2.3 PREPARATION OF THE MILITARY LOGO

For the successful conduct of hostilities, along with the training of troops, measures are being taken to prepare their rear.

Logistics preparation is an integral part of the organization of logistics in units. It is carried out simultaneously with the preparation of troops for combat operations and is organized by the deputy commander of the unit for logistics through the heads of services and commanders of logistics units. in advance. Let us consider in more detail the types of preparation of the rear.

Advance preparation of the rear. It is carried out both in peacetime and in wartime and includes:

Rear development

Making a decision on the organization of logistics and rear services of technical support for units with the outbreak of hostilities and its planning

Accumulation and permanent maintenance of established stocks of material resources

Comprehensive training and maintenance of rear units in high combat and mobilization readiness

Educational work in the rear

Implementation of measures to organize the provision of units with the outbreak of hostilities

Rear management organization

The development of the military rear is carried out on the basis of the general principles of the development of the rear of the Armed Forces and includes the determination of the optimal composition of the rear units (subunits) for peacetime and wartime.

me, measures to improve their organizational structure, technical equipment, the procedure for recruiting personnel and equipment, comprehensive combat and special training of units and subunits of the rear, as well as the development of the principles of logistics and rear services for the technical support of units (units). The development of the rear continues in during the course of hostilities, where the provisions of charters and instructions are tested in practice, and this development is more dynamic than in peacetime. This is evidenced by the experience of the Great Patriotic War, during which many views on the organization of logistic support in the military unit have undergone fundamental changes, and the organizational structure of the military rear was repeatedly specified.

MATERIAL SUPPLY OF MOTOR FIRE

(TANK) REGIMENT

Material support in the regiment is organized and carried out in order to timely and fully meet the needs of personnel in material resources:

All types of weapons;

Combat and other equipment;

Rockets;

Ammunition;

rocket fuel;

fuel;

food;

clothing;

Medical;

Engineering;

Chemical;

Apartment and other property, materials and special liquids for various purposes, as well as in water.

One of the main tasks of material support is the supply of weapons, equipment, ammunition, rocket fuel, fuel and other materiel, which play an important role in ensuring the combat readiness of troops. Therefore, as a type of logistic support, material support is the main one. The need for material resources for combat operations is determined taking into account:

1. - their established consumption and

2. - the necessary stocks by the end of hostilities.

The material expenditure rates for each regiment (battalion) are established by the superior commander, taking into account the combat missions to be solved and the allocated combat resources.

Estimated expenditure of material resources for the battle may change significantly. It depends on a number of factors, the main ones being:

Type and intensity of hostilities;

The depth of the combat mission;

The scale of the use of nuclear and other types of weapons of mass destruction;

The role and place of the regiment in battle;

Combat and strength of the regiment;

The combat qualities and nature of the actions of the enemy troops;

terrain conditions;

The nature of the weather, etc.

So, for example, the largest number of missiles and ammunition, both in the offensive and in defense, is spent by regiments operating in the first echelon and in the main direction, usually on the first day of the battle, when necessary:

On the offensive - to break through the enemy's defenses;

In defense - to repel the offensive of superior enemy forces, inflict significant losses on him and firmly hold important areas of the terrain.

Based on the experience of exercises and calculated data, the consumption of MS (T) D ammunition when attacking a defending enemy using nuclear weapons, and when repelling his attacks in defense in a day of intense combat, can reach 1500-200 tons or more, and when conducting an offensive using only conventional weapons - up to 2500 tons.

Ammunition consumption of MS(T)P can be up to 250-300 tons, and in MS(T)P 60-70 T

To provide the personnel of the division with food, about 20 tons of food is consumed daily.

In addition to ammunition, fuel and food, the regiment consumes a significant amount of other material resources, in particular engineering, chemical, armored, automobile, clothing and communications equipment. The total need for these material resources of MS (T) D for a day of intense combat can reach 10% in the offensive and up to 20% in defense.

In general, the consumption of material resources in a modern MS (T) D for one day of intense combat can be 2100-2800 tons or more, and in MS (T) P 300-400 tons.

Determining the need (of units, subunits) for materiel, taking into account stocks by the end of each day of combat, is caused by the need to complete tasks at night or on the next day of hostilities.

The norm of stocks of materiel that must be in the unit (subunit) by the end of the day of the battle, depending on the specific situation, may not coincide with the norms of stocks established by the beginning of the battle. The material support of the regiment in wartime is organized and carried out, as a rule, according to the scheme: CENTER - FRONT - ARMY - CONNECTION - PART - UNIT - MILITARY. It is carried out according to the plans of higher commanders on the basis of reports on the rear (reports) and requests from units (subunits) for delivery, based on their actual need for materiel and resources allocated for combat operations.

Direct responsibility for the material support of the troops rests with commanders of all levels.

MILITARY STOCKS

For the uninterrupted supply of materiel, units and subunits must constantly have military supplies in the prescribed sizes. They are kept and transported in the material support units of regiments, battalions and divisions, as well as in combat and other vehicles, with mortars and machine guns, in repair and medical units and with personnel.

The size of military reserves by types of materiel and their echeloning is determined by the relevant orders of the Minister of Defense.

They are established taking into account ensuring the autonomy of the actions of divisions (regiments), as well as depending on the possibility and conditions of delivery. With an average intensity of military operations MS (T) D, military supplies, as a rule, should provide 4-6 daily needs (for food - up to 13).

Military stocks of materiel are divided into:

Expenditure part;

Inviolable (for fuel - not reduced) reserve.

The untouchable (irreducible) reserve is spent with the permission of the regiment commander, and in cases of urgency, with the permission of the battalion (division) commander, followed by a report to the senior commander.

The size of the untouchable (irreducible) stock for individual material assets is:

for ammunition - part of them, located with soldiers, sergeants, warrant officers, officers with machine guns, mortars, guns and combat vehicles;

for food - 1 (3) daily dacha, located with the personnel of the units (in combat vehicles).

The troop stocks of materiel used up and destroyed by the enemy during the preparation and entry into hostilities must be immediately replenished.

STANDARDS AND SEPARATION OF TROOP MATERIAL STOCKS

IN THE MOTOR RIFLE (TANK) REGIMENT.

In tanks and BMP-3 s / d "NZ" food for each member

crew, in WMO tb-6 s / d,

In ap and zrp - 0.3 each.

Depending on the situation and the combat mission being performed in a formation (unit, subunit), by the decision of a higher commander (commander), additional stocks of materiel can be created.

For fuel, for example, they are created in containers on combat and transport vehicles, and, if necessary, in tanks (containers), in vehicles of a formation (unit, subdivision).

Additional stocks of ammunition are created by compacted loading of tractors and transport units. In addition, for artillery and mortars participating in artillery preparation, additional stocks of ammunition are laid out at firing positions in

sizes planned for consumption before the change of firing positions by artillery units.

Additional stocks can be created for other types of material assets.

The amount of additional reserves depends on the tasks performed by the formation (unit, subunit), the nature of the expected actions of the enemy, the capabilities of vehicles, as well as on the conditions and location of these reserves.

The troop stocks of materiel of a formation (unit, subunits) spent during the preparation and entry into battle are replenished by

on the basis of reports on the rear, as well as reports and applications submitted by the heads of the relevant services of the formation (unit).

Unit commanders report on the consumption and availability of material resources, as well as on the need for them, upon command.

MEDICAL SUPPORT OF THE MOTOR RIFLE (TANK) REGIMENT.

In the general system of medical support for troops, the medical service of formations and units occupies an important place, since it, performing tasks directly in units and subunits, is the first to take part in providing medical care to the wounded and sick, their evacuation and performing other medical support tasks.

Medical support in the units is organized and carried out in order to maintain the combat capability and improve the health of the personnel, timely provision of medical care to the wounded and sick and their speedy return to duty.

The medical service of the regiment is headed by the head of the medical service, subordinate to the commander of the regiment.

The medical center of the regiment is subordinate to the head of the medical service. To provide medical care to the wounded and sick, the medical center of a motorized rifle (tank) regiment deploys:

Sorting and evacuation department;

dressing room;

Insulator;

In addition, a shelter for personnel, kitchens, power plants, parking of vehicles, collection of weapons (taken from the wounded and sick) are being equipped.

For the deployment of the medical center of the regiment, a site with a size of at least 100x100 meters is selected. It must be ready to receive the wounded and sick immediately upon arrival at the deployment site. Readiness of units of the first stage - 15 min. after arrival (auto-dressing and sanitary-evacuation departments are deployed), full readiness - 30 min. in summer and 40-50 min. in winter.

Medical support in the battalion (division) is organized and carried out by the paramedic of the battalion (division).

The battalion's medical station is equipped with:

Field paramedic kit KPF;

Bags medical military SMV;

Oxygen inhaler;

Helmets for wounded in the head ShR;

Dressings and splints;

Sanitary straps;

Sanitary stretcher;

Sleeve insignia of the Red Cross.

Medical support in the company is carried out by a sanitary instructor. He monitors the implementation of hygiene rules, sanitary-hygienic and anti-epidemic measures by the personnel of the company, provides the company with individual first aid equipment and teaches them how to use them.

In battle, the medical instructor of the company provides first aid to the wounded, organizes the provision of it to the wounded in the order of self-help and mutual assistance, and together with the personnel of the units, collects and evacuates the wounded of the regiment and division, searches for and collects the wounded on

battlefield.

On the equipment of the sanitary instructor there are: SMV, the contents of which are intended for providing first aid to the wounded and sick.

In addition, the health instructor has a wearable shoulder strap and a Red Cross sleeve badge.

All losses in personnel suffered by the regiment during the fighting are called total losses. They are divided into:

Irrevocable;

Sanitary.

IRREVOCABLE LOSSES ARE losses killed, missing and taken prisoner.

Under sanitary losses it is customary to understand persons who, for health reasons, have lost their combat capability or ability to work for at least one day and have entered medical units, units and institutions. The value of sanitary losses is one of the factors that significantly affect the organization of honey. provision in part, and the magnitude of sanitary losses will be influenced by:

The tasks of the regiment;

The nature of the fighting;

The ratio of means and forces of the belligerents;

Properties of the types of weapons used and the extent of their use;

The morale of the personnel;

The nature of the area, etc.

For example, when conducting combat operations with the use of conventional weapons, sanitary losses in a regiment can be:

On the offensive 12-18%;

On the defensive 10-15%

of the total number of personnel.

Under the conditions of the use of weapons of mass destruction, sanitary losses can increase significantly.

Medical assistance to the wounded and sick (except for the first and pre-medical) and their treatment is carried out in medical units, units and medical institutions deployed along the evacuation routes and echeloned in depth in a certain sequence.

These include:

Medical posts of regiments and brigades;

Medical companies of brigades and separate medical battalions of the division;

Separate medical units (army, navy);

Hospital bases of the front;

Hospital bases of the Center.

Each stage of medical evacuation carries out certain therapeutic and preventive measures that are characteristic of it and that together make up the volume of medical care.

In the process of carrying out medical and evacuation measures, it is planned to provide personnel with the following types of medical care:

First aid;

To the medical paramedic;

First medical;

Qualified medical;

Special Medical.

The timely provision of medical assistance to the wounded and sick is the main condition for saving lives, restoring health and promptly returning the maximum number of them to service.

The PLA interacts with the Ministry of State Security, the Ministry of Public Security, customs and financial services. Ministry of State Security of the People's Republic of China. Recently, another direction has also been developed - the creation, on the basis of existing formations, of mobile forces of the PLA, intended for operations in local conflicts along the perimeter ...

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...) with a width of 5-8 km (up to 5 km) and a depth of up to 12 km (3 km). The width of the offensive front of a tank battalion tactical group (for TB - 3 km or more), the width of the defense area and its depth (3-5 km) are similar to the above-mentioned standards for a motorized infantry battalion. gr. The principle and procedure for the use of units in combat Features of the combat use of battalion tactical groups With the adoption of the concept of "air-ground ...

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1st educational question: Tasks and content of the logistic support of the troops.

Modern combined-arms combat is characterized by high decisiveness, maneuverability, tension and transience, rapid and abrupt changes in the situation, combat operations on the ground and in the air, on a wide front, to great depths and at high rates. Combat may be conducted with the use of nuclear weapons and other means of mass destruction, or only conventional weapons.

The successful conduct of modern combat depends on many factors, the most important of which is the state and capabilities of the rear, which is the link between the country's economy and the troops. It organizes joint coordinated actions of various bodies and services on the main types of logistics support for all branches of the Armed Forces, military branches and special forces.

Rear- these are rear formations, units, subunits and institutions with stocks of materiel, intended for comprehensive rear support of troops.

The first elements of the Logistics of the Armed Forces of Russia were permanent military convoys that appeared in the 70s of the 17th century. With the creation of a regular army, the growth in the scale of hostilities and the change in the methods of their conduct in the 18-19th centuries, regular units, units and institutions began to be created as part of units, formations, associations and at the disposal of the central bodies of military departments, designed for centralized logistic support of troops .

The further development of military affairs, especially the use of tanks and aircraft in the troops of the 20th century, the motorization and mechanization of troops, required the creation of forces and means of technical, road, airfield support, the supply of fuel and other property.

The rear of the Soviet Armed Forces was created in the course of the construction of the Red Army. The first detachments did not have full-time rear units. In 1918, the Central Supply Directorate of the Workers 'and Peasants' Red Army was established; in associations and formations, the posts of chiefs of supply were established, to whom the rear units, institutions and services were subordinate.

A well-organized and technically equipped Logistics Service of the Armed Forces was formed during the Great Patriotic War, which successfully completed a large number of tasks for the rear support of the troops. During the war years, the Logistics of the Armed Forces received from industry and ensured the storage and delivery of over 10 million tons of ammunition, 16 million tons of fuel, a large amount of food and other materiel to the troops. 145 million tons of various cargoes were transported by road, rail transportation exceeded 19 million wagons. The road troops built and restored about 100 thousand km of roads, the railway troops - about 120 thousand km of railway lines. More than 6,000 airfields have been equipped for aviation needs. The military medical service and medical institutions of the country returned to service after curing more than 80% of the wounded and sick.

In the post-war years, with the development of the country's economy, changes in the organizational structure, technical equipment of the Armed Forces, the Logistics of the Armed Forces has been and is being improved.

Currently, it is customary to distinguish between:

1. by the scale and nature of the tasks performed:

Strategic rear;

operational rear;

Military rear.

2. by accessories:

rear center;

Front rear, district;

Naval, army, corps rear;

Divisional, brigade rear;

Regimental rear;

Battalion (rear divisions).

The strategic rear is the highest link in the rear of the Armed Forces. It includes the rear of the center, state reserves, special formations, institutions and enterprises intended to be transferred from the economy of the country to the direct disposal of the central command and control bodies of the Armed Forces on the eve or with the outbreak of war for the logistics of troops (forces).

The operational rear is a link between the strategic and military rear, and in some cases has direct ties with enterprises and organizations of the economy.

The military rear is the final link in the rear of the Armed Forces. It provides direct rear and rear services technical support for formations, units and subunits.

On August 1, the rear of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation celebrates its holiday. As you know, there is no army without a rear, although much of what the rear services do for combat units remains “behind the scenes”. Suffice it to say that the rear guards often take as many risks as those on the front lines. Especially in modern local wars, where any delivery of food, uniforms, fuel across the territory of militant operations is a colossal risk.

Supply of troops in pre-Petrine Russia

Logistic support of the troops goes back to the early periods of the formation of a centralized Russian statehood. As you know, until the reforms of Peter the Great, the core of the armed forces of the Russian state was the cavalry local army. It consisted of landowners - nobles and boyar children, who, in the event of hostilities, carried out military service along with their military servants - "combat serfs". The state did not provide the local army with food, equipment, or weapons, so the landlords were forced to solve the issues of providing their troops on their own. Each warrior, however, was required to have a supply of provisions for a period of at least four months. Most often, they stocked up with breadcrumbs, flour, dried and salted meat and fish. Of course, if they had some money, the soldiers could buy food at the place of stay, and hunting always remained a way to get food. The state could also sell bread to the soldiers, but at this stage of national history it did not supply them with food for free. As for the monetary allowance, it was received by boyar children and nobles who served in the regimental service and were divided into three categories. The first category - the regiment of main salaries - received from 80 to 100 rubles of annual salary. The second category - the regiment of the second salary - received from 50 to 60 rubles a year's salary. Finally, the third category, or boyar children, received about 20-30 rubles per year. Half of the salary was given to service people in Moscow, and the other half - during military campaigns. Smaller salaries were received in city regiments stationed in cities - from 4 to 14 rubles.

However, when the first professional military men appeared in the Russian army - “service people according to the instrument”, the state was forced to take upon itself the provision of them not only with land allotments, but also with the necessary allowances. In order to ensure the maintenance of the growing army, the state introduced additional taxes. “Archery money” was used to pay salaries to the archers, “pit money” was used to produce ammunition, and “polonian money” was used to ransom prisoners from the enemy. According to the instrument, the service people included pishchalniks, archers, regimental and city Cossacks, gunners, who in wartime were distributed among the regiments of the local troops. The service people of the Pushkar rank included gunners, gunners (who fired from squeakers), craftsmen who were engaged in the repair of weapons, and serfs. In 1638, 248 gunners and gunners were serving in Moscow, controlled by the Cannon Order. The gunners received a salary from the state for their service. After the creation of the "regiments of the new system", which were formed according to the European model and were completed with subordinate people, the system of issuing salaries to the lower ranks and officers of the Reiter and Dragoon regiments was also streamlined. For military service they took one soldier from every hundred households, then - from every 20-25 households. The service was for life, and the soldiers received monthly and annual salaries - both in money and in bread. Also, land plots could be issued for service. could both be bought at their own expense, and issued by the state. At the same time, food supply was carried out, again, independently. When in 1550 the archery army was just beginning to form, the archers were given a salary of 4 rubles a year - that is, identical to the salary of the least paid service people "in the fatherland" of the local army. Moreover, the archers received a four-ruble salary in Moscow, and the city archers had a salary half as much - only two rubles a year. Gunners received even lower salaries. So, Moscow gunners and zatinshchiks received 2 rubles and a hryvnia a year, and city gunners - generally one ruble. In addition, gunners were also provided with octopus flour, half a pood of salt per month and cloth for two rubles a year. City archers were given two pounds of salt, 12 "boxes" of rye and 12 "boxes" of oats per year. That is, as we can see, the supply of regular troops was at a low level. After the economic turmoil that followed the events of the Time of Troubles, even the boyars and nobles could not equip their troops for service in the local army without state support. In the first half of the XVII century. the boyars received from 300 to 700 rubles a year, the stewards - from 90 to 200 rubles a year, the Moscow nobles - from 10 to 210 rubles a year. At the same time, in wartime, the state sought to increase payments to service people.

Insufficient, in the opinion of the archers and other service people "according to the instrument", the size of the salary has repeatedly become the cause of discontent and ferment among the archers. In the middle of the 17th century, archers who served in the Kola prison received 3.5 rubles of salary, tenants - 3.75 rubles a year, Pentecostals - 4 rubles a year, centurions - 12 rubles a year, and a streltsy head - 25 rubles a year . In addition, the archers were entitled to food security in the amount of two quarters of rye, four quarters of oats and one quarter of barley annually. The monetary salary of the gunners was increased and equated to that of the archers, which was also aimed at curbing the possible dissatisfaction of representatives of such an important military profession as artillery servants. The size of the salary could also depend on the specific place of service - for example, in some prisons they amounted to archers, Cossacks and gunners for 5 rubles a year. Mounted Cossacks serving in prisons could receive 8 rubles a year, being the highest paid category of service people according to the device. When speaking on a campaign, the Cossacks and archers were given additional money.

In the regiments of the new system - dragoon, reiter and soldier - the salary at the first time of their existence was very large by the standards of other units of the Russian army. It is obvious that the state greatly valued the regiments of the new system and the soldiers, reiters and dragoons who served in them. The highest salaries were received by the command of the regiments of the new system, among which foreign military specialists, primarily the Germans and the Dutch, prevailed. So, only a monthly feed salary generals received 90-100 rubles, colonels - 25-50 rubles, lieutenant colonels - 15-18 rubles, majors - 14-16 rubles, captains - 13 rubles, captains - 9-11 rubles, lieutenants - 5- 8 rubles, ensigns - 4-7 rubles. Ordinary soldiers of the regiments of the new system received, of course, a much lower salary, but its size was 2 - 2.5 times higher than the salary of ordinary archers and gunners. To organize the food supply of the regiments of the new system, the collection of "service grain stocks" was organized, which was carried out in all cities and villages. From all the settlements of the country, rye, flour, crackers, cereals were sent to the places of deployment of the regiments, while meat, salt and wine were delivered from Moscow.

Reforms of Peter. Provisional and commissar services

However, until the modernization of the Russian army under Peter I, the organization of logistic support and supply of troops was not streamlined and worked out. Peter I, who took the European model of the army as a basis, decided to reorganize the supply of the armed forces. On February 18, 1700, the Provisional Order was created to manage the supply of the regular army. Under the order were "shops", as food warehouses were then called - in Moscow, St. Petersburg, Kyiv, Chernigov, Bryansk, Smolensk and a number of other cities. The order was structured and consisted of local branches, which were led by food masters. At the head of the order was put okolnichiy Yazykov, who was given the rank of General Provision Master. On the same day, February 18, Peter I established a Special Order, which was responsible for managing the financial allocations received for the needs of the army, as well as supplying the army with uniforms and horses. Thus, both orders were responsible for logistical support and were the prototype of future food, clothing, and financial services. In the field administration of the army, a commissariat was created, which was responsible for all types of supplies. The food supply in the divisions and regiments was led by the Chief Provision Masters and Provision Masters, and the Chief Commissars and Commissars were in charge of finances and uniforms. In addition, a medical service was deployed in the units. In the Military Charter of 1716, the responsibility for organizing the provision of troops was assigned to the commander of the army - Field Marshal General. The general-kriegs-commissar was responsible for the direct management of the supply of the army with food, uniforms, horses, weapons and financial resources. At the same time, the wagon train with pack animals and wagons was not subordinate to the general-kriegs commissar - the wagon service had its own boss. The general-vagenmeister, who led the convoy, was subordinate to the quartermaster-general, whose duties included the supply of supplies, the deployment and arrangement of troops, and the organization of hospitals. Thus, the rear management structure of the Russian army in the Petrine era was “two-headed” - the functions of direct material support for the army and the organization of transportation and quartering were divided. The capabilities of both rear generals were equalized - if the general kriegs commissar was in charge of finances and food, that is, he already had very great influence and opportunities, then the quartermaster general was responsible for transporting finance and food and without the wagon trains subordinate to him, the commissariat of the kriegs commissar simply could not act. Above both "heads of logistics" towered the figure of the Field Marshal, but he did not interfere in the immediate affairs of the rear support of the troops.

Under Peter, the organization of food supply for the army was entirely taken over by the state. In the cities of the country, food warehouses of the army were opened, from where food was delivered by horse carts overland or by boat along the rivers. Mobile warehouses were also organized, called shops and having a monthly supply of food. On February 18, 1705, on the fifth anniversary of the establishment of the Provisional Order, the exact size of the bread allowance of the lower ranks was determined, which consisted of half an octopus (24 kilograms) of flour and a small quarter (3.5 kilograms) of cereals per month. For the purchase of the rest of the food, money was given out and the soldiers could buy food at their own discretion. Military units that were on campaigns and outside the country received an additional allowance at the rate of two pounds of bread, one pound of meat, one garnets of beer and two cups of wine per person per day. In addition, two pounds of salt and one and a half handfuls of cereals were supposed for a month. Non-commissioned officers received a triple portion. On the ships of the Navy, a food consumption rate was introduced: 30 pounds of crackers, 16 pounds of cereals, 16 pounds of oatmeal, 10 pounds of ham, 0.5 sturgeon, 60 cups of wine, 30 cups of sbitnya, 30 cups of vinegar and 1 pound of salt per month . The soldiers and sailors were given portions of food, and the officers received allowances in cash and could buy food at their own discretion. Portion sizes could vary, depending on the location of the regiment in a particular place and the nature of the tasks it performed. When performing more complex tasks, the allowance increased. Naturally, the regular provision of troops with food, uniforms and equipment required the creation of an effective rear service at the regimental level. She was subordinate to the regimental commander and included in her composition the proviantmeister, commissar, quartermaster, convoy officer and doctor. All financial expenses were controlled by the regimental commander and all officers. As for the direct organization of catering for personnel, the supply of units with hot food was carried out by company soldiers' artels. Each artel had not only kitchen utensils, dishes, but also horses, carts and sledges. The artel included a company artel worker, a cook, a baker and a groom.

Development of the rear in the 19th century

In the future, the organization of the rear support of the Russian imperial army continued to improve. In 1800, the post of quartermaster general was introduced, who became the supreme chief of the army supply. In 1802, the Ministry of War was created in Russia, which at the beginning of its existence was called the Ministry of the Military Ground Forces. The first head of the Ministry of War was appointed General of Infantry S.K. Vyazmitinov, who in 1805 reformed the logistic support of the troops, combining the Commissariat and Provision departments into the Quartermaster's department. However, the Quartermaster Department functioned for a short time. Insufficiently effective supply of Russian troops during the war of 1807 with France and 1808-1809. with Sweden, it was the Quartermaster's Office that was blamed. After that, the department was dissolved, and independent departments were created on its basis - Commissariat, Provision, Medical. During the period under review, the effectiveness of the organization of logistics support for the army increased significantly. Since 1810, after the creation of divisions, corps and armies, field commissariat, provision and commissariat departments of the armies, corps commissions and commissions under divisions were created, which were responsible for the logistics of their formations. In addition, the structure of the organization of medical care for the wounded and sick servicemen was changed. The medical service department in the army became an independent structure from civilian medicine, after which 70 permanent hospitals and military temporary hospitals were created. Accordingly, the food supply to the medical institutions of the active army improved, the wounded and sick soldiers and officers received the opportunity for better and healthier food.

During the Patriotic War of 1812, delivery and mobile hospitals were formed to meet the needs of the army in medical care. Before preparing the Battle of Borodino, the commander-in-chief ordered to organize food and medical care for the wounded on the way to Moscow. Estimated losses of the Russian army were to be about 5 thousand people killed and 20 thousand people wounded. Of the 20,000 wounded, it was assumed that 4,000 would be seriously wounded and 16,000 lightly wounded. The latter will be able to move independently, and it was planned to take out the seriously wounded from the battlefield on carts. However, in reality, the losses of the Russian army turned out to be much greater. In the main military hospital, 30,000 wounded were concentrated in need of transportation. In just three days, they were able to evacuate 20 thousand wounded, the rest of the wounded, who could move, were forced to move out of Moscow on their own. As for the organization of food supply for the army, before the start of the offensive, the command decided to procure corned beef, which was to become one of the main sources of food for military personnel. Enough food was collected to provide 120,000 servicemen for 25 days. In wagon trains there were 30,000 poods of crackers and 8,000 quarters of cereals, in addition, 10,000 poods of crackers and 20,000 quarters of oats were delivered by wagons. The provision of the army with hay was entrusted to the population of the provinces, and most of the hay was supposed to be collected from the nobles, and the smaller part from the merchants and townspeople. Thus, already in the Patriotic War of 1812, the organization of the rear support of the army showed its strengths and weaknesses, the analysis and understanding of which subsequently made it possible to continue to further improve the organization of the rear support of the Russian army.

In 1812, the positions of field general-krieg commissars were introduced, each of which was responsible for supplying a separate army. On January 27, 1812, the Commissariat Department was created, which was responsible for the clothing and financial allowance of the army and the medical service. Local commissions were set up. The Provisions Department, which was responsible for providing the army with food and fodder, had a similar structure. In 1812, the organization of the rear support of the army was entrusted to the quartermaster general and the chief of the main staff at the same time. At the same time, the duty general was subordinate to the chief of the main headquarters, who was directly in charge of the transport support of the troops and the medical service. He was subordinated to the general-wagenmeister and the director of military communications. In 1857, the provisional commissions on the ground were disbanded, and instead of them, the departments of the chief provisional master were created, which existed until 1864. For provision of troops from 1700 to 1864. the Provision Master General continued to answer. Since 1724, two deputies were subordinate to the general-proviantmeister - the general-proviantmeister-lieutenant. In 1812, the Field Provisional Directorate was created, led by a Provision Master General, who reported directly to the Quartermaster General. In 1836, the general proviantmeister was introduced into the Main Staff of the Russian army, and in 1864 the Provisional Department was introduced into the main commissariat department and the post of general proviantmeister was also abolished. The military reform of 1864, carried out by D.A. Milyutin, contributed to the centralization of the management of the rear of the armed forces. Since 1864, the functions of supplying troops with clothing, financial, food, fodder and housing allowances were transferred to the Main Quartermaster Directorate, formed on August 11, 1864. The Main Quartermaster Directorate included six departments, as well as the Technical Committee, commissions, inspector of quartermaster technical institutions, Management of the head of the experience of conducting a military economy by the ranks of the quartermaster department and quartermaster inspectors.

The Main Quartermaster Department existed until 1918 and was already liquidated in Soviet Russia, in connection with the creation of the Workers 'and Peasants' Red Army and the corresponding structures under it. In addition, in the same 1864, the Committee for the Movement of Troops by Railways was created, which took over the management of military communications. The post of head of military communications of the active army and commander of the troops located in the rear of it was introduced. Subordinate to the chief of military communications were the quartermaster, artillery, military medical, engineering in the rear of the army and the military medical in the rear of the army control. The duties of the new leader were spelled out in the "Temporary regulation on the management of military communications of the army in the field and the troops located in its rear." Thus, an attempt was made to modernize and centralize the management of the rear of the armed forces. Each active army was to be provided with its own military district, which performed the functions of the rear. However, the deepening of ideas about the organization of the rear in the Russian imperial army refers only to the period of the Russo-Japanese war of 1904-1905. So, it was during this period that the concepts of “general” and “nearest” rear, that is, the rear of the front and the rear of the army, appeared. The chief commander of the rear of the front was placed under the direct subordination of the commander in chief and was responsible for the supply and evacuation of troops. During the First World War, the rear services underwent further improvement. On July 16, 1914, Nicholas II decided to withdraw from the Office of the Chief Head of Supply of the Front the heads of the Department of Military Communications and the sanitary part of the front. They were directly subordinated to the commander-in-chief.

At the origins of the modern Rear. General Khrulev

After the October Revolution of 1917 and the creation of the Workers 'and Peasants' Red Army the following year, the young Soviet state faced the question of forming and improving the logistics of the Red Army and Red Navy units. Since the old structure of organizing the rear services of the imperial army was destroyed, the Soviet command and party leadership had to use trial and error, in consultation with the "military experts" of the old school, to test the most effective methods of organizing rear work in the troops. The organization of rear services was more or less streamlined already before the start of the Great Patriotic War. In 1939, by order of I.V. Stalin, the Red Army Supply Department was created, headed by the head of supply. Andrey Vasilyevich Khrulev was appointed head of supply. It is he who is considered the "founding father" of the rear of the armed forces of the USSR. Andrei Vasilyevich Khrulev was born in 1892 and by the time of his appointment he was already an elderly 47-year-old military specialist with a rich and interesting biography. He began his career at the age of nine, working in St. Petersburg workshops as an apprentice, then as a locksmith. Even before the revolution, he became a social activist in the labor movement, in March 1918 he joined the RSDLP (b), was a commissar of the Porokhov District Committee of Petrograd. In August 1918, 26-year-old Khrulev voluntarily joined the Red Army. In January, he became the commandant of the revolutionary guards of the Porokhov district of Petrograd, then he was transferred to military-political work. From 1919 to 1928 he went from assistant chief of the political department of the 11th Cavalry Division as part of the 1st Cavalry Army to deputy chief of the political department of the Moscow Military District. In 1930, Khrulev headed the Central Military Financial Directorate of the Red Army, then the Financial Directorate of the People's Commissariat of Defense of the USSR. In 1935 he was awarded the rank of corps commissar. In 1936-1938. Khrulev served as head of the Construction and Apartment Department of the People's Commissariat of Defense, and in 1938-1939. headed the Military Construction Directorate of the Kyiv Military District. Obviously, I.V. Stalin, appointing the 47-year-old corps commissar to the responsible position of head of the Supply Department of the entire Red Army. On July 22, 1940, the Supply Directorate was reorganized and renamed the Main Quartermaster Directorate of the Red Army, and Khrulev was appointed head of the latter with the rank of Lieutenant General of the Quartermaster Service. It was Khrulev who supervised the food, clothing, economic and housing support of the Red Army, military trade and military educational institutions of the rear. Knowing full well that the danger of an enemy invasion loomed over the Soviet country, Khrulev saw his main task as preparing the commissary services of the Red Army for mobilization deployment and ensuring the supply of existing formations in the event of a war. On March 1, 1941, Lieutenant General of the Quartermaster Service Khrulev was appointed Deputy People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR. All this time, the leadership of the quartermaster services discussed the possibilities of the most effective organization of the rear support of the Red Army. Anastas Mikoyan, who served as Deputy Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR, was directly in charge of supplying the Red Army in the country's leadership. It was Mikoyan who laid down on the table the considerations for reorganizing the rear, proposed by Khrulev and his associates. Anastas Ivanovich conveyed the general's thoughts to Iosif Vissarionovich Stalin. After the draft order on the creation of a centralized organization of the rear of the Red Army was developed, the top leaders of the Main Quartermaster Directorate and representatives of the General Staff of the Red Army gathered for a meeting with I.V. Stalin, who carefully studied the proposed considerations.

On August 1, 1941, Joseph Stalin signed the order "On the organization of the Main Logistics Directorate of the Red Army." The Main Directorate of Logistics included the Main Quartermaster Directorate of the Red Army, the Fuel Supply Directorate, the Military Communications Directorate, the Sanitary and Veterinary Directorates, and the Highway Directorate. The head of the Main Directorate of Logistics of the Red Army was simultaneously called the head of the Logistics of the Red Army. It was decided to appoint Lieutenant General Khrulev to this position. Similar positions of rear chiefs were introduced on all fronts and in all armies. In 1942, Khrulev was awarded the rank of colonel-general of the quartermaster service, and in 1943 - army general. From February 1942 to April 1943, General Khrulev also served as People's Commissar of Railways of the USSR, since the railway communication during the Great Patriotic War acquired particular importance in providing the rear of the fighting Red Army. Evidence of the remarkable abilities and knowledge of Andrei Vasilyevich Khrulev was that he remained the head of the Logistics of the Red Army throughout the Great Patriotic War, although Stalin repeatedly changed other top military leaders, moving them from one position to another. Khrulev's life path refuted the well-known words "we do not have irreplaceable people." At least there was no one to replace Khrulev. After the Victory over fascist Germany, Andrey Vasilievich Khrulev retained the post of head of the Logistics of the Red Army. In 1946, he was appointed Deputy Minister - Head of Logistics of the Armed Forces of the USSR and retained this position until 1951. In 1951, at the age of 59, General of the Army Khrulev was dismissed from military service and moved to a leadership position in the Ministry of Construction Industry materials of the USSR for the post of Deputy Minister. In 1956-1958. he was Deputy Minister of Construction of the USSR, then - a military inspector - adviser to the Group of General Inspectors of the USSR Ministry of Defense. In 1962, Army General Khrulev died. His name for a long time (from 1964 to 1999 and from 2003 to 2007) was borne by the Yaroslavl Higher Military Financial School (Military Financial and Economic Institute), which trained military financial service specialists for the Armed Forces of the USSR, and then Russia.

Rear of the Soviet Army in the post-war period

It was during the Great Patriotic War that the final formation of the Logistics of the Red Army, which later became the basis of the Logistics of the Armed Forces of the USSR, took place. Without the organization of an effective logistic supply for the active fronts and armies, victory over Nazi Germany would not have been possible. The soldiers of the rear made a huge contribution to the victory over the enemy. In the post-war period, there was a further development and strengthening of the Logistics of the Armed Forces of the USSR, and after the collapse of the USSR - the Logistics of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation. A great contribution to strengthening the Logistics of the Armed Forces of the USSR was made by Marshal of the Soviet Union Ivan Khristoforovich Bagramyan. One of the legendary Soviet military commanders of the Great Patriotic War, who replaced Vasilevsky as commander of the 3rd Belorussian Front, Bagramyan had a great mind, energy and honesty. Perhaps it was these personal qualities of the marshal that contributed to his promotion to a new responsible position. In 1956-1958. Bagramyan headed the Higher Military Academy. K.E. Voroshilov (Military Academy of the General Staff), after which in 1958 he was appointed Deputy Minister of Defense of the USSR - Head of Logistics. Bagramyan held this responsible position until 1968 - ten years. In the years when the illustrious Bagramyan was at the head of the Logistics of the Armed Forces of the USSR, the status of deputy commander was again returned to the head of the rear. The concept of the rear was extended not only to the army, corps, division, but also to the brigade, regiment and battalion. The positions of deputy brigade commander, deputy regiment commander and deputy battalion commander for logistics were introduced. In 1968, the 69-year-old Marshal Bagramyan was transferred to the post of General Inspector of the Group of General Inspectors of the USSR Ministry of Defense.

The logistic services of the Soviet Army played the most important role during the war in Afghanistan. The difficult natural and climatic conditions of this country, the presence of a constant danger in the face of disparate detachments of militants operating almost throughout the entire territory of Afghanistan, made it very difficult to ensure the limited contingent of Soviet troops in Afghanistan. To solve these problems, a number of units of special troops of the brigade and battalion level were introduced into Afghanistan, including the 276th pipeline brigade, the 278th road commandant brigade, the 159th separate road construction brigade, and the 58th separate automobile brigade. , 59th separate brigade of material support, separate 692nd road and 14th and 1461st pipeline battalions, 342nd department of engineering works (actually - a connection of 6 military construction and 3 construction and installation battalions, 2 construction companies ). Soldiers and officers of the pipeline, road, automobile troops, all rear services showed real heroism, solving the most difficult tasks to provide for the warring units of the Soviet Army. Given the lack of railway communication in Afghanistan, the underdevelopment of pipeline infrastructure, automobile and road troops became the most important component of providing OKSVA with food, uniforms, ammunition, fuel and lubricants. An important role was played by the pipeline troops, which provided the supply of water and fuel. Finally, the military medical service played a colossal role, since the specific climatic conditions of Afghanistan contributed to the appearance, in addition to those wounded in combat operations, of thousands of patients, including such serious diseases as hepatitis. The special troops and services that were part of the Logistics of the Armed Forces of the USSR suffered considerable casualties in Afghanistan, fulfilling their duty no less courageously than the soldiers and officers of other troops.

Modern Logistics of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation

In 1991, after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the beginning of the destruction of the powerful Soviet Army, serious blows were dealt to the rear of the Armed Forces of young Russia. So, the head of logistics was deprived of the post of Deputy Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation. Logistic units and troops that were part of the rear of the Armed Forces were subjected to significant reductions. The effectiveness and efficiency of logistics management decreased, which led to the decision in 1994 to return the chief of logistics of the RF Armed Forces to the rank of deputy minister of defense of the country. In 1997, the Main Military Medical Directorate and the Directorate of Military Communications, previously separated from it, were returned to the rear of the RF Armed Forces. A great contribution to the reorganization and strengthening of the rear of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation was made by General of the Army Vladimir Ilyich Isakov, from 1997 to 2008. occupied the post of Chief of Logistics of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation - Deputy Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation. Combat General Vladimir Ilyich Isakov, a combatant in Afghanistan who miraculously survived after severe wounds, knew firsthand the importance of effective organization of the rear of the army. For 11 years of being at the head of the rear of the Russian army, Isakov did a lot for its revival and modernization.

The modern rear of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation is a very complex structure. It includes directorates, departments, services, troops performing tasks for economic, food, clothing, trade, medical, environmental, fuel, road, rail support of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation. The structural components of the rear of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation are: the Central Directorate of Military Communications of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation; Main Military Medical Directorate of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation; Automobile and Road Administration of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation; Central Directorate of Rocket Fuel and Fuel of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation; Main Department of Trade of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation; Central Food Administration of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation; Central Clothing Directorate of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation; Department of Environmental Safety; Department of Agriculture of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation; Directorate for Active Recreation of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation; Fire and rescue and local defense service of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation; Veterinary and Sanitary Service of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation; Military Scientific Committee of the Logistics of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation; Department of Military Education of the Logistics of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation; Personnel Department of the Logistics of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation; Secretariat of the Chief of Logistics of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation. In addition, the rear of the arms and services of the RF Armed Forces, the rear of military districts, fleets and flotillas are subordinated to the rear of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation. The rear of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation also includes automobile, road, rail, pipeline troops and rear guard troops. In accordance with the order of the Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation of July 28, 2011, every year on August 1, the Day of Logistics of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation is celebrated.

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Movement and placement of military rear

During the advancement of troops to combat areas, the rear moved in the usual manner as part of columns of its units and formations under the cover of specially assigned combat guards (armored groups).

In the war zone battalion and regimental rear was located, as a rule, near the command post, part of the divisional rear, together with the operational group (OG) of the division.

Arrangement of troops

Accommodation of personnel originally carried out in tents(UST, USB, UL and camp) or in existing local buildings. Later, when it became clear that the troops would be in the areas assigned to them for a long time, the leadership of the Armed Forces decided to build comfortable premises in all garrisons to accommodate personnel, as well as canteens, baths and other military facilities.

Therefore, in all large garrisons, prefabricated panel barracks (houses) were built to accommodate personnel and headquarters, and collapsible metal storage facilities (CRM-18XA) were used for storage facilities.

Total troops in Afghanistan located in 183 military camps .

Logistic support of outposts, raid and blocking groups P

In order to ensure the unhindered passage of combat subunits and units, motor vehicle convoys with materiel, as well as to monitor enemy activity in mountainous conditions and for combat protection of areas of permanent deployment of troops, outposts were equipped. They were strongholds with a prepared fire system and engineering equipment. Each of them, as a rule, included a motorized rifle platoon (motorized rifle company or parachute company), reinforced with artillery, tanks, engineering and other units. The outposts were removed from each other at a distance of 5 to 25 or more km. Most of them, from dawn to dusk, allocated mobile guard posts from their composition at an interval of 2-5 km from each other.

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On outposts increased stocks of material resources were created, which made it possible to conduct all-round defense for several days without their replenishment. Cooking was carried out on standard field equipment (MK-10, KP-20, KO-75, KP-130). For the supply and storage of water, the outposts were provided with TsV-3 (3000 l) and TsV-1.2 (1200 l). The washing of personnel was carried out in a specially equipped place at the outpost. There were three sets of underwear for each soldier.

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Personnel were usually stationed in dugouts which were equipped with field furniture and property.

Special Forces Units and airborne troops in a number of cases were involved in raid operations. Based on their expected duration, increased stocks of material resources, and especially water, were necessarily created. The delivery of materiel during the performance of a combat mission was carried out, as a rule, by helicopters. For medical support, a doctor usually followed with the battalion command, a paramedic with companies, and sanitary instructors and orderlies with platoons.

Material assets were delivered to blocking groups (separate groups) operating in the mountains using transport helicopters. Usually, cargo in special packaging was dropped from a helicopter, only in rare cases, cargo was delivered with a helicopter landing.