On February 21, 1944, Lavrentiy Beria, while in Grozny, issued an order for the deportation of Chechens and Ingush. Two days later, the well-known operation to resettle residents of the Checheno-Ingush Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic, “Lentil,” began. Three months before the start of the eviction, NKVD troops were already present in the high mountain villages of the republics. Many soldiers lived in the houses of local residents.

“People were told that the Carpathian operation was planned and the fighting there would take place in mountainous and wooded areas. To fight effectively, soldiers train on the territory of Chechnya and Ingushetia, where the areas are similar to the places where the battles will be fought,”

— Doctor of Historical Sciences, Professor, Corresponding Member of the Academy of Sciences of the Chechen Republic Musa Ibragimov tells Gazeta.Ru.

Before the deportation began, there were more than 100 thousand NKVD soldiers with military equipment, aircraft and vehicles in Chechnya and Ingushetia. Along with them were 19 thousand employees of the NKGB special forces.

Despite the fact that the soldiers were forbidden to talk about the imminent eviction of the population, those of them who lived in the houses of the Chechens and Ingush tried in different ways to convey to them what awaited them.

“One of the residents of the Shatoevsky district recalled that before the eviction there was a market day and he went to the market to sell a bull. Returning home, without having sold the animal, he saw the dissatisfied face of the elderly soldier who lived at his house. Knowing about the upcoming eviction, the serviceman understood that now the highlander would not have enough money on hand, and he would have to leave the bull. There were cases when the military did let it slip while drinking with the locals. For this they were severely punished,” says Musa Ibragimov.

Separation from the land of our ancestors at the cost of thousands of lives

Early in the morning of February 23, 1944, operatives began calling men to meetings in local clubs and squares supposedly dedicated to the Day of the Red Army. There they were informed that they were being evicted. Some of those gathered were sent home to notify relatives, and the rest were taken to the loading points on the trains. In many cases, the soldiers themselves came for women, old people and children.

“I remember those terrible days very well. Early in the morning they knocked on our door and about eight soldiers entered the house. In a stern voice, they ordered us to quickly get ready and informed us that we would be deported. At this time, the shocked mother jumped up and pulled on her father's leather jacket.

One of the guards took the jacket from the mother, saying that it was a man’s jacket. However, her mother snatched her from his hands. Then we were loaded into dirty, old and cold carriages,”

- recalls Petimat Saidova, a native of Starye Atagi.

From February 23 to March 15, 1944, 180 trains were sent to Kazakhstan. According to the NKVD report, as of July 9, 1944, over 469 thousand residents of Chechnya and Ingushetia were resettled. Also, according to official data,

During the deportation, one and a half thousand people died and 60 children were born. Also, more than a thousand people were hospitalized.

“On the way, the soldiers acted strictly according to orders. Once a day people were given hot food. Those who managed to take food with them cooked on the way,” Musa Ibragimov tells Gazeta.Ru.

However, not everyone was able to take warm clothes and food supplies with them.

In order to feed their children something, women diluted flour with water and gave them batter.

“We had nothing else but flour. You may ask: where did we get the water? Of course, they melted the snow. During stops, young guys jumped out of the trains and collected snow. It happened that we were given salt water, but only in order to somehow calm the children,” Sovdat N. recalls the events of 73 years ago.

Her older sister passed away on the road, and they were left alone with their mother. A few days later, the mother also died from severe stress, cold and dehydration.

“The last words my mother said to me on this train of death were: “Sovdat, my poor one, what will you do in this life alone? How painful it is that you are orphaned."

- says a 90-year-old woman.

Young men and women, even in the face of death, did not forget about traditions and respect for elders. The train rarely stopped, and there was no opportunity to go to the toilet, except in a carriage with old people and women.

Many died en route from a ruptured bladder. And all the dying were thrown out of the carriages.

“It was not allowed to transport the bodies of the dead. The only thing the relatives could do was cover them with snow. It was very difficult. For Chechens and Muslims, leaving the bodies of their loved ones unburied is a painful memory for the rest of their lives,” says historian Musa Ibragimov.

Our expert's family was also deported. His older brother, who was six months old, died during the journey.

“The mother suffered until the end of her life; she did not remember why he died: from the cold or she could somehow strangle him with her body during sleep. There was an older man from our family in the carriage, and he said:

“Don’t show the soldiers that the child has died. I’ll take him with me, and when they bring us, we’ll bury him.” And so they carried my brother’s corpse for two weeks,”

- says Professor Ibragimov.

12-year-old Taus Magomadova also suffered a difficult fate.

Three days before the eviction, her mother, with whom she was treated in the hospital, died. She learns about his death only a few years later. The girl's father, who had not yet recovered from his wife's funeral, was at home when the soldiers knocked on his door.

“He tried to explain to the guards that his daughter was in the hospital and he needed to go get her. But who will listen to a traitor, an enemy of the people? No one even looked in his direction. Without allowing him to get ready, he was taken away.

Granny told me how, already on the road, she prayed that her mother, sister or father would not be among the discarded bodies,”,

— Aset Okueva tells Gazeta.Ru the story of his grandmother.

Upon arrival in Kazakhstan, 12-year-old Taus ended up in an orphanage in Karaganda. Together with her there were six more girls from Chechnya, whom he brought biological father because he had nothing to feed them. Every day he came to visit his children.

Taus, who was trying to find her family, questioned the man carefully. As fate would have it, it turned out that the father of six girls was from her village, and he promised Taus to find her relatives.

“I tried to escape from the orphanage six times. And at this time my father considered me long dead.

That same villager of ours told my dad that I had died, and he kind of buried me, slaughtering a sheep in the process

(according to religious custom, when a child dies, they sacrifice a ram or a bull and distribute the meat to the poor. - Gazeta.Ru). He probably said this to feed himself and his family, I don’t know. Everyone was looking for a way not to die of hunger. My father, not suspecting anything, thanked him for the “good” he had done and returned two instead of one slaughtered sheep - as a token of gratitude for not leaving me there,” says Aset Okueva from the words of grandmother Taus.

On the seventh time, the girl still managed to escape from the orphanage. She had no money for food, much less for a train ticket. Every time the train stopped, she hid under the cars to avoid being caught by the controllers. And then she jumped back. Having thus reached the city of Leninogorsk, the girl saw her fellow countrymen and asked about her relatives.

“I didn’t even expect to hear a positive answer. Feelings overwhelmed me at that moment. One of those Chechens said that he would take me to my aunt, and we went. All the way I imagined the joyful face of my aunt, father and the long-awaited meeting with my mother. And here we are. At first she didn’t believe that I was me, but the burn scar on my left leg, received in distant childhood, was able to convince her.

When the father was informed that his daughter had been found, he did not believe it and said that the dead do not return from the other world.

When we met, for the first time in my life I saw tears on his face. And only then did I find out that the person I had been thinking about all these years was mine. mom died»,

— Taus told her granddaughter Aset Okueva many years later.

Years later, Taus married and had seven children. She died in 2012 and left behind 11 grandchildren, 11 granddaughters and 14 great-grandchildren.

Khaibakh - an aul that does not exist

It was much more difficult to deport people living in mountainous areas. Farms and auls were scattered over a vast territory, and it was not possible to deliver residents to collection points and then to the trains. The order from senior management was clear: do not leave anyone in place. One of the famous and tragic decisions, according to Caucasian historians, was the incident when 700 people were allegedly burned and shot.

“It was not possible to remove the sick, the elderly, and children. And the decision was made to destroy them.

People were herded into a large stable, supposedly to spend the night. They asked for help to insulate it with hay so that the wind would not blow, and after that they burned all these people alive.

Realizing what had happened, people began to run to the gate, which opened under their onslaught. Seeing this, Gvishiani, who was responsible for their eviction, gave the order to open fire on them,” Musa Ibragimov outlines one of the versions of those events.

Despite numerous disputes about the reality of this crime, there are witnesses who described what happened in detail and sought punishment for the perpetrators. These are people who, at the time of the burning of the stables, found themselves in camps high in the mountains or were away from home somewhere. They could only watch. Another of the witnesses is the former People's Commissar of Justice of the Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic Ziyavdi Malsagov.

“When Malsagov began to ask Gvishiani to stop the killing of people, he was allegedly told:

“These people are not transportable and must be destroyed. This is an order from Serov and Beria,”

- notes the historian.

In 1956, Malsagov wrote about the atrocities in the high-mountainous Khaibakh to the first secretary of the CPSU Central Committee Nikita Khrushchev. A commission was created, which, having gone to the site, discovered the remains of hundreds of people. However, the examination protocol was not made public. Despite the testimony of dozens of witnesses and the remains found, Khaibakh’s status has not yet been determined. Some historians, based on documents from those years, claim that the burning of 700 people in the high-mountainous Galanchozh region is a “historical fake.”

“Colonel Gvishiani and other participants in those events were awarded the Order of Alexander Nevsky and other military orders. After the adoption of the law on the rehabilitation of repressed peoples in 1991, they were deprived of awards. They searched for Gvishiani, but there is no exact information about his further fate,” explains Professor Musa Ibragimov.

Another mass grave was found on the territory of the Urus-Martan hospital. Now there is a monument to the innocent victims of resettlement.

The deported people were distributed in different regions of Kazakhstan. Largest quantity remained in the Karaganda region, Kustanay, East Kazakhstan region, Aktobe. It was especially difficult for people in the northern part of the country because of the cold weather.

There are no deportation flights from Sakhalin

During the operation of eviction of Chechens and Ingush, curious cases arose. A native of Chechnya, Said Khasuev served on Sakhalin Island during this period.

To avoid deportation, the policeman, who was in good standing, was asked to change his nationality in his documents.

“The Chechen NKVD fighter categorically refused. It was decided to deport him. Then they thought: it turns out that he is being sent to the East from the point that is the most distant in the country from the Caucasus. One of Khasuev’s commanders then said: “There is nowhere else to send,” and it was decided to leave the Chechen in the service. True, Said did not have more awards and promotions, despite his excellent service,” Islam Khatuev, Chairman of the Union of Journalists of the Chechen Republic, Candidate of Historical Sciences, told Gazeta.Ru.

In the early 80s, Khasuev’s son, who served in the border troops in the Kuril Islands, died in a shootout with border violators. He was buried with honors and posthumously awarded a medal.

Another interesting case happened to natives of the Chechen village of Chishki. Red Army soldier Said-Emi Delmayev, returning from the front line to his ancestral village, looked into one of the houses in the deserted village of Starye Atagi and drew attention to the photographs piled in heaps on the floor. Two of them depicted pretty girls. He put the two photographs he liked in his pocket.

Like other front-line soldiers from deported peoples, Side-Emi went to Kazakhstan in search of surviving relatives.

He didn’t have to look for them for long - his relatives, the Tsintsaevs, were the first with whom he stopped for the night.

“When the table was set for the guest, he looked carefully at his relative’s wife, who seemed very familiar to him. Later, returning to his home and sorting out the things he had brought, he came across photographs of Atagin girls. It dawned on him: one of them depicted the same girl, Chekhardig,” Khavazh Tsintsayev, the son of the girl from the photo, told Gazeta.Ru.

Returning from eviction to his homeland, Side-Emi gave one of these two photographs to the Tsintsaevs.

No time to explain, evict!

According to Doctor of Historical Sciences Musa Ibragimov, there are several versions of the reasons for the eviction. According to official data of the NKVD, peoples were deported for collaboration with German troops and desertion.

how could the Chechens cooperate with the Germans if the Germans had never set foot on the territory of Checheno-Ingushetia, not including the Malgobek area?” - says Ibragimov.

According to another version, the Chechens and Ingush could join the Turks in the war against the Nazis and become a “fifth column” for the Red Army.

“In my opinion, the main and main reason deportation was the political system itself Soviet Union and its totalitarian character. These repressions were an integral part of the country's existence. Since the 20s of the 20th century, this policy has been an integral part of the national policy of the Soviet state.

And the reason for the eviction could be banditry on the territory of the Chechen Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic. Although by March 1943 the NKVD would write that almost all bandit groups had been liquidated,”

— historian Musa Ibragimov told Gazeta.Ru.

Another reason for the eviction could be Kazakhstan’s need for workers, where during the war citizens were drafted to work at metallurgical plants.

“Workers were needed to occupy the Karaganda coal basin, Ust-Kamenogorsk zinc production and many others. This circumstance could play decisive role. After all, the bulk of those who worked there were deported Chechens and Ingush,” the professor emphasizes.

On April 26, 1991, the Supreme Council of the RSFSR adopted the law “On the rehabilitation of repressed peoples.”

Peoples who were subjected to slander and genocide at the state level were recognized as repressed, which was accompanied by their forced relocation, the abolition of national-state entities, and the establishment of a regime of terror and violence in places of special settlement.

According to experts, ten peoples were subjected to total deportation in the USSR: Koreans, Germans, Ingrian Finns, Karachais, Kalmyks, Chechens, Ingush, Balkars, Crimean Tatars and Meskhetian Turks. Of these, seven - Germans, Karachais, Kalmyks, Ingush, Chechens, Balkars and Crimean Tatars - also lost their national autonomy.

On March 1, 1944, the People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR L. Beria reported to Stalin on the results of the eviction of Chechens and Ingush: “The eviction began on February 23 in most areas, with the exception of high-mountain settlements. By February 29, 478,479 people were evicted and loaded onto railway trains, including 91,250 Ingush. 180 trains have been loaded, of which 159 have already been sent to the site of the new settlement. Today, trains with former executives and religious authorities of Checheno-Ingushetia, who were used in carrying out the operation, have been sent. From some points of the Galanchozhsky district, 6 thousand Chechens remained not evicted due to heavy snowfall and impassable roads, the removal and loading of which will be completed in 2 days. The operation took place in an organized manner and without serious cases of resistance or other incidents... The leaders of the party and Soviet bodies of North Ossetia, Dagestan and Georgia have already begun work on the development of new areas ceded to these republics... To ensure the preparation and successful implementation of the operation to evict the Balkars, measures were taken all necessary measures. Preparatory work will be completed by March 10 and the eviction of Balkars will be carried out from March 15. Today we finish our work here and leave for Kabardino-Balkaria and from there to Moscow.” (State Archives Russian Federation. F.R-9401. Op. 2. d. 64. l. 61).

It was an unprecedented crime that had no analogues in world history. An entire people, who made an outstanding contribution to the conquest, establishment and defense of Soviet power, as well as to the fight against Nazi Germany, on false charges of “treason” were forcibly deported from their historical homeland, in fact, to complete extinction in Central Asia and Siberia. As a result, almost half of the population died from hunger, cold and disease. What kind of treason and cooperation with the enemy could we talk about if our republic was not occupied by the Germans? In his book, the former secretary of the Chechen-Ingush regional committee for personnel during the war, and later a university teacher N.F. Filkin reports: “At the beginning of the war, there were at least 9 thousand Chechens and Ingush in its personnel units” (N.F. Filkin. Chechen-Ingush party organization during the war years. - Grozny, 1960, p. 43). And all in Great Patriotic War About 50 thousand Chechens and Ingush took part. Even if we take one episode from the war years - defense Brest Fortress- According to the latest data, 600 Chechens and Ingush took part in its defense, and 164 of them were nominated for the high title of Hero of the Soviet Union.

From other military units that fought on the battlefields of the Great Patriotic War, 156 Chechens and Ingush were nominated for the title of Hero of the USSR. Why they didn't get these stars hardly needs explaining. The historical truth, however, is that the Vainakhs have always been famous for their warriors. In support of these words, I would like to cite the statement of Marshal of the Soviet Union Semyon Mikhailovich Budyonny from A. Avtorkhanov’s book “The Murder of the Chechen-Ingush People”: “...This was after the evacuation of Kerch by the Reds. The commander of the Southern Front, Marshal Budyonny, who was inspecting the disorderly retreating units from Kerch and Crimea, having placed two divisions against each other in Krasnodar, one that had just arrived at the Chechen-Ingush front, the other that had just fled here from Kerch, said, addressing the Russian division: “Look at them, the mountaineers, their fathers and grandfathers, under the leadership of the great Shamil, bravely fought for 25 years and defended their independence against the whole of Tsarist Russia. Take them as an example of how to defend the Motherland.” Apparently, fearing this mass heroism on the part of our soldiers who took part in the Great Patriotic War, I.V. In March 1942, Stalin issued secret order No. 6362 banning the awarding of Chechens and Ingush with high military awards for their heroic deeds (see S. Khamchiev, Return to Origins - Saratov, 2000).

Myths about Chechen-Ingush bandits were promoted by NKVD agents and the employees of these bodies themselves. If, for example, there were 20-30 people dissatisfied with the Stalinist regime and the provocations of the NKVD, then their number was inflated tens and even hundreds of times, which was reported to Moscow in order to curry favor and earn titles for allegedly discovering large gang groups and their destruction. Today it is impossible to calculate how many innocent Chechens and Ingush were killed. But there are always “historians and writers” like the Pykhalovs who are happy to label us with the Stalinist label “enemies of the people.” I would like to cite some documents on this matter: “There are 33 bandit groups (175 people), 18 lone bandits, registered in the Chechen-Ingush Republic, 10 more bandits (104 people) were active. Revealed during a trip to the regions: 11 bandit groups (80 people), thus, on August 15, 1943, there were 54 bandit groups operating in the republic - 359 participants.

The growth of banditry must be attributed to such reasons as insufficient party mass and explanatory work among the population, especially in high mountainous regions, where there are many auls and villages located far from regional centers, lack of agents, lack of work with legalized gang groups..., permissible excesses. in conducting security and military operations, expressed in mass arrests and murders of persons who were not previously on the operational register and do not have incriminating material. Thus, from January to June 1943, 213 people were killed, of which only 22 people were operationally registered...” (from the report of the deputy head of the department for combating banditry of the NKVD of the USSR, comrade Rudenko. State Archive of the Russian Federation. F.R. -9478 Op. 1. d. 41. l. 244). And one more document (from the report of the head of the NKVD department of Checheno-Ingushetia for the fight against banditry, Lieutenant Colonel G.B. Aliev, addressed to L. Beria, August 27, 1943) on the same occasion: “...Today in The Chechen-Ingush Republic has 54 registered gang groups with a total number of participants of 359 people, of which there are 23 gangs that existed before 1942, 27 that arose in 1942, and 4 gangs in 1943. Of the indicated gangs, there are 24 active gangs consisting of 168 people and 30 gangs that have not manifested themselves since 1942 with a total composition of 191 people. In 1943, 19 gang groups with 119 participants were liquidated, and during this time, 71 bandits were killed in total...” (Package of documents No. 2 “spy”, 1993 No. 2, pp. 64-65).

However, even these figures cannot be completely trusted, since the above archival document shows how “gangster” groups were created and destroyed. The murder of innocent Chechens reached such proportions that one of the high-ranking officials of the NKVD apparatus of the USSR was forced to admit this lawlessness in his report addressed to the leadership. This is what the great scientist, historian and political scientist Abdurakhman Avtorkhanov writes about the number of expelled Chechens and Ingush: “...According to the 1936 USSR Constitution, the North Caucasus region consisted of the autonomous regions of Circassia, Adygea, Karachay and the autonomous Soviet socialist republics of Kabardino-Balkaria, North Ossetia, Checheno-Ingushetia and Dagestan.

The Chechen-Ingush Soviet Republic itself occupied an area of ​​15,700 square kilometers (half the area of ​​Belgium) with a population of about 700 thousand people, and the number of all Chechens and Ingush living in the Caucasus, counting normal population growth, amounted to about one million people at the time of the eviction (a population of almost equal to the population of Albania)". (Murder in the USSR. Murder of the Chechen-Ingush people. - Moscow, 1991, p. 7).

The largest figure mentioned in officially declassified documents is 496,460 Chechens and Ingush, which executioner L.P. writes about in his report. Beria in July 1944 addressed to I.V. Stalin, V.M. Molotov and G.M. Malenkova. But where did almost half of our people not listed in Beria’s documents disappear? What is their fate? There can only be one answer to all these questions: they were destroyed during the deportation. Apparently, I. Stalin could not even imagine that the time would come when top secret and not subject to publication would become public knowledge. archival documents, telling about terrible crimes and the destruction of millions of Soviet citizens. And that his actions will be condemned by the entire civilized world community. I will refer to one more fact from A. Avtorkhanov’s book “Murder in the USSR. Murder of the Chechen-Ingush people: “...The Soviet press, even in the era of glasnost, was not allowed to write about the number of North Caucasians who died during their deportation. Now for the first time in the Literary Gazette dated August 17, 1989, Doctor of Historical Sciences Hadji-Murat Ibragimbayli provides preliminary data on this matter: out of 600 thousand Chechens and Ingush, 200 thousand people died, Karachais 40 thousand (more than one third), Balkars - more 20 thousand (almost half).

If we add about 200 thousand dead Crimean Tatars and 120 thousand dead Kalmyks, then the famous “Leninist-Stalinist national policy” cost these small nations about 600 thousand dead, mainly old people, women and children.” And also from the book “Lenin in the destinies of Russia. Reflections of a historian”: “All these calculations, of course, are approximate. The country will learn the whole truth about the victims of both Leninist and Stalinist terror when the secret funds of the archives of the KGB, the army and the apparatus of the CPSU Central Committee itself are opened. Probably, the contents of these archives are so monstrous and making them public will be so deadly for the existing totalitarian system that even the “new thinkers” of the Kremlin do not dare to do this. However, they are intelligent enough to understand that without a radical break with the past they will not get out of the current trouble...”

Doctor of Economic Sciences, famous Russian scientist Ruslan Imranovich Khasbulatov writes: “...Beria reported on March 3, 1944 to Stalin that 488 thousand Chechens and Ingush were deported (loaded into wagons). But the fact is that according to the statistical census of 1939, there were 697 thousand Chechens and Ingush people. Over five years, if the previous population growth rates were maintained, there should have been more than 800 thousand people, minus 50 thousand people who fought on the fronts of the active army and other units of the armed forces, that is, the population subject to deportation, there were at least 750-770 thousand people . The difference in numbers is explained by the physical extermination of a significant part of the population and the colossal mortality rate in this short period of time, which, in fact, is quite rightfully equated to murder. During the period of eviction, about 5 thousand people were in inpatient hospitals in Checheno-Ingushetia - none of them “recovered” or were reunited with their families. We also note that not all mountain villages had stationary roads - in winter, neither cars nor even carts could move along these roads. This applies to at least 33 high-mountain villages (Vedeno, Shatoy, Naman-Yurt, etc.), in which 20-22 thousand people lived. What their fate turned out to be is shown by the facts that became known in 1990, related to the tragic events, the death of the inhabitants of the village of Khaibakh. All its inhabitants, more than 700 people, were driven into a barn and burned.

The monstrous action was led by NKVD Colonel Gvishiani. This episode was carefully hidden by the party authorities and was made public only in 1990. In many cases, the elderly, the sick, the weak and small children were left in high-mountain villages - they were destroyed, and the rest were driven on foot along icy roads to lowland villages - to collection points (“septic tanks”). Thus, from the period of February 23 - early March 1944, there were at least 360 thousand dead Chechens and Ingush people. Researchers believe that more than 60 percent of the deported population died from cold, hunger, disease, melancholy and suffering...” (R.Kh. Khasbulatov. The Kremlin and the Russian-Chechen war. Aliens. - Moscow, 2003, p. 428 -429).

The Khaibakh tragedy became known thanks to the outstanding son and patriot of the Chechen people Dziyaudin Malsagov, former deputy. People's Commissar of Justice and a direct eyewitness to this terrible tragedy, who, being in exile, risking his life, conveyed a written appeal to the First Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee N.S. Khrushchev personally in his hands, in it he reported this greatest crime. And the world learned about this tragedy thanks to the outstanding statesman, President of the USSR M.S. Gorbachev and the glasnost he proclaimed, freedom of speech and perestroika. These examples mass destruction ours and other peoples of our former common homeland indicate that I.V. Stalin disposed of the lives and destinies of millions of citizens of the Soviet Union as his personal property. And confirmation of what was said is his very long bloody political life- from 1922 to 1953 - during which he destroyed, according to Professor Kurganov’s calculations, 66 million citizens of the Soviet Union. Let me give you another example: this topic: “From some settlements in the high-mountainous Galanchozh region, 6,000 Chechens remained unevacuated due to heavy snowfall and impassable roads, the removal and loading of which will be completed in 2 days. The operation is carried out in an organized manner and without serious cases of resistance...” (from the report of the People's Commissar of the NKVD of the USSR L.P. Beria addressed to I.V. Stalin, March 1, 1944).

Residents of some villages, as well as patients in hospitals, were exterminated... An NKVD regiment was brought to the Galanchozhsky district. His quick transfer was ensured by the then Minister of Internal Affairs of the Chechen Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic Drozdov. And on the very eve of the denouement of the drama, Gvishiani arrived in the Galanchozhsky district. Along gorges and paths they drove onto the ice of lakes and narrow coastal strips residents from approximately 10-11 villages in the high mountain region. Beria accurately counted them - 6,000 people. Around them, the NKVD regiment gradually tightened the ring. At the right moment, machine guns and machine guns started working. The ice battle lasted three days. Then, for another three days, work continued to eliminate traces of the crime. Over a thousand corpses were driven under the ice, the remaining five thousand were thrown with stones and turf. Having won this “brilliant victory,” the regiment retreated in an organized manner, but the approaches to the lake were still blocked in order to prevent “extra” witnesses from getting to it. What happened next? The lake was poisoned in order to keep exotic residents away from it for a long time - for more than ten years they did not allow access to Galanchozh, the approaches to it were blown up. But you can’t hide your sewing in a bag. After the Chechens returned home, construction of a road to the lake began in this area, and that’s when the “ominous secret” was revealed (O. Dzhurgaev “Vesti Respubliki”, No. 169, 02.09.10). There are still many unsolved and undeclassified crimes related to the deportation of our people. How many eyewitnesses left this world without having time or daring to talk about all the mass executions and murders of the Chechen people. I would like to cite documents concerning the destruction of the village of Khaibakh: “Top secret to the People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR, Comrade. L.P. Beria.

For your eyes only, due to non-transportability and in order to strictly implement Operation Mountains on time, I was forced to eliminate more than 700 people in the town of Khaibakh. Colonel Gvishiani."

Chief executioner I.V. Stalin L.P. Beria responds with gratitude for the crime committed: “For decisive actions during the eviction of Chechens in the Khaibakh region, you have been nominated for a government award with a promotion in rank. People's Commissar of the NKVD of the USSR L. Beria.”

For the burning alive of more than 700 innocent residents of the village of Khaibakh, the state security commissioner of the 3rd rank was awarded one of the highest orders of the country - the Order of Suvorov, II degree, with the conferment military rank Major General. And the country's chief inquisitor I.V. Stalin, in turn, thanks the dogs loyal to him:

“On behalf of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) and the USSR Defense Committee, I express gratitude to all units and units of the Workers’ and Peasants’ Red Army and the NKVD troops for the successful completion of the government assignment in the North Caucasus.”

The oldest of the “traitors to the motherland” burned in Khaibakh was 110 years old, the youngest “enemies of the people” were born the day before this terrible tragedy (Yu.A. Aidaev. Chechens. History. Modernity. - Moscow, 1996, p. 275) .

And to prove the genocide of our people in their places of “residence” in Central Asia and Kazakhstan, I will cite the following documents:

“People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR L. Beria addressed to the Deputy Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR A. Mikoyan. Secret. November 27, 1944

The overwhelming majority of collective farms in the Kirghiz SSR and a significant part of the collective farms in the Kazakh SSR do not have the opportunity to pay specially resettled collective farmers for their workdays either in grain or other types of food. In this regard, 215 thousand special settlers from North Caucasus, settled on collective farms of the Kirghiz and Kazakh SSR are left without food. Taking this into account, I would consider it necessary to provide special purpose migrants from the North Caucasus who are especially in need of food, to allocate food funds at the disposal of the Council of People's Commissars of the Kyrgyz and Kazakh SSR for a specific purpose, at least in the minimum amount, based on the distribution per person per day: flour - 100 grams, cereals - 50 gr., salt - 15 gr. and sugar for children - 5 grams, - for the period from December 1, 1944 to July 1, 1945. This requires: flour 3870 tons, cereals - 1935 tons, salt - 582 tons, sugar - 78 tons. Draft resolution of the Council of People's Commissars I enclose. People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR L. Beria A.I. Mikoyan, secret. November 29, 1944 (TsGOR. F. 5446. Op. 48. D. 3214. L. 6. Deportation of peoples: nostalgia for totalitarianism. P. 146, 137, 138, 172, 173).

“Due to the state of resources, the People's Commissariat of Procurement does not consider it possible to allocate flour and cereals to supply special settlers and asks for a petition from Comrade. Reject Beria."

Deputy People's Commissar of Procurement of the USSR D. Fomin (GORF F.R.-5446.op.48.d.3214 L.2).

Thanks to this “national” policy, the Chechen population, which numbered 392.6 thousand people according to the 1926 census, and 408 thousand in 1939, reached 418.8 thousand in 1959, that is, it increased in 33 years by only 162 thousand people. Even if we believe these official statistical data, counting the annual natural population growth minus the deaths, then by 1959 there should have been one million Chechens. From 1959 to 1969, Chechens, according to the USSR State Statistics Service, numbered 614,400 people, and in the ten years after returning from this hellish exile, their number increased by 195,600 people!

What happened to him over the course of not even hundreds or thousands of years, but the last decades of our tragic and at the same time heroic story. Let justice and truth prevail. The memory of all the crimes and atrocities against our people that took place along its historical path of development, no matter how tragic and bleeding it may be, must always be preserved in the hearts of our people. And I would like to conclude this article with the words of Ilya Grigorievich Chavchavadze, the great Georgian poet, writer and public figure, spoken as if for us: “The fall of a nation begins from the moment when the memory of the past ends.” It is hardly possible to say anything better and more convincingly.

Salambek Gunashev.
(C) photo Yandex.

At 2 a.m. on February 23, 1944, the most famous ethnic deportation operation began - the resettlement of residents of the Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic, formed ten years earlier by uniting the Chechen and Ingush Autonomous Regions.

There were deportations of “punished peoples” before this - Germans and Finns, Kalmyks and Karachais, and after - Balkars, Crimean Tatars and Greeks, Bulgarians and Armenians living in Crimea, as well as Meskhetian Turks from Georgia. But Operation Lentil to evict almost half a million Vainakhs - Chechens and Ingush - became the largest.

The Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR motivated the decision to deport Chechens and Ingush by the fact that “during the Great Patriotic War, especially during the actions of the Nazi troops in the Caucasus, many Chechens and Ingush betrayed their Motherland, went over to the side of the fascist occupiers, and joined the ranks of saboteurs and intelligence officers , thrown by the Germans into the rear of the Red Army, created armed gangs at the behest of the Germans to fight against Soviet power, and also taking into account that many Chechens and Ingush for a number of years participated in armed uprisings against Soviet power and for a long time, being not engaged in honest labor, carry out bandit raids on collective farms in neighboring regions, rob and kill Soviet people.”

These two peoples had difficult relations with the authorities even before the war. Until 1938, there was not even a systematic conscription of Chechens and Ingush into the Red Army - no more than 300-400 people were conscripted annually.

Then the conscription was significantly increased, and in 1940-1941 it was carried out in full accordance with the law on universal conscription.

“The attitude of the Chechens and Ingush towards Soviet power was clearly expressed in desertion and evasion of conscription into the Red Army. During the first mobilization in August 1941, out of 8,000 people subject to conscription, 719 people deserted. In October 1941, out of 4,733 people, 362 evaded conscription. In January 1942, during the formation of the national division, only 50 percent of the personnel were recruited. In March 1942, out of 14,576 people, 13,560 deserted and evaded service, went underground, went to the mountains and joined gangs. In 1943, out of 3,000 volunteers, the number of deserters was 1,870,” wrote L.P. in a memo. Beria's deputy people's commissar, state security commissioner of the 2nd rank B.Z. Kobulov.

According to him, there were 38 sects in the republic, numbering over 20 thousand people. These were mainly hierarchical organized Muslim religious brotherhoods of murids.

“They are conducting active anti-Soviet work, sheltering bandits and German paratroopers. When the front line approached in August-September 1942, 80 members of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) quit their jobs and fled, including 16 leaders of district committees of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks), 8 senior officials of district executive committees and 14 chairmen of collective farms,” wrote Bogdan Kobulov.

After the start of the war, the mobilization of the Chechens and Ingush was actually thwarted - “believing and hoping that the USSR would lose the war, many mullahs and teip authorities agitated for evasion military service or desertion,” says the collection of documents prepared by the international foundation “Democracy” “Stalin’s deportations. 1928-1953".

Due to mass desertion and evasion from service, in the spring of 1942, by order of the USSR NGO, the conscription of Chechens and Ingush into the army was canceled.

In 1943, the conscription of approximately 3 thousand volunteers was authorized, but two-thirds of them deserted.

Because of this, it was not possible to form the 114th Chechen-Ingush Cavalry Division - it had to be reorganized into a regiment, however, even after this, desertion was widespread.

According to data as of November 20, 1942, in the Northern group of the Transcaucasian Front there were all 90 Chechens and Ingush - 0.04%.

Heroes of War

At the same time, many Vainakhs who went to the front showed themselves with the best side and contributed to the victory of the Soviet people in the Great Patriotic War in 1941-1945.

The names of three Chechens and one Ingush are immortalized in the Memorial Complex of the Defenders of the Brest Fortress. But, according to various sources, from 250 to 400 people from Checheno-Ingushetia took part in the heroic defense of the Brest Fortress, which became a symbol of fortitude and courage. Together with other units of the Red Army, the 255th Chechen-Ingush Regiment and a separate cavalry division fought in Brest.

One of the last and staunch defenders of the Brest Fortress was Magomed Uzuev, but only in 1996, by Decree of the President of the Russian Federation, was he posthumously awarded the title of Hero of the Russian Federation. Magomed’s brother Visa Uzuev also fought in Brest.

Two defenders of the Brest Fortress are still alive in Chechnya - Akhmed Khasiev and Adam Malaev

Sniper Abukhaji Idrisov destroyed 349 fascists - an entire battalion. Sergeant Idrisov was awarded the Order of the Red Banner and the Red Star, and was given the title Hero of the Soviet Union.

Chechen sniper Akhmat Magomadov became famous in the battles near Leningrad, where he was called “the fighter of the German occupiers.” There are more than 90 Germans on his side.

Khanpasha Nuradilov destroyed 920 fascists at the fronts, captured 7 enemy machine guns and personally captured 12 fascists. Behind feats of arms Nuradilov was awarded the Order of the Red Star and Red Banner. In April 1943, he was posthumously awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.

During the war years, 10 Vainakhs became Heroes of the Soviet Union. 2,300 Chechens and Ingush died in the war.

Anti-Soviet protests

With the beginning of the war, gangs in the Chechen Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic became more active. In October 1941, two separate uprisings took place, covering the Shatoevsky, Itum-Kalinsky, Vedensky, Cheberloevsky and Galanchozhsky districts of the republic. At the beginning of 1942, the leaders of the uprisings, Khasan Israilov and Mairbek Sheripov, united, creating the “Provisional People's Revolutionary Government of Checheno-Ingushetia.” In its statements, this rebel "government" viewed Hitler as an ally in the fight against Stalin.

As the front line approached the border of the republic in 1942, anti-Soviet forces began to act more actively. In August-September 1942, collective farms were dissolved in almost all mountainous regions of Chechnya, and several thousand people, including dozens of Soviet functionaries, joined the uprising of Israilov and Sheripov.

After the appearance of German landing forces in Chechnya in the fall of 1942, the NKVD accused Israilov and Sheripov of creating pro-fascist parties, the National Socialist Party of the Caucasian Brothers and the Chechen-Mountain National Socialist Underground Organization.

In the eight teams of fascist paratroopers with a total number of 77 people dropped onto the territory of the republic, the majority were recruited Chechens and Ingush. But there was no widespread participation of Chechens and Ingush in anti-Soviet gangs. The NKVD registered 150-200 gangs of 2-3 thousand bandits on the territory of Checheno-Ingushetia. This is approximately 0.5% of the population of Chechnya. From the beginning of the war until January 1944, 55 gangs and 973 bandits were liquidated in the republic, 1901 bandits, fascists and their accomplices were arrested.

"Lentils"

Operation Lentil began preparations in October-November 1943. Initially, it was planned to relocate to Novosibirsk and Omsk region, in the Altai and Krasnoyarsk territories. But then it was decided to resettle the Chechens and Ingush to Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan.

On January 29, 1944, the head of the NKVD Lavrentiy Beria approved the “Instructions on the procedure for the eviction of Chechens and Ingush.” On February 1, the issue was discussed by the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks. Disagreements arose only over the timing of the start of the operation.

Beria personally led the operation. On February 17, 1944, he reported from Grozny that preparations were being completed and 459,486 people were to be evicted. The operation was designed to last eight days, and 19 thousand operatives of the NKVD, NKGB and SMERSH and about 100 thousand officers and soldiers of the NKVD troops were involved in it.

On February 22, Beria met with the republic’s top leadership and senior clergy and told them about the government’s decision and “the motives that formed the basis for this decision. After this message, Chairman of the Council of People’s Commissars Mollaev “teared up, but promised to pull himself together and promised to fulfill all the tasks that would be given to him in connection with the eviction,” Beria reported to Stalin.

Beria suggested that the highest clergy of Checheno-Ingushetia “carry out the necessary work among the population through the mullahs and other local “authorities” associated with them.”

The influence of the mullahs was enormous. Their preaching, wrote the USSR Minister of Internal Affairs N.P. Dundorov in the mid-1950s, could improve labor discipline and even double productivity.

“Both the party-Soviet and clergy we employ have been promised some resettlement benefits (the norm of things allowed for export will be slightly increased),” Beria said.

The operation, according to his assessment, began successfully - 333,739 people were removed from populated areas within 24 hours, of which 176,950 were loaded onto trains. A faster eviction was prevented by heavy snow that fell on the afternoon of February 23.

Nevertheless, by February 29 (1944 was a leap year), 478,479 people were evicted and loaded into wagons, including 91,250 Ingush and 387,229 Chechens.

“177 trains have been loaded, of which 159 trains have already been sent to the place of the new settlement,” Beria reported the results of the operation.

During the operation, 2,016 “people of anti-Soviet element” were arrested, and more than 20 thousand firearms were confiscated.

“The population bordering Checheno-Ingushetia reacted favorably to the eviction of Chechens and Ingush,” said the head of the NKVD.

Residents of the republic were allowed to take with them 500 kilograms of cargo per family. The special settlers had to hand over livestock and grain - in exchange they received livestock and grain from local authorities at their new place of residence.

There were 45 people in each carriage (for comparison, the Germans were allowed to take a ton of property during deportation, and there were 40 people in each carriage without personal belongings). The party nomenklatura and the Muslim elite traveled in the last echelon, which consisted of normal carriages.

And just months later, in the summer of 1944, several spiritual leaders of the Chechens were summoned to the republic to help persuade the gangs and Chechens who had evaded deportation to stop resisting.

Incidents

The deportation did not take place without incidents - according to various sources, from 27 to 780 people were killed, and 6,544 residents of the republic managed to evade deportation. The People's Commissariat of State Security reported "a number of ugly facts of violation of revolutionary legality, arbitrary executions of old Chechen women who remained after the resettlement, the sick, the crippled, who could not follow."

According to a document published by the Democracy Foundation, in one of the villages three people were killed, including an eight-year-old boy, in another - “five old women”, in the third - “according to unspecified data” “arbitrary execution of the sick and crippled up to 60 people "

IN last years There were reports of the burning of from 200 to 600-700 people in the Galanchozhsky district. Two commissions were created to investigate the operation in this area - in 1956 and 1990, but the criminal case was never brought to an end. The official report of the 3rd rank State Security Commissioner M. Gvishiani, who led the operation in this area, spoke only of several dozen killed or died along the way.

As for the mortality of displaced persons, as the leadership of the NKVD convoy troops reported, 56 people were born on the way to Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, “1,272 people died, which is 2.6 people per 1,000 transported. According to a certificate from the Statistical Directorate of the RSFSR, the mortality rate in the Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic in 1943 was 13.2 people per 1,000 inhabitants.” The causes of death were "elderly and early age resettled", the presence of chronic diseases among those resettled", the presence of physically weak people.

Toponymic repressions

On March 7, 1944, the Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic itself was liquidated. In place of the areas inhabited by Chechens, the Grozny Okrug was created as part of the Stavropol Territory.

Part of the territory of the republic was divided between Georgia and North Ossetia. All Ingush place names were repressed - they were replaced with Russian and Ossetian names.

Opinion of historians

Despite a number of incidents, in general the eviction of the whole passed calmly and did not push the Chechens and Ingush into a terrorist war, although, according to historians, there were all the possibilities for this.

Some historians explain this by saying that the harsh punishment was at the same time gentle towards the people. According to the laws of war, desertion and evasion from military service deserved severe punishment. But the authorities did not shoot the men, “cut off the roots of the people,” but evicted everyone. At the same time, party and Komsomol organizations were not disbanded, and recruitment into the army was not stopped.

However, most historians consider it unacceptable to punish an entire people for the crime of some of its representatives. Deportations of peoples as repressions were extrajudicial in nature and were aimed not at a specific person, but at a whole group of people, and a very large one at that. Masses of people were torn out of their usual habitat, deprived of their homeland, and placed in a new environment, thousands of kilometers from the previous one. Representatives of these peoples were evicted not only from their historical homeland, but also from all other cities and regions, and demobilized from the army.

Rehabilitation and return

The ban on returning to their homeland for Chechens and Ingush was lifted on January 9, 1957 by decree of the Presidiums Supreme Soviets USSR and RSFSR. These decrees restored Chechen-Ingush autonomy, and an Organizing Committee was created to organize repatriation.

Immediately after the decree, tens of thousands of Chechens and Ingush in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan quit their jobs, sold off their property and began to seek emigration to their previous place of residence. The authorities were forced in the summer of 1957 to temporarily suspend the return of Chechens and Ingush to their homeland.

One of the reasons was the tense situation developing in the North Caucasus - local authorities were not prepared for the massive return and conflicts between the Vainakhs and settlers from Central Russia and land-poor regions of the North Caucasus who occupied their homes and lands in 1944.

The restoration of autonomy provided for a new, complex redrawing of the administrative-territorial division of the region. Outside the Chechen Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic was the Prigorodny district, which remained part of the North Ossetian Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic and at the end of the 1980s turned into a hotbed of the Ossetian-Ingush conflict.

The authorities planned to return 17 thousand families to the Chechen Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic in 1957, but twice as many returned, and many sought to be placed in exactly the same villages and houses in which they lived before deportation. This led to ethnic confrontation. In particular, in August 1958, after a domestic murder, riots broke out, about a thousand people seized the regional party committee in Grozny and staged a pogrom there. 32 people were injured, including four employees of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, two civilians died and 10 were hospitalized, almost 60 people were arrested.

Most Chechens and Ingush returned to their homeland only in the spring of 1959.

The Chechens and Ingush were completely rehabilitated according to the RSFSR law of April 26, 1991 “On the rehabilitation of repressed peoples.” The law provided for “the recognition and implementation of their right to restore the territorial integrity that existed before the unconstitutional policy of forcibly redrawing borders, to restore national-state entities that existed before their abolition, as well as to compensate for damage caused by the state.”

At the same time, the law provided that the rehabilitation process should not infringe on the rights and legitimate interests of citizens currently living in these territories.

This year marks the 70th anniversary of the deportation of the Chechen and Ingush peoples. The mass forced migration of peoples, unprecedented in history, has long been recognized as a crime, the peoples have been rehabilitated, and the creators of such punishment have undergone historical condemnation.

There are no guilty nations. To confirm the immutability of this political position, soon after the annexation of Crimea to Russia, a presidential decree appeared on the rehabilitation of repressed peoples - Crimean Tatars, Greeks, Bulgarians... But historical tragedy updated for other purposes. Such an unexpected update was the frequent quotation of one terrible document that explodes all ideas about humanity. It also formed the basis of the plot of the film "Ashes", filmed, as its creators explained, with a view to being shown at European film festivals. Archival investigation shows that we are dealing with a fake.

FEBRUARY 2014 marked 70 years since the deportation of the Chechen and Ingush peoples. History has never seen such a massive forced relocation. During this operation, during the period from February 23 to February 29, 1944 alone, 478,479 people were evicted and loaded into wagons, including 91,250 Ingush and 387,229 Chechens. On 177 echelons, the “special contingent” was sent to settle in Central Asia and Kazakhstan.

In order to restore historical justice, the Law “On the Rehabilitation of Repressed Peoples” was adopted in 1991.

The stamp "For Your Eyes Only" is still used in classified documents of the US military department

Historians and archivists are doing a lot to ensure that the tragedy of the Chechen and Ingush peoples ceases to be a “blank spot” national history. Many documents on this topic, previously kept in secret storage, have now been declassified. Dozens of articles and monographs devoted to the February events of 1944 in the Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic have been published.

However, documents are constantly published in the press and on the Internet, the authenticity of which is questionable. Based on them, films are created that distort the events of the past. One of these “documents” is a certain “report from Colonel Gvishiani” with the following content: “Top secret. To the People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR, Comrade L.P. Beria. For your eyes only. Due to the lack of transportability and for the purpose of strictly completing Operation Mountains on time "I was forced to liquidate more than 700 residents in the town of Khaibakh. Colonel Gvishiani."

This “report” has been published several times. However, the publications never made any reference to the place of its storage, which raises doubts about its authenticity. A search for this document in the Russian state archives did not yield positive results.

The text of the “Gvishiani report” raises questions among experts, leading them to assume that it is a fake document. In the operational correspondence of the NKVD and the NKGB of the USSR there was no stamp “Top Secret. For your eyes only.” In the Soviet Union there were classifications: “Secret”, “Top Secret”, “Top Secret, Special Importance”. The documents could be stamped: “Making copies is prohibited,” but the stamp “for your eyes only” is not found in original documents of the law enforcement agencies of the Soviet Union. At the same time, the stamp “For Your Eyes Only” is still used in secret documents of the US military department.

A place of memory of the tragic events of deportation. Photo: RIA News

The settlement of Khaibakh is called a “town” in the “Gvishiani report”. In fact, in operational documentation, Chechen settlements were always called auls, hamlets, villages; in some cases they were mentioned without indicating the nature of the settlement.

In the "report" the operation to evict the Chechens and Ingush appears as Operation "Mountains", in reality it was codenamed "Operation Lentil".

The “report” contains neither the date of its signing nor the record number. This is incredible for the documentation of the NKVD troops! Even the copy of the document was marked with the originating number and the date of signing. The rule was mandatory for all documentation of the NKVD of the USSR without exception.

The "report" was signed by "Colonel Gvishiani". In fact, M. M. Gvishiani was never a colonel. In the period from February 1943 to July 1945. the real Gvishiani had the title of “state security commissioner of the 3rd rank.” It is absolutely incredible that he could “forget” his rank in his report to his superiors.

We should also dwell on the content of the arguments of “Colonel Gvishiani” about the reasons for the mass execution of residents in the village. Khaibakh. The “report” speaks of their “non-transportability,” which is not entirely true. The difficulties in carrying out the operation in the Galanchezhsky region are spoken of in the actual report of the People's Commissar of Internal Affairs L. Beria addressed to I. Stalin on the completion of the operation to evict the Chechens and Ingush dated February 29, 1944. The report, in particular, says: “From some points In the high-mountainous Galanchezhsky district, 6 thousand Chechens remained unevacuated due to heavy snowfall and impassable roads, the removal and loading of which will be completed in 2 days." It's about about carrying out an operation in the high mountain villages of this area. The settlement of Khaibakh was located 5 km east of the regional center of Galanchezh. About 1 km north of Khaibakh there was the village of Testeroi and then the valley of the Gekhi River began. There was no road connecting the regional center with Grozny in 1944. The entire journey of 60 - 70 km, of course, was not short, but it could be covered partly along the bed of the Gekhi River, partly along the road starting from the settlement of Gekhi.

How and when did the deportation of the population of the Galanchezhsky district actually take place? The answer to this question is contained in the original memorandum of State Security Commissioner of the 3rd rank M. M. Gvishiani addressed to the Deputy People's Commissar of Internal Affairs Colonel General A. N. Apollonov “On the results of the operation to resettle Chechens and Ingush in the Galanchezhsky district of the Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic ", dated March 5, 1944.

"Gvishiani's report" raises questions among experts, leading them to assume that it is a fake document

The note is distinguished by a scrupulous calculation of the population of the entire Galanchezhsky district (7026 people) and each of its nine village councils. Source - population census data verified by operational workers. The last census took place in 1939. Almost 5 years have passed, and much has changed in the socio-demographic situation of the area, so employees of the regional department of the NKVD carried out a reconciliation to establish the exact population size on January 1, 1944.

According to the so-called report, in the small village of Khaibakh, 10% of the entire population of the area was destroyed. In fact, the figure mentioned there - 700 people - exceeds the total population of the Galanchezh village council at the beginning of 1944.

The actual report names the names of those who were absent from the villages during the operation. In 5 village councils (out of 9) 52 people were absent. The NKVD authorities took measures to detain them. Why does Gvishiani, reporting to the Deputy People's Commissar, stop there? The success of the operation was determined not only by the timing of its completion, but also by the number of resettled people.

According to Gvishiani’s report, the number of special settlers in the region was 7,163 people. In 6 out of 9 village councils there were evictions more people than originally planned. In three village councils (Yalkhoroisky, Akkiysky and Melkhestinsky) the number of displaced people is lower than planned (by 80 - 100 people). It should be noted that the total number of special settlers in the district (7,163 people) was not verified with data for each village council separately (7,255 people). Perhaps a mistake was made by the compiler of the note, or the document did not take into account losses during the transportation of people to the loading sites (those who died en route, those who fled and those killed while trying to escape).

M. M. Gvishiani’s memo, like other documents on the preparation and conduct of the deportation operation, is stored in the Russian State Military Archive (RGVA). We present some of them to the readers.

Original documents

Instructions for escorting special contingents resettled according to special instructions of the NKVD of the USSR

1. To escort echelons with special settlers, the Convoy Directorate of the NKVD of the USSR assigns a platoon of convoy troops (36 - 40 people) to each echelon.

2. Responsibility for organizing reliable protection of resettled persons at the place of their loading at railway stations, along the route and during unloading at places of resettlement rests with the commandant of the echelon, allocated from among officers NKVD escort troops. NCOs are assigned to assist the echelon commandant.

3. For each echelon, one NKVD or NKGB operative is allocated for operational and intelligence services for those resettled along the route. The operative is obliged to establish contact with agents and informants from among the special contingent and promptly inform the echelon commandant about this in order to take the necessary measures against possible attempts on the part of those evicted to engage in anti-Soviet actions and organized escape.

4. Before loading the special contingent into the carriages, the train commander is obliged to carefully check their serviceability in order to exclude the possibility of escape of those relocated during loading and en route.

5. Upon the arrival of a special contingent from the areas of deportation to the echelon, the commandant of the echelon immediately cordones off the echelon and does not let any of those being resettled outside the cordon zone. The echelon commandant is responsible for organizing the security of the special contingent during the loading period.

6. If it is necessary to use a special contingent to deliver water, fuel, food, etc. to the cars, the echelon commandant allocates a separate convoy to accompany them.

7. The echelon commandant receives a special contingent from the operational staff according to family cards drawn up for the head of the family. The officer hands over one copy of the family card to the echelon commandant against receipt.

8. At least 40 special contingent personnel must be seated in each two-axle car. The train must have 63 passenger cars, which must accommodate at least 2,500 people. In addition, one [car] is allocated for the convoy and one ambulance. If necessary, a punishment cell is organized in one of the carriages for persons violating the rules of movement.

9. After boarding the special contingent into the wagons, the train commandant or on his behalf, persons from among the convoy carefully fill out the wagon lists, in which all persons, without exception, loaded into the wagon, including infants, are recorded.

10. In each carriage, a senior carriage officer is appointed from among the special settlers, whose duties include responsibility for order in the carriage, recording and checking at least once a day all special settlers placed in the carriage, distribution of food, etc. About all incidents in the carriage (escape , death, etc.) the head of the carriage must immediately report to the commandant of the train. In the event of an escape while the train is moving, the train commandant at the first stop reports the identifying information of the escaped or lagging behind to the transport authorities of the NKGB or the police in order to take appropriate measures to search.

11. For every 8 - 10 cars, a senior is appointed from among the sergeants of the convoy troops, whose duties include monitoring the behavior of the settlers of this group of cars. Persons who violate the established order of movement may be transferred to a punishment cell car by the head of the train.

12. The train commandant places the convoy at the head and tail of the train and organizes communication between them both at stops and along the route in such a way as to exclude the possibility of group escapes and successfully repel possible attempts by bandit elements to attack the train.

13. The commandant of the train is obliged to report daily to the transportation department of the NKVD of the USSR about the movement, location of the train and its condition. For example: “Echelon N... proceeded to station “K” on January 5 this year. Signature.”

14. The organization of meals for those resettled along the route is carried out by the commandant of the train at established points. Payment for food is made by the commandant of the echelon in accordance with the established procedure. The train commandant receives money for food from a representative of the NKVD of the USSR in charge of monetary issues. 8 - 10 hours before the train arrives at the station where food should be prepared, the train commandant makes a request by telephone or telegraph.

15. All documents received by the echelon commandant in connection with expenses for resettled persons must be certified at the places of their expenditure by local NKVD authorities. It is prohibited to give money to migrants, except for the purchase of milk for children.

16. For medical care of those resettled, the People's Commissariat of Health allocates one doctor and two nurses. One carriage is allocated for medical personnel and patients. The doctor must have the required amount of medicine with him. In the event of a serious illness of migrants on the way, the commandant of the train transfers the patients through the local transport authorities of the NKVD for treatment to the nearest health centers and reports this to the Transportation Department of the NKVD of the USSR.

17. Upon arrival of those resettled at the unloading station, the train commandant hands over the displaced persons to representatives of local NKVD authorities and authorities according to the carriage lists. An act of surrender is drawn up, one copy of which [the commandant] keeps for himself.

Convoy troops accompany special settlers right up to their place of resettlement.

Enter this instruction as an addendum to PKV-39.

Chief of the USSR NKVD Convoy Troops, Major General Bochkov

Russian State Military Archive (RGVA). F.38660. Op.1. D.3. L.285 - 288. Certified copy.

From the combat log of the 145th Infantry Regiment of the Internal Troops of the NKVD of the USSR for the period from May 1, 1942 to December 31, 1946.

/.../February 24, 1944 At 1.00 the regiment received the task: at 6.00 in vehicles to jump to V. Alkun, from there in marching order to the Galanchezhsky district to conduct an operation in the mountainous regions. By the end of the day on February 24, 1944, the regiment arrived in vehicles in Upper Alkun, where they spent the night and on the morning of February 25, 1944, at 4.00, set out for Upper Yalkhoroy - 49 km along the mountain road.

February 25, 1944. The regiment marched all day long, the path was very difficult, a mountain road with large ups and downs, snow and frost with wind. At 24.00 we arrived in V. Yalkhoroy, the personnel settled down to rest. (specified where - editor's note) During the march, there were cases of frostbite among personnel.

On February 26, 1944, the regiment was divided into 4 groups (groups and their commanders are listed - editor's note). All groups went to the mountains to carry out an operation to evict the Chechen-Ingush population from mountain villages at a distance of 40 - 50 km. The regiment's headquarters was located in V. Kiy.

On February 29, 1944, units of the regiment began evictions in the indicated villages and escorting those evicted to assembly points. The eviction and escort of the special contingent were carried out successfully.

March 4, 1944 The regiment's units escorted a special contingent from the mountain villages to Nizhny Al/.../ and here they [handed over] it to the assembly point [and] headed by car to a new location - Art. Assinovskaya.

Russian State Military Archive (RGVA). F. 38771. Op.1. D.1. L.27ob. Script.

Memorandum of the Commissioner of State Security of the 3rd rank M. M. Gvishiani

Galanchezhsky district is administratively divided into nine village councils, which unite from 8 to 22 farms each. On January 1, 1944, the number of farms was 123. The population census was carried out and the census data was verified. workers found that 7,026 Chechen residents live in the area.

At the direction of the leadership, the operation to resettle residents of the district began on February 28, and in six village councils on February 29.

Results of the operation. According to the Yalkharoi village council, 1073 people and 213 households were subject to resettlement (according to population census data); 902 people and 203 households were resettled. According to the Meredzhoi village council, 712 people and 155 farms were subject to resettlement; 819 people and 168 households were resettled. According to the Nikaroi village council, 629 people and 107 farms were subject to resettlement; 796 people and 121 households were resettled. According to the Nashkhoi village council, 1,501 people and 257 farms were subject to resettlement; 1,508 people and 267 farms were resettled. According to the Peshkhoi village council, 441 people, 84 farms were subject to resettlement, 482 people, 93 farms were resettled. According to the Galanchezhsky village council, 581 people, 120 farms were subject to resettlement, 635 people, 179 farms were resettled. According to the Kiysky village council, 710 people and 126 farms were subject to resettlement; 820 people and 150 farms were resettled. According to the Akki village council, 769 people and 166 farms were subject to resettlement; 699 people and 142 farms were resettled. According to the Melkhestinsky village council, 610 people, 101 farms were subject to resettlement, 594 people, 92 farms were resettled.

Thus, 7,026 people and 1,330 households were subject to resettlement in the region; 7,163 people and 1,406 households were resettled.

In a number of village councils, some residents, mainly from among the legalized bandits and participants in the uprisings, disappeared, while others left for the surrounding areas before the start of the operation in the area.

So, in the Nashkhoi village council, 15 people were absent on the day of the operation, of which 5 were men, 8 women and 2 children. Of the men, 5 names were absent (5 names are listed - editor's note).

8 people were absent from the Kiysky village council (surnames are listed - editor's note)

Most of those listed were subject to arrest based on certificates. In the Akki village council, 16 people were absent (surnames are listed - editor's note). Of these, 6 people were detained and subjected to resettlement to other areas. In the Yalkharoi village council, 4 people were absent (surnames are listed - editor's note). In the Melkhestinsky village council, 9 people were absent (surnames are listed - editor's note). According to certificates and orders of the NKVD - NKGB of the Chechen Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic, 30 people were arrested, 18 people (subject to arrest) were killed: Saigov Magomed, Mamaev Kortani and others. The remaining 10 people, subject to arrest according to certificates, disappeared on the day of the operation.

During the work of the task force since November 1, 1943, 197 weapons were confiscated in the area: Rifles - 139. PPSh - 4. Pistols and revolvers - 24. Smoothbore rifles - 29. Heavy machine gun - 1.

During the operation, weapons were seized in the region: Rifles - 29. PPSh - 1. Pistols and revolvers - 23. RGD 1933 grenade - 16. Live ammunition - 964. Smoothbore rifles - 7. Edged weapons - 276.

621 people were recruited as operational workers, of which 486 people took part in the operation in village councils, the rest were employed at assembly points.

Before and during the operation, several skirmishes between our troops and gangs took place in the area. As a result, 18 people were killed by bandits, 4 people were killed on our side (middle commander and 3 privates), one Red Army soldier was wounded - all from the 137th joint venture. Of those resettled, 19 people died or were killed along the way.

Commissioner of State Security 3rd rank Gvishiani.

Russian State Military Archive (RGVA). F.38660. Op.1. D.1. L.1 - 5. Original.

Documents have been shortened for layout reasons.

Almost everyone knows about the fact of the deportation of Chechens and Ingush, but few know the true reason for this relocation.

Almost everyone knows about the fact of the deportation of Chechens and Ingush, but few know the true reason for this relocation.

The fact is that since January 1940, an underground organization has been operating in the Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic Khasan Israilov, which set as its goal the separation of the North Caucasus from the USSR and the creation on its territory of a federation of a state of all the mountain peoples of the Caucasus, except for the Ossetians. The latter, as well as the Russians living in the region, according to Israilov and his associates, should have been completely destroyed. Khasan Israilov himself was a member of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) and at one time graduated from the Communist University of the Working People of the East named after I.V. Stalin.

Israilov began his political activity in 1937 with a denunciation of the leadership of the Chechen-Ingush Republic. Initially, Israilov and eight of his associates themselves went to prison for libel, but soon the local leadership of the NKVD changed, Israilov, Avtorkhanov, Mamakaev and his other like-minded people were released, and in their place were imprisoned those against whom they had written a denunciation.

However, Israilov did not rest on this. At a time when the British were preparing an attack on the USSR, he created an underground organization with the goal of raising an uprising against Soviet power at the moment when the British landed in Baku, Derbent, Poti and Sukhum. However, British agents demanded that Israilov begin independent actions even before the British attack on the USSR. On instructions from London, Israilov and his gang were to attack the Grozny oil fields and disable them in order to create a shortage of fuel in the Red Army units fighting in Finland. The operation was scheduled for January 28, 1940. Now in Chechen mythology this bandit raid has been elevated to the rank of a national uprising. In fact, there was only an attempt to set fire to the oil storage facility, which was repulsed by the facility’s security. Israilov, with the remnants of his gang, switched to an illegal situation - holed up in mountain villages, the bandits, for the purpose of self-supply, from time to time attacked food stores.

However, with the beginning of the war, Israilov’s foreign policy orientation changed dramatically - now he began to hope for help from the Germans. Israilov’s representatives crossed the front line and handed the German intelligence representative a letter from their leader. On the German side, Israilov began to be supervised by military intelligence. The curator was the colonel Osman Gube.

This man, an Avar by nationality, was born in the Buynaksky region of Dagestan, served in the Dagestan regiment of the Caucasian native division. In 1919 he joined the army of General Denikin, in 1921 he emigrated from Georgia to Trebizond, and then to Istanbul. In 1938, Gube joined the Abwehr, and with the outbreak of war he was promised the position of head of the “political police” of the North Caucasus.

German paratroopers were sent to Chechnya, including Gube himself, and a German radio transmitter began operating in the forests of the Shali region, communicating between the Germans and the rebels. The first action of the rebels was an attempt to disrupt mobilization in Checheno-Ingushetia. During the second half of 1941, the number of deserters amounted to 12 thousand 365 people, evading conscription - 1093. During the first mobilization of Chechens and Ingush into the Red Army in 1941, it was planned to form a cavalry division from their composition, but when it was recruited, only 50% (4247) were recruited people) from the existing conscript contingent, and 850 people from those already recruited upon arrival at the front immediately went over to the enemy. In total, during the three years of the war, 49,362 Chechens and Ingush deserted from the ranks of the Red Army, another 13,389 evaded conscription, for a total of 62,751 people. Only 2,300 people died at the fronts and went missing (and the latter include those who went over to the enemy). The Buryat people, who were half smaller in number and were not threatened by the German occupation, lost 13 thousand people at the front, and the Ossetians, who were one and a half times smaller than the Chechens and Ingush, lost almost 11 thousand. At the same time when the decree on resettlement was published, there were only 8,894 Chechens, Ingush and Balkars in the army. That is, ten times more deserted than fought.

Two years after his first raid, on January 28, 1942, Israilov organized the OPKB - “Special Party of Caucasian Brothers,” which aims to “create in the Caucasus a free fraternal Federative Republic of the states of the fraternal peoples of the Caucasus under the mandate of the German Empire.” He later renamed this party the “National Socialist Party of the Caucasian Brothers.” In February 1942, when the Nazis occupied Taganrog, an associate of Israilov, the former chairman of the Forestry Council of the Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic, Mairbek Sheripov, raised an uprising in the villages of Shatoi and Itum-Kale. The villages were soon liberated, but some of the rebels went to the mountains, from where they carried out partisan attacks. So, on June 6, 1942, at about 17:00 in the Shatoi region, a group of armed bandits on the way to the mountains fired at a truck with traveling Red Army soldiers in one gulp. Of the 14 people traveling in the car, three were killed and two were wounded. The bandits disappeared into the mountains. On August 17, Mairbek Sheripov’s gang actually destroyed the regional center of the Sharoevsky district.

In order to prevent the bandits from seizing oil production and oil refining facilities, one NKVD division had to be introduced into the republic, and also during the most difficult period The battle for the Caucasus remove the military units of the Red Army from the front.

However, it took a long time to catch and neutralize the gangs - the bandits, warned by someone, avoided ambushes and withdrew their units from the attacks. Conversely, targets that were attacked were often left unguarded. So, just before the attack on the regional center of the Sharoevsky district, an operational group and a military unit of the NKVD, which were intended to protect the regional center, were withdrawn from the regional center. Subsequently, it turned out that the bandits were protected by the head of the department for combating banditry of the Chechen Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic, Lieutenant Colonel GB Aliyev. And later, among the things of the murdered Israilov, a letter from the People’s Commissar of Internal Affairs of Checheno-Ingushetia, Sultan Albogachiev, was found. It was then that it became clear that all Chechens and Ingush (and Albogachiev was Ingush), regardless of their position, were dreaming of how to harm the Russians, and they were doing harm very actively.

However, on November 7, 1942, on the 504th day of the war, when Hitler’s troops in Stalingrad tried to break through our defenses in the Glubokaya Balka area between the Red October and Barrikady factories, in Checheno-Ingushetia, by the forces of the NKVD troops with the support of individual units of the 4th Kuban Cavalry Corps carried out a special operation to eliminate gangs. Mairbek Sheripov was killed in the battle, and Gube was captured on the night of January 12, 1943 near the village of Akki-Yurt.

However, bandit attacks continued. They continued thanks to the support of bandits local population and local authorities. Despite the fact that from June 22, 1941 to February 23, 1944, 3,078 gang members were killed in Checheno-Ingushtia And 1,715 people were captured, it was clear that as long as someone gave the bandits food and shelter, it would be impossible to defeat banditry. That is why on January 31, 1944, the USSR State Defense Committee Resolution No. 5073 was adopted on the abolition of the Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic and the deportation of its population to Central Asia and Kazakhstan.

On February 23, 1944, Operation Lentil began, during which 180 trains of 65 wagons each were sent from Checheno-Ingushenia with a total of 493,269 people resettled. 20,072 firearms were seized. While resisting, 780 Chechens and Ingush were killed, and 2016 were arrested for possession of weapons and anti-Soviet literature.

6,544 people managed to hide in the mountains. But many of them soon descended from the mountains and surrendered. Israilov himself was mortally wounded in battle on December 15, 1944.