Zhukov G.K. Vasilevsky A.M.

“...Our unit was located in the deserted village of Novolipitsy, 10 - 12 km from the forward positions, and began active combat training and construction of defensive lines. The proximity of the front was felt: artillery thundered in the west, flares flashed at night. We were often attacked air battles, downed planes fell. Soon our division, like our neighboring formations, staffed mainly by cadets from military schools, turned into a well-trained “guards” combat unit.

It happened that it was impossible to stick my head out of the shelter. But, despite the constant attacks and incessant battles, we found strength, endurance, patience and fought back the enemy. Only the price was very expensive. How many soldier died - no one can count. Very few survived.And every survivor deserves a reward..."

Telenev Yuri Vasilievich:

“Back then we didn’t even think about awards”

“On the sector of the front where the battle was to take place, the Germans were on high ground, and we were on low ground, in plain sight. They tried to bomb us - the strongest artillery attack lasted approx.for about an hour, there was a terrible roar all around, no voices could be heard, so I had to scream. But we did not give up and responded in kind: on the German side, shells exploded, tanks burned, everythingcovered in smoke. Then our shock army went on the attack, we were in the trenches, they stepped over us, then we followed them. The crossing of the Oka River began, only the

infantry. The Germans began to shoot at the crossing, but since they were suppressed and paralyzed by our resistance, they shot randomly and without aim. Having crossed the river, we joined the fightingThey liberated settlements where the Nazis still remained."

Yuri Vasilyevich proudly says that after the Battle of Stalingrad the mood Soviet soldiers was only for victory, no one doubted that we would defeat the Germans anyway, and the victory in the Battle of Kursk was yet another proof of this.

On the Kursk Bulge, junior lieutenant Telenev, using an anti-tank rifle, shot down an enemy aircraft "Henkel-113", popularly called a "crutch", for which, after the victory, he was awarded the Order of the Great Patriotic War. “During the war, we didn’t even think about awards, and there was no such fashion,” recalls Yuri Vasilyevich. In general, he considers himself a lucky man, because he was wounded near Kursk. If it was wounded and not killed, it is already a great happiness for the infantry. After the battles, there were no entire regiments left - a company or a platoon.“They were young,” says Yuri Vasilyevich, “reckless,at 19 years old we were not afraid of anything, got used to danger. Yes, you can’t protect yourself from a bullet if it’s yours.” . After being wounded, he was sent to a Kirov hospital, and when he recovered, he went to the front again, and until the end of 1944 he fought on the 2nd Belorussian Front.

Before the New Year 1945, Lieutenant Telenev was demobilized due to a severe arm wound. Therefore, I met victory in the rear, in Omsk. There he worked as a military instructor at a school and studied at a music school. A few years later, he moved with his wife and children to Votkinsk, and later to the very young Tchaikovsky, where he taught at a music school and was an instrument tuner.

Volodin Semyon Fedorovich

The events of those days will be remembered for a long time when the fate of the war was decided on the Kursk Bulge, when Lieutenant Volodin’s company held a small piece of land between a birch hill and the stadium in the village of Solomki. Of what the young commander had to endure on the first day of the Battle of Kursk, the most memorable thing was the retreat: not the very moment when the company, which had repulsed six tank attacks, left the trench, but another night road. He walked at the head of his “company” - twenty surviving soldiers, remembering all the details...

For about an hour, the Junkers continuously bombed the village, as soon as one batch flew away, another appeared in the sky, and everything was repeated all over again - the deafening roar of exploding bombs, the whistling of fragments and thick, choking dust. The fighters were chasing the fighters, and the roar of their engines, like a groan, layered above the ground, when the German artillery began to fire and at the edge of the forest, in front of the buckwheat field, a black tank diamond appeared again.

A heavy and smoky military dawn was rising ahead: in an hour the battalion would take up defense on the high-rises, and in another hour everything would start all over again: an air raid, artillery cannonade, rapidly approaching boxes of tanks; everything will repeat itself - the whole battle, but with great ferocity, with an irresistible thirst for victory.

Within seven days they were to see other crossings, other gatherings along the banks of Russian rivers - accumulations of wrecked German vehicles, corpses of German soldiers, and he, Lieutenant Volodin, would say that this was fair retribution that the Nazis deserved.

In August 1942, a 17-year-old boy was drafted into the Red Army. He was sent to study at the Omsk Infantry School, but Sasha could not graduate. He signed up as a volunteer and received baptism of fire near Vyazma, Smolensk region. The smart guy was immediately noticed. How can you not notice a young fighter who has true eye and a steady hand. This is how Alexander Stepanovich became a sniper.

“- It’s impossible to remember the battle on the Kursk Bulge without shuddering - it’s terrible! The sky was filled with smoke, houses, fields, tanks, and combat positions were burning. The thunder of cannonade on both sides. And in such heavy fire,” the veteran recalled, “fate protected me. I remember this case: we, three snipers, chose positions on the slope of a ravine, began to dig trenches, and suddenly - a flurry of fire. We quickly fell into one half-dug trench. The owner of the trench was below, I fell on him, and my neighbor fell on me. And then - a burst from a large-caliber machine gun at our shelter... The owner of the trench was immediately killed, the soldier who was above me was wounded, but I remained unharmed. Fate is evident..."

Alexander Stepanovich received a medal for the battle on the Kursk Bulge“For Courage” is an award most revered among front-line soldiers.

“...On the eve of the Battle of Kursk, we were transferred to the city of Orel as part of the 125th special communications battalion. By that time there was nothing left of the city; I remember only two surviving buildings - a church and a train station. On the outskirts here and there some sheds have been preserved. Piles of broken bricks, not a single tree in the whole huge city, constant shelling and bombing. At the temple there was a priest and several female singers who remained with him. In the evening, our entire battalion, together with its commanders, gathered in the church, and the priest began to serve a prayer service. We knew that we had to attack the next day. Remembering their relatives, many cried. Scary…

There were three of us radio operator girls. The rest of the men: signalmen, reel-to-reel operators. Our task is to establish the most important thing - communication, without communication it’s the end. I can’t say how many of us were alive; at night we were scattered along the entire front, but I think it was not many. Our losses were very large. The Lord saved me..."

Smetanin Alexander

“...For me, this battle began with a retreat. We retreated for several days. And before the decisive battle, breakfast was brought to our crew. For some reason I remember it well - four crackers and two unripe watermelons, they were still white. Back then they couldn’t provide us with anything better. At dawn, huge black clouds of smoke appeared on the horizon from the Germans. We stood motionless. Nobody knew anything - neither the company commander nor the platoon commander. We just stood there. I am a machine gunner and I saw the world through a two and a half centimeter hole. But I saw only dust and smoke. And then the tank commander commands: “Sour cream, fire.” I started shooting. For whom, where - I don’t know. At about 11 o'clock in the morning we were ordered "forward". We rushed forward, shooting as we went. Then there was a stop, they brought us shells. And again forward. The roar, the gunfire, the smoke - that's all my memories. I would be lying if I said that everything was clear to me then - the scale and significance of the battle. Well, the next day, July 13, a shell hit us on the starboard side. I received 22 shrapnel in my leg. This is what my Battle of Kursk was like..."

Oh, Russia! A country with a difficult fate.

I have you, Russia, like my heart, alone.

I will tell a friend, I will tell an enemy too -

Without you it's like without a heart, I can't live!

(Yulia Drunina)

In July 1943, the German army launched Operation Citadel, a massive offensive on the Orel-Kursk Bulge on the Eastern Front. But the Red Army was well prepared to at some point crush the advancing German tanks with thousands of Soviet T-34 tanks.

CHRONICLE OF THE BATTLE OF KURSK July 5-12

July 5 - 04:30 The Germans launch an artillery strike - this marked the beginning of the battle on the Kursk Bulge.

July 6 – over 2,000 tanks from both sides took part in the battle near the villages of Soborovka and Ponyri. German tanks were unable to break through the Soviet defenses.

July 10 - Model's 9th Army was unable to break through the defenses of the Soviet troops on the northern front of the arc and went on the defensive.

July 12 - Soviet tanks hold back the attack of German tanks in the grandiose battle of Prokhorovka.

Background. Decisive bet

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In the summer of 1943, Hitler directed the entire military power of Germany to the Eastern Front to achieve a decisive victory at the Kursk Bulge.

After the surrender of German troops at Stalingrad in February 1943, it seemed that the entire southern flank of the Wehrmacht was about to collapse. However, the Germans miraculously managed to hold out. They won the battle of Kharkov and stabilized the front line. With the onset of the spring thaw, the Eastern Front froze, stretching from the suburbs of Leningrad in the north to the west of Rostov on the Black Sea.

In the spring, both sides summed up their results. Soviet leadership wanted to resume the offensive. In the German command, in connection with the realization of the impossibility of making up for the horrific losses of the last two years, an opinion arose about the transition to strategic defense. In the spring, only 600 vehicles remained in the German tank forces. The German army as a whole was short-staffed by 700,000 men.

Hitler entrusted the revival of tank units to Heinz Guderian, appointing him chief inspector of armored forces. Guderian, one of the architects of the lightning victories at the start of the war in 1939-1941, tried his best to increase the number and quality of tanks, and also helped introduce new types of vehicles, such as the Pz.V Panther.

Supply problems

The German command was in a difficult situation. During 1943, Soviet power could only increase. The quality of Soviet troops and equipment also improved rapidly. Even for the German army to transition to defense, there were clearly not enough reserves. Field Marshal Erich von Manstein believed that, given the superiority of the Germans in the ability to wage maneuver warfare, the problem would be solved by “elastic defense” with “inflicting powerful local attacks of a limited nature on the enemy, gradually undermining his power to a decisive level.”

Hitler tried to solve two problems. At first he sought to achieve success in the East in order to induce Turkey to enter the war on the side of the Axis powers. Second, the defeat of the Axis forces in North Africa meant that the Allies would invade southern Europe in the summer. This would further weaken the Wehrmacht in the east due to the need to regroup troops to deal with the new threat. The result of all this was the decision of the German command to launch an offensive on the Kursk Bulge - that was the name of the protrusion in the front line, which was 100 km across at its base. In the operation, codenamed Citadel, German tank armadas were to advance from the north and south. A victory would thwart the plans for the Red Army's summer offensive and shorten the front line.

The plans of the German command are revealed

German plans for an offensive on the Kursk Bulge became known to the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command from the Soviet resident “Luci” in Switzerland and from British codebreakers. At a meeting on April 12, 1943, Marshal Zhukov convincingly argued that instead of launching a preemptive offensive by Soviet troops, “it would be better if we exhaust the enemy on our defense, knock out his tanks, and then, introducing fresh reserves, by going on a general offensive we will finally finish off the main enemy group " Stalin agreed. The Red Army began to create a powerful defense system on the ledge.

The Germans planned to strike at the end of spring or early summer, but they were unable to concentrate attack groups. It was not until July 1 that Hitler informed his commanders that Operation Citadel would have to begin on July 5. Within 24 hours, Stalin learned from “Lutsi” that the strike would be carried out between July 3 and July 6.

The Germans planned to cut off the ledge under its base with powerful simultaneous attacks from the north and south. In the north, the 9th Army (Colonel General Walter Model) from Army Group Center was supposed to fight its way straight to Kursk and east to Maloarkhangelsk. This grouping included 15 infantry divisions and seven tank and motorized divisions. In the south, General Hermann Hoth's 4th Panzer Army of Army Group South was to break through the Soviet defenses between Belgorod and Gertsovka, occupy the city of Oboyan, and then advance to Kursk to link up with the 9th Army. The Kempf army group was supposed to cover the flank of the 4th Panzer Army. The shock fist of Army Group South consisted of nine tank and motorized divisions and eight infantry divisions.

The northern front of the arc was defended by the Central Front of Army General Konstantin Rokossovsky. In the south, the German offensive was to be repelled by the Voronezh Front of Army General Nikolai Vatutin. Powerful reserves were concentrated in the depths of the ledge as part of the Steppe Front of Colonel General Ivan Konev. A reliable anti-tank defense was created. In the most tank-dangerous directions, up to 2,000 anti-tank mines were installed for every kilometer of the front.

Opposing parties. The Great Controversy

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In the Battle of Kursk, Wehrmacht tank divisions faced a reorganized and well-equipped Red Army. On July 5, Operation Citadel began - the experienced and battle-hardened German army went on the offensive. Its main striking force was tank divisions. Their staff at that time of the war was 15,600 people and 150-200 tanks each. In reality, these divisions included an average of 73 tanks. However, three SS tank divisions (as well as the Grossdeutschland division) each had 130 (or more) combat-ready tanks. In total, the Germans had 2,700 tanks and assault guns.

Mainly tanks of the Pz.III and Pz.IV types took part in the Battle of Kursk. The command of the German troops had high hopes for the striking power of the new Tiger I and Panther tanks and Ferdinand self-propelled guns. The Tigers performed well, but the Panthers showed some shortcomings, in particular those associated with unreliable transmission and chassis, as Heinz Guderian warned.

1,800 Luftwaffe aircraft took part in the battle, especially active at the beginning of the offensive. Ju 87 bomber squadrons carried out classic massive dive bombing attacks for the last time in this war.

During the Battle of Kursk, the Germans encountered reliable Soviet defensive lines of great depth. They were unable to break through or get around them. Therefore, German troops had to create a new tactical group for a breakthrough. The tank wedge - “Panzerkeil” - was supposed to become a “can opener” for opening Soviet anti-tank defense units. At the head of the strike force were heavy Tiger I tanks and Ferdinand tank destroyers with powerful anti-shell armor that could withstand hits from Soviet anti-tank defense shells. They were followed by lighter Panthers, Pz.IV and Pz.HI, dispersed along the front with intervals of up to 100 m between tanks. To ensure cooperation in the offensive, each tank wedge constantly maintained radio contact with strike aircraft and field artillery.

Red Army

In 1943, the Wehrmacht's combat power was declining. But the Red Army was rapidly turning into a new, more effective formation. A uniform with shoulder straps and unit insignia was reintroduced. Many famous units earned the title of “guards”, as in the tsarist army. The T-34 became the main tank of the Red Army. But already in 1942, modified German Pz.IV tanks were able to compare with this tank in terms of their data. With the advent of the Tiger I tanks in the German army, it became clear that the T-34's armor and armament needed to be strengthened. The most powerful combat vehicle in the Battle of Kursk was the SU-152 tank destroyer, which entered service in limited quantities. This self-propelled artillery unit was armed with a 152 mm howitzer, which was very effective against enemy armored vehicles.

The Soviet army had powerful artillery, which largely determined its successes. Anti-tank artillery batteries included 152 mm and 203 mm howitzers. Rocket artillery combat vehicles, the Katyushas, ​​were also actively used.

The Red Army Air Force was also strengthened. The Yak-9D and La-5FN fighters negated the technical superiority of the Germans. The Il-2 M-3 attack aircraft also turned out to be effective.

Victory tactics

Although at the beginning of the war the German army had superiority in the use of tanks, by 1943 this difference had become almost imperceptible. The bravery of the Soviet tank crews and the courage of the infantry in defense also negated the experience and tactical advantages of the Germans. The Red Army soldiers became masters of defense. Marshal Zhukov realized that in the Battle of Kursk it was worth using this skill in all its glory. His tactics were simple: form a deep and developed defensive system and force the Germans to get bogged down in the labyrinth of trenches in futile attempts breakthrough. Soviet troops with the help local population they dug thousands of kilometers of trenches, trenches, anti-tank ditches, densely laid minefields, erected wire fences, prepared firing positions for artillery and mortars, etc.

Villages were fortified and up to 300,000 civilians, mainly women and children, were recruited to build defense lines. During the Battle of Kursk, the Wehrmacht was hopelessly stuck in the defense of the Red Army.

First stage. Strike from the North

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Tanks and infantry from Model's 9th Army launched an attack on Ponyri, but ran into powerful Soviet defensive lines. On the evening of July 4, on the northern face of the arc, Rokossovsky’s troops captured a team of German sappers. During interrogation, they testified that the offensive would begin in the morning at 03:30.

Taking this data into account, Rokossovsky ordered counter-artillery preparation to begin at 02:20 in the areas where German troops were concentrated. This delayed the start of the German offensive, but nevertheless, at 05:00, intense artillery shelling of the advanced units of the Red Army began.

The German infantry advanced with great difficulty through densely shot terrain, suffering serious losses from anti-personnel mines planted at a high density. By the end of the first day, for example, two divisions that were the main striking force of the group on the right flank of the German troops - the 258th Infantry, which had the task of breaking through the Orel Kursk highway, and the 7th Infantry - were forced to lie down and dig in.

The advancing German tanks achieved more significant successes. During the first day of the offensive, the 20th Panzer Division, at the cost of heavy losses, in some places wedged 6-8 km deep into the defense line, occupying the village of Bobrik. On the night of July 5-6, Rokossovsky, assessing the situation, calculated where the Germans would attack the next day and quickly regrouped the units. Soviet sappers laid mines. The main defense center was the town of Maloarkhangelsk.

On July 6, the Germans tried to capture the village of Ponyri, as well as Hill 274 near the village of Olkhovatka. But the Soviet command appreciated the significance of this position at the end of June. Therefore, Model's 9th Army stumbled upon the most fortified section of the defense.

On July 6, German troops went on the offensive with Tiger I tanks in the vanguard, but they not only had to break through the Red Army's defensive lines, but also repel counterattacks from Soviet tanks. On July 6, 1000 German tanks launched an attack on a 10 km front between the villages of Ponyri and Soborovka and suffered serious losses on the prepared defense lines. The infantry let the tanks pass and then set them on fire by throwing Molotov cocktails onto the engine shutters. The dug-in T-34 tanks fired from short distances. The German infantry advanced with significant losses - the entire area was intensively shelled by machine guns and artillery. Although Soviet tanks suffered damage from the powerful 88-mm guns of the Tiger tanks, German losses were very heavy.

German troops were stopped not only in the center, but also on the left flank, where reinforcements that arrived in Maloarkhangelsk in time strengthened the defense.

The Wehrmacht was never able to overcome the resistance of the Red Army and crush Rokossovsky's troops. The Germans only penetrated to an insignificant depth, but every time Model thought that he had managed to break through, the Soviet troops retreated and the enemy encountered a new line of defense. Already on July 9, Zhukov gave the northern group of troops a secret order to prepare for a counteroffensive.

Particularly strong battles were fought for the village of Ponyri. As in Stalingrad, although not on the same scale, desperate battles broke out for the most important positions - a school, a water tower and a machine and tractor station. During fierce battles they changed hands many times. On July 9, the Germans threw Ferdinand assault guns into battle, but they could not break the resistance of the Soviet troops.

Although the Germans did capture most of the village of Ponyri, they suffered serious losses: more than 400 tanks and up to 20,000 soldiers. The model managed to wedge 15 km deep into the defensive lines of the Red Army. On July 10, Model threw his last reserves into a decisive assault on the heights at Olkhovatka, but failed.

The next strike was scheduled for July 11, but by then the Germans had new reasons for concern. Soviet troops undertook reconnaissance in force in the northern sector, which marked the beginning of Zhukov's counteroffensive on Orel to the rear of the 9th Army. Model had to withdraw tank units to eliminate this new threat. By noon, Rokossovsky could report to the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command that the 9th Army was confidently withdrawing its tanks from the battle. The battle on the northern face of the arc was won.

Map of the battle for the village of Ponyri

July 5-12, 1943. View from southeast

Events

1. On July 5, the German 292nd Infantry Division attacks the northern part of the village and the embankment.
2. This division is supported by the 86th and 78th Infantry Divisions, which attacked Soviet positions in and near the village.
3. On July 7, reinforced units of the 9th and 18th tank divisions attack Ponyri, but encounter Soviet minefields, artillery fire and dug-in tanks. Il-2 M-3 attack aircraft strike attacking tanks from the air.
4. In the village itself there are fierce hand-to-hand fights. Particularly heated battles took place near the water tower, school, machine and tractor and railway stations. German and Soviet troops struggled to capture these key defense points. Because of these battles, Ponyri began to be called “Kursk Stalingrad”.
5. On July 9, the 508th regiment of German grenadiers, supported by several Ferdinand self-propelled guns, finally occupied height 253.3.
6. Although by the evening of July 9, German troops advanced forward, but at the cost of very heavy losses.
7. To complete the breakthrough in this sector, Model, on the night of July 10-11, throws its last reserve, the 10th Tank Division, into the assault. By this time, the 292nd Infantry Division was drained of blood. Although the Germans occupied most of the village of Ponyri on July 12, they were never able to completely break through the Soviet defenses.

Second phase. Strike from the south

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Army Group South was the most powerful formation of German troops during the Battle of Kursk. Its offensive became a serious test for the Red Army. It was possible to stop the advance of Model’s 9th Army from the north relatively easily for a number of reasons. The Soviet command expected that the Germans would deliver the decisive blow in this direction. Therefore, a more powerful group was created on the Rokossovsky front. However, the Germans concentrated their best troops on the southern front of the arc. Vatutin's Voronezh Front had fewer tanks. Due to the greater length of the front, it was not possible to create a defense with a sufficiently high density of troops. Already at the initial stage, the German advanced units were able to quickly break through the Soviet defenses in the south.

Vatutin became known exact date the beginning of the German offensive, as in the north, on the evening of July 4, and he was able to organize counter-artillery preparation for the German strike forces. The Germans began shelling at 03:30. In their reports, they indicated that more shells were expended in this artillery barrage than in the entire war with Poland and France in 1939 and 1940.

The main force on the left flank of the German strike force was the 48th Panzer Corps. His first task was to break through the Soviet defense line and reach the Pena River. This corps had 535 tanks and 66 assault guns. The 48th Corps was able to occupy the village of Cherkasskoye only after fierce fighting, which greatly undermined the power of this formation.

2nd SS Panzer Corps

In the center of the German group was advancing the 2nd SS Panzer Corps under the command of Paul Hausser (390 tanks and 104 assault guns, including 42 Tiger tanks out of 102 vehicles of this type as part of Army Group South). This corps was also able to advance into the first day thanks to good cooperation with aviation. But on the right flank of the German troops, the army task force "Kempf" was hopelessly stuck near the crossings of the Donets River.

These first offensive actions of the German army worried the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command. The Voronezh Front was reinforced with infantry and tanks.

Despite this, the next day the German SS panzer divisions continued their success. The powerful 100 mm frontal armor and 88 mm guns of the advancing Tiger 1 tanks made them almost invulnerable to fire from Soviet guns and tanks. By the evening of July 6, the Germans broke through another Soviet defense line.

Resilience of the Red Army

However, the failure of Task Force Kempf on the right flank meant that the II SS Panzer Corps would have to cover its right flank with its own regular units, which hampered the advance. On July 7, the actions of German tanks were greatly hampered by massive raids by the Soviet Air Force. Still, on July 8, it seemed that the 48th Tank Corps would be able to break through to Oboyan and attack the flanks of the Soviet defense. On that day, the Germans occupied Syrtsovo, despite persistent counterattacks by Soviet tank units. The T-34s were met by heavy fire from Tiger tanks of the elite Grossdeutschland tank division (104 tanks and 35 assault guns). Both sides suffered heavy losses.

During July 10, the 48th Tank Corps continued to attack Oboyan, but by this time the German command had decided only to simulate an attack in this direction. The 2nd SS Panzer Corps was ordered to attack Soviet tank units in the Prokhorovka area. Having won this battle, the Germans would have been able to break through the defenses and enter the Soviet rear into operational space. Prokhorovka was to become the site of a tank battle that would decide the fate of the entire Battle of Kursk.

Map of the defense of Cherkasy

Attack of the 48th Tank Corps on July 5, 1943 - view from the south

Events:

1. On the night of July 4-5, German sappers clear passages in Soviet minefields.
2. At 04:00, the Germans begin artillery preparation along the entire front of the 4th Tank Army.
3. New Panther tanks of the 10th Tank Brigade begin the offensive with the support of the fusilier regiment of the Grossdeutschland division. But almost immediately they stumble upon Soviet minefields. The infantry suffered heavy losses, the battle formations were mixed up, and the tanks stopped under concentrated hurricane fire from Soviet anti-tank and field artillery. Sappers came forward to remove the mines. Thus, the entire left flank of the 48th Tank Corps' offensive stood up. The Panthers were then deployed to support the main forces of the Grossdeutschland division.
4. The offensive of the main forces of the Grossdeutschland division began at 05:00. At the head of the strike group, a company of Tiger tanks from this division, supported by Pz.IV, Panther tanks and assault guns, broke through the Soviet defense line in front of the village of Cherkasskoe. In fierce battles, this area was occupied by battalions of the Grenadier Regiment; by 09:15 the Germans reached the village.
5. To the right of the Grossdeutschland division, the 11th Panzer Division breaks through the Soviet defense line.
6. Soviet troops offer stubborn resistance - the area in front of the village is filled with destroyed German tanks and anti-tank guns; A group of armored vehicles was withdrawn from the 11th Panzer Division to attack the eastern flank of the Soviet defense.
7. Lieutenant General Chistyakov, commander of the 6th Guards Army, reinforces the 67th Guards Rifle Division with two regiments of anti-tank guns to repel the German offensive. It did not help. By noon the Germans broke into the village. Soviet troops were forced to retreat.
8. Powerful defense and resistance of the Soviet troops stop the 11th Panzer Division in front of the bridge on the Psel River, which they planned to capture on the first day of the offensive.

Third stage. Battle of Prokhovka

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On July 12, German and Soviet tanks collided in a battle near Prokhorovka, which decided the fate of the entire Battle of Kursk. On July 11, the German offensive on the southern front of the Kursk Bulge reached its culmination. Three significant events occurred that day. First, in the west, the 48th Panzer Corps reached the Pena River and prepared for a further attack to the west. In this direction there remained defensive lines through which the Germans still had to break through. Soviet troops constantly launched counterattacks, limiting the Germans' freedom of action. Since the German troops now had to advance further east, to Prokhorovka, the advance of the 48th Tank Corps was suspended.

Also on July 11, the Army's Task Force Kempf, on the far right flank of the German advance, finally began to advance north. She broke through the Red Army's defenses between Melekhovo and Sazhnoye station. Three tank divisions of the Kempf group could advance to Prokhorovka. 300 units of German armored vehicles went to support an even larger group of 600 tanks and assault guns of the 2nd SS Panzer Corps, which was approaching this city from the west. The Soviet command was preparing to meet their rapid advance to the east with an organized counterattack. This German maneuver was dangerous for the entire defense system of the Soviet army, and forces were gathered in this area to prepare for the decisive battle with a powerful German armored group.

July 12th is the decisive day

Throughout the short summer night, Soviet and German tank crews prepared their vehicles for the battle that lay ahead the next day. Long before dawn, the roar of warming tank engines was heard in the night. Soon their bass roar filled the entire area.

The SS Tank Corps was opposed by the 5th Guards Tank Army (Steppe Front) of Lieutenant General Rotmistrov with attached and supporting units. From his command post southwest of Prokhorovka, Rotmistrov observed the positions of Soviet troops, which at that moment were bombed by German aircraft. Then three SS tank divisions went on the offensive: Totenkopf, Leibstandarte and Das Reich, with Tiger tanks in the vanguard. At 08:30, Soviet artillery opened fire on German troops. Following this, Soviet tanks entered the battle. Of the 900 tanks of the Red Army, only 500 vehicles were T-34s. They attacked German Tiger and Panther tanks at top speeds to prevent the enemy from exploiting the superior guns and armor of their tanks at long range. Having approached, Soviet tanks were able to hit German vehicles by firing at the weaker side armor.

A Soviet tankman recalled that first battle: “The sun helped us. It illuminated the contours of German tanks well and blinded the eyes of the enemy. The first echelon of attacking tanks of the 5th Guards Tank Army crashed into the battle formations of the Nazi troops at full speed. The through tank attack was so swift that the front ranks of our tanks penetrated the entire formation, the entire battle formation of the enemy. The battle formations were mixed up. The appearance of such large quantity Our tanks on the battlefield came as a complete surprise to the enemy. Control in its advanced units and subunits soon broke down. The Nazi Tiger tanks, deprived of the advantages of their weapons in close combat, were successfully shot at by our T-34 tanks from short distances, and especially when hit on the side. Essentially it was tank hand-to-hand combat. Russian tank crews went to ram. The tanks flared up like candles when hit by direct shots, scattered into pieces from the explosion of ammunition, and turrets fell off.”

Thick black oily smoke billowed over the entire battlefield. Soviet troops failed to break through the German battle formations, but the Germans were also unable to achieve success in the offensive. This situation continued throughout the first half of the day. The attack by the Leibstandarte and Das Reich divisions began successfully, but Rotmistrov brought in his last reserves and stopped them, albeit at the cost of significant losses. The Leibstandarte division, for example, reported that it had destroyed 192 Soviet tanks and 19 anti-tank guns, losing only 30 of its tanks. By evening, the 5th Guards Tank Army had lost up to 50 percent of its fighting vehicles, but the Germans also suffered damage to the tune of about 300 of the 600 tanks and assault guns that attacked in the morning.

Defeat of the German army

The Germans could have won this colossal tank battle if the 3rd Panzer Corps (300 tanks and 25 assault guns) had come to the rescue from the south, but they failed. The units of the Red Army opposing him skillfully and staunchly defended themselves, so that the Kempf army group did not manage to break through to Rotmistrov’s positions until the evening.

From July 13 to July 15, German units continued to conduct offensive operations, but by that time they had already lost the battle. On July 13, the Fuhrer informed the commanders of Army Group South (Field Marshal von Manstein) and Army Group Center (Field Marshal von Kluge) that he had decided to abandon the continuation of Operation Citadel.

Map of the tank battle near Prokhorovka

Hausser tank attack on the morning of July 12, 1943, as seen from the southeast.

Events:

1. Even before 08:30, Luftwaffe planes begin intensive bombing of Soviet positions near Prokhorovka. The 1st SS Panzer Division "Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler" and the 3rd SS Panzer Division "Totenkopf" advance in a tight wedge with Tiger tanks at the head and the lighter Pz.III and IV on the flanks.
2. At the same time, the first groups of Soviet tanks emerge from camouflaged shelters and rush towards the advancing enemy. Soviet tanks crash into the center of the German armored armada at high speed, thereby reducing the advantage of the Tigers' long-range guns.
3. The clash of armored “fists” turns into a fierce and chaotic battle, breaking up into many local actions and individual tank battles at very close range (the fire was almost point-blank). Soviet tanks seek to envelop the flanks of the heavier German vehicles, while the Tigers fire from the spot. All day and even into the approaching dusk, a fierce battle continues.
4. Shortly before noon, the Totenkopf division is attacked by two Soviet corps. The Germans are forced to go on the defensive. In a fierce battle that lasted all day on July 12, this division suffered heavy losses in men and military equipment.
5. All day long the 2nd SS Panzer Division "Das Reich" has been fighting very hard battles with the 2nd Guards Tank Corps. Soviet tanks steadfastly hold back the advance of the German division. By the end of the day, the battle continues even after dark. The Soviet command allegedly estimates the losses of both sides during the battle of Prokhorovka at 700 vehicles

Results of the Battle of Kursk

up

The result of the victory in the battle of Kursk was the transfer of strategic initiative to the Red Army. On the outcome Battle of Kursk influenced, among other things, by the fact that a thousand kilometers to the west the Allies landed in Sicily (Operation Husky). For the German command, this meant the need to withdraw troops from the Eastern Front. The results of the German general offensive near Kursk were disastrous. The courage and tenacity of the Soviet troops, as well as the selfless work in the construction of the most powerful field fortifications ever created, stopped the selected Wehrmacht tank divisions.

As soon as the German offensive stalled, the Red Army prepared its offensive. It started in the north. Having stopped Model's 9th Army, Soviet troops immediately went on the offensive on the Oryol salient, which jutted deep into the Soviet front. It began on July 12 and became the main reason for Model’s refusal on the northern front to continue the advance, which could affect the course of the battle of Prokhorovka. The model himself had to fight desperate defensive battles. The Soviet offensive on the Oryol salient (Operation Kutuzov) failed to divert significant Wehrmacht forces, but German troops suffered heavy losses. By mid-August, they retreated to a prepared defense line (the Hagen line). In the battles since July 5, Army Group Center lost up to 14 divisions, which could not be replenished.

On the southern front, the Red Army suffered serious losses, especially in the battle of Prokhorovka, but was able to pin down the German units wedged into the Kursk ledge. On July 23, the Germans were forced to retreat to the positions they had occupied before the start of Operation Citadel. Now the Red Army was ready to liberate Kharkov and Belgorod. On August 3, Operation Rumyantsev began, and by August 22, the Germans were driven out of Kharkov. By September 15, von Manstein's Army Group South had retreated to the western bank of the Dnieper.

Losses in the Battle of Kursk are assessed differently. This is due to a number of reasons. For example, defensive battles near Kursk from July 5 to 14 smoothly flowed into the phase of the Soviet counteroffensive. While Army Group South was still trying to continue its advance at Prokhorovka on 13 and 14 July, the Soviet offensive had already begun against Army Group Center in Operation Kutuzov, which is often seen as separate from the Battle of Kursk. German reports, hastily compiled during intense fighting and then rewritten after the fact, are extremely inaccurate and incomplete, while the advancing Red Army had no time to count its losses after the battle. The enormous importance that these data had from the point of view of propaganda of both sides was also reflected.

According to some studies, for example, Colonel David Glanz, from July 5 to July 20, the 9th Army of Army Group Center lost 20,720 people, and the formations of Army Group South - 29,102 people. Total – 49,822 people. The losses of the Red Army, according to rather controversial data, which are used Western analysts, for some reason turned out to be more than three times higher: 177,847 people. Of these, 33,897 people were lost by the Central Front and 73,892 people by the Voronezh Front. Another 70,058 people were lost to the Steppe Front, which acted as the main reserve.

The losses of armored vehicles are also difficult to estimate. Often damaged tanks were repaired or restored the same or the next day, even under enemy fire. Taking into account the empirical law that usually up to 20 percent of damaged tanks are completely written off, in the Battle of Kursk German tank formations lost 1b12 vehicles damaged, of which 323 units were irretrievable. The losses of Soviet tanks are estimated at 1,600 vehicles. This is explained by the fact that the Germans had more powerful tank guns.

During Operation Citadel, the Germans lost up to 150 aircraft, and up to 400 more were lost during the subsequent offensive. The Red Army Air Force lost over 1,100 aircraft.

The Battle of Kursk became the turning point of the war on the Eastern Front. The Wehrmacht was no longer able to conduct general offensives. Germany's defeat was only a matter of time. That is why, since July 1943, many strategically thinking German military leaders realized that the war was lost.

We continue the topic of the Kursk Bulge, but first I wanted to say a few words. Now I have moved on to the material about the losses of equipment in our and German units. Ours were significantly higher, especially in the Battle of Prokhorov. The reasons for the losses suffered by the 5th Guards Tank Army of Rotmistrov, was dealt with by a special commission created by Stalin's decision, chaired by Malenkov. In the commission's report, in August 1943, the military actions of Soviet troops on July 12 near Prokhorovka were called an example of an unsuccessful operation. And this is a fact that is not at all victorious. In this regard, I would like to provide you with several documents that will help you understand the reason for what happened. I especially want you to pay attention to Rotmistrov’s report to Zhukov dated August 20, 1943. Although it sins in places against the truth, it still deserves attention.

This is only a small part of what explains our losses in that battle...

"Why was the Battle of Prokhorovsk won by the Germans, despite the numerical superiority of Soviet forces? The answer is provided by combat documents, links to the full texts of which are given at the end of the article.

29th Tank Corps :

“The attack began without artillery bombardment of the occupied line by pr-kom and without air cover.

This made it possible for the pr-ku to open concentrated fire on the battle formations of the corps and bomb tanks and motorized infantry with impunity, which led to large losses and a decrease in the tempo of the attack, and this in turn made it possible for the pr-ku to conduct more effective artillery and tank fire from the spot . The terrain for the offensive was not favorable due to its ruggedness; the presence of hollows impassable for tanks to the northwest and southeast of the PROKHOROVKA-BELENIKHINO road forced the tanks to press against the road and open their flanks, without being able to cover them.

Individual units that took the lead, even approaching the storage facility. KOMSOMOLETS, having suffered heavy losses from artillery fire and tank fire from ambushes, retreated to the line occupied by the fire forces.

There was no air cover for the advancing tanks until 13.00. From 13.00 cover was provided by groups of fighters from 2 to 10 aircraft.

With the tanks coming out to the front line of the defense from the forest in the north. STORZHEVOYE and eastern. env. STORDOZHEVOYE pr. opened hurricane fire from ambushes of Tiger tanks, self-propelled guns and anti-tank guns. The infantry was cut off from the tanks and forced to lie down.

Having broken through into the depths of the defense, the tanks suffered heavy losses.

Units of the brigade, supported by a large number of aircraft and tanks, launched a counterattack and units of the brigade were forced to withdraw.

During the attack on the front line of the tank, self-propelled guns, operating in the first echelon of tank battle formations and even breaking out ahead of the tanks, suffered losses from the tank's anti-tank fire (eleven self-propelled guns were put out of action)."

18th Tank Corps :

“Enemy artillery fired intensely at the corps’ battle formations.
The corps, lacking adequate support from fighter aircraft and suffering heavy losses from artillery fire and intense air bombardment (by 12:00, enemy aircraft had carried out up to 1,500 sorties), slowly moved forward.

The terrain in the corps' zone of action is crossed by three deep ravines running from the left bank of the river. PSEL to railway BELENIKHINO - PROKHOROVKA, why the 181st, 170th tank brigades advancing in the first echelon were forced to operate on the left flank of the corps line near a strong enemy stronghold. OCTOBER. The 170th Tank Brigade, operating on the left flank, had lost up to 60% of its combat equipment by 12.00.

By the end of the day, the enemy launched a frontal attack of tanks from the area of ​​KOZLOVKA, GREZNOE with a simultaneous attempt to bypass the battle formations of the corps units from the direction of KOZLOVKA, POLEZHAEV, using their Tiger tanks and self-propelled guns, intensively bombarding the battle formations from the air.

Carrying out the assigned task, 18th Tank Corps encountered a well-organized, strong enemy anti-tank defense with pre-buried tanks and assault guns at the line of heights 217.9, 241.6.

In order to avoid unnecessary losses in personnel and equipment, by my order No. 68, parts of the corps went on the defensive at the achieved lines.""

"The car is on fire"

Battlefield on the Kursk Bulge. In the foreground on the right is a damaged Soviet T-34

T-34 shot down in the Belgorod area and a tanker killed

T-34 and T-70, shot down during the battle on the Kursk Bulge. 07.1943

Destroyed T-34s during the battle for the Oktyabrsky state farm

Burnt T-34 “For Soviet Ukraine” in the Belgorod area. Kursk Bulge. 1943

MZ "Li", 193rd separate tank regiment. Central Front, Kursk Bulge, July 1943.

MZ "Li" - "Alexander Nevsky", 193rd separate tank regiment. Kursk Bulge

Destroyed Soviet light tank T-60

Destroyed T-70 and BA-64 from the 29th Tank Corps

OWL SECRET
Instance No. 1
TO THE FIRST DEPUTY PEOPLE'S COMMISSIONER OF DEFENSE OF THE USSR UNION - MARSHAL OF THE SOVIET UNION
Comrade Zhukov

In tank battles and battles from July 12 to August 20, 1943, the 5th Guards Tank Army encountered exclusively new types of enemy tanks. Most of all on the battlefield there were T-V (Panther) tanks, a significant number of T-VI (Tiger) tanks, as well as modernized T-III and T-IV tanks.

Having commanded tank units from the first days of the Patriotic War, I am forced to report to you that our tanks today have lost their superiority over enemy tanks in armor and weapons.

The armament, armor and fire targeting of German tanks became much higher, and only the exceptional courage of our tankers and the greater saturation of tank units with artillery did not give the enemy the opportunity to fully exploit the advantages of their tanks. The presence of powerful weapons, strong armor and good sighting devices on German tanks puts our tanks at a clear disadvantage. The efficiency of using our tanks is greatly reduced and their breakdown increases.

The battles I conducted in the summer of 1943 convince me that even now we can successfully conduct a maneuverable tank battle on our own, taking advantage of the excellent maneuverability of our T-34 tank.

When the Germans go over to the defensive with their tank units, at least temporarily, they thereby deprive us of our maneuvering advantages and, on the contrary, begin to fully use the effective range of their tank guns, while at the same time being almost completely out of reach from our aimed tank fire .

Thus, in a collision with German tank units that had gone over to the defensive, we, as general rule, we suffer huge losses in tanks and have no success.

The Germans, having opposed our T-34 and KV tanks with their T-V (Panther) and T-VI (Tiger) tanks, no longer experience the former fear of tanks on the battlefields.

T-70 tanks simply cannot be allowed into tank battles, since they are more than easily destroyed by fire from German tanks.

We have to admit with bitterness that our tank technology, with the exception of the introduction into service of the SU-122 and SU-152 self-propelled guns, did not produce anything new during the war years, and the shortcomings that occurred on the tanks of the first production, such as: the imperfection of the transmission group (main clutch, gearbox and side clutches), extremely slow and uneven rotation of the turret, extremely poor visibility and cramped crew accommodation have not been completely eliminated to this day.

If our aviation during the years of the Patriotic War, according to its tactical and technical data, has been steadily moving forward, producing more and more advanced aircraft, then unfortunately the same cannot be said about our tanks.

Now the T-34 and KV tanks have lost the first place that they rightfully had among the tanks of the warring countries in the first days of the war.

Back in December 1941, I captured a secret instruction from the German command, which was written on the basis of field tests of our KV and T-34 tanks conducted by the Germans.

As a result of these tests, the instructions read approximately the following: German tanks cannot engage in tank combat with Russian KV and T-34 tanks and must avoid tank combat. When meeting Russian tanks, it was recommended to take cover with artillery and transfer the actions of tank units to another section of the front.

And, indeed, if we recall our tank battles in 1941 and 1942, then it can be argued that the Germans usually did not engage us in battle without the help of other branches of the military, and if they did, it was with a multiple superiority in the number of their tanks, which it was not difficult for them to achieve in 1941 and 1942.

On the basis of our T-34 tank - the best tank in the world at the beginning of the war, the Germans in 1943 managed to produce an even more improved T-V "Panther" tank, which is essentially a copy of our T-34 tank, in its own way qualities is significantly higher than the T-34 tank and especially in terms of the quality of weapons.

To characterize and compare our and German tanks, I provide the following table:

x) The barrel of a 75 mm gun is 1.5 times longer than the barrel of our 76 mm gun and the projectile has a significantly higher initial velocity.

I, as an ardent patriot of the tank forces, ask you, Comrade Marshal of the Soviet Union, to break the conservatism and arrogance of our tank designers and production workers and raise with all urgency the question of the mass production of new tanks by the winter of 1943, superior in their combat qualities and design design of currently existing types of German tanks.

In addition, I ask you to dramatically improve the equipment of tank units with evacuation means.

The enemy, as a rule, evacuates all his damaged tanks, and our tankers are often deprived of this opportunity, as a result of which we lose a lot in terms of tank recovery time. At the same time, in those cases when the tank battlefield remains with the enemy for some period, our repairmen find shapeless piles of metal instead of their damaged tanks, since this year the enemy, leaving the battlefield, blows up all our damaged tanks.

TROOPER COMMANDER
5TH GUARDS TANK ARMY
GUARDS LIEUTENANT GENERAL
TANK FORCES -
(ROMISTROV) Signature.

Active Army.
=========================
RCHDNI, f. 71, op. 25, building 9027с, l. 1-5

Something I would definitely like to add:

"One of the reasons for the staggering losses of the 5th Guards TA is also the fact that approximately a third of its tanks were light T-70. Frontal hull armor - 45 mm, turret armor - 35 mm. Armament - 45 mm 20K cannon, model 1938, armor penetration 45 mm at a distance of 100 m (one hundred meters!). Crew - two people. These tanks had nothing to catch at all on the field near Prokhorovka (although, of course, they could damage a German tank of the Pz-4 class and older, driving up point-blank and working in “woodpecker” mode... if you persuade the German tankers to look in the other direction; well, or an armored personnel carrier, if you’re lucky enough to find one, drive it into the field with a pitchfork). There is nothing to catch in the framework of an oncoming tank battle, of course - if they were lucky enough to break through the defenses, then they could quite successfully support their infantry, which is, in fact, what they were created for.

One should also not discount the general lack of training of the personnel of the 5th TA, which received reinforcements literally on the eve of the Kursk operation. Moreover, both ordinary tank crews and junior/middle-level commanders are untrained. Even in this suicidal attack, it was possible to achieve better results by observing proper formation - which, alas, was not observed - everyone rushed into the attack in a heap. Including self-propelled guns, which have no place at all in attacking formations.

Well, and most importantly - monstrous ineffective work of repair and evacuation teams. This was generally very bad until 1944, but in this case the 5th TA simply failed on a massive scale. I don’t know how many were on the BREM staff by that time (and whether they were even in its combat formations in those days - they might have forgotten in the rear), but they couldn’t cope with the job. Khrushchev (then a member of the Military Council of the Voronezh Front), in a report on July 24, 1943 to Stalin about the tank battle near Prokhorovka, writes: “when the enemy retreats, specially created teams evacuate their damaged tanks and other materiel, and everything that cannot be taken out, including ours tanks and our material part, burns and blows up. As a result of this, the damaged material part captured by us in most cases cannot be repaired, but can be used as scrap metal, which we will try to evacuate from the battlefield in the near future" (RGASPI, f. 83, op.1, d.27, l.2)

………………….

And a little more to add. Regarding the general situation with command and control of troops.

The point is also that German reconnaissance aircraft discovered in advance the approach to Prokhorovka of the 5th Guards TA and 5th Guards A formations, and it was possible to establish that on July 12, near Prokhorovka, Soviet troops would go on the offensive, so the Germans especially strengthened the anti-tank missile defense on the left flank of the division." Adolf Hitler" 2nd SS Panzer Corps. They, in turn, were going to, after repelling the advance of the Soviet troops, go on a counteroffensive and encircle the Soviet troops in the Prokhorovka area, so the Germans concentrated their tank units on the flanks of the 2nd SS Tank Tank, and not in the center. This led to the fact that on July 12, the 18th and 29th Tank Tank had to attack the most powerful German anti-tank tanks head-on, which is why they suffered such heavy losses. In addition, German tank crews repelled the attacks of Soviet tanks with fire from the spot.

In my opinion, the best that Rotmistrov could have done in such a situation was to try to insist on canceling the counterattack on July 12 near Prokhorovka, but no traces were found that he even tried to do this. Here the difference in approaches is especially clearly evident when comparing the actions of the two commanders of tank armies - Rotmistrov and Katukov (for those who are bad with geography, let me clarify - Katukov’s 1st Tank Army occupied positions west of Prokhorovka at the Belaya-Oboyan line).

The first disagreements between Katukov and Vatutin arose on July 6. The front commander gives the order to launch a counterattack with the 1st Tank Army together with the 2nd and 5th Guards Tank Corps in the direction of Tomarovka. Katukov sharply replies that, given the qualitative superiority of German tanks, this is disastrous for the army and will cause unjustified losses. The best way combat is maneuverable defense using tank ambushes, allowing you to shoot enemy tanks from short distances. Vatutin does not cancel the decision. Further events occur as follows (I quote from the memoirs of M.E. Katukov):

“Reluctantly, I gave the order to launch a counterattack. ... Already the first reports from the battlefield near Yakovlevo showed that we were doing not at all what was needed. As one would expect, the brigades suffered serious losses. With pain in my heart, I saw NP, how thirty-fours burn and smoke.

It was necessary to achieve the cancellation of the counterattack at all costs. I hurried to the command post, hoping to urgently contact General Vatutin and once again report to him my thoughts. But he had barely crossed the threshold of the hut when the communications chief reported in a particularly significant tone:

From Headquarters... Comrade Stalin. Not without excitement, I picked up the phone.

Hello, Katukov! - a well-known voice rang out. - Report the situation!

I told the Commander-in-Chief what I saw on the battlefield with my own eyes.

“In my opinion,” I said, “we were too hasty with the counterattack.” The enemy has large unspent reserves, including tank reserves.

What are you offering?

For now, it is advisable to use tanks to fire from a spot, burying them in the ground or placing them in ambushes. Then we could bring enemy vehicles to a distance of three to four hundred meters and destroy them with targeted fire.

Stalin was silent for some time.

“Okay,” he said, “you won’t launch a counterattack.” Vatutin will call you about this."

As a result, the counterattack was canceled, the tanks of all units ended up in the trenches, and July 6 became the darkest day for the 4th German Tank Army. During the day of fighting, 244 German tanks were knocked out (48 tanks lost 134 tanks and 2 SS tanks - 110). Our losses amounted to 56 tanks (mostly in their formations, so there were no problems with their evacuation - I again emphasize the difference between a knocked out tank and a destroyed one). Thus, Katukov’s tactics fully justified themselves.

However, the command of the Voronezh Front did not draw any conclusions and on July 8 issued a new order to carry out a counterattack, only 1 TA (due to the stubbornness of its commander) was tasked not to attack, but to hold positions. The counterattack is carried out by 2 Tank Corps, 2 Guards Tank Corps, 5 Tank Corps and separate tank brigades and regiments. The result of the battle: the loss of three Soviet corps - 215 tanks irretrievably, the loss of German troops - 125 tanks, of which 17 were irretrievable. Now, on the contrary, the day of July 8 becomes the darkest day for the Soviet tank forces, in terms of its losses it is comparable to the losses in the Battle of Prokhorov.

Of course, there is no particular hope that Rotmistrov would be able to push through his decision, but it was at least worth a try!

It should be noted that limiting the battles near Prokhorovka only on July 12 and only to the attack of the 5th Guards TA is unlawful. After July 12, the main efforts of the 2nd SS Tank Tank and 3rd Tank Tank were aimed at encircling the divisions of the 69th Army, southwest of Prokhorovka, and although the command of the Voronezh Front managed to withdraw the personnel of the 69th Army from the resulting pocket in time, however, most of the weapons and they had to give up technology. That is to the German command managed to achieve a very significant tactical success, weakening the 5 Guards A and 5 Guards TA and for some time depriving the 69 A of combat effectiveness. After July 12, there were actually attempts on the German side to encircle and inflict maximum damage on the Soviet troops (in order to calmly begin to withdraw their forces to former front line). After which the Germans, under the cover of strong rearguards, quite calmly withdrew their troops to the lines they occupied until July 5, evacuating the damaged equipment and subsequently restoring it.

At the same time, the decision of the command of the Voronezh Front from July 16 to switch to a stubborn defense on the occupied lines becomes completely incomprehensible, when the Germans not only did not intend to attack, but, on the contrary, were gradually withdrawing their forces (in particular, the “Totenkopf” division actually began withdrawing on July 13 ). And when it was established that the Germans were not advancing, but were retreating, it was already too late. That is, it was already too late to quickly catch the Germans’ tail and peck them in the back of the head.

It seems that the command of the Voronezh Front had little idea of ​​what was happening at the front in the period from July 5 to 18, which manifested itself in a too slow reaction to the rapidly changing situation at the front. The texts of orders for advancement, attack or redeployment are replete with inaccuracies and uncertainties; they lack information about the opposing enemy, its composition and intentions, and there is no at least approximate information about the outline of the front line. A significant part of the orders in the Soviet troops during the Battle of Kursk was given “over the heads” of subordinate commanders, and the latter were not informed about this, wondering why and why the units subordinate to them were carrying out some incomprehensible actions.

So it is not surprising that the chaos in the units was sometimes indescribable:

So on July 8, the Soviet 99th Tank Brigade of the 2nd Tank Corps attacked the Soviet 285th Infantry Regiment of the 183rd Infantry Division. Despite the attempts of the commanders of the units of the 285th regiment to stop the tankers, they continued to crush the soldiers and fire guns at the 1st battalion of the said regiment (result: 25 people were killed and 37 wounded).

On July 12, the Soviet 53rd Guards Separate Tank Regiment of the 5th Guards TA (sent as part of the combined detachment of Major General K.G. Trufanov to help the 69th Army) without accurate information about the location of its own and the Germans and without sending forward reconnaissance (into battle without reconnaissance - this is close and understandable to us), the tankers of the regiment immediately opened fire on the battle formations of the Soviet 92nd Infantry Division and the tanks of the Soviet 96th Tank Brigade of the 69th Army, defending against the Germans in the area of ​​​​the village of Aleksandrovka (24 km southeast of Prokhorovka station). Having fought through their own, the regiment came across advancing German tanks, after which it turned around and, crushing and dragging along separate groups of its own infantry, began to retreat. The anti-tank artillery, which was following the same regiment (53 Guards Tank Regiment) to the front line and had just arrived at the scene of events, mistaking the tanks of the 96 Tank Brigade for German tanks pursuing the 53 Guards Separate Tank Regiment, turned around and did not open fire on its infantry and tanks only thanks to serendipity.

Well, and so on... In the order of the commander of the 69th Army, all this was described as “these outrages.” Well, that's putting it mildly.

So we can summarize that the Germans won the Battle of Prokhorovka, but this victory was a special case against a generally negative background for Germany. The German positions at Prokhorovka were good if a further offensive was planned (which Manstein insisted on), but not for defense. But it was impossible to advance further for reasons not directly related to what was happening near Prokhorovka. Far from Prokhorovka, on July 11, 1943, reconnaissance in force began from the Soviet Western and Bryansk fronts (accepted by the German command ground forces OKH for the offensive), and on July 12 these fronts actually went on the offensive. On July 13, the German command became aware of the impending offensive of the Soviet Southern Front in the Donbass, that is, practically on the southern flank of Army Group South (this offensive followed on July 17). In addition, the situation in Sicily became more complicated for the Germans, where the Americans and British landed on July 10. Tanks were also needed there.

On July 13, a meeting was held with the Fuhrer, to which Field Marshal General Erich von Manstein was also summoned. Adolf Hitler ordered the end of Operation Citadel in connection with the activation of Soviet troops in various sectors of the Eastern Front and the sending of part of the forces from it to form new German formations in Italy and the Balkans. The order was accepted for execution despite the objections of Manstein, who believed that Soviet troops on the southern front of the Kursk Bulge were on the verge of defeat. Manstein was not directly ordered to withdraw his troops, but was forbidden to use his only reserve, the 24th Tank Corps. Without the deployment of this corps, a further offensive would lose perspective, and therefore there was no point in holding the captured positions. (soon 24 Tank Corps was already repelling the advance of the Soviet Southwestern Front in the middle reaches of the Seversky Donets River). The 2nd SS Tank Tank was intended for transfer to Italy, but it was temporarily returned for joint operations with the 3rd Tank Tank with the aim of eliminating the breakthrough of the troops of the Soviet Southern Front on the Mius River, 60 km north of the city of Taganrog, in the defense zone of the German 6th Army.

The merit of the Soviet troops is that they slowed down the pace of the German offensive on Kursk, which, combined with the general military-political situation and a combination of circumstances that were not in favor of Germany everywhere in July 1943, made Operation Citadel unfeasible, but to speak purely military victory of the Soviet Army in the Battle of Kursk is wishful thinking. "

On July 5, 1943, the Battle of Kursk, also known as Battle of Kursk. This is one of the key battles of the Second World War and the Great Patriotic War, which finally consolidated the radical turning point during the Great Patriotic War, which began at Stalingrad. The offensive was launched by both sides: both the Soviet and the German. The Wehrmacht's summer strategic offensive on the northern and southern fronts of the Kursk bridgehead was called Operation Citadel.

According to Soviet and Russian historiography, the battle lasted 49 days, it included: Kursk strategic defensive operation (July 5 - 23), Oryol (July 12 - August 18) and Belgorod-Kharkov (August 3 - 23) strategic offensive operations.

What about the Oryol-Kursk arc? Is that also more correct?

In various sources you can find references to the events of July 5 - August 23, 1943 as the “Battle of Oryol-Kursk” and the “Oryol-Kursk Bulge”. For example, in his report at a ceremonial meeting in the Kremlin Palace of Congresses dedicated to the 20th anniversary of the victory of the Soviet people in the Great Patriotic War on May 8, 1965, L. I. Brezhnev says:

"Giant Battle" on the Oryol-Kursk Bulge in the summer of 1943 I broke my back...".

How often did this spelling occur? We'll find out a little later.

The arc was located between the Oryol and Kursk regions, which means it should be called that - Oryol-Kursk

An arc is a section of a curve between two of its points. The southern point of the bulge that formed at the front by July 5, 1943 is Belgorod, now the Belgorod region, the northern point is the Maloarkhangelsk station, now the Oryol region. Based on the names of the extreme points, we will give the name: Belgorod-Oryol arc. So?

• On June 13, 1934, Belgorod was included in the newly formed Kursk region.
• On June 13, 1934, after the liquidation of the Central Black Earth Region, Maloarkhangelsk District became part of the newly formed Kursk Region.

For a contemporary of the Battle of Kursk, it would be completely natural to call the arc the Kursk-Kursk Bulge. That is... just the Kursk Bulge. That's what they called her.

Where did they call her that?

See the titles of some materials from different years:

• Markin I. I. On the Kursk Bulge. - M.: Voenizdat, 1961. - 124 p.
• Antipenko, N. A. On the main direction (Memoirs of the deputy front commander). - M.: Nauka, 1967. Chapter “ On the Kursk Bulge»
• O. A. Losik - Head of the Military Academy of Armored Forces, professor, colonel general. From a speech on July 20, 1973 at the Institute of Military History of the USSR Ministry of Defense at a scientific session dedicated to the 30th anniversary of the defeat of the Nazi troops on the Kursk Bulge
• Even Brezhnev, in his speech at the ceremonial meeting dedicated to the presentation of the Order of Lenin to Georgia, at the Sports Palace in Tbilisi on November 1, 1966, noted, as if he had not said anything about Orel in 1965:
  

  ... stood to the death at the walls of the legendary Stalingrad and on Kursk Bulge…

• Etc.

There will be some interesting statistics below.

In 1944, the Maloarkhangelsk region returned to the Oryol region, and Belgorod became the administrative center of the newly formed Belgorod region only in 1954. The Belgorod arc never became, and the Oryol part was sometimes added - without any visible system.

The arc is fine. Well, is it really the Oryol-Kursk battle? Okay, Kursko-Orlovskaya?

J.V. Stalin, who read a report on November 6, 1943 at the ceremonial meeting of the Moscow Council of Working People's Deputies with party and public organizations city ​​of Moscow, says:

From a purely military point of view, the defeat of German troops on our front by the end of this year was predetermined by two the most important events: the battle of Stalingrad and battle of Kursk.

Textbooks from different years also keep up:

History of the USSR. Part 3. 10th grade. (A. M. Penkratova. 1952), p. 378.

The Germans hoped to strike from two sides - from the Oryol bridgehead in the north and from the Belgorod region in the south - to encircle and destroy the Soviet troops concentrated in the bend Kursk Bulge, and then launch an attack on Moscow.

§10. Battle of Kursk. Completion of a radical turning point in the war

Methodological manual on modern history. Bogolyubov, Izrailovich, Popov, Rakhmanova. - 1978, p. 165. 2nd question for the lesson:

What was the historical significance of the largest battles of the Second World War - Moscow, Stalingrad, Kursky?

No matter what, everything they have is Kursk.

Maybe the Battle of Oryol never happened?

According to Soviet and Russian historiography, there was an Oryol strategic offensive operation as part of the Battle of Kursk.

It’s still correct - Battle of Oryol-Kursk

If you compare the frequency of mentions on the Internet, the difference is striking:

• “Oryol-Kursk battle”- 2 thousand results;
• “Battle of Kursk” - Oryol- 461 thousand results;

• “Oryol-Kursk arc”- 6 thousand results;
• “Kursk Bulge” - Orlovsko- 379 thousand results;

• “Oryol arc”- 946 results. Indeed, why not.

So not all documents are uploaded to the Internet

There are no “underloaded” documents in quantities that can compensate for a two-hundred-fold difference.

So, the Battle of Kursk and the Kursk Bulge?

Yes, the Battle of Kursk and the Kursk Bulge. But if for some reason you want to name events, adding the Oryol component, no one minds. Formally, a small piece of the Oryol region was part of the ledge even in 1943.