible way encourages long-term service and improves the life of non-commissioned officers. The importance of the latter in the life of the combat unit is very great, their power over the lower. rank is very high, the treatment of subordinates is arbitrary and cruel, which leads to their subordinates placating them with gifts and money. Nevertheless, the non-commissioned officers are excellent in many respects: knowledgeable about the service, devoted to their unit, pedantic and imbued with discipline.
Non-commissioned officers live in barracks separately from other lower officers. rank and have their own meetings with dining rooms and reading rooms. The selection and training of unt.-officers is carried out very carefully; Nationality is of great importance in this matter.
The Germans enjoy a special advantage everywhere, in Slavic. parts - Jews and Poles, in the Hungarian parts - of course, Magyars.
In the general mass of the lower ranks, due to its diverse composition, a sense of community is strongly developed, which the authorities fight against by establishing a common regimental language (most often German, Hungarian or Polish).
Officers often poorly understand the language of their unit, which greatly alienates them from the lower ones. rank, deprives them of what they need moral influence and gives the discipline a purely formal character.
The idea of ​​the homeland is inextricably linked for a soldier with his nationality, which is why the suggestion is lower. rank the concept of a common fatherland is not successful. Abuse of subordinates. rank is reflected in the number of suicides in the troops, reaching 20-25% of all mortality. Placement on leave depends on the unt.-officers. Since 1908, holidays have been established during the grain harvest, but this measure has not been widely used. In general, at all levels of command, a purely formal, dry attitude towards the soldier and the desire to discipline him, most importantly, were firmly established. arr., from the outside. The Magyars and Czechs are the most difficult to succumb to this, the easiest are the Russians, Slovenes and Poles.
The Czechs are considered the most unreliable element of the army, which was clearly revealed, by the way, during the mobilization carried out on the occasion of the annexation of the Bosno-Herzegs. lands.

The language of the population is as diverse as the peoples themselves inhabiting A.-V. The multilingualism of the population is a big hindrance to their military service. The army accepted the command German; but the Hungarians have long and strenuously insisted on the introduction of the Hungarian command language; in addition, each regiment has its own regimental language (sometimes 2), which officers and non-commissioned officers must know in order to be able to communicate with their subordinates.”

Don’t you think that some of the characteristics noted by our specialists in the Austro-Hungarian army are too similar to the “pain points” of our current Russian army?!
Let's hope that a happier fate awaits our army (and country)...

As already mentioned, the combat capabilities of different parts of the Austro-Hungarian army varied greatly, which is why strong contradictions often arose between them.

J. Hasek, who knew these features well, in his immortal book about the adventures of the good soldier Schweik, describes the entry of the Austro-Hungarian army into the war in a humorous and grotesque manner.
(Colonel Schroeder talks with Lieutenant Lukash):
“The divisional court, in its relation sent to the headquarters of our regiment,” continued the colonel, “comes to the conclusion that the case, in fact, is about systematic persecution directed against military units arriving from Cisleithania to Transleithania. Moreover, compare how many troops were sent to the front on our side and how many on their side. I’ll tell you frankly: I like the Czech soldier better than this Hungarian rabble.

One has only to remember how, near Belgrade, the Hungarians fired at our second marching battalion, which, not knowing that the Hungarians were shooting at it, began to fire at the deutschmeisters standing on the right flank, and the deutschmeisters also confused and opened fire on the Bosnian regiment standing next to them .
Here, I’ll tell you, the situation! I was just at lunch at brigade headquarters. The day before we had to supplement ourselves with ham and canned soup, but on that day they prepared a good chicken bouillon, fillet with rice and rum babkas. Just the night before we hanged a Serbian innkeeper in a town, and our cooks found thirty-year-old wine in his cellar. You can imagine how much we were all looking forward to this lunch. We finished the broth and just started eating the chicken, when suddenly there was a skirmish, then gunfire, and our artillery, having no idea that it was our units firing at their own, began firing at our line, and one shell fell right at the brigade headquarters.
The Serbs probably decided that an uprising had broken out among us, and let’s cover us from all sides, and then they began to cross the river.
The brigadier general is called to the telephone, and the division chief raises terrible scandal, what kind of disgrace is happening there in the brigade’s combat area.
After all, he had just received an order from army headquarters to launch an attack on the Serbian positions on the left flank at two hours and thirty-five minutes at night.
We are a reserve and must immediately cease fire.
Well, where is “Feuer einstellen!” in such a situation?
The brigade telephone exchange reports that it cannot reach anywhere except the headquarters of the Seventy-fifth Regiment, which reports that it has received the order "Ausharren!" from the nearest division. (Hold on until the end!), that he cannot contact our division, that the Serbs
occupied heights 212, 226 and 327, the transfer of one battalion is required for communications, and it is necessary to establish telephone communication with our division.
We are trying to contact the division, but there is no connection, since the Serbs have so far entered our rear from both flanks and squeezed our center into a triangle, which includes infantry and artillery, a convoy with the entire convoy, a food store and a field hospital.
I didn’t get out of the saddle for two days, and the division chief was captured and so was our brigade commander.
And it’s all the fault of the Magyars, who opened fire on our second march
battalion. But, of course, all the blame was placed on our regiment.”

Of course, this did not always happen and not with all units of the Austro-Hungarian army. It had many divisions that fought well at the front and were not much inferior even to the German divisions.

Fortunately for us, the severe failures of the Russian army in 1915 turned the heads of many Austrian commanders, who decided that the Russian army was already completely demoralized and incapable of an offensive on the Eastern Front.
In 1915, Italy entered WWI on the side of the Entente. Austria-Hungary had to fight on THREE fronts at once: Russian, Serbian and Italian.
In December 1915, the armies of Germany, Austria-Hungary and Bulgaria managed to finally defeat the Serbian army.
The remnants of the Serbian army and refugees (about 150 thousand people in total) retreated to the territory of Albania, and were then evacuated by the allies to the island of Corfu. The entire territory of Serbia and Montenegro was occupied.
Austria-Hungary began preparations for a major offensive against Italy, moving to a strategic defense on the Eastern Front.

Considering that the Russian armies after the Great Retreat of 1915 were not combat-ready, and their own fortified zones were insurmountable, the Austrian command transferred its best units to Italy - the 3rd, 10th, 34th, 43rd, 59th, 13th infantry divisions. A significant part of the heavy artillery also went there.
“By the beginning of the offensive of the Southwestern Front, the Austrians held thirty-five divisions in Italy, and thirty-nine in Russia.
Thus, in the East, the Austrians did not have a strategic reserve, and all the calculations of the Austrian commander-in-chief (nominal commander-in-chief - Archduke Friedrich) general. F. Konrad von Götzendorf were built on the invincibility of defense." (M.V. Oskin “Brusilovsky breakthrough”)
All these mistakes and characteristic features of the Austro-Hungarian army, of course, contributed to the success of the Lutsk breakthrough of the Russian army.

We need to end the chapter on the Austrian army with a quote from the now half-forgotten work of the Russian general A.N. Kuropatkin "Russian-Japanese War, 1904-1905: Results of the War." In it, he gives a brilliant analysis of Austria-Hungary and prophetically predicts the possible troubles of Russia:
“For Russia, after a victorious war and the likely collapse of Austria as a consequence of the defeat, the question will be: should we take territorial rewards and, if so, what kind?

The usual phrase about the need to correct our border will then appear on the scene. The Carpathians will again appear as a natural border, and all of Galicia may be annexed to Russia.

We must give ourselves an idea in advance: do we need this increase in territory and population? Will we be strengthened by this addition or, on the contrary, will we create for ourselves a source of weakness and anxiety?

But now, after Galicia has lived a life separate from us for such a long time, its separation from Austria can only be violent and therefore painful. Not only the Polish, but even the Russian population of Galicia (Russins) are not at all eager to become Russian citizens. For the Slavs of Austria, not excluding the Russins, we can only serve as a means, but not as an end. We must constantly remember this. Even less cultured Bulgarians and Serbs than us immediately turned away from Russia as soon as they got on their feet at the cost of precious Russian blood.

The Slavs of Austria do not need our help. With great persistence, every year they peacefully win for themselves rights that equal them to the Germans and Hungarians. Despite the difficult economic situation of the population of Galicia, despite the purchase of land by Jews, taxes heavier than in Russia, the relative inequality of Poles and Russins, the population of Galicia fundamentally considers the culture they have acquired to be higher than that of our neighboring population. The transition to Russian citizenship, in the opinion of this Slavic population, will be a step back, not a step forward. We need to know this firmly, so as not to deceive ourselves with false and harmful dreams that as soon as our troops enter eastern Galicia, the population will rebel against the Austrians, their centuries-old oppressors.

If, on the contrary, we were carried away by the thought of rounding out our possessions to natural boundaries, we would undoubtedly create for ourselves an endless source of anxiety and, I add, expenses at the expense of the payment forces and funds of the indigenous Russian population.

Despite our unpreparedness, the Austrians, pushed by the Germans, will not invade our borders with a light heart, for they know for sure that they will meet courageous resistance from our armies and people's war. In turn, we must not deceive ourselves about the ease of defeating the Austrian army. Perfectly equipped with everything necessary, the numerous Austrian army, relying on the perfectly prepared theater of war in Galicia, with skillful leadership of its forces, can stop even the superior forces of our army.”

What can I say...
“The Prophet is not in his Fatherland”...
General Kuropatkin was an extremely unhappy and indecisive commander - a failure.
He is responsible for many defeats of the Russian army in the war with Japan, and even during WWI, when for some time he ingloriously commanded an army corps and even the Northern Front.
But he was an excellent staff officer and analyst.
In addition, he was one of the few courtiers who had the courage to tell Nicholas II the bitter truth.
It’s a pity that the king listened to completely different people...

In the photo: "Binding". One of the types of punishment in the Austro-Hungarian army. Widely used for Russian prisoners of war during WWI (pictured)

Not even the most advanced, advanced and trouble-free weapon can guarantee victory. A clear example of this was Austria-Hungary, which, although it gave the formal start to the Great War, suffered more often than not severe defeats during its course, and eventually ceased to exist altogether. The country's army was equipped, without exaggeration, with automatic and small arms that were exemplary for that time. But ethnic heterogeneity made it obviously weak; the soldiers of the “dual monarchy” did not shine with stamina and success on the battlefield. Without German support, the Austro-Hungarian units more or less successfully resisted only the complete outsider of the Great War - the army of Italy, which did not win almost a single serious victory. The Slavic troops - Russians and Serbs - easily defeated the most elite Austro-Hungarian divisions. Although things were much worse with their weapons.

German Schwarzlose vs. American Maxim

The Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905 demonstrated to the military circles of all the leading countries of the world that defense technology had entered a new age - the age of automatic weapons.

In the Austro-Hungarian Empire, this realization had its own specifics: the country's military elite and its high-tech defense industry were formed mainly on an ethnically German basis, while a very significant part of the army's rank and file was formed by Hungarian and Slavic conscripts, often illiterate. The command language in the army was German, although there were Hungarian, Czech, Polish, Serbo-Croatian, Romanian, Slovak and Slovenian regiments in the armed forces. In order for a German officer to have the opportunity, if necessary, to somehow convey his order to the consciousness of a Slavic soldier, the latter was required to learn the army vocabulary minimum, which consisted of 80 words in German.

The poor education of conscripts and their almost complete lack of technical knowledge brought the armies of the Austro-Hungarian Empire and Tsarist Russia. Similar conditions for the formation of the conscript contingent also predetermined similar problems when choosing weapons for a soldier: Austrian generals, like the Russians, sought to arm soldiers with technologically simple weapons that were easy to operate and repair.

In 1893, Austria-Hungary began to arm its army with the Skoda M1893 machine gun, developed by Archduke Karl Salvator and Austrian Colonel von Dormus. Its design was complex, and the reliability of the automation left much to be desired. Although the day before Russo-Japanese War In 1904-1905, a small series of these machine guns was sold to Japan; the Austrian generals were dissatisfied with its effectiveness and believed that Skoda should be replaced in combat units with a more technologically advanced system.

In 1905, the Austro-Hungarian military department began comparative tests of the Vickers-Maxim machine gun purchased in Great Britain, adapted for the standard Austrian 8x50R cartridge, and a new machine gun recently patented by Andreas Wilhelm Schwarzlose.

Andreas Wilhelm Schwarzlose with his machine gun. Photo: opoccuu.com

As the famous weapons expert S.L. points out in his study on machine guns. Fedoseev, the German “Schwarzlose” had a good idea of ​​the performance qualities that the Austrian military could show for a promising model. Andreas Schwarzlose served for some time as an engineer in the weapons repair shops of the Austrian-Hungarian army, then trained at the Suhl weapons factories in Germany. The combination of German technical thought with knowledge of the specifics of the operation of small arms equipment in units of the Austro-Hungarian army provided an excellent result: Schwarzlose created an original machine gun design, which managed to surpass the famous “Maxim” in simplicity and operation.

Comparative tests with the brainchild of Hiram Maxim revealed significantly greater reliability of the Andreas Schwarzlose machine gun with firepower quite comparable to the Maxim. The German machine gun turned out to be significantly simpler to manufacture and consisted of only 166 parts, while even the Russian (the simplest) version of the Maxim had 282 parts. The brainchild of an American gunsmith required 830 patterns for technological testing and assembly. The production of "Schwarzlose" cost only 486 patterns. The German machine gun was significantly lighter than the Maxim: about 41 kg (including the machine gun) versus 64 kg for the American system.

According to the test firing tables, the Schwarzlose showed very good hit accuracy, quite comparable to the Maxim, and was only slightly inferior to the American in terms of firing range efficiency, which was inevitable with a lower initial bullet speed (610 m/s versus 865 m/s). At the same time, the design features of the Schwarzlose and its lighter weight made it possible to create a lightweight, essentially “manual” version of this machine gun, which was not allowed by the Maxim design, which is close in weight to a small-caliber anti-tank gun.

Taking into account all these features, the military-technical board of the General Staff of Austria-Hungary adopted the system of Andreas Schwarzlose. Subsequently, placing machine gun nests on the mountain passes of the Carpathians and the Austrian Alps, the officers of the dual monarchy, without a doubt, more than once thanked their General Staff for this correct choice.

The main thing is simplicity and reliability

The reliability of the Schwarzlose machine gun was ensured by a simpler automation principle than that of the Maxim.

The Maxim's automatic system was based on the recoil of the machine gun barrel, which had a short stroke. The pressure of the powder gases pushed the movably fixed barrel back - the energy of this movement carried out the reloading process through a system of mechanisms that removed the next cartridge from the fabric tape, sent it to the breech, cocked it and, after locking the bolt, released the firing pin. After the shot, the operation was repeated again.

Austro-Hungarian soldiers in the mountains with a Schwarzlose machine gun. Photo: Fritz Weber "The End of the Army"

The automatic operation of the Schwarzlose machine gun worked due to the recoil energy of a semi-free massive bolt with a stationary, rigidly fixed barrel. After the shot, under the pressure of the powder gases, the bolt core rushed back, setting in motion a massive lever mechanism that collected recoil energy, reloaded and cocked the mainspring. The increased recoil energy with such a reloading system required, on the one hand, a greater distance for the movement of the bolt (in the Schwarzlose it was 95 mm), and on the other, a shorter barrel of the weapon to accelerate the release of pressure of the powder gases in the barrel after the bullet ejected.

The combat nutrition of the Schwarzlose, like the Maxim, was carried out from coarse fabric tape. The full belt had 250 cartridge slots, was placed in a special cartridge box and weighed 8.25 kg when assembled. For cooling, the barrel of the Schwarzlose machine gun was covered with a voluminous casing into which water or a special coolant based on a mixture of water and glycerin was poured. The round-shaped, “pipe-shaped” casing, which held 3.5 liters of liquid, gave the Austrian machine gun an external resemblance to the Maxim.

The relative simplicity, lightness and good transportability of the Schwarzlose machine gun, especially in mountainous conditions, attracted the attention of the Austro-Hungarian military to this weapon system. In 1906, the dual monarchy acquired the right to produce Andreas Schwarzlose machine guns at the plant of the Waffenfabrik Steyr engineering concern. The machine gun mechanism was redesigned for the 8-mm Mannlicher welt cartridge, common in the Austrian-Hungarian army for the infantry rifle of the same name.

In 1907, a new modernized version of the machine gun appeared under the designation M/07. In 1912, the machine gun underwent a deeper modernization, primarily in terms of reliability and manufacturability. In addition, the design of the machine gun was improved.

The Austro-Hungarian Empire entered the Great War with relatively few machine guns (especially compared to the machine gun “abundance” of Germany). At the beginning of August 1914, the troops had 2,761 machine guns, including not only the newest Schwarzlose M/12, but also the long-outdated Skoda.

The Austrian General Staff failed to mobilize its military industry, at least to the level of Russia (not to mention Germany). As is known from sources, in 1915 the total production of machine guns in Germany was more than 8,000 units, in Great Britain - 6,064, in Russia - 4,300, and in the dual monarchy - only 2,500 machine guns. In total, during the war years, Austria-Hungary produced about 40.5 thousand Schwarzlose (in easel and manual versions), which created a saturation of machine guns in the Austro-Hungarian infantry units approximately at the level of the Russian army.

It is curious that in the pre-war years the Austrians supplied their machine gun not only to the armies of the allies of Bulgaria and Turkey, but also to the states that later became opponents of the Triple Alliance - Greece, Italy, Romania and even Serbia.

Weapons Collector

The Schwarzlose machine gun was actively used during the Great War by Russian infantry formations. The Russian front during the First World War could rightfully be called a “weapons collector.” “Not a single army in any war,” noted the famous Russian and then Soviet gunsmith V.G. Fedorov, “has been armed with such a significant number of different-caliber systems, very different from each other in design. In this regard, Russian troops of 1914-1917. to some extent could only be compared with the hastily organized parts of the Northern and Southern States of America during the Civil War of 1861-1865.”

Russian soldiers with a Schwarzlose machine gun. Photo: opoccuu.com

In terms of small arms, the Russian front used (except for the standard three-line Mosin rifle) literally a “collection” of rifles: the 6.5 mm Japanese “Arisaka Type 38”, the French 8 mm “Lebel-Berthier”, an outdated French rifle (model 1885) “Gra-Kropachek”, Swiss (outdated even for this non-belligerent country) 10.4 mm “Vetterli-Vitali”, American “Winchester” (cartridge 7.62 mm R), remade for Russian order, captured Austrian 8 mm “ Mannlicher" and, finally, the archaic rifle "Berdan No. 2" with cartridges filled with black powder.

Against this background, the use of the new Schwarzlose machine gun was not surprising. Russian troops received a significant number of them in 1914 as a result of the Battle of Galicia, which was successful for Russia, during which the huge arsenals of the Przemysl fortress were captured.

Some of the captured Schwarzlose, as noted by military historians, were converted to use the Russian standard 7.62 mm R (welt) cartridge, but most were used with “native” Austrian 8 mm R cartridges. In the spring of 1916, about 60 Schwarzlose were transferred to the Russian army by the French, who organized the evacuation of Serbian military equipment during the victorious offensive of German-Austrian troops in Serbia. All these machine guns were transferred to the front after conversion to the Russian 7.62 mm cartridge.

The massive use of captured Austrian weapons raised the question of the production of rifle cartridges of Austrian caliber before the Main Artillery Directorate of the General Staff. According to sources, according to the decision of the Russian Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, at least 25 million 8-mm R rounds of ammunition were to be produced monthly at domestic factories. However, in fact, it was possible to organize the production of “Austrian caliber” cartridges only at the level of 13.5 million pieces monthly.

On March 1, 1917, there were more than 1,450 captured machine guns on all four fronts of Russia, the vast majority of which were the brainchild of Andreas Schwarzlose. Due to its moderate weight and size characteristics, it was often used on Ilya Muromets aircraft, and especially widely on Russian armored cars and armored trains.

Original "Mannlicher"

Equally original and different in design from the main foreign models was the infantry rifle of the Austro-Hungarian army, developed by the talented designer Ferdinand von Mannlicher. He did successful career in the Ministry of Railways, rising to the post of chief engineer of the Northern Railway of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, and in 1878 he went to work at the country's leading arms company - the Waffenfabrik Steyr concern (another name is Waffenfabrik Gesellschaft).

Ferdinand von Mannlicher. Photo: austro-hungarian-army.co.uk

The change of work was associated with von Mannlicher’s promising ideas on creating modern high-tech small arms in Austria-Hungary. In the Waffenfabrik Steyr factory workshops, he took up two projects at once - the creation of an automatic rifle and its mechanical repeating version.

Due to the general technological underdevelopment of the industry of Austria-Hungary, the project of a self-loading rifle was eventually abandoned. But some promising ideas worked out by von Mannlicher on “self-loading” were subsequently applied in the design of the main infantry weapon, which received official name- Mannlicher rifle M.95.

The main “highlights” of its design were two ideas: accelerated batch loading of weapons and a direct action bolt, which allowed the shooter to send a new cartridge into the rifle barrel with one simple reciprocating movement of the hand.

The Mannlicher rifle, adopted for service in 1885, used an integral box-shaped single-stack magazine. The cartridges were not put into this magazine individually, but at once - all 5 pieces, placed in a metal pack. The pack was a kind of clip, which in one movement was inserted into the rifle magazine and remained in it until all the cartridges were completely used up. After shooting the cartridges, the pack fell out of the weapon (under the influence of its own weight) through a special window in the bottom of the rifle magazine.

Model 1895 Mannlicher rifle. Photo: Imperial War Museums

To speed up reloading, von Mannlicher used a special type of shutter, the handle of which did not have to be turned 90°, as in the Russian Mosinka, the English Lee-Enfield or the German Mauser. The Mannlicher bolt had a special movable combat cylinder in its front part. With the rectilinear movement of the bolt stem, the combat larva rotated around the longitudinal axis and closed the bolt with its combat protrusions, which fit into milled transverse grooves inside the receiver.

The Mannlicher shutter system, despite its apparent complexity, turned out to be surprisingly functional and durable. Subsequently, the idea of ​​​​a rotating combat cylinder in front of the free bolt was developed by the outstanding American gunsmith John Moses Browning. Nowadays this system is widely used in both military and hunting weapons.

The design of von Mannlicher's direct-action bolt, in addition to the speed and ease of reloading, allowed the shooter to almost silently cock the rifle without touching the bolt handle. This was achieved with the help of a special trigger mounted in the rear part of the bolt stem, which made it possible to cock the firing pin (put it on combat cock) without opening the bolt, and, therefore, without any movements of its handle.

Austrian soldier with a Mannlicher rifle. Photo: wikimedia.org

In general, the Mannlicher rifles (Steyr Mannlicher M95) were high-tech for their time, durable, well-made weapons. The forging of steel and drilling of the Mannlicher barrels made it possible to conduct long-range, very accurate fire from these weapons. An average-level shooter reloaded the Mannlicher approximately twice as fast as required by the Russian "three-line" or the German infantry "Mauser".

Of course, the M95 rifle had its drawbacks, primarily related to the need for regular and thorough cleaning of the direct action bolt. The large ejection window at the bottom of the magazine also caused some complaints: soldiers noted that through it the bolt group of the rifle quickly became contaminated with dust. This drawback, however, was corrected during the subsequent modernization of the Mannlicher rifle: a special safety curtain-latch was installed on the “pack” window of the store.

In Russian hands

After the victorious Battle of Galicia, which ensured the capture of the military warehouses of the Przemysl fortress, a huge number of Mannlicher M95 rifles became trophies of the Russian armies of the Southwestern Front. Russian and then Soviet general A.A. Manikovsky, who was involved in military-technical supply issues during the Great War, notes: there were so many captured Austrian rifles that “they could have armed at least two field armies.”

Soviet Marshal A.M. Vasilevsky, who served in 1915 as an ensign in the 409th Novokhopersky Regiment of the Southwestern Front, recalled: “Many soldiers, in particular our entire regiment, were armed with captured Austrian rifles, fortunately there were more cartridges for them than for ours.”

Prominent military theorist, General N.N. Golovin, in one of his works, specifically emphasized that the crisis in providing rifles to the Russian Southwestern Front would have been felt less acutely if the captured services of the Russian armies had taken time to properly preserve the huge mass of Austrian “mannlichers”. The general writes that in the first time after the Battle of Galicia, Austrian rifles were lying around everywhere, useless to anyone, they were broken up to be sent for melting down, late autumn In 1914, Russian soldiers made huge fire pits from the broken butts of Mannlichers and warmed themselves with them.

This thoughtless attitude towards trophies ended in the spring of 1915, when the Russian army was struck by a severe rifle and shell “hunger”. Austrian “mannlichers” literally began to be assembled piece by piece, repaired and immediately transferred for replenishment of weapons.

According to official certificate GAU, on November 1, 1915, the Kiev artillery depot received 215,646, and the main artillery depot in Moscow - 11,285 Austrian "mannlichers". At the beginning of 1916, according to the conclusions of military experts, the number of Mannlicher M95 rifles transferred to front-line units reached 300,000.

Even in the fall of 1916, in addition to the rifles supplied to the front, the Moscow, Tula, Kursk and Kiev artillery depots had more than 68 thousand captured Mannlichers in reserve. Constant mass production of cartridges for this excellent weapon was organized at the state-owned Petrograd Cartridge Plant.

If we compare the countries participating in the First World War from different military-political blocs, then a comparison of Austria-Hungary with the Russian Empire suggests itself. In some respects, the Ottoman Empire can be placed in the same camp. All three empires were great continental powers that united dozens of nationalities and were in need of socio-economic modernization. Like Russia, Austria-Hungary and the Ottoman Empire were burdened with complex internal political problems, among which social and national issues stood out. However, if in Russian Empire the social issue was more pressing, then in the Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman empires the main thing was national problem. In Austria-Hungary, the titular nations (German-Austrians and Hungarians) did not make up even half of the total population. The national question became for Austria-Hungary and Ottoman Empire the “mine” that crushed the two powers only needed a “fuse”, which was the First World War. External forces interested in the collapse of old empires actively used the national map to their advantage.

The situation on the Balkan Peninsula played a major role in the national question in Austria-Hungary (as well as in Turkey). Greeks, Serbs, Montenegrins and Bulgarians gained independence and recreated states. This was a prerequisite for the development of corresponding trends in the territory of Austria-Hungary and the Ottoman Empire. Russia had its own interests in the Balkans. The main stumbling block in the Balkans was Serbia. Russia and Serbia had a special relationship; the Serbs were closest to the Russians in their mentality. At the same time, the Serbian kingdom, which successfully withstood two Balkan wars of 1912-1913, created huge problems for the Austro-Hungarian Empire. The Serbian elite hatched plans to build a “Greater Serbia” at the expense of the Slavic possessions of Austria-Hungary (these plans were secretly supported by external forces hoping to set Europe on fire). In Serbia they hoped to unite all the South Slavic peoples.

For the Austro-Hungarian Empire, the implementation of such plans was a disaster. In addition, Serbia was an economic competitor, undermining Hungarian agriculture. Belgrade's resolve was given by the support of St. Petersburg. All this irritated the Austro-Hungarian elite, most of whom were increasingly inclined to solve the problem by force. Many in Austria-Hungary wanted to start a preventive war, not wait for the South Slavic peoples to rise up, and defeat Serbia. Militarily, the Austro-Hungarian Empire was much stronger than Serbia, and if the war could be localized to one Balkan front, Vienna hoped to achieve rapid success. According to the Austro-Hungarian elite, this victory was supposed to eliminate the threat to the integrity of the empire and restore the position of leader in the Balkan region.

Decline of the Empire. Army

The traditional pillars of the House of Habsburg were the army and the bureaucracy. The army was the monarch's "favorite toy". However, the army gradually lost its former unity. National composition The “imperial and royal army” became more and more motley. On turn of XIX-XX centuries, out of the 102 infantry regiments in the army, 35 were Slavic, 12 German, 12 Hungarian, 3 Romanian, the rest were mixed. As separate types of ground forces, there were Austrian (Landwehr) and Hungarian (Honved) territorial armed formations, as well as militia (Landsturm), which were called up during general mobilization. By the beginning of the 20th century, 29% of the army personnel were Germans, 18% - Hungarians, 15% - Czechs, 10% - South Slavs, 9% - Poles, 8% - Rusyns, 5% - Slovaks and Romanians each, and 1% - Italians . At the same time, Germans and Hungarians predominated among the officer corps, and among the Slavs there were mainly Poles, Croats and Czechs; there were few others.

In the general imperial army there were “safeties” against friction between representatives of different nationalities. Thus, if in any regiment representatives of a particular nationality made up more than 20% of the unit’s personnel, their language was recognized as the regimental language and knowledge of it (at the level necessary for normal service) was recognized as mandatory for officers and non-commissioned officers. The command language for all branches of the army, except for the Hungarian Honveds, was German. Every soldier, not to mention officers, had to know German at least at the level main commands and military terms. German was also the official language of the army, correspondence was conducted in it, it was used by military courts, logistics and economic services, etc. The commander-in-chief of the armed forces was the emperor. In fact, initially the army in Austria-Hungary was a supranational structure based on “Germanness”. The main defender of this principle was the emperor. The separation of national units in the army led to general degradation and destruction of the empire's building.

Soldiers of the 28th (Czech) Infantry Regiment

By the beginning of the First World War, the processes of depriving the army of unity gradually gained momentum. The democratization of the army officer corps intensified this process. The aristocracy gradually lost its leading positions in the army and state apparatus. So, in 1880-1910. the share of majors in the imperial army who had a noble title decreased from 37.7% to 18.2%, lieutenant colonels - from 38.7% to 26.8%, colonels - from 46.7% to 27%. If in 1859 90% of the Austrian generals were nobles, then by the end of the First World War - only every fourth general. Although in general the military elite remained loyal to the throne, gradually nationalist and democratic sentiments penetrated the stronghold of the empire.

This was especially evident after the 1914 campaign, when, after a series of unsuccessful battles that led to the massive death of army personnel and general mobilization at the front, the majority of the officer corps began to be represented by reservists - yesterday's teachers, professors, doctors, lawyers, shopkeepers, students and etc. By October 1, 1918, out of 188 thousand Austrian and Hungarian officers, only 35 thousand were career military officers. This led to a sharp increase in nationalist and democratic sentiments in the army. We can see a similar situation in the Russian Empire, where the death of the core of the regular army on the battlefields of the First World War predetermined the death of the empire and the fall of the House of Romanov. The army, instead of a stabilizing factor that stopped destructive trends, itself became a factor of general destabilization.

The army was recruited by conscription. The conscription age in the general imperial army was 21 years. The service period was: a) for those conscripted into the general imperial army, 3 years of service, 7 years in the army reserve, 2 years in the Landwehr reserve, b) for those conscripted into the Landwehr, 2 years of service and 10 years in the Landwehr reserve. In numerical and qualitative terms, the Austro-Hungarian army was seriously inferior to the French, German and Russian armies. However, it clearly had an advantage over the armies of Italy, the Ottoman Empire and the Balkan states. In 1902, 31 infantry and 5 cavalry divisions were divided into 15 corps (mostly two infantry divisions each) dispersed throughout the empire. Thus, the 1st Corps was located in Krakow, the 2nd Corps in Vienna, the 3rd Corps in Graz, the 4th Corps in Budapest, etc.

Army strength in Peaceful time in 1905 there were 20.5 thousand officers, about 337 thousand lower ranks with 65 thousand horses and 1048 guns. At that time, 3.7 million people were liable for military service, but only about a third had satisfactory military training. This was a weakness of the Austro-Hungarian army, which had a small trained reserve and was not prepared for a long war. For example, the German Empire already in 1905 had more than 4 million trained military personnel.

The big problem was the technical supply of the army. The troops lacked new types. Budget expenditures on armies clearly did not correspond to the military-political situation in Europe and especially in the Balkans. Military expenditures of Austria-Hungary in 1906 amounted to 431 million German marks, France in the same year spent 940 million marks on military needs, Germany - about 1 billion marks, Russia - more than 1 billion marks.

Until 1906, the armed forces were headed by Friedrich von Beck-Rzykowski. Beck was the Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Austria-Hungary from 1881. Beck was informally called the “Vice Kaiser” under Franz Joseph in the field of defense policy, since he concentrated the leadership of the armed forces in the General Staff. Beck was a cautious figure who balanced between the progressive liberal movement and the conservative camp. The new head of the General Staff was Franz Conrad von Hötzendorff (Götzendorf), who was the soul of the “hawk party”. Hötzendorf played a big role in the fact that Austria-Hungary unleashed a great war in Europe. As the head of the “war party,” he advocated intensifying Vienna’s foreign policy, unleashing a preventive war with Serbia and Montenegro, and hegemony in Albania. Not trusting Italy (it was then part of the Triple Alliance), he called for strengthening the Austro-Italian border. Hötzendorf energetically developed and rearmed the army, strengthened the artillery (especially heavy artillery).

Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Austria-Hungary in 1881-1906. Count Friedrich von Beck-Rzykowski

Hötzendorf was literally obsessed with a preventive war against Serbia or Italy, or better yet both. Once, during a conversation with Emperor Franz Joseph, in response to the warlike thoughts of the Chief of the General Staff, the monarch said that “Austria never started the war first” (clearly sinning against the historical truth), Conrad replied: “Alas, Your Majesty!” Thanks to the efforts of the Chief of the General Staff and heir to the throne, Archduke Franz Ferdinand, who was the Emperor’s deputy in the supreme command of the army (he also did not like the Serbs, but was opposed to preventive war, restraining the “hawks”), the all-empire army in 1906-1914. made a big step forward in the field of technical equipment and combat training of troops. According to the law of 1912, the number regular army in wartime it increased from 900 thousand people to 1.5 million soldiers and officers (not counting territorial armed formations, reserve units and Landsturm militia). Military spending increased noticeably, programs for the construction of new fortifications, the rearmament of the fleet and the development of combat aviation were approved.

So, in 1907 they began to build a series battleships type "Radetsky". A total of 3 ships were built: “Archduke Franz Ferdinand” (1910). “Radetsky” and “Zriny” (both 1911). Total displacement 15845 tons, maximum length 138.8 m, beam 24.6 m, draft 8.2 m. Power of steam engines 19800 liters. s., speed 20.5 knots. Armor protection: belt 230-100 mm, anti-torpedo bulkhead 54 mm, main caliber turrets 250-60 mm, 240 mm turrets 200-50 mm, casemates 120 mm, deck 48 mm, wheelhouse 250-100 mm. Armament: twelve 305 mm and 150 mm guns, twenty 66 mm cannons, 4 torpedo tubes. In 1910, construction began on a series of new, more modern battleships: Viribus Unitis, Tegetthof (1913), Prinz Eugen (1914) and Szent Stephen (1915). Total displacement 21,595 tons, maximum length 152.2 m, beam 27.3 m, draft 8.9 m. Turbine power 27,000 l. s., speed 20.3 knots. Armor belt 280-150 mm, turret armor 280-60 mm, casemate 180 mm, deck 48-30 mm, arm 280-60 mm. Armament: twelve 305 mm and 150 mm guns, twenty 66 mm cannons, 4 torpedo tubes.

It is worth noting another feature of the Austro-Hungarian army. The all-empire army had not fought for almost half a century. After defeat in the Austro-Prussian War of 1866, the Austrians did not fight. The operation in Bosnia in 1878 was local in nature and did not add combat experience. The lack of combat experience and military victories could not but affect the moral and psychological state of the imperial army. It was not for nothing that Archduke Franz Ferdinand believed that, despite the overall impressiveness of the Austro-Hungarian army, it was incapable of prolonged combat operations with a strong enemy. Konrad von Hötzendorff thought differently. The heir to the throne and the Chief of the General Staff argued over this issue. As a result, the war showed that Franz Ferdinand's assessment was correct.

The Austro-Hungarian army was good at parades, posed a threat to its neighbors, cemented the unity of the empire, but prolonged hostilities affected it in the most negative way. The Habsburg military had not fought or won for a long time, which affected their morale. The officers and soldiers of the all-empire army were not cowards, but the army, having forgotten the taste of victory, found itself at a disadvantage when confronted with the enemy. The weak point of the Austro-Hungarian army (as well as the Russian one) was the generals, who lacked the aggressiveness (activity), determination and initiative necessary for the military. The “peacetime” generals did not know how to fight.

To be continued…

INSIGNIA AND UNIFORMS OF THE AUSTRIAN ARMY 1918 - 1938.

M. Razygraev

With almost all revolutions, changes in the form of government, or the collapse of a country, new symbols (emblems) appear, including insignia for military personnel and civilian officials. The Austro-Hungarian Empire was no exception in this regard. After its collapse, the Republic of Austria arose in territories with a German-speaking population (German Austria). In 1918–1920, soldiers of the German-Austrian Volkswehr (Volkswehr- People's Army)continued to wear the old Imperial-Royal Army uniform with new insignia on the sleeves. Unfortunately, the author has information relating only to chief and staff officers.

According to the Saint-Germain Peace Treaty of 1919, restrictions were established for Austria on the size of the armed forces (no more than 30 thousand people, of which 1,500 officers and 2,000 non-commissioned officers), the number of heavy weapons - artillery and machine guns - was limited, it was forbidden to have military aircraft and produce armored vehicles. The Austrian government strictly observed all these restrictions, and only in 1933-34, with the consent of Great Britain and France, some army reforms were carried out.

The highest unit of the Austrian army was a mixed brigade - infantry or mountain infantry regiments and an artillery division. There was also a separate artillery regiment, and the cavalry was consolidated into two regiments.

The infantry and mountain infantry units were armed with: the 8-mm Mannlicher rifle model 1895, the 8-mm Schwarzlose machine gun model 1907 and its modification mod. 1907/12; 8 mm light machine gun. The cavalry was armed with an 8-mm Mannlicher carbine and a saber model 1904, machine guns - like in the infantry. Non-commissioned officers and privates of some specialties received automatic pistols various systems. The artillery was equipped with: 75 mm mountain guns, 100 mm mountain howitzers, 76.5 mm field guns and 100 mm mechanical and horse-drawn howitzers, as well as mortars. All artillery systems are from the period of the 1st World War.

When formingF federal ground forces ( Bundesheer) in 1920 a new system of insignia was established. For thirteen years, Austrian soldiers and military officials wore insignia that had nothing in common with the traditional collar insignia of the Austro-Hungarian army.

The military personnel were divided into the following groups: lower ranks, non-commissioned officers, chief officers, staff officers, generals. Military officials consisted of junior officials (corresponding to the rank of staff sergeant), officials without class (corresponding to the rank of “acting officer”) and class officials (corresponding to both R- both staff officers and generals).

The insignia established in 1920 were horizontal stripes above the cuffs (the width of the braid or braid, the color of the braid or braid, the color of the gaps, the order of placement of the stripes are presented in the table). The length of the braid for privates and non-commissioned officers was about 13 cm, the braid for officers and military officials was half as long - approximately 6 - 6.5 cm.

The top row of braid (braid) or the only one (for the group commander and lieutenant) had a special difference - a piece of braid (braid) was sewn together in the form of a ring and sewn at the upper edge of the horizontal patch. This distinction was granted only to military personnel.

The junior official corresponded in rank to a staff sergeant, but the insignia was distinguished not only by the absence of a ring, but also by a separately sewn horizontal braid 1 cm wide.

The non-commissioned officer's braid and the officer's braid resembled the Russian “hussar braid” - there was a zigzag pattern in the middle, not reaching the edges. It is quite possible that instead of metallized braid, silk braid was used for certain types of uniforms.

On September 11, 1923, another change in insignia took place, this time the German system of insignia used inReichsheerWeimar Republic .

The lower ranks received galloon chevrons on the sleeves; non-commissioned officers - shoulder straps with a rounded top, trimmed with silver galloon with four-beam with or without stars, and with edging according to the color of the branch of service or service; junior officers - shoulder straps made of parallel folded silver cords on a lining in the color of the branch of service or service with four-beam with or without asterisks;senior officers and generals - strands of silver and gold threads on a lining in the color of the branch of service or service with or without stars. The numbers or letters of units and institutions were also attached to the shoulder straps.

At the ends of the collar there were buttonholes in the form of “double coils” made of silver braid with the colors of the military branch. The following colors were established for the military branches and services:

cavalry - golden yellow;

infantry or alpine rangers - grass green;

artillery – scarlet;

pioneers (sappers) – black;

telegraph troops - light brown;

senior management (General Staff) – crimson;

automobile troops - pink;

bicycle parts – yellow-green.

Generals originally wore "double coils" of silver braid on their collars with a scarlet lining, but on December 21, 1925 they were replaced by gold patterned embroidery (similar to the sewing of the generals of the old Prussian army) on a red lining.

The system of insignia continued to improve: on September 24, 1924, the rank was introduced vice lieutenant (Vizeleutnant), and on August 14, 1925 - ensign ( F ähnrich). The insignia of these two ranks were the same - the shoulder straps were trimmed on three sides with a double silver cord, and a double silver cord was sewn longitudinally in the center. There is a gap between the side and central cord according to the color of the shoulder strap (i.e., the color of the branch of service or service). For the fenrich, a smooth golden button was additionally attached to the rear end of the buttonhole.

On December 22, 1927, the rank was introduced corporal (Korporal) for which two sleeve chevrons were installed, and platoon leader (Zudführer) began to wear three chevrons, respectively.

In 1929, there was a division of generals into two categories: general from infantry and general from artillery; outwardly this division was not expressed in anything.

The insignia established in 1923 was used until 1933, when it was decided to return to the traditional Austrian insignia - colored buttonholes with various combinations of braid and six-pointed starsand the military personnel put on old Austrian-style uniforms.

The appearance of the military personnel has changed slightly compared to the military personnel of the former Imperial-Royal Army of Austria-Hungary. The same field blouse with a secret fastener, a stand-up collar with buttonholes, breast and side welt pockets with flaps remained; trousers with cuffs (breeches with leather leis for cavalrymen), a soft cap for lower ranks and a hard cap of the French type for officers, boots for infantry and boots for cavalry. Only the color of the blouse, instead of the previous gray-blue, became similar to the German one.”feldgrau” – gray-green, and the trousers changed color to gray. Field and everyday uniforms for all branches of the military were of the same type and differed only in finishing elements.

Cavalry officers had two options for their uniform: 1st - a blue blouse with a secret fastener, a stand-up collar, white piping along the side, no pockets; there are golden plaits on the shoulders; long black trousers with maroon piping, black cap; 2nd – blouse, as in the first option; maroon breeches, maroon cap.

For officers of the Guards Battalion, the uniform included a green blouse similar in cut to a cavalry blouse with red piping along the side; long black trousers with red piping, black cap.

In the cold season, they wore a double-breasted gray-green overcoat with buttonholes on the collar. Instead of an overcoat, cavalrymen were given an insulated jacket like a hussar's mentic, which in warm weather was worn draped over the left shoulder; cavalrymen's breeches were hemmed with leather leis. When out of formation, officers could wear untucked black trousers and black caps; while in casual and field uniforms, they could wear khaki caps. Boots were worn by infantry officers, and in the cavalry by all personnel, in addition, privates and non-commissioned officers of some branches of the military received black leather leggings. The German steel helmet model 1916 in the Guards battalion had a stamped image on the front side state emblem, and during reviews, parades and exercises it was decorated on the left side with the traditional Austrian “feldabzeichen” (field distinction) - with an oak or spruce branch. In other units there was no coat of arms on the helmet, and the twig was worn in the same way as in the guard.

Insignia were six-pointed stars (celluloid for non-commissioned officers and metal for officers) and braid of various widths, sewn along the front and bottom edges of the buttonhole. If the braid was silver, then the stars were golden and vice versa. Generals of all branches of the army were entitled to only gold braid. Silver braid was worn by officers of mountain infantry units and infantry; most other units used gold braid.

Ranks up to and including platoon level belonged to the rank and file, from sergeant to Fenrich inclusive - to non-commissioned officers, all others - officers and generals.

The ranks and insignia remained as in the previous imperial army:

Another tradition passed down from the Austro-Hungarian army is the “own” color of the buttonhole field for units and subunits.

The following colors were assigned to the branches of the military, services, individual regiments and even some units:

bright blue - 4th Infantry Regiment;

carmine - 5th Infantry Regiment;

ash gray - 6th and 13th infantry regiments;

brown-yellow - 15th Infantry Regiment;

blue-green - 11th Infantry Regiment, engineering troops and signal troops;

dark brown - 7th Infantry Regiment;

orange - 12th Infantry Regiment;

white – 1st Dragoon Regiment;

dark red – headquarters and 2nd squadron of the 1st Dragoon Regiment;

dark green - 1st, 2nd, 3rd infantry regiments, 2nd dragoon regiment;

bright yellow - 2nd squadron of the 2nd dragoon regiment, 10th regiment of alpine riflemen;

light blue – supply units and military administration;

crimson - 3rd and machine-gun squadrons of the 1st Dragoon Regiment, artillery battalions and a separate artillery regiment;

black - 14th Infantry Regiment, automobile units;

light green - 8th, 9th regiments of Alpine riflemen, 3rd, 5th battalions of Alpine riflemen, Tyrolean riflemen.

In some cases, two colors were used:

General Staff - black and red;

medical service - black and blue;

Guards battalion - red and white.

For the air force recreated in the early 30s, a special system of insignia was established. Insignia were placed on the sleeves above the cuffs; in addition, for each category of military personnel (privates, non-commissioned officers, officers) distinctions were introduced on headdresses. The colors of insignia were established for privates - blue, non-commissioned officers - silver, officers and generals - gold.

The generals' galloons were sewn onto a red cloth lining; for officers of the General Staff, the braid was sewn on black cloth, and a narrow strip of red cloth was sewn along the contour above the top braid.

For all aviation ranks, a single cap was installed with a black band and a gray crown, a black fiber visor, on the band there was a single emblem - a flying eagle in a wreath, on the crown there was a national red and white cockade with a “shine”.

The differences between rank groups were as follows:

Privates - blue cord above the visor, blue braid along the lower edge of the band, emblem - of blue color, on the crown there is a cockade with a blue “shine”;

Non-commissioned officers - a silver cord above the visor, a silver braid along the lower edge of the band, a silver emblem, a cockade with a silver “shine” on the crown;

Junior officers - a gold cord above the visor, gold braid along the lower edge of the band, a gold emblem, a cockade with a gold “shine” on the crown;

Senior officers - a gold cord above the visor, 2 rows of gold braid along the band, the emblem is gold, on the crown there is a cockade with a gold “shine”;

Generals - a gold cord above the visor, 3 rows of gold braid along the band, the emblem is gold, and there is a cockade with a gold “shine” on the crown.

Officers of the General Staff and generals of the ground forces and aviation wore double-row red stripes on their trousers.

In a number of units there were special differences, for example: in the Guards battalion they wore a white and red aiguillette with two cords, and in the 4th Infantry Regiment all ranks were given a small blue aiguillette with two balls. The personnel of the mountain infantry units wore a metal emblem on the left side of the cap and in the buttonholes - silver edelweiss, under which there could be a lining of light green cloth. In automobile parts, a golden emblem was worn on the buttonholes - a “winged” steering wheel.

The infantry soldier's equipment included: a leather waist belt with ammunition pouches; a satchel, on top of which an overcoat roll was attached; a flask in a case, a biscuit bag traditional for the Austrian army; mask; sheath for bayonet. The cavalryman's equipment included a sword belt, on the waist belt of which pouches were attached and a saber was fastened; saddle bags were used for transporting personal belongings. Officers and generals, as well as non-commissioned officers in individual positions, wore sword belts with a holster, field bags, binoculars in a case or case, and a whistle.

In 1938, Wehrmacht breast eagles were sewn onto the uniform, and in 1939, the personnel of the armed forces were included in the Wehrmacht and Luftwaffe units, and the Austrian armed forces were completely disbanded and were revived only in 1955.

Balla T., Kiss G.

Most of the article is summary military operations on the Southwestern Front, but at the end of it there are interesting information about life in the trenches. Photos have been added to the article.

The fighting of the Austro-Hungarian army during the First World War took place mainly on the Eastern, i.e., on the Russian Front, where already in August 1914, the Austro-Hungarian mountain divisions won their first victories in difficult battles at Stoyanov, Gorodok and Yaroslavitsa. However, the Austro-Hungarian troops were unable to contain the advance of the superior forces of the Russian 3rd and 8th armies in Eastern Galicia and were defeated in the battle of Lvov.

At the beginning of September 1914, the front moved beyond the San and Dunajewiec rivers, Austro-Hungarian troops abandoned the eastern and central parts of Galicia, and on September 17, the city and fortress of Przemysl (Przemysl) were surrounded by troops of the Russian 3rd Army. By the end of September, Austrian troops were pushed back to the Carpathian line. Infantry General Hermann Kusmanek, commander of the fortress garrison, was given the order to resist to the end. Most of the garrison consisted of detachments of the Royal Hungarian 23rd Honvédian Infantry Division under the command of Lieutenant General Árpád Fogarasi Tomasi, the second-in-command.

At the Battle of Limanow between December 3 and 15, 1914, Austro-Hungarian troops successfully stopped the Russian advance on Krakow, but the victory cost the lives of 90,000 Austro-Hungarian and German soldiers and officers and 110,000 Russians. As for the Carpathians, here Austro-Hungarian troops tried to oust the Russians from the foothills of the Carpathians and Galicia and lift the siege of Przemysl. However, this was not possible: Przemysl fell on March 22, and its entire garrison, approximately 120,000 people, capitulated. Nevertheless, in May 1915, the German 11th and Austro-Hungarian 4th Armies broke through the lines of the Russian 3rd Army in Gorlice and Tarnów and advanced to a depth of 15–20 km. Russian troops withdrew to the San River in mid-May, and Allied forces reoccupied Przemysl (June 3) and Lviv (June 22). From mid-July, the allied Austro-Hungarian and German forces went on the offensive along the entire Eastern Front. By September, the front had advanced 450 km to the east and stopped on the line Riga–Dunaburg–Baranow–Pinsk–Dubno–Tarnopol–Chernivtsi. The so-called trench warfare began. During the summer battles of 1915, the Russians lost 2.2 million people, while the losses of the Austro-Hungarian troops amounted to about 500,000 soldiers and officers.

Trench warfare on the Eastern Front continued until the summer of 1916; on June 4, cavalry general A. A. Brusilov, commander of the Russian Southwestern Front, launched an offensive with the four at his disposal (8th, 11th, 7th and 9th) armies. On the first day, the Russian 8th Army penetrated deep into the defense line of the Imperial-Royal 4th Army at Olyka. On June 7, the Russians occupied the city of Luk and by June 10 reached the Stir River ( Styr). The Austro-Hungarian 7th Army was unable to resist the advance of the Russian 7th and 9th armies in the southern part of the front. On June 10, Russian troops broke through to Okna, then occupied Chernivtsi and Stanislav. The Austro-Hungarian 7th Army abandoned Eastern Bukovina. As a result of the Brusilov breakthrough Russian troops penetrated to a depth of 60–120 km on a front approximately 400 km wide. It cost the Russians over 800,000 casualties, while Austria-Hungary lost an estimated 600,000 men.

After February Revolution In Russia, the Provisional Government decided not only to continue the war, but also to resume offensive operations. At the end of June 1917, the Russian 11th and 7th Armies broke through the defenses of the Austro-Hungarian 2nd Army east of Zborov, the Russian 8th Army broke through the front of the Imperial-Royal 3rd Army in Stanislav. The Russian advance was stopped only west of Kallus ( Kalusha), moreover, with German help. In July, Austro-Hungarian troops reoccupied Tarnopol and Stanislav, Eastern Galicia and Bukovina returned to the rule of the Central Powers ( naturally - under the rule of the Austrian Empire ). Russian casualties reached 500,000.

The truce on the Russian front began on December 5, 1917. On February 9, 1918, the Central Powers made peace in Kyiv with the Ukrainian Rada (with Ukrainian Central Rada and not in Kyiv, but in Brest-Litovsk ), and on March 3 in Brest-Litovsk - with Soviet Russia.

The Austro-Hungarian 2nd Army, under the command of Field Marshal Eduard von Böhm-Ermolli, took part in the occupation of Ukraine together with the Germans from the end of February to the end of May 1918. The military administration operated in the occupied territories until November 1918.

Speaking about the First World War, one cannot ignore such an important military aspect as the life and life of soldiers during the so-called trench warfare.

The equipped rifle cell - the embrasure is covered by a factory-made metal "rifle shield".

On the Eastern Front, as already indicated, it began at the end of 1914. Austro-Hungarian soldiers, like all soldiers of the warring armies, lived in trenches, often for many months in the same ones. The trenches were 1.5-2 m deep and 2 m wide with parapets and cells for firing from small arms. The trenches were equipped with protective covering against shrapnel and wire mesh against hand grenades. Built-in bomb shelters could accommodate all personnel; the entire system was protected by several rows of barbed wire. The dugouts and bomb shelters were heated by so-called field stoves. Sanitary posts, bomb shelters with two exits, latrines and telephone dugouts were located in trenches approximately 15 m behind the first line. Individual lines of trenches were connected to each other by so-called communication trenches, so that the actual network of trenches was quite significant, having 4–5 lines of defense at a distance of 100–200 m from one another. In rainy weather, trenches, fortifications and dugouts were often flooded, and soldiers waded through them knee-deep in water and mud. In many cases, boards were placed at the bottom of the trenches to facilitate movement. It was not easy in cold period when the snow covered everything around. At this time, the problem of feeding and supplying soldiers with everything they needed acquired particular importance. Those in the front lines rarely received hot food. The main supply was organized by company field kitchens and regimental bakeries. Since 1916, the daily portion of a first-line soldier was 70 decagrams ( 700 grams) bread, 37 decagrams ( 370 grams) meat, 10 decagrams ( 100 grams dried ) vegetables, 2 decagrams ( 20 grams) fat, two cans of canned coffee ( ground coffee) and 10 cigarettes. By 1918, portions were reduced to 50 decagrams ( half a kilogram) bread and 18 decagrams ( 180 grams) meat. Sometimes soldiers were left without any supplies for many days. Given these circumstances and the stability of their positions, the soldiers started vegetable gardens and even raised poultry and pigs.

The life of officers in front-line positions was not much different from the life of soldiers, but their diet was much better. It should be added that everyone was looking forward to parcels from home and Christmas parcels from home front charities with food, cigarettes and other products. What they managed to capture from the enemy was also used.

Changes at the front lines took place weekly, so that during rest, servicemen had the opportunity to wash themselves and change their uniforms. Traveling film crews and pop artists came to the positions. The soldiers themselves organized sports competitions. There were field libraries where private individuals sent their books. On rest days, those who distinguished themselves in battle were usually awarded a Silver Medal ( Clearly this means the “Silver Medal for Bravery,” but why did the authors decide to highlight it among others? ). But there were also guilty ones. In their regard, it has become common practice Physical punishment(shackled). True, this was applied only to the rank and file and only until 1917. After the February Revolution of 1917, the number of fraternizations at the front increased. Austro-Hungarian and Russian soldiers put an end to hostilities on several sectors of the front, they visited each other in the trenches, and there were cases when they shared mailboxes.

During the First World War approximately 850,000 Russian soldiers were captured by the Austro-Hungarians. According to international agreements, officers could not work. The rank and file, however, were busy agriculture, in various public works, in certain industries and in mines. Big number Russian prisoners of war worked in army rear units.

Russian prisoners of war in Hungary were guarded by territorial battalions ( meaning militia ) in 15–20 large prisoner-of-war camps in Basfa, Cinkota, Chota, Dunasherdahel, Haimasker, Kenimermets, Kiralihida, Lök, Ostfassonif, Soproniek, Šatmarnemet, Varosshalonak, Wassuran, Zalacan and Zalagerszeg.

Balla T., Kiss G. Austro-Hungarian soldiers on the Russian Front in 1914–1918 // The Last War Russian Empire: Russia, the world on the eve, during and after the First World War according to documents from Russian and foreign archives. - M., 2006. - P. 233–236.