Appendix 10 Order No. 114 on the Lokot Okrug Self-Government October 31, 1942 On the fight against banditry Recently, cases of raids by bandits remaining in the forests on the civilian population of the Okrug entrusted to me have become more frequent. This is due to the fact that the bandits remaining in the forests

Operational summary for October 5, 1942 Morning report on October 5During the night of October 5, our troops fought with the enemy in the Stalingrad and Mozdok regions. No changes occurred on other fronts. Evening message on October 5During October 5, our

Operational summary for October 10, 1942 Another Nazi fakeThe other day, the German command announced that German troops allegedly surrounded and destroyed 7 Soviet divisions south of Lake Ladoga, took 12,370 prisoners, captured or destroyed 244 tanks, 307 guns, 491

Operational summary for October 11, 1942 Morning report October 11 During the night of October 11, our troops fought with the enemy in the Stalingrad region and in the Mozdok region. On other fronts, no changes occurred. Evening message on October 11th During October 11th

Operational summary for October 12, 1942 Morning message October 12During the night of October 12, our troops fought with the enemy in the area of ​​Stalingrad and in the area of ​​Mozdok. On other fronts, no changes occurred. Evening message on October 12th During October 12th

Operational summary for October 13, 1942 Morning report October 13During the night of October 13, our troops fought with the enemy in the Stalingrad region and in the Mozdok region. No changes occurred on the other fronts. Evening message October 13 During October 13 on

Operational summary for October 14, 1942 Morning message on October 14 During the night of October 14, no changes occurred on the fronts. Evening message on October 14 During October 14, no significant changes occurred on the fronts.

Operational summary for October 15, 1942 Morning report on October 15 During the night of October 15, no significant changes occurred on the fronts. Evening report on October 15 During October 15, our troops fought with the enemy in the Stalingrad region and in the Mozdok region. Ha

Operational summary for October 16, 1942 Morning report on October 16 During the night of October 16, our troops fought with the enemy in the Stalingrad region and in the Mozdok region. There were no significant changes on other fronts. Evening message on October 16B for 16

Another propaganda duck - the order of the German command regarding prisoners of war.

Leaflet dimensions: 90x147 mm. Registry code - 690/I.44
Apparently, the leaflet is dated January 1944.

The appearance of the text of the "order" is connected with the operation "Silver Stripe" carried out by the Germans in April-May 1943, during an operational pause at the front. This propaganda campaign was the largest during the Great Patriotic War. Its purpose was to attract the maximum number of defectors from our side and the psychological preparation of the operation "Citadel".

At the same time, a special stake was placed on the formation of the Russian Liberation Army (ROA) of General A.A. Vlasov (1901-1946). Therefore, the main slogan of the operation was: "The Russians are running over to the Russians." Some of the leaflets were signed. representatives of Vlasov's headquarters. Vlasov also participated in the implementation of sound broadcasting.
The second task of the operation was to intimidate Soviet soldiers with the threat of using the latest, still unknown to them armored vehicles (Tiger tanks, Ferdinand self-propelled guns), and other weapons, and thereby also encourage them to surrender or desert.
Finally, all Soviet servicemen who voluntarily surrendered to German captivity were promised a number of benefits for the period of their captivity.
These benefits were determined by Order No. 13 "On Red Army servicemen who voluntarily defected to the side of the German Army." The order emphasized that every soldier of the Red Army who, on his own initiative, left his unit and came to the Germans on his own, would "be considered not a prisoner of war, but voluntarily defected to the side of the German Army."

In order to counteract effective Soviet propaganda and in support of their own efforts to corrupt the enemy army, the OKH early on began to attach importance to the fact that defectors were given better conditions than other prisoners of war. On March 7, 1942, directives on this issue were given by the Quartermaster General, then the issue was finally regulated in Order No. 13 of April 20, 1943, issued by the Chief of the General Staff of the OKH, General Zeitzler, on behalf of Hitler. All employees of the Red Army (whether it be an "officer, political instructor, commissar, non-commissioned officer or private") who voluntarily surrendered individually or in groups were guaranteed privileges in terms of accommodation, food, clothing in accordance with the terms of the Geneva Convention, which was not recognized by the Soviet Union. government. It was indicated that the prisoners "will be left with the money, valuables, clothes, insignia, orders that they have with them."

Joachim Hoffman, "History of the Vlasov Army".

You can read about the discussion of Order No. 13 at the Fuhrer's residence here: http://www.bibliotekar.ru/general-vlasov/92.htm
This is the chapter of O. S. Smyslov's book "Hitler's Fifth Column. From Kutepov to Vlasov."

The following figures indicate the scale of the operation:
In the zone of responsibility 4A of Army Group Center, 520 thousand copies of leaflets with the text of the order in Russian were distributed. In addition, on almost every German leaflet with a different content, the remark "Read Order No. 13" was made.
The total number of leaflets distributed in May 1943 on the front in the Kursk region amounted to more than 32 million copies, not counting newspapers and magazines published in Russian.
In May and June, 49 million propaganda leaflets were distributed in Army Group North. During this time, 622 Soviet servicemen went over to the side of the Germans, while only half of them did this as a result of a propaganda campaign as part of Operation Silver Streak.
The result, obviously, was much more than modest.
The officers of the German propaganda departments believed that this campaign could have been more successful if, as originally planned, it had been linked to Operation Citadel, that is, if it had not been conducted during a lull at the front, when desertion was much more more difficult.
Let's leave this statement on the conscience of the German propagandists.
After the defeat of the Wehrmacht in Operation Citadel, which soon followed, the German propaganda machine finally lost the initiative and was forced to go on the defensive.

In preparing the post, the book by V. Krysko "Secrets of psychological warfare" was used.

PS: This same leaflet, published in 1944, is an echo of last year's campaign. In fact, it reflects the fact that after 1943 German propagandists stopped bothering to invent new methods of agitation, but used old, "hackneyed" clichés.

I decided, as soon as weather conditions allowed, to launch the Citadel Offensive, the first offensive of the year.

This offensive is of decisive importance. It must end with a quick and decisive success. The offensive must give us the initiative for the spring and summer of this year.

In this regard, all preparatory measures must be carried out with the greatest care and energy. In the direction of the main attacks, the best formations, the best weapons, the best commanders and a large amount of ammunition must be used. Every commander, every ordinary soldier must be imbued with the consciousness of the decisive significance of this offensive. The victory at Kursk must be a torch for the whole world.

I order:

1. The purpose of the offensive is a concentrated strike, carried out decisively and quickly by the forces of one shock army from the Belgorod region and the other from the region south of Orel, by means of a concentric offensive, to encircle the enemy troops located in the Kursk region and destroy them.

In the course of this offensive, in order to save forces, a new shortened front should be occupied along the line of Nezhegol-Korocha-Skorodnoye-Tim-east of Shchigr-r. Pine.

2. Necessary;

a) widely use the moment of surprise and keep the enemy in the dark, primarily about the time of the start of the offensive;

b) to ensure the maximum massing of strike forces in a narrow sector so that, using local overwhelming superiority in all means of attack (tanks, assault guns, artillery, mortars, etc.), to break through the enemy defenses with one blow, to achieve the connection of both advancing armies and thus close the encirclement ring;

c) to transfer forces from the depths as quickly as possible to cover the flanks of the shock groups so that the latter can only move forward;

d) by timely strikes from all directions against the encircled enemy, not to give him a respite and hasten his destruction;

e) carry out the offensive at the fastest possible pace so that the enemy cannot avoid encirclement and bring up powerful reserves from other sectors of the front;

e) by quickly creating a new front, release forces in a timely manner to carry out subsequent tasks, especially mobile formations.

3. Army Group "South" strikes with concentrated forces from the Bel-Gorod-Tomarovka line, breaks through the front at the Prilepy-Oboyan line, connects at Kursk and its east with the advancing army of Army Group Center. To provide cover for the offensive from the east, reach the Nezhegol-R. Korocha-Skorodnoye-Tim, however, at the same time, to prevent the weakening of the massive forces in the direction of Prilepa, Oboyan. To cover the offensive from the west, use part of the forces, which at the same time set the task of striking at the encircled enemy grouping.

4. Army Group "Center" inflicts a massive blow by the advancing army from the line Trosna-region north of Maloarkhangelsk, breaks through the front in the Fatezh, Veretinovo sector, concentrating the main efforts on its eastern flank, and connects with the shock army of Army Group "South" near Kursk and eastern . In order to cover the advancing grouping from the east, it is necessary to reach the Tim line east of the Shchigr-Pine River as soon as possible, while preventing the weakening of forces in the direction of the main attack. To cover the advancing grouping from the west, use part of the available forces.

Parts of the Army Group "Center", introduced into battle in the area west of the river. Troyena to the demarcation line with the Army Group "South", have the task of tying down the enemy with the start of the offensive by conducting local attacks by specially created strike groups and in a timely manner to strike at the encircled enemy grouping. Continuous observation and aerial reconnaissance to ensure the timely opening of the enemy's withdrawal. In this case, you should immediately go on the offensive along the entire front.

5. The concentration of the forces of both army groups for the offensive should be carried out in depth, away from the starting positions, so that, starting from April 28, on the sixth day after the order was given by the high command of the ground forces, they could launch an offensive. At the same time, all measures should be taken to disguise, maintain secrecy and mislead the enemy. The earliest date of occurrence is 3.5. The advance to the starting positions for the offensive should be carried out only at night, subject to all the rules of camouflage.

6. To mislead the enemy, continue preparations for Operation Panther in the zone of Army Group South. Preparations must be intensified by all means (demonstrative reconnaissance, advancement of tanks, concentration of crossing facilities, radio communications, agent activities, spreading rumors, use of aviation, etc.) and should be carried out as long as possible. These measures to mislead the enemy must also be effectively supported by appropriate measures for the defense capability of the troops stationed there (see paragraph 11 of this directive). In the Army Group Center zone, measures should not be carried out on a large scale to mislead the enemy, but by all means it is necessary to hide from the enemy the true picture of the situation (withdrawal of troops to the rear and false transfers, movement of vehicles in the daytime, dissemination of false information about the timing the offensive began only in June, etc.)

In both army groups, formations newly arriving in the shock armies must maintain radio silence.

7. In order to maintain secrecy, only those persons whose involvement is absolutely necessary should be privy to the concept of the operation. New faces should be introduced to the concept gradually and as late as possible. This time it is absolutely necessary to avoid that, due to imprudence or negligence, the enemy becomes aware of our plans. By strengthening counterintelligence, to ensure a constant fight against enemy espionage.

8. Troops intended for the offensive, taking into account the spatially limited and precisely known goals of the offensive (unlike previous operations), must leave in the rear all the transport that can be dispensed with in the offensive, as well as any ballast that burdens them. All this only interferes and can adversely affect the offensive impulse of the troops and make it difficult to quickly bring the next forces. Therefore, each commander must be imbued with the desire to take with him only what is necessary for the battle. Corps and division commanders must strictly control the fulfillment of this requirement. It is necessary to introduce strict regulation of traffic on the roads. It must be carried out in the most resolute manner.

9. Orders for supplies, as well as for the immediate and complete accounting of all captured prisoners, local residents and trophies, as well as for conducting propaganda to decompose the enemy, are given in appendices 1-3.

10. The air force also uses in ie the available forces on the directions of the main attack. Coordination of issues of interaction with the Air Force command authorities should immediately begin. Pay special attention to secrecy (see paragraph 7 of this directive).

11. For the success of the offensive, it is of decisive importance that the enemy does not succeed in offensive operations on other sectors of the front of Army Groups "South" and "Center" to force us to delay the start of the offensive "Citadel" or prematurely withdraw the formations participating in it. Therefore, along with the offensive Operation Citadel, both army groups must systematically prepare defenses on the rest, and above all on the threatened sectors of the front, by the end of the month. At the same time, first of all, it is necessary to speed up the construction of defensive positions by all means, cover tank-dangerous directions with a sufficient number of anti-tank weapons, create tactical reserves, and timely reveal the directions of the enemy's main attacks by active reconnaissance operations.

12. Upon completion of the operation, it is envisaged:

a) transfer of the dividing line between Army Groups "South" and "Center" to the common line Konotop (for the Army Group "South") - Kursk (for the Army Group "South") - Dolgoe (for the Army Group "Center");

b) the transfer of the 2nd Army, consisting of three corps and nine infantry divisions, as well as parts of the RGC, which will still be specified, from Army Group Center to Army Group South;

c) the release by Army Group Center of an additional three divisions into the reserve of the main command of the ground forces in the area northwest of Kursk;

d) withdrawal from the front of all mobile formations for their use in accordance with new tasks. All movements of the formations of the 2nd Army must correspond to these plans.

I reserve the right even during the operation, depending on the course of hostilities, to gradually reassign the headquarters and formations mentioned in paragraph 12-6 of this order to Army Group South.

I also reserve the right, in the event of a planned development of the operation, to immediately launch an offensive to the southeast (Panther) in order to take advantage of the confusion in the ranks of the enemy.

13. Army groups to report on the preparations for the offensive and defensive actions carried out on the basis of this operational order, with the application of maps at a scale of 1: 300,000 with the applied grouping of troops in their original position, as well as tables of distribution of parts of the RGC and a plan agreed with the command of the 4th air fleet and the command of the Air Force "Vostok" of measures to support the "Citadel" offensive from the air, as well as a plan of measures to disinform the enemy. The deadline for submission is 24.4.

After the defeat of the elite troops at Stalingrad, Hitler longed for revenge. The Kursk Bulge seemed to him the most suitable place for new Cannes. The configuration of the terrain in the form of a huge ledge, deepening two hundred kilometers to the west of the general front line, in the Kursk direction, seemed to contribute to this. At the beginning of April 1943, the fascist German command began to carefully prepare a strategic offensive operation under the code name "Citadel" .

OPERATIONAL ORDER N 6

OKH, General Staff of the Ground Forces Operations Department (1) X. 430246/43

Printed in 13 copies.

"Sov. secret.

For command only.

Transmit only through an officer I have decided, as soon as weather conditions permit, to launch the Citadel Offensive, the first offensive of the year. This offensive is of decisive importance. It must end with a quick and decisive success. The offensive must give us the initiative for the spring and summer of this year. In this regard, all preparatory measures must be carried out with the greatest care and energy. In the direction of the main attacks, the best formations, the best weapons, the best commanders and a large amount of ammunition must be used. Every commander, every ordinary soldier must be imbued with the consciousness of the decisive significance of this offensive. The victory at Kursk must be a torch for the whole world. I order:

1. The purpose of the offensive is a concentrated strike, carried out decisively and quickly by the forces of one shock army from the Belgorod region and the other from the region south of Orel, by means of a concentric offensive to surround the enemy troops located in the Kursk region and destroy them ...

2. Required:

a) widely use the moment of surprise and keep the enemy in the dark, primarily with regard to the time of the start of the offensive;

b) to ensure the maximum massing of strike forces in a narrow area in order ... to break through the enemy defenses with one blow, to achieve the connection of both advancing armies and thus close the encirclement ... Hitler. "There were thirteen points in operational order * 6. Further they set out the tasks: Army Group South to break through the front at the Prilepa-Oboyan line and connect at Kursk with the troops of Army Group Center advancing towards them; Army Group Center, inflicting a massive blow from the Troen-Maloarkhangelsk line, to break through the defenses in the Fatezh - Veretinovo sector and connect with the strike army of the Army Group "South" at Kursk and to the east. In the order, a significant place was given to measures aimed at misleading the Russians and maintaining the secrecy of the operation. Only those persons whose involvement was absolutely necessary.

In addition, preparations were underway for a false operation "Panther" in the zone of the Army Group "South". In order to successfully disinformation, it was planned to advance tanks, concentrate crossing facilities, radio communications, agent actions, and spread rumors.

The leadership of the Wehrmacht carefully developed and prepared the operation, which received the code name "Citadel". Hitler strove at all costs to regain the strategic initiative that had eluded him after Stalingrad, otherwise the loss of the war was inevitable. This operation was planned as a "single throw" aimed at the encirclement and lightning defeat of the Soviet troops in the Kursk region.

The Nazi command set the task for the troops

"... to ensure the maximum massing of strike forces in a narrow area in order, using local overwhelming superiority in all means of attack (tanks, assault guns, artillery, mortars, etc.), to break through the enemy defenses with one blow, to achieve the connection of both advancing armies and thus close the encirclement ring. The main line of the Soviet defense was supposed to break through within two days, and by the end of the fourth day of the offensive, the Wehrmacht strike groups were to connect east of Kursk. By encircling and defeating more than a million Soviet troops in the area of ​​the Kursk salient, the fascist German command intended to take revenge for Stalingrad.

At Kursk, the question was to be decided whether the initiative would finally pass into the hands of the Soviet Armed Forces or the Germans would be able to regain it. During the preparation of the operation, the timing of the German offensive was postponed several times by Hitler. The attack scheduled for May was then delayed until a brigade of new Panther tanks arrived. In May, Hitler held a meeting in Munich with the commanders of the armies and army groups "Center", "South" and the generals of the Wehrmacht to finally determine the composition of the strike groups. A strike from the south to Kursk was planned by ten tank, one motorized and seven infantry divisions. Seven armored, two motorized and nine infantry divisions were to take part in the offensive from the north. All the reserves of the fascist German command were thrown into this sector of the front. However, at the meeting, one of Hitler's close associates, Colonel General Guderian, expressed his doubts about the need for an offensive near Kursk. This shook Hitler, he was forced to change the timing of the offensive, but continued to blindly believe in the successful outcome of the operation.

"Never before have German troops in Russia," said the Fuhrer, "have been so well equipped with heavy tanks as they are now..."

Two thousand aircraft and two thousand seven hundred tanks were to fall on the troops of the Central Front of the Rokossovsky and Voronezh Fronts of Vatutin, which accounted for fifty percent of all enemy tanks and aircraft on the Soviet-German front. (During the battle, the Germans planned to bring in almost the same number of troops, tanks and aircraft from the reserve.)

At the end of June, in the Orlovsky and Belgorod directions, our reconnaissance discovered large movements of enemy armored and infantry formations. On July 2, the Headquarters informed the commanders of the Voronezh and Central Fronts that the Germans were about to go over to the offensive. This is the third warning. The first two were at the beginning and at the end of May, but turned out to be insolvent. The tension associated with the long wait had reached its limit. The excitement seized everyone - from the soldier to the front commander. This was the case when everyone wanted the enemy to go on the offensive as soon as possible. Otherwise, the Soviet command made a major miscalculation, giving the Germans time to organize defense in depth.

On the night of July 4, the situation changed dramatically, the Nazis intensified their reconnaissance operations in front of the defense front of the 60th and 65th armies. The head of intelligence reported to Chernyakhovsky that on the right wing, in the defense zone of the corps of General Kiryukhin, sixteen search groups of Germans were found hunting for "tongues", and on the left wing, in the defense zone of the corps of General Lazko, twelve. At the junction of these two buildings, German sappers cleared our minefields. The obvious activation of the enemy alerted Chernyakhovsky. And he immediately reported on VCh Rokossovsky: - On the night of July 4, the enemy conducted twenty-eight reconnaissance searches, before that the number of such searches was five, six times less. How is Pukhov doing? - In front of the front of Pukhov's formations, the enemy has not yet shown activity. Rokossovsky thought.

The commander of the Army Group "Center" could deliver the main blow in the defense zone of Chernyakhovsky and Batov. Such a strike, designed to dismember the battle formations of our troops, with their subsequent encirclement, also fraught with serious danger. Especially when the main forces of the Central and Voronezh fronts were aimed against the enemy offensive on the neck of the Kursk salient. Finally, Rokossovsky asked Chernyakhovsky: - What conclusion did you yourself come to? - Ensure full readiness to repel the offensive of the Nazis! - Undoubtedly, one must be prepared, but it seems to me that the Nazi generals are cunning. The same situation on the left wing of the defense of Batov's army! On the night of July 5, at the junction of the armies of Pukhov and Romanenko, our scouts discovered a group of German sappers clearing passages in minefields. Several enemy sappers were killed, two fled, one was taken prisoner.

Rokossovsky at two in the morning became aware of the testimony of the prisoner:

"The offensive is scheduled for 3 o'clock on July 5 ..." Consequently, only twenty minutes remained before the start of the artillery preparation planned by the enemy. Before the Military Council of the Central Front, the question was on the agenda: to believe these data or not? The adoption of a responsible decision to conduct counter-barrage preparation, designed to suppress the enemy at the starting positions for the offensive, depended on this. And, of course, it was carried out with the aim of disorganizing the offensive plans of the fascist German command. But it could turn out that the information of the scouts was erroneous and the troops of Army Group Center did not take their starting positions for the offensive. In this case, half of our ammunition, mines and shells could be fired at an empty place.

There was no time left for reflection and agreement with the Stavka. It was the greatest risk, but Rokossovsky ordered at two and twenty minutes on July 5 to open fire!

Links:
1. Hitler launched Operation Barbarossa without any preparation!
2. Formation of the Kursk Bulge
3.

On April 15, 1943, Adolf Hitler signed the Operational Order of the Wehrmacht Headquarters No. 6. The document approved the procedure and conditions for conducting Operation Citadel, which was destined to become the last major offensive maneuver of Nazi Germany.

The plan of the German command involved inflicting powerful lightning strikes on the formations of the Workers 'and Peasants' Red Army (RKKA), stationed in the Kursk region, in July 1943. The success of Hitler's blitzkrieg opened the way to Stalingrad, which had been abandoned earlier, and made it possible to re-launch the offensive against Moscow.

“On the direction of the main attacks, the best formations, the best weapons, the best commanders and a large amount of ammunition should be used. Every commander, every ordinary soldier must be imbued with the consciousness of the decisive significance of this offensive. The victory near Kursk should be a torch for the whole world, ”the order of Hitler said.

• The crew of the German tank "Tiger"
• globallookpress.com
• Andrey Kotliarchuk

Lack of resources

The task of the "Citadel" was to eliminate the so-called Kursk ledge, or the Kursk salient. As a result of the March battles of 1943, the Red Army entrenched itself in the area west of Kursk, which wedged into the territory of the USSR occupied by the Germans for about 120 km. Soviet troops occupied a convenient bridgehead, which made it possible to continue the liberation of the southern regions of the RSFSR and eastern Ukraine.

The Germans intended to launch two converging strikes from the north and south. From the side of Orel, the ledge was to be cut off by the troops of the Army Group "Center", from the side of Belgorod - the formations of the Army Group "South".

It was assumed that the Wehrmacht units would advance to Kursk at about 30 km per day and in five days completely complete the encirclement of Soviet troops.

The main strike force of the Germans was attack aircraft and armored formations, reinforced by the latest heavy tanks T-5 "Panther", T-6 "Tiger" and self-propelled guns "Ferdinand". Hitler expected to literally ram the deep defenses of the Red Army in separate narrow sections, and then build on success by pulling up infantry units.

• Soviet tank troops on the streets of Stalingrad in early 1943
• globallookpress.com
• Berliner Verlag/Archive

A significant part of the German command opposed the Fuhrer's view of the Citadel. The main reason for the doubts of the generals was that the Nazi war machine had not yet recovered from the defeat at Stalingrad. According to historians, Germany needed about six months to fully restore its strength.

Even his most devoted commander, Field Marshal Walter Model, entered into a discussion with Hitler. In particular, he warned the Fuhrer that the Red Army was able to create a deep and effective defensive line in a short time.

Also on topic

In early March 1943, Italian troops began to hastily leave the territory of the Soviet Union. The so-called crusade...

The commander of Army Group Center, Field Marshal Hans Günther von Kluge, and Colonel General Heinz Wilhelm Guderian, who was considered Germany's leading tank strategist, convinced Hitler that the country might not have enough resources to carry out a large-scale offensive operation.

Guderian openly told the Fuhrer that the defeat on the Kursk Bulge would lead to irreparable losses and would mean a military catastrophe. However, the leader of Nazi Germany attached decisive importance to the Citadel and hurried the generals with the start of the operation. With great difficulty, the German commanders convinced Hitler to postpone it for a month, to July 5, 1943.

The Wehrmacht pulled 50 divisions (900 thousand people), 2 thousand tanks, 2 thousand aircraft and 10 thousand artillery pieces to the Kursk salient. Before the offensive, the soldiers were read Hitler's appeal, in which he stated that the German army had achieved enormous technical superiority over the enemy.

The best ground formations were thrown into the assault on the ledge - the 1st division of the Leibstandarte SS "Adolf Hitler", the 2nd SS Panzer Division "Das Reich", the 3rd SS Panzer Division "Totenkopf". Air support for the Nazis was provided by the forces of the 4th and 6th air fleets.

"For the sake of secrecy"

One of the most important conditions for success, Hitler considered the observance of maximum secrecy in the preparation of the Citadel. The Fuhrer was aware of the increased power of Soviet military intelligence and feared that copies of all plans would end up in the office of Joseph Stalin.

“In order to maintain secrecy, only those persons whose involvement is absolutely necessary should be privy to the plan of the operation. New faces should be introduced to the concept gradually and as late as possible. This time it is imperative to avoid that, due to negligence or negligence, the enemy becomes aware of our plans, ”Hitler’s order emphasized.

Despite the desperate attempts of the Nazis to take precautions, the Soviet command received all the necessary information about the development of the Citadel in a timely manner. Most of the data on the operation was obtained in the UK (the "Cambridge Five"), in Berlin (the agent Werther, who became the prototype of Stirlitz) and through a spy network in Switzerland.

Suffice it to say that already on April 16, 1943, a day after Hitler signed the order to prepare the Citadel, the agents of the USSR were aware of the plans specified in the document.

The Headquarters of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief immediately received information that the Wehrmacht would advance from Orel and Belgorod during the summer campaign.

In addition, the success of the Soviet Union was ensured by the reform that Stalin carried out at the request of the front commanders. In April, the Main Intelligence Directorate was created in the structure of the Red Army, which was engaged in ensuring the activities of the agent network, and the Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff, whose tasks included front-line intelligence.

On April 19, 1943, Stalin signed the order "On the state of military intelligence agencies and on measures to improve its combat activities." The document noted that insufficient attention is paid to military intelligence in the Red Army. It was about the fact that reconnaissance units often acted autonomously or performed combined arms tasks.

The order of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief freed the scouts from the army routine and made it possible to systematize the collection of information about the enemy. According to the new order, captured Germans or documents found in the hands of the Red Army were immediately delivered to the intelligence departments. From there, all relevant information flowed to the headquarters.

The measures taken to strengthen the reconnaissance units helped to determine the location of the reserves, the types of military equipment and the number of troops that the enemy had concentrated near the Kursk salient.

Information about the movements of Wehrmacht units near the front line, as a rule, came to the Soviet command from radio intercepts. In May-June, effective front-line reconnaissance nullified German attempts to disguise offensive maneuvers.

Change of tactics

The information obtained by Soviet intelligence became the key to a well-organized defense of the Kursk salient. The line of engineering structures and minefields on the arc stretched for 550 km. By July 1943, the Red Army had concentrated 1.9 million soldiers, more than 20,000 guns, 5,000 tanks, and 2,000 aircraft in the area of ​​the defensive operation.

The headquarters of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief was aware of the plans of the Germans to use the latest heavy equipment to break through the defenses in narrow areas. "Tiger", "Panther" were considered at that time the best tanks in the world in terms of power and protection. And "Ferdinand" in terms of tactical and technical characteristics was unparalleled for several more years after the war.

The frontal armor of the latest tracked vehicles could withstand most Soviet artillery shells. Given the technical superiority of the Germans, the command of the Red Army radically changed the tactics of fighting against tank armadas.

Enormous attention was paid to the installation of minefields and anti-tank ditches. With the beginning of the "Citadel", the need to pave the way for the tanks greatly slowed down the advance of the Wehrmacht and gave the Red Army time to regroup its forces. Instead of the planned 30 km per day, the occupiers approached Kursk by 8-10 km at best.

On the way of the movement of German tank columns, Soviet troops constantly set up ambushes. The superiority in artillery allowed the Red Army to fire on one German tank with a crew, which sometimes consisted of 10 guns. The key task of the gunners was to hit the sides, undercarriage and barrel of "impenetrable" German vehicles.

The tank formations of the Red Army, equipped with the legendary T-34s, also acted in a similar way, which also could not penetrate the frontal armor of the Tiger, Panther and Ferdinand. Soviet tanks took advantage of mobility. Performing diversionary maneuvers, they bypassed the clumsy German vehicles and struck at their vulnerable parts.

Another army

On July 11, 1943, the offensive of the invaders bogged down. The Wehrmacht was forced to start transferring reserves. On July 12, on the southern face of the Kursk Bulge near the Prokhorovka railway station, a grandiose tank battle took place, which, as historians believe, did not bring victory to either side.

From July 12 to August 18, 1943, the Red Army carried out the Oryol offensive operation, pushing back Army Group Center. From 3 to 23 August 1943, during the Belgorod-Kharkov operation, the Red Army defeated the southern flank of the enemy. In the Battle of Kursk, the Wehrmacht lost its best formations and in the autumn was forced to leave the entire Left-Bank Ukraine.

In an interview with RT, the head of the scientific department of the Russian Military Historical Society, Candidate of Historical Sciences Yuri Nikiforov noted that the Germans had carefully thought out the Citadel. According to him, the operation was excellently prepared, but the balance of power by the summer of 1943 was on the side of the USSR.

“In my opinion, Hitler and the German generals, in principle, did not count on serious success. There is a point of view that the "Citadel" was, in fact, a defensive operation. After Stalingrad, the victory at Kursk would have had rather political and inspiring significance for the Nazis. Germany could demonstrate its power and viability to the people and the whole world,” Nikiforov said.

The expert called the excellent work of Soviet intelligence officers, who obtained all the information necessary for the front command, the key to the success of the Red Army.

In addition, according to Nikiforov, the Nazis did not take into account the significant superiority of the Soviet group in manpower and equipment near Kursk.

“In the Battle of Kursk, we saw other Soviet soldiers and other generals. The actions of the Red Army, which had gained experience, were more coordinated and perfect from a tactical point of view. The professionalism and courage of our commanders and fighters did not allow the Germans to realize their plans. Near Kursk, Hitler put everything at stake - and lost, ”Nikiforov summed up.