The beginning of the siege. After the successful crossing of the Danube by Russian troops at Sistovo, the Turkish command on July 2 (14) began the transfer of Osman Pasha’s corps to Plevna from Vidin (northwest Bulgaria), which was tasked with striking the right flank of the Russian troops. On July 4, 1877, the 9th Army Corps of Lieutenant General N.P. Kridener captured the Nikopol fortress on the banks of the Danube north of Plevna.

The Russian command allocated a nine-thousand-strong detachment of Lieutenant General Schilder-Schuldner to occupy Plevna, which on the evening of July 7 reached the outskirts of the city and the next morning attacked Turkish positions. The 15,000-strong garrison of Plevna repelled scattered attacks by Russian regiments, inflicting serious losses on them (2.5 thousand people).

After the concentration of Kridener's entire corps (26 thousand soldiers, 140 guns) near the city, a second assault on Plevna was launched on July 18. By this time, Osman Pasha concentrated about 23 thousand people and 58 guns in the city. Kridener had no information about the Turkish forces, exaggerated their numbers and acted indecisively. The attacks were carried out from the east and southeast head-on against the most fortified areas, troops were brought into battle in parts. The assault ended in failure. Russian losses amounted to 7 thousand people, Turks - about 4 thousand people.

Plevna was of great strategic importance; its strong garrison threatened the crossings of the Danube and could attack the advancing Russian army in the flank and rear. Therefore, the Russian command postponed the transfer of the main forces through the Balkan Mountains (the Shipka Pass was captured on July 8) and during July-August concentrated an 83,000-strong army with 424 guns near Plevna, of which 32,000 people and 108 guns were from the allied Romanian army.

Third assault on Plevna. The Allies besieged Plevna from the south and east. On the right flank, opposite the Grivitsky redoubts, the Romanians settled down. From the east the city was besieged by Kridener's corps, from the southeast by General Krylov's 8th corps. In the southern direction there was a left-flank detachment of General M.D. Skobelev. From the north, the Turkish garrison was reliably covered by the heights of Yanyk-Bair, and from the west it was supplied along the Sofia-Plevna road. By the end of summer, the Turks increased the size of the Plevna garrison to 34 thousand people with 72 guns. Nominal commander allied army near Plevna was the Romanian King Carol I, in fact, his chief of staff, Lieutenant General P. D. Zotov, was in charge. But near Plevna there was also the headquarters of the Russian Emperor Alexander II and the commander-in-chief of the entire Danube Army, Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich Sr.

The third assault on Plevna took place on August 26-31. The Turks predicted the directions of attack of the Russian and Romanian troops and managed to hold their line of defense, inflicting heavy losses on the attackers. The decisive day was August 30, when the Romanians, with the support of the Russian 18th Infantry Regiment, managed to capture one of the two Grivitsky redoubts. On the same day, Skobelev’s detachment, delivering an auxiliary attack, found a weak point in the Turkish positions, broke through their defenses in the Green Mountains area, captured the Issa and Kavanlyk redoubts and reached the southern outskirts of the city. The Turks hastily transferred reserves from the north and east against Skobelev.

On August 31, the Russian command did not take offensive actions and did not support Skobelev with reserves. As a result, under the pressure of superior forces, Skobelev’s detachment was forced to return to its original positions. In the third assault on Plevna, Russian and Romanian troops lost 16 thousand people, the Turks - about three thousand.

Siege and capture of Plevna. On September 1, it was decided to proceed to a thorough siege of Plevna, for the leadership of which the best specialist in siege work in Russia, engineer-general E. I. Totleben, was called in. To successfully conduct a siege, the Russians needed to cut the Sofia-Plevna road, along which the Turks received reinforcements. To solve this problem from guards units a strike detachment of General I.V. Gurko was created. He managed to capture Gorny Dubnyak on October 12, Telish on October 16, Dolny Dubnyak on October 20 - strongholds on the Sofia road, thereby completely closing the blockade ring of the Pleven garrison, whose number by that time amounted to 50 thousand people.

The lack of food forced the Turkish commander Osman Pasha to attempt an independent liberation of Plevna. On November 28, having withdrawn troops from defensive positions, he attacked Russian troops northwest of Plevna. Units of the 2nd and 3rd Grenadier Divisions and the 5th Infantry Division of the Russian Army repelled the Turkish attack. Having lost 6 thousand soldiers and unable to escape from encirclement, Osman Pasha surrendered with 43 thousand soldiers. The fall of Plevna freed up a hundred thousand Russian-Romanian army for a subsequent offensive across the Balkans.

In the fighting near Plevna they received further development forms and methods of besieging fortresses. The Russian army developed new methods of infantry combat tactics, a combination of movement and fire from rifle chains, and the use of infantry self-entrenchment in the offensive began. At Plevna, the importance of field fortifications, the interaction of infantry with artillery, the role of heavy artillery in preparing an attack on fortified positions was revealed, and the possibility of controlling artillery fire when firing from closed positions was determined. In memory of the battles for Plevna, a mausoleum was built in the city in memory of fallen Russian and Romanian soldiers (1905), a park-museum of M. D. Skobelev (1907), and an artistic panorama complex “Liberation of Plevna in 1877.” In Moscow, at the Ilyinsky Gate, there is a monument to the grenadiers who fell near Plevna.

Based on materials from Internet resources

The Battle of the Bulgarian city of Plevna (Pleven) is the main episode of the Russian-Turkish War of 1877-1878. The fortress was located at the intersection of roads necessary for the transfer of troops to the Constantinople area.

On the eve of the war

The Russian Empire was forced to go to war with Turkey after the failure of negotiations for a peaceful settlement of issues related to the protection of the Christian population on the Balkan Peninsula. Porta (Ottoman government) ) conducted military operations against Serbia and actually ignored the ultimatum of Alexander II to conclude a truce.

The Russian generals decided to launch an offensive along the western coast of the Black Sea in the direction of the capital of the Ottoman Empire. Thus, it was planned to force Porto to the negotiating table, achieve guarantees of the rights of the Slavic peoples of the peninsula and strengthen its position in the region.

The next Russian-Turkish war could finally resolve the Eastern Question for St. Petersburg, which arose in the second half of the 18th century with the creation of the Montenegrin Fleet.

Russia sought to gain control of the strategically important Bosporus and Dardanelles straits and gain the status of a Mediterranean power.

This would give it significant military and economic advantages.

In the middle of the 19th century, the Ottoman Empire lost its former power and could no longer resist its northern neighbor on equal terms. The Western powers understood that the Porte was doomed to defeat without their help. Moreover, in the 1870s, Russia practically recovered from the consequences of the Crimean War of 1853-1856, in which it lost to the coalition of Turkey, Great Britain and France.

To prevent the collapse of the Ottoman Empire and contain the ambitions of St. Petersburg, the British and French trained and rearmed Turkish troops. At the same time, London and Paris did not support the Porte's overly harsh position towards the Christian population in the Balkans.

In 1877, against the backdrop of Ottoman repression against Christians, Russia managed to achieve the neutrality of the West, which made it possible to declare war on Turkey. However, Great Britain and France closely monitored the progress of the fighting, fearing a hasty surrender of Turkey and the capture of the straits by Russian troops.

On the approaches to Plevna

Alexander II delayed the moment of entering the war with Turkey, although the plan for this war was prepared in 1876. The Emperor rightly believed that the Russian army was not yet ready to fight large-scale battles, at least for a long time.

The armed forces of the empire were in the stage of modernization. The troops did not have time to receive modern weapons and master advanced combat tactics. The unfinished military reform was one of the reasons for the first failures in the battles for Plevna.

On the eve of the war, the size of the Russian army was estimated at about half a million people against the two hundred thousand Turkish army. In the fall of 1876, Russia concentrated an army of over 180 thousand people on its southwestern borders. On the side Russian Empire Romanian and Serbian troops, as well as Bulgarian, Armenian and Georgian militias, were ready to act.

Alexander II declared war on Turkey in April 1877. At the beginning of July, part of the Russian troops crossed the Danube, which separates Romania and Bulgaria, and gained a foothold on the approaches to Plevna. On July 16, the 9th Corps of Lieutenant General Nikolai Kridener captured the Nikopol fortress, 40 km from Plevna.

At that time, the city's garrison consisted of only three Turkish infantry battalions, armed with four guns. On July 19, 17 thousand Turkish soldiers under the command of Marshal Osman Pasha made a forced march of 200 km and took up defenses around the city.

• Artillery battle near Plevna. A battery of siege weapons on the Grand Duke's Mountain. Artist Nikolay Dmitriev-Orenburgsky
• encyclopedia.mil.ru

The battles for Plevna began on July 18, but the first attacks of Russian troops failed. By August 1877, the Russian army had lost almost 10 thousand soldiers. Taking advantage of the pause, the Turks increased the size of the garrison to 32 thousand people with 70 guns and erected new engineering structures.

The Turkish group created a threat to crossing the Danube, and the Russian command stopped the offensive in the Constantinople direction. It was decided to take the city by storm. 84 thousand soldiers with 424 guns were concentrated near Plevna. The Russians were supported by Romanian troops (32 thousand people with 108 guns) and detachments of Bulgarian militias.

From assault to siege

In August-September, Russian-Romanian units made several unsuccessful attempts to capture Turkish fortifications. Historians of the Military Academy of the General Staff Armed Forces Russian Federation explain the failures of the attacking forces by disorganization in the control system.

“With the detachment were Emperor Alexander II, Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich and Minister of War Dmitry Milyutin, which made unified command and control of the troops difficult. The planning and preparation of the allied forces for the offensive were carried out in a formulaic manner, the strikes were planned to be carried out in the previous directions, the interaction between the troops attacking in each of them was not organized,” experts note.

The Military Academy of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces believes that the Russians and Romanians underestimated the enemy and neglected intelligence that would have helped identify gaps in the defense of Plevna. In particular, on the western outskirts of the city the Turks had almost no fortifications, but this direction never became promising.

According to historians, the reason for three unsuccessful assaults on Plevna and dozens of battles for redoubts lay in the high density of fire created by the Turkish infantrymen. At long range, the Ottomans used American Peabody-Martini rifles, and in close combat, they used Winchester carbines.

• Capture of the Grivitsky redoubt near Plevna. Artist Nikolay Dmitriev-Orenburgsky
• encyclopedia.mil.ru

On September 13, Alexander II decided to begin a systematic siege of Plevna. The construction of the fortifications was led by General Eduard Totleben, at that time a leading specialist in the field of engineering. He came to the conclusion that the city's garrison would not be able to hold out for more than two months if all supply lines were cut off.

On November 1, Russian troops completely surrounded Plevna, knocking out the Turks from the villages of Gorny, Dolny Dubnyaki, Telish and Gorny Metropol. On November 12, Osman Pasha was asked to surrender, but he refused. The fortress was held by 44 thousand people, the number of Russian troops was 130 thousand bayonets. The situation of the garrison worsened every day due to shortages of food and water.

Final fight

The goal of the Russian-Romanian units was to prevent the enemy from breaking through the defensive lines erected by the besieging troops. The only chance of salvation for the Ottomans was to cross the Vid River, then launch a surprise attack and retreat to Vidin or Sofia, where the Turkish army was stationed.

On December 1, Osman Pasha decided to withdraw the garrison from Plevna. The operation to break the siege began on the night of December 10. Under cover of darkness, the Ottomans crossed to the left bank of the Vid and early morning attacked the 9th Siberian Grenadier Regiment.

By 9:00 the Turks were able to break through two lines of fortifications, but at 11:00 the 2nd Brigade of the 3rd Grenadier Division went on the offensive. An hour later, Turkish troops were pushed back to the first line of defense. After this, the 1st Brigade of the 2nd Grenadier Division struck the enemy from the left flank, forcing him to retreat to the river.

Turkish troops came across convoys left after the crossing. Panic began in their ranks, and the retreat became chaotic. The grenadiers literally shot the enemy at a distance of 800 steps. Seeing that his troops were doomed to destruction, Osman Pasha decided to surrender.

On December 10, Russian-Romanian units occupied Plevna without hindrance. Ten Turkish generals, 2,128 officers, 41,200 soldiers were captured; in addition, the winners became the owners of 77 guns. The fall of the fortress made it possible to free more than 100 thousand people and continue the offensive against Constantinople.

• The captured Osman Pasha is presented to Alexander II on the day of the capture of Plevna. Artist Nikolay Dmitriev-Orenburgsky
• encyclopedia.mil.ru

“This army, with its worthy commander at its head (Osman Pasha), numbering 40 thousand, surrendered to us unconditionally.<…>I am proud to command such troops and must tell you that I cannot find words to adequately express my respect and amazement at your military prowess.<…>Remember that I am not alone, but all of Russia, all its sons are rejoicing and rejoicing in your glorious victory over Osman Pasha,” said Lieutenant General Ivan Ganetsky, commander of the grenadier corps, after the end of the battle.

Historians of the Military Academy of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces note that, despite the mistakes made, imperial army achieved success in the use of new infantry techniques, “whose rifle chains combined fire and movement, and used self-entrenchment when approaching the enemy.” The importance of field fortifications and the high effectiveness of heavy artillery were also realized.

The siege of Plevna taught the command Russian army use more advanced methods of cargo delivery, movement and deployment of troops. For example, two “civilian transport” were engaged in transporting food and weapons. Also, analogues of modern field kitchens appeared for the first time in the world near Plevna.

Holy memory

The victory at Plevna and successful actions in Transcaucasia, where the army of Marshal Mukhtar Pasha was defeated, created the conditions for the military surrender of the Porte. On January 19, 1878, the Truce of Adrianople was signed, and on March 3, the Treaty of San Stefano was signed.

As a result of negotiations with the Porte, Serbia, Montenegro and Romania gained independence. Bulgaria became an autonomous principality, although during the Berlin Congress, which was convened at the initiative of the Western powers, Sofia's powers in the sphere of self-government were significantly curtailed.

March 3 is a national holiday for Bulgarians. War with Ottoman Empire in 1877-1878 in the historiography of Bulgaria is called the Liberation War. Monuments to Russian and Romanian soldiers were erected throughout the country.

“In memory of the battles near Plevna, a mausoleum of fallen Russian and Romanian soldiers, the Skobelevsky Park Museum, historical Museum“The liberation of Plevna in 1877,” near Grivitsa there is a mausoleum of Romanian soldiers and about 100 monuments in the vicinity of the fortress,” note historians of the Military Academy of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces.

In 1887, a monument-chapel to Russian grenadiers who died in the battles for Plevna was erected in Kitay-Gorod in Moscow. The memorial was built on the initiative of the Russian Archaeological Society and officers of the Grenadier Corps stationed in Moscow.

• Monument-chapel in memory of the Heroes of Plevna in Ilyinsky Park in Moscow
• globallookpress.com
• Konstantin Kokoshkin

Scientific director of the Russian Military Historical Society, Mikhail Myagkov, in a conversation with RT, noted that, despite the difficult political relations between Moscow and Sofia, the battle for Plevna and the Shipka Pass remains a symbol of the military brotherhood of Russians, Romanians and Bulgarians.

“Repeatedly, Russia and Bulgaria found themselves on opposite sides of the barricades, but political disputes did not concern the sacred memory of the Russian contribution to the country’s independence. We are seeing the same thing now. Unfortunately, there are forces in Bulgaria that demand that the monuments be dismantled Soviet soldiers. However, the attitude towards the memorials of the Russian-Turkish War is extremely positive,” the historian said.

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Fall of Plevna

Dmitriev-Orenburgsky N.D.
Capture of the Grivitsky redoubt near Plevna

The capture of Plevna by Russian troops was a key event in the Russian-Turkish War of 1877-1878, which predetermined the successful completion of the campaign on the Balkan Peninsula. Fighting near Plevna lasted five months and is considered one of the most tragic pages of the Russian military history.

After crossing the Danube at Zimnitsa, the Russian Danube Army (Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich (the Elder)) advanced its Western detachment (9th Corps, Lieutenant General) to the Turkish fortress of Nikopol to capture it and secure the right flank of the main forces. After capturing the fortress on July 4 (16), Russian troops did not take active action for two days to capture Plevna, located 40 km from it, the garrison of which consisted of 3 Turkish infantry battalions and 4 guns. But on July 1 (13) the Turkish corps began moving out of Vidin to strengthen the garrison. It consisted of 19 battalions, 5 squadrons and 9 batteries - 17 thousand bayonets, 500 sabers and 58 guns. Having passed a forced march of 200 km in 6 days, at dawn on July 7 (19), Osman Pasha reached Plevna and took up defensive positions on the outskirts of the city. On July 6 (18), the Russian command sent a detachment of up to 9 thousand people with 46 guns (lieutenant general) to the fortress. On the evening of the next day, parts of the detachment reached the distant approaches to Plevna and were stopped by Turkish artillery fire. On the morning of July 8 (20), Russian troops launched an offensive, which initially developed successfully, but was soon stopped by enemy reserves. Schilder-Schuldner stopped the fruitless attacks, and the Russian troops, having suffered heavy losses (up to 2.8 thousand people), returned to initial position. On July 18 (30), the second assault on Plevna took place, which also failed and cost the Russian troops about 7 thousand people. This failure forced the command to suspend offensive operations in the Constantinople direction.

The Turks quickly restored the destroyed defensive structures, erected new ones and turned the closest approaches to Plevna into a heavily fortified area with more than 32 thousand troops defending it with 70 guns. This group posed a threat to the Russian crossing of the Danube, located 660 km from Plevna. Therefore, the Russian command decided to make a third attempt to capture Plevna. The Western detachment was increased more than 3 times (84 thousand people, 424 guns, including Romanian troops - 32 thousand people, 108 guns). Emperor Alexander II, Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich and the Minister of War were with the detachment, which made unified command and control of the troops difficult. The planning and preparation of the allied forces for the offensive were carried out in a formulaic manner, the attacks were planned to be carried out in the same directions, and the interaction between the troops attacking in each of them was not organized. Before the start of the offensive on August 22 (September 3), Lovcha was captured, and on the right flank and in the center of the battle formation of the Western detachment, a 4-day artillery preparation was carried out, in which 130 guns took part, but the fire was ineffective - it was not possible to destroy the Turkish redoubts and trenches and disrupt the enemy's defense system.

Dmitriev-Orenburgsky N.D.
Artillery battle near Plevna. Battery of siege weapons on the Grand Duke's Mountain

In the middle of the day on August 30 (September 11), a general offensive began. Romanian troops and the Russian infantry brigade of the 5th Infantry Division struck from the northeast, the Russian 4th Corps - from the southeast, and a detachment (up to 2 infantry brigades) - from the south. The regiments went on the attack at different times, entered the battle in parts, acted frontally and were easily repelled by the enemy. On the right flank, Russian-Romanian troops, at the cost of heavy losses, captured Grivitsky redoubt No. 1, but did not advance further. The Russian 4th Corps was not successful and suffered heavy losses.

Henryk Dembitsky.
Battle on the Romanian part of the redoubt at the village. Grivitsa

Only Skobelev’s detachment in the 2nd half of the day managed to capture the redoubts of Kouvanlyk and Isa-Aga and open the way to Plevna. But the Russian high command refused to regroup forces to the south and did not support Skobelev’s detachment with reserves, which the next day, having repelled 4 strong counterattacks of the Turks, was forced to retreat under pressure from superior enemy forces to its original position. The third attack on Plevna, despite the high military valor, the dedication and perseverance of Russian and Romanian soldiers and officers ended in failure.

Diorama "Battle of Plevna" from the Military Museum in Bucharest, Romania

The failure of all attempts to capture Plevna was due to a number of reasons: poor intelligence of the Turkish troops and their defense system; underestimation of enemy forces and means; a patterned attack in the same directions on the most fortified areas of Turkish positions; the lack of maneuver of troops to attack Plevna from the west, where the Turks had almost no fortifications, as well as to transfer the main efforts to more promising direction; lack of interaction between groupings of troops advancing in different directions and clear control of all allied forces.

The unsuccessful outcome of the offensive forced the Russian high command to change the way they fought the enemy. On September 1 (13), Alexander II arrived near Plevna and convened a military council, at which he raised the question of whether the army should remain near Plevna or whether it should retreat beyond the Osma River. The chief of staff of the Western detachment, Lieutenant General, and the chief of artillery of the army, Lieutenant General Prince, spoke in favor of retreat. The continuation of the fight for the fortress was advocated by the assistant chief of staff of the Danube Army, Major General, and the Minister of War, Infantry General D.A. Milyutin. Their point of view was supported by Alexander II. The council participants decided not to retreat from Plevna, strengthen their positions and wait for reinforcements from Russia, after which it was planned to begin a blockade or a proper siege of the fortress and force it to capitulate. An engineer-general was appointed as assistant commander of the detachment of the Romanian Prince Charles to lead the siege work. Arriving at the theater of military operations, Totleben came to the conclusion that the Plevna garrison was provided with food for only two months, and therefore could not withstand a prolonged blockade. The newly arrived Guards Corps (1st, 2nd, 3rd Guards Infantry and 2nd Guards Cavalry Divisions, Guards Rifle Brigade) joined the Western Detachment.

In order to implement the plan developed by the Russian command, it was considered necessary to cut off communications between Osman Pasha’s army and the base in Orhaniye. The Turks firmly held three fortified points on the Sofia Highway, along which the Plevna garrison was supplied - Gorny and Dolny Dubnyaki and Telish. The Russian command decided to use Guard troops entrusted to the lieutenant general to capture them. On October 12 (24) and October 16 (28), after bloody battles, the guards occupied Gorny Dubnyak and Telish. On October 20 (November 1), Russian troops entered Dolny Dubnyak, abandoned by the Turks without a fight. On the same day, the advanced units of the 3rd Grenadier Division that arrived in Bulgaria approached the settlement north-west of Plevna - Mountain Metropolis, interrupting communications with Vidin. As a result, the fortress garrison was completely isolated.

On October 31 (November 12), the Turkish commander was asked to surrender, but he refused. By the end of November, the besieged garrison of Plevna found itself in a critical situation. Of the 50 thousand people who found themselves in Plevna after the annexation of the Dolny Dubnyak garrison, less than 44 thousand remained. Taking into account the deplorable state of the garrison troops, Osman Pasha convened a military council on November 19 (December 1). Its participants made a unanimous decision to fight their way out of Plevna. The Turkish commander expected to cross to the left bank of the Vid River, strike at Russian troops in a northwest direction towards Magaletta, and then move, depending on the situation, to Vidin or Sofia.

By the end of November, the Plevna taxation detachment consisted of 130 thousand combatant lower ranks, 502 field and 58 siege guns. The troops were divided into six sections: 1st - Romanian General A. Cernat (consisted of Romanian troops), 2nd - Lieutenant General N.P. Kridener, 3rd - Lieutenant General P.D. Zotov, 4th - Lieutenant General M.D. Skobelev, 5th - Lieutenant General and 6th - Lieutenant General. A tour of the Plevna fortifications convinced Totleben that an attempt by the Turks to break through would most likely follow in the 6th sector.

On the night of November 27-28 (December 9-10), taking advantage of the darkness and bad weather, the Turkish army left its positions near Plevna and secretly approached the crossings of the Vid. By 5 o'clock in the morning, three brigades of Tahir Pasha's division moved to the left bank of the river. The troops were followed by convoys. Osman Pasha was also forced to take with him about 200 families from among the Turkish residents of Plevna and most of the wounded. Despite all the precautions taken, the crossing Turkish army turned out to be a complete surprise for the Russian command. At 7:30 the enemy quickly attacked the center of the position
6th section, occupied by 7 companies of the 9th Siberian Grenadier Regiment of the 3rd Grenadier Division. 16 Turkish battalions drove the Russian grenadiers out of the trenches, capturing 8 guns. By 8:30 the first line of Russian fortifications between the Dolny Metropol and the Dug Grave was broken through. The retreating Siberians tried to fortify themselves in the buildings scattered between the first and second lines of defense, but to no avail. At this moment, the 10th Little Russian Grenadier Regiment approached from the direction of the Mountain Metropolis and counterattacked the enemy. However, the heroic counterattack of the Little Russians failed - the regiment retreated with heavy losses. At about 9 o'clock the Turks managed to break through the second line of Russian fortifications.

Plan of the battle of Plevna on November 28 (December 10), 1877

The critical moment of the last Plevna battle had arrived. The entire area north of the Dug Grave was littered with the bodies of killed and wounded grenadiers of the Siberian and Little Russian regiments. Corps commander Ganetsky arrived on the battlefield to personally lead the troops. At the beginning of 11 o'clock, the long-awaited 2nd brigade of the 3rd Grenadier Division (11th Phanagorian and 12th Astrakhan regiments) appeared from the direction of the Mountain Metropolis. As a result of the ensuing counterattack, the Russian grenadiers recaptured the second line of fortifications occupied by the enemy. The 3rd brigade was supported by the approaching 7th Grenadier Samogitsky and 8th Grenadier Moscow regiments of the 2nd division.

Chapel-monument in honor of the grenadier,
killed in the battle of Plevna on November 28 (December 10), 1877

Pressed from the front and flanks, Turkish troops began to retreat to the first line of fortifications. Osman Pasha intended to wait for the arrival of the second division from the right bank of the Vid, but it was delayed due to the crossing of numerous convoys. By 12 noon the enemy was driven out of the first line of fortifications. As a result of the counterattack, Russian troops not only recaptured 8 guns captured by the Turks, but also captured 10 enemy ones.

Dmitriev-Orenburgsky N.D.
The last battle near Plevna on November 28, 1877 (1889)

Lieutenant General Ganetsky, seriously fearing a new attack by the Turks, did not plan to pursue them. He ordered to occupy the forward fortifications, bring artillery here and wait for the enemy to attack. However, the intention of the commander of the Grenadier Corps - to stop the advancing troops - did not come true. The 1st Brigade of the 2nd Grenadier Division, which occupied the fortified position of the Dolne-Dubnyaksky detachment, seeing the retreat of the Turks, moved forward and began to envelop them from the left flank. Following her, the rest of the troops of the 6th section went on the offensive. Under the pressure of the Russians, the Turks at first slowly and in relative order retreated to Vid, but soon the retreating ones encountered their convoys. Panic began among the civilians following the convoys. At that moment Osman Pasha was wounded. Lieutenant Colonel Pertev Bey, commander of one of the two regiments covering the convoys, tried to stop the Russians, but to no avail. His regiment was overthrown, and the retreat of the Turkish army turned into a disorderly flight. Soldiers and officers, residents of Plevna, artillery pieces, carts, and pack animals crowded together at the bridges in a dense mass. The grenadiers approached the enemy at 800 steps, firing aimed rifle fire at him.

In the remaining areas of investment, the blocking troops also went on the offensive and, having captured the fortifications of the northern, eastern and southern fronts, occupied Plevna and reached the heights to the west of it. The 1st and 3rd brigades of the Turkish division of Adil Pasha, which covered the retreat of the main forces of Osman Pasha's army, laid down their arms. Surrounded on all sides by superior forces, Osman Pasha decided to surrender.

Osman Pasha presents a saber to Lieutenant General I.S. Ganetsky

Dmitriev-Orenburgsky N.D.
The captured Osman Pasha, who commanded the Turkish troops in Plevna, is presented to His Imperial Majesty the Sovereign Emperor Alexander II
on the day of the capture of Plevna by Russian troops on November 29, 1877

10 generals, 2,128 officers, 41,200 soldiers surrendered; 77 guns were delivered. The fall of Plevna made it possible for the Russian command to free up more than 100 thousand people for an offensive across the Balkans.

Capture of Plevna from November 28 to 29, 1877
Lubok publishing house I.D. Sytin

In the fighting near Plevna, methods of encircling and blockading an enemy group were developed. The Russian army used new infantry techniques, whose rifle chains combined fire and movement, and used self-entrenchment when approaching the enemy. The importance of field fortifications, the interaction of infantry with artillery, the high efficiency of heavy artillery in fire preparation for an attack on fortified positions was revealed, and the possibility of controlling artillery fire when firing from closed positions was determined. The Bulgarian militia fought bravely as part of the Russian troops near Plevna.

In memory of the battles near Plevna, a mausoleum of fallen Russian and Romanian soldiers, the Skobelevsky Park Museum, the historical museum “Liberation of Plevna in 1877” were built in the city, near Grivitsa - a mausoleum of Romanian soldiers and about 100 monuments in the vicinity of the fortress.

Skobelev Park in Plevna

In Moscow, at the Ilyinsky Gate, there is a monument-chapel to the Russian grenadiers who fell near Plevna. The chapel was built on the initiative of the Russian Archaeological Society and military personnel of the Grenadier Corps stationed in Moscow, who raised about 50 thousand rubles for its construction. The authors of the monument were the famous architect and sculptor V.I. Sherwood and engineer-colonel A.I. Lyashkin.

Monument to the heroes of Plevna in Moscow

Material prepared by the Research Institute
(military history) Military Academy of the General Staff
Armed Forces of the Russian Federation

Tragedy near Plevna

After the capture of Nikopol, Lieutenant General Kridener had to occupy Plevna, which was not defended by anyone, as quickly as possible. The fact is that this city was of strategic importance as a junction of roads leading to Sofia, Lovcha, Tarnovo, Shipka Pass, etc. In addition, on July 5, the forward patrols of the 9th Cavalry Division reported movement towards Plevna great forces enemy. These were the troops of Osman Pasha, urgently transferred from Western Bulgaria. Initially, Osman Pasha had 17 thousand people with 30 field guns.

The Chief of Staff of the Active Army, General Nepokochitsky, sent a telegram to Kridener on July 4: “...immediately move a Cossack brigade, two infantry regiments with artillery to occupy Plevna.” On July 5, General Kridener received a telegram from the commander-in-chief, in which he demanded to immediately occupy Plevna and “cover in Plevno from a possible offensive of troops from Vidin.” Finally, on July 6, Nepokochitsky sent another telegram, which said: “If you cannot immediately march to Plevno with all the troops, then send there immediately Tutolmin’s Cossack brigade and part of the infantry.”

The troops of Osman Pasha, making daily 33-kilometer marches, covered a 200-kilometer path in 6 days and occupied Plevna, while General Kridener failed to cover a distance of 40 km in the same time. When the units allocated to them finally approached Plevna, they were met by fire from mounted Turkish reconnaissance. The troops of Osman Pasha had already settled on the hills surrounding Plevna and began to equip positions there. Until July 1877, the city had no fortifications. However, from the north, east and south, Plevna was covered by dominant heights. Having successfully used them, Osman Pasha erected field fortifications around Plevna.

Turkish general Osman Pasha (1877-1878)

To capture Plevna, Kridener sent a detachment of Lieutenant General Schilder-Schuldner, who only approached the Turkish fortifications on the evening of July 7. The detachment numbered 8,600 people with 46 field guns. The next day, July 8, Schilder-Schuldner attacked the Turks, but was unsuccessful. In this battle, called “First Plevna,” the Russians lost 75 officers and 2,326 lower ranks killed and wounded. According to Russian data, Turkish losses amounted to less than two thousand people.

The presence of Turkish troops at a distance of only two days' march from the only crossing of the Danube near Sistovo greatly worried Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich. The Turks could threaten from Plevna the entire Russian army and especially the troops advanced beyond the Balkans, not to mention the headquarters. Therefore, the commander demanded that the troops of Osman Pasha (whose forces were significantly exaggerated) be defeated and Plevna captured.

By mid-July, the Russian command concentrated 26 thousand people with 184 field guns near Plevna.

It should be noted that the Russian generals did not think of encircling Plevna. Reinforcements freely approached Osman Pasha, ammunition and food were delivered. By the beginning of the second assault, his forces in Plevna had increased to 22 thousand people with 58 guns. As we see, the Russian troops did not have an advantage in numbers, and the almost triple superiority in artillery did not play a role decisive role, since the field artillery of that time was powerless against well-made earthen fortifications, even of the field type. In addition, the artillery commanders near Plevna did not risk sending cannons into the first ranks of the attackers and shooting the defenders of the redoubts at point-blank range, as was the case near Kars.

However, on July 18, Kridener launched a second assault on Plevna. The assault ended in disaster - 168 officers and 7,167 lower ranks were killed and wounded, while Turkish losses did not exceed 1,200 people. During the assault, Kridener gave confused orders, the artillery as a whole acted sluggishly and spent only 4073 shells during the entire battle.

After the Second Plevna, panic began in the Russian rear. In Sistovo they mistook the approaching Cossack unit for Turks and were about to surrender to them. Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich turned to the Romanian King Charles with a tearful request for help. By the way, the Romanians themselves had offered their troops before, but Chancellor Gorchakov categorically did not agree to the Romanians crossing the Danube for some political reasons known to him alone. Turkish generals had the opportunity to defeat the Russian army and throw its remnants over the Danube. But they also did not like to take risks, and they also intrigued against each other. Therefore, despite the absence of a continuous front line, for several weeks there was only a positional war in the theater.

On July 19, 1877, Tsar Alexander II, deeply depressed by the “Second Plevna,” ordered the mobilization of the Guards and Grenadier Corps, the 24th, 26th Infantry and 1st Cavalry Divisions, a total of 110 thousand people with 440 guns. However, they could not arrive before September - October. In addition, it was ordered to move to the front the already mobilized 2nd and 3rd Infantry Divisions and the 3rd Infantry Brigade, but these units could not arrive before mid-August. Until reinforcements arrived, they decided to confine themselves to defense everywhere.

By August 25, significant forces of Russians and Romanians were concentrated near Plevna: 75,500 bayonets, 8,600 sabers and 424 guns, including more than 20 siege guns. The Turkish forces numbered 29,400 bayonets, 1,500 sabers and 70 field guns. On August 30, the third assault on Plevna took place. The date of the assault was timed to coincide with the tsar’s name day. Alexander II, the Romanian King Charles and Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich personally arrived to observe the assault.

The generals did not bother to provide massive artillery fire, and there were very few mortars near Plevna, as a result, enemy fire was not suppressed, and the troops suffered huge losses. The Turks repulsed the assault. The Russians lost two generals, 295 officers and 12,471 lower ranks killed and wounded; their Romanian allies lost approximately three thousand people. A total of about 16 thousand against three thousand Turkish losses.

Alexander II and Prince Charles of Romania near Plevna

“Third Plevna” made a stunning impression on the army and the whole country. On September 1, Alexander II convened a military council in the town of Poradim. At the council, the commander-in-chief, Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich, suggested immediately retreating back across the Danube. In this he was actually supported by Generals Zotov and Massalsky, while Minister of War Milyutin and General Levitsky categorically opposed the retreat. After much reflection, Alexander II agreed with the latter’s opinion. It was decided to go on the defensive again until new reinforcements arrived.

Despite the successful defense, Osman Pasha was aware of the riskiness of his position in Plevna and asked permission to retreat until he was blocked there. However, he was ordered to remain where he was. From the garrisons of Western Bulgaria, the Turks urgently formed the army of Shefket Pasha in the Sofia region, as reinforcement for Osman Pasha. On September 8, Shevket Pasha sent the Akhmet-Hivzi division (10 thousand bayonets with 12 guns) with a huge food transport to Plevna. The collection of this transport went unnoticed by the Russians, and when the lines of convoys stretched past the Russian cavalry (6 thousand sabers, 40 guns), its mediocre and timid commander, General Krylov, did not dare to attack them. Encouraged by this, Shevket Pasha sent another transport on September 23, with which he went himself, and this time the entire guard of the convoy consisted of only one cavalry regiment! General Krylov let both transport and Shevket Pasha through, not only to Plevna, but also back to Sofia. Truly, even an enemy agent in his place could not have done more! Due to Krylov’s criminal inaction, Osman Pasha’s army received food for two months.

On September 15, General E.I. arrived near Plevna. Totleben, summoned by the Tsar's telegram from St. Petersburg. Having toured the positions, Totleben categorically spoke out against a new assault on Plevna. Instead, he proposed tightly blockading the city and starving the Turks, i.e. something that should have started right away! By the beginning of October, Plevna was completely blocked. By mid-October, there were 170 thousand Russian troops there against 47 thousand Osman Pasha.

To relieve Plevna, the Turks created the 35,000-strong so-called “Sofia Army” under the command of Mehmed-Ali. Mehmed-Ali slowly moved towards Plevna, but on November 10-11 his units were thrown back near Novagan by the western detachment of General I.V. Gurko (Gurko also had 35 thousand people). Gurko wanted to pursue and finish off Mehmed-Ali, but Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich forbade this. Having burned himself at Plevna, the Grand Duke was now cautious.

By mid-November, surrounded Plevna began to run out of ammunition and food. Then, on the night of November 28, Osman Pasha left the city and went for a breakthrough. The 3rd Grenadier Division, vigorously supported by artillery, stopped the Turks. And in the middle of the day the main forces of the Russian army approached the battlefield. The wounded Osman Pasha gave the order to surrender. In total, more than 43 thousand people surrendered: 10 pashas, ​​2128 officers, 41,200 lower ranks. 77 guns were taken. The Turks lost about six thousand people killed and wounded. Russian losses in this battle did not exceed 1,700 people.

The stubborn resistance of Osman Pasha in Plevna cost the Russian army huge losses in manpower (22.5 thousand killed and wounded!) and a five-month delay in the offensive. This delay, in turn, negated the possibility of a quick victory in the war, created thanks to the capture of the Shipka Pass by General Gurko’s units on July 18-19.

The main reason for the tragedy at Plevna was the illiteracy, indecisiveness and outright stupidity of such Russian generals as Kridener, Krylov, Zotov, Massalsky and the like. This is especially true for the use of artillery. The clueless generals did not know what to do with a large number of field guns, although they could at least remember how Napoleon concentrated batteries of 200-300 guns in the decisive place of the battle and literally swept away the enemy with artillery fire.

On the other hand, long-range, rapid-fire rifles and effective shrapnel made it almost impossible for infantry to attack fortifications without first suppressing them with artillery. And field guns are physically unable to reliably suppress even earthen fortifications. For this you need mortars or howitzers of 6-8 inch caliber. And there were such mortars in Russia. In the western fortresses of Russia and in the siege park of Brest-Litovsk, about 200 units of 6-inch mortars of the 1867 model stood idle. These mortars were quite mobile, it was not difficult to transfer even all of them to Plevna. In addition, on June 1, 1877, the siege artillery of the Danube Army had 16 units of 8-inch and 36 units of 6-inch mortars of the 1867 model. Finally, to fight infantry and artillery hidden in earthen fortifications, close combat weapons could be used - half-pound smooth mortars, hundreds of which were available in fortresses and siege parks. Their firing range did not exceed 960 meters, but the half-pound mortars easily fit into trenches; crews carried them to the battlefield manually (this is a kind of prototype of mortars).

The Turks in Plevna did not have mortars, so Russian 8-inch and 6-inch mortars from closed positions could shoot Turkish fortifications with almost impunity. After 6 hours of continuous bombardment, the success of the attacking troops could be guaranteed. Especially if the 3-pound mountain and 4-pound field guns supported the attackers with fire, moving in the advanced infantry formations on horseback or human traction.

By the way, back in the late 50s of the 19th century, tests of chemical ammunition were carried out on the Volkovo Field near St. Petersburg. Bombs from a half-pound (152 mm) unicorn were filled with cyanide cacodyle. In one of the experiments, such a bomb was exploded in a log house, where there were twelve cats protected from shrapnel. A few hours later, a commission headed by Adjutant General Barantsev visited the site of the explosion. All the cats lay motionless on the floor, their eyes were watering, but they were all alive. Upset by this fact, Barantsev wrote a resolution stating that it was impossible to use chemical ammunition either now or in the future due to the fact that they do not have a lethal effect. It did not occur to the adjutant general that it is not always necessary to kill the enemy. Sometimes it is enough to temporarily disable him or force him to flee by throwing away his weapon. Apparently, the general actually had sheep in his family. It is not difficult to imagine the effect of the massive use of chemical shells near Plevna. In the absence of gas masks, even field artillery can force any fortress to surrender.

In addition to all that has been said, the true disaster for the Russian army in this war was the invasion of the titular locusts. Before the start of the war, the Commander-in-Chief, Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich, addressed a letter to Alexander II, in which he argued the undesirability of the Tsar’s presence in the army, and also asked not to send the Grand Dukes there. Alexander II answered his brother that “the upcoming campaign is of a religious-national character,” and therefore he “cannot remain in St. Petersburg,” but promised not to interfere with the orders of the commander-in-chief. The Tsar was going to start rewarding distinguished military personnel and visiting the wounded and sick. “I will be a brother of mercy,” Alexander finished the letter. He also refused the second request. They say, due to the special nature of the campaign, the absence of grand dukes in the army Russian society can understand how they are evading their patriotic and military duty. “In any case,” wrote Alexander I, “Sasha [Tsarevich Alexander Alexandrovich, future Tsar Alexander III], as the future Emperor, cannot help but participate in the campaign, and at least in this way I hope to make a man out of him.”

Alexander II still went to the army. The Tsarevich, Grand Dukes Alexei Alexandrovich, Vladimir Alexandrovich, Sergei Alexandrovich, Konstantin Konstantinovich and others were also there. They all tried to give advice, if not to command. The trouble from the tsar and the great princes was not only incompetent advice. With each of them rode a large retinue of confidants, lackeys, cooks, their own guards, etc. Together with the emperor, there were always ministers in the army - military, internal and foreign affairs, and other ministers visited regularly. The tsar's stay in the army cost the treasury one and a half million rubles. And it’s not just about money - there were no military operations in the theater railways. The army experienced constant supply shortages; there were not enough horses, oxen, fodder, carts, etc. The terrible roads were clogged with troops and vehicles. Is there any need to explain the chaos caused by the thousands of horses and carts that served the Tsar and the Grand Dukes?

SIEGE OF PLEVNA SIEGE OF PLEVNA

SIEGE OF PLEVNA in 1877. During Russian-Turkish war 1877-1878 There were stubborn battles for the city of Plevna (Pleven) from July 8 (20) to November 28 (December 10), 1877. Three assaults by Russian and Romanian troops in July-August were unsuccessful, after which Plevna was taken into the blockade ring. On November 28 (December 10), 1877, Turkish troops led by Osman Pasha surrendered after an unsuccessful breakout attempt.
Beginning of the siege of Plevna
After the successful crossing of the Danube by Russian troops at Sistovo, the Turkish command on July 2 (14) began the transfer of Osman Pasha’s corps to Plevna from Vidin (northwest Bulgaria), which was tasked with striking the right flank of the Russian troops.
On July 4, 1877, the 9th Army Corps of Lieutenant General N.P. Kridener captured the Nikopol fortress (cm. NIKOPOL in Bulgaria) on the banks of the Danube north of Plevna.
The Russian command allocated a nine-thousand-strong detachment of Lieutenant General Schilder-Schuldner to occupy Plevna, which on the evening of July 7 reached the outskirts of the city and the next morning attacked Turkish positions. The 15,000-strong garrison of Plevna repelled scattered attacks by Russian regiments, inflicting serious losses on them (2.5 thousand people).
After the concentration of Kridener's entire corps (26 thousand soldiers, 140 guns) near the city, a second assault on Plevna was launched on July 18. By this time, Osman Pasha concentrated about 23 thousand people and 58 guns in the city. Kridener had no information about the Turkish forces, exaggerated their numbers and acted indecisively. The attacks were carried out from the east and southeast head-on against the most fortified areas, troops were brought into battle in parts. The assault ended in failure. Russian losses amounted to 7 thousand people, Turks - about 4 thousand people.
Plevna was of great strategic importance; its strong garrison threatened the crossings of the Danube and could attack the advancing Russian army in the flank and rear. Therefore, the Russian command postponed the transfer of the main forces through the Balkan Mountains (the Shipka Pass was captured on July 8) and during July-August concentrated an 83,000-strong army with 424 guns near Plevna, of which 32,000 people and 108 guns were from the allied Romanian army.
Third assault on Plevna
The Allies besieged Plevna from the south and east. On the right flank, opposite the Grivitsky redoubts, the Romanians settled down. From the east the city was besieged by Kridener's corps, from the southeast by General Krylov's 8th corps. In the southern direction there was a left-flank detachment of General M.D. Skobelev (cm. SKOBELEV Mikhail Dmitrievich). From the north, the Turkish garrison was reliably covered by the heights of Yanyk-Bair, and from the west it was supplied along the Sofia-Plevna road. By the end of summer, the Turks increased the size of the Plevna garrison to 34 thousand people with 72 guns.
The nominal commander of the allied army near Plevna was the Romanian king Carol I (cm. KAROL I), his chief of staff, Lieutenant General P. D. Zotov, actually ordered. But near Plevna there was also the headquarters of the Russian Emperor Alexander II (cm. ALEXANDER II Nikolaevich) and the commander-in-chief of the entire Danube Army, Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich Sr. (cm. NIKOLAI Nikolaevich (Senior)).
The third assault on Plevna took place on August 26-31. The Turks predicted the directions of attack of the Russian and Romanian troops and managed to hold their line of defense, inflicting heavy losses on the attackers. The decisive day was August 30, when the Romanians, with the support of the Russian 18th Infantry Regiment, managed to capture one of the two Grivitsky redoubts. On the same day, Skobelev’s detachment, delivering an auxiliary attack, found a weak point in the Turkish positions, broke through their defenses in the Green Mountains area, captured the Issa and Kavanlyk redoubts and reached the southern outskirts of the city. The Turks hastily transferred reserves from the north and east against Skobelev.
On August 31, the Russian command did not take offensive actions and did not support Skobelev with reserves. As a result, under the pressure of superior forces, Skobelev’s detachment was forced to return to its original positions. In the third assault on Plevna, Russian and Romanian troops lost 16 thousand people, the Turks - about three thousand.
Siege and capture of Plevna
On September 1, it was decided to proceed to a thorough siege of Plevna, for the leadership of which the best specialist in siege work in Russia, engineer-general E. I. Totleben, was called in (cm. TOTLEBEN Eduard Ivanovich). To successfully conduct a siege, the Russians needed to cut the Sofia-Plevna road, along which the Turks received reinforcements. To solve this problem, a strike detachment of General I.V. Gurko was created from the guards units (cm. GURKO Joseph Vladimirovich). He managed to capture Gorny Dubnyak on October 12, Telish on October 16, Dolny Dubnyak on October 20 - strongholds on the Sofia road, thereby completely closing the blockade ring of the Pleven garrison, whose number by that time amounted to 50 thousand people.
The lack of food forced the Turkish commander Osman Pasha to attempt an independent liberation of Plevna. On November 28, having withdrawn troops from defensive positions, he attacked Russian troops northwest of Plevna. Units of the 2nd and 3rd Grenadier Divisions and the 5th Infantry Division of the Russian Army repelled the Turkish attack. Having lost 6 thousand soldiers and unable to escape from encirclement, Osman Pasha surrendered with 43 thousand soldiers. The fall of Plevna freed up a hundred thousand Russian-Romanian army for a subsequent offensive across the Balkans.
In the fighting near Plevna, forms and methods of besieging fortresses were further developed. The Russian army developed new methods of infantry combat tactics, a combination of movement and fire from rifle chains, and the use of infantry self-entrenchment in the offensive began. At Plevna, the importance of field fortifications, the interaction of infantry with artillery, the role of heavy artillery in preparing an attack on fortified positions was revealed, and the possibility of controlling artillery fire when firing from closed positions was determined.
In memory of the battles for Plevna, a mausoleum was built in the city in memory of fallen Russian and Romanian soldiers (1905), a park-museum of M. D. Skobelev (1907), and an artistic panorama complex “Liberation of Plevna in 1877.” In Moscow, at the Ilyinsky Gate, there is a monument to the grenadiers who fell near Plevna.

encyclopedic Dictionary . 2009 .

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