Lieutenant General Andrei Andreevich Vlasov at the beginning of 1942 was one of the most popular personalities in the USSR. After the battle of Moscow, where he was named in Stalin’s order as one of the most distinguished army commanders, a ditty was sung about him: “The guns spoke in a deep voice, / the thunder of the guns rumbled, / General Comrade Vlasov / gave the Germans pepper.” But just six months later, his name was branded as a symbol of betrayal.

Background

In the winter of 1941/42, after the Germans were driven back from Moscow, the Soviet high command was going to complete the ongoing defeat of the occupiers. In addition to continuing the offensive in the central direction, it was planned to strike the enemy in Ukraine and near Leningrad. It was planned not only to lift the blockade of the city on the Neva, but also to inflict a decisive defeat on the enemy Army Group North and push it back from the northern capital.

The plan of the Headquarters provided for the delivery of two counter strikes. Having crossed the Volkhov, the Volkhov Front under the command of Army General Kirill Meretskov was supposed to advance to the rear of the enemy troops besieging Leningrad. From the Neva, the Leningrad Front, commanded by Lieutenant General Mikhail Khozin, was to be struck. Two fronts captured the German 18th Army in a pincer movement.

In the offensive of the Volkhov Front, the decisive role was assigned to the 2nd Shock Army under the command of Lieutenant General Grigory Sokolov. This army was formed in November 1941 in the Volga region as the 26th combined arms army. Initially, it was intended to cover the area east of Moscow in the event of a German breakthrough there. In December 1941, she was transferred to the Volkhov Front, which had just successfully completed the Tikhvin offensive operation. The Germans planned to surround Leningrad with a second ring and link up with Finnish troops east of Lake Ladoga, but were forced to retreat across the Volkhov River.

Grigory Sokolov, who joined the army from the NKVD, turned out to be unsuitable for his new position. Marked by a whole series of ridiculous orders, he alienated the commanders of all formations. His leadership, when attempting to go on the offensive on January 7, 1942, brought great losses to the army. After only two weeks in office he was dismissed. On January 10, Lieutenant General Nikolai Klykov became the new commander of the army.

Failure of the winter offensive

On January 13, 1942, the 2nd Shock Army crossed the Volkhov River again, this time successfully. Biting into enemy defenses and repelling frequent German counterattacks, it gradually formed a bridgehead up to 60 km deep to the west of the Volkhov River. All army formations crossed to this bridgehead. Its bottleneck, figuratively and literally, remained the neck between Myasny Bor and Spasskaya Polist, connecting it with the eastern bank of the Volkhov. Since February, the Germans have been trying to localize the breakthrough Soviet troops, narrow the corridor of the 2nd Shock Army, or even cut it off completely.

In turn, the Soviet command was preparing to continue the offensive. Great importance was attached to the capture of the city and the Lyuban railway station. The 2nd Shock Army approached it from the south. The 54th Army of the Leningrad Front attacked from the north. With the capture of Lyuban, the German group in the area of ​​Chudovo station would have been cut off.

On February 25, the 2nd Shock Army resumed its offensive and three days later, individual units reached the outskirts of Lyuban. But the Germans restored the situation with a counterattack. By this time, Soviet offensives on Kharkov and Dnepropetrovsk, near Vyazma and Rzhev had failed. The headquarters, however, planned to try their luck in the Leningrad direction. On March 9, a group of its representatives led by Marshal Kliment Voroshilov and GKO member Georgy Malenkov arrived at the headquarters of the Volkhov Front “to strengthen it.” The group also included General Vlasov.

Meanwhile, the front command already knew from the prisoners that the Germans were going to go on the offensive with the goal of cutting off the 2nd Shock Army in the bridgehead. The information was true: the decision on this offensive was made on March 2 at a meeting with Hitler.

2nd drum environment

On March 15, 1942, the Germans launched an offensive on both sides of the neck that connected the 2nd strike with the “mainland”. Fierce fighting raged here until April 8. Several times the Germans managed to cut the corridor at Myasny Bor, but Soviet troops again restored it in counterattacks. In the end, the corridor remained with the Soviet troops, but the ability to supply the army along it sharply deteriorated: in mid-April, ice drift and flooding on the Volkhov began, and enemy aircraft dominated the clear spring sky.

The failure of the offensive was followed by organizational conclusions. The commander of the 2nd Shock Army, Klykov, was dismissed and replaced by Vlasov. The Volkhov Front was abolished and a group of troops became part of the Leningrad Front. Based on Vlasov’s report, General Khozin sent a proposal to Headquarters to stop further offensive attempts and withdraw the 2nd Shock Army beyond the Volkhov. On May 12, the Headquarters agreed to this. The withdrawal of the 2nd strike from the “bag” began.

In the first days, we managed to withdraw a cavalry corps, a tank brigade, two rifle divisions and two brigades. But on May 22, the Germans went on the offensive with the goal of cutting off the escape route for the remaining units, which they succeeded in doing. Seven divisions and six brigades, numbering more than 40 thousand soldiers, 873 guns and mortars, were completely surrounded. Attempts to break through the encirclement again and ensure the supply of troops in the “cauldron” by air did not lead to success.

On June 9, the Volkhov Front, led by Meretskov, was restored. He was tasked with saving the 2nd strike. In fierce battles on June 22, it was possible to establish land communication with it. By this time, the bridgehead of the 2nd strike had narrowed so that it was shot right through by German artillery. Over the next three days, the corridor was either cut by the Germans or restored again. Several times the 2nd strike, on Vlasov’s orders, went for a breakthrough. On June 25, the ring closed completely.

Surrender of Vlasov

General Vlasov, until the last moment, while there were still chances to save the army, remained with it and led the operation on the western bank of the Volkhov. After the Germans established complete control over the breakthrough area, Vlasov gave the order to the remaining units to break out of the encirclement as best they could. Vlasov himself headed a group of staff workers. He had already emerged from encirclement in September 1941 near Kiev, when he commanded the 37th Army. This time he failed. His group dispersed. Vlasov himself was captured by the Germans on July 11, 1942.

It is obvious that until the moment of capture, Vlasov did not plan to cooperate with the enemy. Otherwise, he would have announced the surrender of the 2nd strike even earlier. This would be an unprecedented precedent during the Great Patriotic War, which would have a great resonance in the world, and in addition would greatly increase Vlasov’s shares with his new owners. But he didn’t go for it then. The betrayal began later - when Vlasov, in captivity, proposed to the Germans to create an army of collaborators.

This summer, search groups, who had a little money from the Ministry of Defense for their search, were brought for a week to raise and bury a grandfather who fought in the 42nd in the 2nd Shock. He is 86 years old (God bless him), he is a former junior military technician of the 1102nd rifle regiment, and miraculously survived. At the funeral he began to speak his mind:

""" If Vlasov had not appeared in April 1942, we would all have died here. Our group took the regiment's banner out of the encirclement, several people from the regiment headquarters left us here, if not for Vlasov, Khozin would have rotted us here (general Khozin commanded the Leningrad Front and temporarily the 2nd Shock) We stood here because Vlasov was with us. We stood tightly all spring, Vlasov every day, either in the artillery regiment, then with us, then with the anti-aircraft gunners - always with us, if it weren’t for the general if we would have given up back in May"""
The cameras were immediately turned off, the organizers began to make excuses that the old man was in captivity, etc. And the grandfather went wild, little puny, almost no hair, and began to scald: “We ate bark before Vlasov, and drank water from the swamp, we were animals, our 327th division was CROSSED OUT from the Leningrad Front’s food certificates (Khrushchev later restored the Voronezh 327th Yu).

The death of the 1102nd Infantry Regiment, the feat of these Voronezh guys, is not noted anywhere. They died (the regiment died, unlike other units that surrendered) in battle. In all materials of TsAMO, the 1102nd regiment died a heroic death. It is not in the reports of the Volkhov Front, it is not in the reports of the Leningrad Front, there is no 1102nd infantry regiment yet, there are no fighters. There are no 1102nd regiments.

On March 9, A. Vlasov flew to the headquarters of the Volkhov Front, on 03/10/42 he was already at CP 2 Ud.A in Ogoreli, and on 03/12/42 he led the battle to capture the ill-fated Krasnaya Gorka, which was taken by the 327th Infantry Division along with the 259th Infantry Division, 46th Infantry Division, 22 and 53 OBR 03/14/42. Krasnaya Gorka is almost the farthest section of the ring; staff commanders almost never came there, limiting themselves to control through an intermediate point in Ozerye, where there was a small task force of officers, medical battalions, a food warehouse, and the place was not marshy. Krasnaya Gorka had no significance, but it was like a thorn. And then a whole lieutenant general appeared with her and immediately established control and interaction between the formations, since they often beat each other, especially at night. Then the Germans blocked the corridor at Myasnoy Bor for the first time on March 16, 1942. The blame for this lies entirely with the commanders of 59 and 52 A (Galanin and Yakovlev) and the front commander Meretskov. He then personally led the clearing of the corridor, sending 376 Rifle Division there and pouring in 3,000 non-Russian reinforcements 2 days before. Those who came under bombing for the first time, some died (many), some fled without breaking through the corridor. One regiment commander, Khatemkin (as he was called - both Kotenkin and Kotenochkin) shot himself after that. Meretskov was confused, he clearly speaks about this in his memoirs. The main action to break through the ring was carried out by 2 Ud.A itself from the inside. Who do you think led these efforts? That's right, A. Vlasov, personally commanding in the area east of Novaya Keresti units of the 58th Specialized Brigade and 7th Guards Tank Brigade, as well as courses for junior lieutenants.

During his stay in the 2nd Ud.A from March 9 to June 25, 1942, Lieutenant General A. Vlasov did everything he could, as a military man and as a person, including while surrounded at Myasny Bor. In a situation where, instead of food and ammunition, fresh newspapers are dumped into the cauldron, it is unlikely that anyone would have done more. When, at the moment of the greatest concentration of people around (by the way, the majority who had time, dressed in clean clothes, going to last Stand, fortunately, they managed to bring in supplies of new underwear and summer uniforms before the complete encirclement) before the breakthrough on the night of 06/25/42 west of the Polist River, 20 minutes before the appointed hour, 2 regiments of guards mortars (28 and 30 Guards Minp) delivered a concentrated attack directly on them with four regimental volleys, there is no time for sentimentality. Nevertheless, even on the night of June 25, 1942, he made an attempt to exit the ring towards the bullet of Lavrenty Palych, trying to refuse the task assigned to him, but fate did not...

Three times loyal general. The last secret of Andrei Vlasov.

So - autumn 1941. The Germans attack Kyiv. However, they cannot take the city. The defense has been greatly strengthened. And it is headed by a forty-year-old Major General of the Red Army, commander of the 37th Army, Andrei Vlasov. A legendary figure in the army. He has gone all the way - from private to general. He went through the civil war, graduated from the Nizhny Novgorod theological seminary, and studied at the Academy of the General Staff of the Red Army. Friend of Mikhail Blucher. Just before the war, Andrei Vlasov, then still a colonel, was sent to China as military advisers to Chai-kan-shi. He received the Order of the Golden Dragon and a gold watch as a reward, which aroused the envy of all the generals of the Red Army. However, Vlasov was not happy for long. Upon returning home, at the Alma-Ata customs, the order itself, as well as other generous gifts from Generalissimo Chai-kan-shi, were confiscated by the NKVD...

Even Soviet historians were forced to admit that the Germans “got punched in the face for the first time,” precisely from the mechanized corps of General Vlasov.

This has never happened in the history of the Red Army, possessing only 15 tanks, General Vlasov stopped Walter Model’s tank army in the Moscow suburb of Solnechegorsk, and pushed back the Germans, who were already preparing for the parade on Moscow’s Red Square, 100 kilometers away, liberating three cities.. There was something to earn him the nickname “Savior of Moscow.” After the battle of Moscow, the general was appointed deputy commander of the Volkhov Front.

Andrei Vlasov understood that he was flying to his death. As a person who had gone through the crucible of this war near Kiev and Moscow, he knew that the army was doomed, and no miracle would save it. Even if this miracle is himself - General Andrei Vlasov, the savior of Moscow.

Troops 59 A already from 12/29/41 fought to break through enemy fortifications on the river. Volkhov, suffering heavy losses in the zone from Lezno - Vodosje to Sosninskaya Pristan.
The commissioning of 2 Ud.A only complemented the almost continuous attacks of formations 52 and 59 A, the battles took place on January 7 and 8.
The target of the offensive of 2 Ud.A also on January 27 was not Lyuban, but the city of Tosno; on 02/10-12/42 a joint offensive of 2 Ud.A from the south, 55 A from the north, 54 A from the east, 4 and 59 A from southeast in the direction of Tosno, but it did not happen for a number of reasons; only at the end of the 3rd decade of February did the redirection of attacks from 2 Ud.A to Lyuban take shape, in order to at least cut off the Germans in the Chudovsky Cauldron; 54 A also hit there in March.
59 A did not have any instructions to connect with 4 A, it was breaking through the German defense to connect with 2 Ud.A, advancing from the southwest both towards Lyuban and towards Chudovo; 59 A, putting more than 60% of its initial l / s, was withdrawn to the south into the breakthrough zone, and its strip north of Gruzino was occupied by 4 A; to unite with 4 Moreover, there was no need due to the fact that both armies had the closest connection in the elbow connection in the Gruzino region.
The Germans blocked the corridor at Myasny Bor for the first time not on 03/16/42; the corridor was restored only on March 28, 1942 with a narrow thread of 2 km.
General A. Vlasov flew to 2 Ud.A already on 03/10/42, by 03/12/42 he was already in the Krasnaya Gorka area, which, under his leadership, on 03/14/42 units of 2 Ud.A were able to take; from 03/20/42 he was transferred to lead the breakthrough of the intercepted corridor from inside the boiler, which he did - the corridor was broken through from the inside, not without help, of course, from the outside.
On May 13, 1942, not only I. Zuev flew to Malaya Vishera - how can one imagine the flight of only one member of the Military Council without the army commander to report to the front commander M. Khozin; All three flew out for the report - Vlasov, Zuev, Vinogradov (NS Army); there was no talk of any hopelessness in Vlasov’s report; There, a counter-offensive plan was approved 2 Ud. and 59 And towards each other by cutting off the German “finger” hanging over the corridor - in TsAMO there are maps, sweepingly signed by Vlasov’s hand (approximately as in the photo) with an offensive plan and dated around 05/13/42; the plan for a joint offensive appeared because before that the attempt of the 59th A alone to break through the “finger” from the outside with the forces of the Arkhangelsk fresh 2nd Infantry Division towards its own 24th Guards, 259th and 267th Infantry Division inside ended in complete failure, while the 2nd Infantry Division lost on the battlefield in 14 days, 80% of their fighters were surrounded and barely escaped with the remnants.
The withdrawal of troops did not begin on 05/23/42, and the headquarters near the village of Ogoreli was moved by fire due to the news of the appearance of the Germans in the village of Dubovik in the rear of our troops (and this was just reconnaissance), the troops behind the headquarters panicked, but quickly recovered; the withdrawal was not massive, but planned, this is a more precise word, since they retreated along lines that had been previously developed and approved and prepared in detail.
The first time the corridor was breached was on 06/19/42, it lasted until the evening of 06/22/42, during which time about 14,000 people came out.
On the night of June 25, 1942, a decisive assault was planned. positions, before this our units received a massive attack in their concentrated battle formations at 22.40-22.55 by several regimental salvoes of two regiments of our RS (28 Guards and 30 Guards Minp); from 23.30 the units began to break through, about 7,000 people came out; The fighting inside the ring continued actively for another 2 days.

The total number of our prisoners from units 2 Ud.A in the cauldron ranged from 23,000 to 33,000 people. together with several parts 52 and 59 A; About 7,000 people died in the cauldron and during a breakthrough from inside.
http://www.soldat.ru/forum/viewtopic.php?f=2&t=23515

Note to the head of the special department of the NKVD of the Volkhov Front

To Senior Major of State Security Comrade MELNIKOV

In accordance with the tasks set by you for the period of your business trip in the 59th Army from 06/21 to 06/28/42, I report:

By the end of the day on June 21, 1942, units of the 59th Army broke through the enemy defenses in the Myasnoy Bor area and formed a corridor along the narrow-gauge railway. approximately 700–800 meters wide.

In order to hold the corridor, units of the 59th Army turned their front to the south and north and occupied combat areas parallel to the narrow-gauge railway.

A group of troops covering the corridor from the north with its left flank, and a group covering the corridor from the south with its right flank, bordered the pore. Gain weight...

By the time units of the 59th Army reached the river. It turned out that the message from Shtarm-2 about the allegedly occupied lines of the 2nd Shock Army along the river. To gain weight were unfaithful. (Base: report of the commander of the 24th Rifle Brigade)

Thus, there was no ulnar connection between units of the 59th Army and the 2nd Shock Army. This connection did not exist subsequently.

The resulting corridor on the night from 21 to 22.06. Food products were delivered to the 2nd Shock Army by people and on horses.

From 21.06. and until recently, the corridor was under fire from enemy mortar and artillery fire; at times, individual machine gunners and machine gunners infiltrated into it.

On the night of June 21-22, 1942, units of the 2nd Shock Army advanced towards units of the 59th Army, approximately in the corridor with forces: the first echelon of the 46th Division, the second echelon of the 57th and 25th Brigades. Having reached the junction with units of the 59th Army, these formations went through the corridor to the rear of the 59th Army.

In total, on the day of June 22, 1942, 6,018 wounded people and about 1,000 people left the 2nd Shock Army. healthy soldiers and commanders. Both among the wounded and among the healthy there were people from most of the formations of the 2nd Shock Army.

From 06/22/42 to 06/25/42 no one left the 2nd UA. During this period, the corridor remained on the western bank of the river. Gain weight. The enemy fired strong mortar and artillery fire. fire. In the corridor itself there was also infiltration of machine gunners. Thus, the exit of units of the 2nd Shock Army was possible with battle.

On the night of June 24-25, 1942, a detachment under the overall command of Colonel KORKIN, formed from Red Army soldiers and commanders of the 2nd Shock Army who emerged from encirclement on June 22, 1942, was sent to reinforce units of the 59th Army and secure the corridor. measures taken to resist the enemy in the corridor and on the western bank of the river. The plumpness was broken. Units of the 2nd UA moved in a common flow from approximately 2.00 on June 25, 1942.

Due to almost continuous enemy air raids during 06/25/42, the flow of people leaving the 2nd UA was stopped at 8.00. On this day, approximately 6,000 people came out. (according to the calculations of the counter standing at the exit), 1,600 of them were sent to hospitals.

From surveys of commanders, Red Army soldiers and operational personnel of the Special Divisions of the formations, it is obvious that the leading commanders of units and formations of the 2nd UA, when organizing the withdrawal of units from encirclement, did not count on leaving in battle, as evidenced by the following facts.

Detective officer 1st department OO NKVD front lieutenant state. security comrade ISAEV was in the 2nd Shock Army. In a report addressed to me, he writes:

“On June 22, it was announced in hospitals and units that those who wish could go to Myasnoy Bor. Groups of 100–200 soldiers and commanders, lightly wounded, moved to M. Bor without orientation, without signs and without group leaders, ending up on the front line of the enemy’s defense and captured by the Germans. Before my eyes, a group of 50 people wandered into the Germans and were captured. Another group of 150 people walked towards the German front line of defense, and only with the intervention of a group of the Special Department of 92 pages div. switching to the enemy's side was prevented.

At 20 o'clock on June 24, by order of the division's logistics chief, Major BEGUNA, the entire division's personnel, about 300 people, set off along the clearing of the central communication line to M. Bor. Along the way, I observed the movement of similar columns from other brigades and divisions, numbering up to 3,000 people.

The column, having passed from the Drovyanoe Pole clearing up to 3 km, was met by a strong barrage of machine gun, mortar and artillery fire. enemy fire, after which the command was given to move back to a distance of 50 meters. When retreating back, there was mass panic and groups fleeing through the forest. We split into small groups and scattered through the forest, not knowing what to do next. Each person or small group solved their further task independently. There was no single leadership for the entire column.

Group 92 page div. 100 people decided to go the other way, along the narrow-gauge railway. As a result, we passed through a barrage of fire to Myasnoy Bor with some losses.”

The detective officer of the 25th Infantry Brigade, political instructor SHCHERBAKOV, writes in his report:

“June 24 this year. From early morning, a barrier detachment was organized, which detained all passing military personnel capable of carrying weapons. Together with the remnants of units and subunits, the brigades were divided into three companies. In each company, an operative, an employee of the NKVD OO, was assigned for maintenance.

When reaching the starting line, the command did not take into account the fact that the first and second companies had not yet moved to the starting line.

Having pushed the third company forward, we placed it under heavy enemy mortar fire.

The company command was confused and could not provide leadership to the company. The company, having reached the flooring under enemy mortar fire, scattered in different directions.

The group moved to the right side of the flooring, where there were detective officer KOROLKOV, platoon commander - ml. Lieutenant KU-ZOVLEV, several soldiers of the OO platoon and other units of the brigade, came across enemy bunkers and lay down under enemy mortar fire. The group consisted of only 18–20 people.

The group could not attack the enemy in such numbers, so the platoon commander KUZOVLEV suggested returning to the starting line, joining other units and leaving on the left side of the narrow-gauge railway, where enemy fire was much weaker.

Concentrating on the edge of the forest, the head of the OO comrade. PLAKHAT-NIK found Major KONONOV from the 59th Infantry Brigade, joined his group with his people, with whom they moved to the narrow-gauge railway and left together with the 59th Rifle Brigade.”

Operative officer of the 6th Guard. of the mortar division, state security lieutenant Comrade LUKASHEVICH writes about the 2nd division:

- All brigade personnel, both privates and commanders, were informed that the exit would begin by assault at exactly 23.00 on June 24, 1942 from the starting line of the river. Gain weight. The first echelon was the 3rd battalion, the second echelon was the second battalion. No one from the brigade command, service chiefs, or battalion commands came out of the encirclement due to the delay at the command post. Having broken away from the main body of the brigade and, obviously, starting to move in a small group, one must assume that they died along the way.

An operative of the Front's OO reserve, Captain GORNOSTAYEV, working at the concentration point of the 2nd Shock Army, had a conversation with those who had escaped the encirclement, about which he writes:

“Through our workers, commanders and soldiers who came out, it is established that all units and formations were given a specific task about the order and interaction of entering the formation in battle. However, during this operation, a disaster occurred, small units were confused, and instead of a fist, there were small groups and even individuals. The commanders, for the same reasons, could not control the battle. This happened as a result of heavy enemy fire.

There is no way to establish the actual position of all the parts, because no one knows. They declare that there is no food, many groups are rushing from place to place, and no one will bother to organize all these groups and fight to connect.

This is how the situation in the 2nd Shock Army that developed at the time of its exit and when it left the encirclement is briefly characterized.

It was known that the Military Council of the 2nd Shock Army was supposed to leave on the morning of June 25, but their exit did not take place.

From conversations with Deputy Head of the NKVD OO of the 2nd Shock Army Art. State Security Lieutenant Comrade GORBOV, with the soldiers accompanying the Military Council of the Army, with the driver of the Member of the Military Council, comrade. ZUEVA, from Beginning. chemical services of the Army, the Prosecutor of the Army and other persons, to one degree or another, aware of the attempt to escape from the encirclement of the Military Council, the following is obvious:

The Military Council came out with security measures in front and from the rear. Having encountered enemy fire resistance on the river. Plump, head guard under the command of Deputy. The head of the 2nd Shock Army, Comrade GORBOV, took the lead and went to the exit, while the Military Council and rear guards remained on the western bank of the river. Gain weight.

This fact is indicative in the sense that even when the Military Council left, there was no organization of the battle and control of the troops was lost.

Persons who went out individually and in small groups after June 25 of this year know nothing about the fate of the Military Council.

To summarize, it should be concluded that the organization of the withdrawal of the 2nd Shock Army suffered from serious shortcomings. On the one hand, due to the lack of interaction between the 59th and 2nd Shock Armies to secure the corridor, which largely depended on the leadership of the Front headquarters, on the other hand, due to confusion and loss of control of the troops of the 2nd Shock Army headquarters and headquarters connections when leaving the environment.

As of June 30, 1942, 4,113 healthy soldiers and commanders were counted at the concentration point, among them there were persons who came from encirclement under very strange circumstances, for example: on June 27, 1942, one Red Army soldier came out and said that he lay in the crater and is now returning. When he was asked to eat, he refused, declaring that he was full. The route to the exit was described by a route that was unusual for everyone.

It is possible that German intelligence used the moment of leaving the encirclement of the 2nd UA to send in converted Red Army soldiers and commanders who had previously been captured by them.

From a conversation with Deputy I know from the head of the PA Army - Comrade GORBOV that in the 2nd UA there were facts of group betrayal, especially among Chernigov residents. Comrade GORBOV in the presence of the Head. OO 59th Army Comrade NIKITIN said that 240 people from Chernigov betrayed their Motherland.

In the first days of June, in the 2nd UA there was an extraordinary betrayal of the Motherland on the part of the assistant. the head of the encryption department of the Army headquarters - MALYUK and an attempt to betray the Motherland by two more employees of the encryption department.

All these circumstances suggest the need for a thorough check of all personnel of the 2nd UA by strengthening security measures.

Beginning 1 branch of the NKVD organization

Captain of State Security - KOLESNIKOV.

Top secret
DEPUTY People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR to Commissar of State Security 1st Rank Comrade ABAKUMOV

REPORT

About the disruption of the military operation

On the withdrawal of troops of the 2nd Shock Army

From the enemy environment
According to agent data, interviews with commanders and soldiers of the 2nd Shock Army who emerged from encirclement, and personal visits to the site during combat operations of units and formations of the 2nd, 52nd and 59th armies, it was established:

The enemy managed to encircle the 2nd Shock Army consisting of the 22, 23, 25, 53, 57, 59th Rifle Brigades and 19, 46. 93, 259, 267, 327, 282 and 305th Rifle Divisions only because the criminally negligent attitude of the front commander, Lieutenant General Khozin, who did not ensure the implementation of the Headquarters directive on the timely withdrawal of army troops from Lyuban and the organization of military operations in the Spasskaya Polist area.

Having taken command of the front, Khozin from the village area. Olkhovki and the Gazhi Sopki swamps brought the 4th, 24th and 378th rifle divisions into front reserve.

The enemy, taking advantage of this, built a narrow-gauge railway through the forest to the west of Spasskaya Polist and freely began to accumulate troops to attack the communications of the 2nd Shock Army Myasnoy Bor - Novaya Kerest.

The front command did not strengthen the defense of communications of the 2nd Shock Army. The northern and southern roads of the 2nd Shock Army were covered by the weak 65th and 372nd Rifle Divisions, stretched out in a line without sufficient firepower on insufficiently prepared defensive lines.

The 372nd Rifle Division by this time occupied a defense sector with a combat strength of 2,796 people, stretching 12 km from the village of Mostki to mark 39.0, which is 2 km north of the narrow-gauge railway.

The 65th Red Banner Rifle Division occupied a 14 km long defense sector with a combat strength of 3,708 people, stretching from the corner of the forest of the southern clearing of the flour mill to the barn 1 km from the village of Krutik.

The commander of the 59th Army, Major General Korovnikov, hastily approved the raw diagram of the division's defensive structures, presented by the commander of the 372nd Infantry Division, Colonel Sorokin; the defense headquarters did not check it.

As a result, of the 11 bunkers built by the 8th company of the 3rd regiment of the same division, seven turned out to be unusable.

The front commander Khozin and the front chief of staff, Major General Stelmakh, knew that the enemy was concentrating troops against this division and that they would not provide defense of the communications of the 2nd Shock Army, but they did not take measures to strengthen the defense of these sectors, having reserves at their disposal.

On May 30, the enemy, after artillery and air preparation with the help of tanks, launched an attack on the right flank of the 311th Regiment of the 65th Infantry Division.

The 2, 7 and 8 companies of this regiment, having lost 100 soldiers and four tanks, retreated.

To restore the situation, a company of machine gunners was sent out, which, having suffered losses, withdrew.

The Military Council of the 52nd Army threw its last reserves into battle - the 54th Guards Rifle Regiment with a reinforcement of 370 people. The replenishment was introduced into battle on the move, uncoupled, and at the first contact with the enemy they scattered and were stopped by barrage detachments of special departments.

The Germans, having pushed back units of the 65th Division, came close to the village of Teremets-Kurlyandsky and cut off the 305th Infantry Division with their left flank.

At the same time, the enemy, advancing in the sector of the 1236th Infantry Regiment of the 372nd Infantry Division, broke through the weak defenses, dismembered the second echelon of the reserve 191st Infantry Division, reached the narrow-gauge railway in the area of ​​\u200b\u200bmark 40.5 and linked up with the advancing units from South.

The commander of the 191st Rifle Division repeatedly raised the question with the commander of the 59th Army, Major General Korovnikov, about the need and advisability of withdrawing the 191st Rifle Division to Myasnoy Bor in order to create a strong defense along the northern road.

Korovnikov did not take any measures, and the 191st Rifle Division, inactive and not erecting defensive structures, remained standing in the swamp.

Front commander Khozin and commander of the 59th Army Korovnikov, being aware of the concentration of the enemy, still believed that the defense of the 372nd division had been broken through by a small group of machine gunners, and, therefore, reserves were not brought into battle, which enabled the enemy to cut off the 2nd shock army.

Only on June 1, 1942, the 165th Infantry Division was brought into battle without artillery support, which, having lost 50 percent of its soldiers and commanders, did not improve the situation.

Instead of organizing the battle, Khozin withdrew the division from the battle and transferred it to another sector, replacing it with the 374th Infantry Division, which moved back somewhat at the time of the change of units of the 165th Infantry Division.

The available forces were not brought into battle in a timely manner; on the contrary, Khozin suspended the offensive and began moving division commanders:

He removed the commander of the 165th Infantry Division, Colonel Solenov, and appointed Colonel Morozov as the division commander, releasing him from the post of commander of the 58th Infantry Brigade.

Instead of the commander of the 58th Infantry Brigade, the commander of the 1st Infantry Battalion, Major Gusak, was appointed.

The chief of staff of the division, Major Nazarov, was also removed and Major Dzyuba was appointed in his place; at the same time, the commissar of the 165th Infantry Division, senior battalion commissar Ilish, was also removed.

In the 372nd Rifle Division, the division commander, Colonel Sorokin, was removed and Colonel Sinegubko was appointed in his place.

The regrouping of troops and the replacement of commanders dragged on until June 10. During this time, the enemy managed to create bunkers and strengthen the defense.

By the time it was surrounded by the enemy, the 2nd Shock Army found itself in an extremely difficult situation; the divisions numbered from two to three thousand soldiers, exhausted due to malnutrition and overworked by continuous battles.

From 12.VI. to 18.VI. 1942, soldiers and commanders were given 400 g of horse meat and 100 g of crackers, on subsequent days they were given from 10 g to 50 g of crackers, on some days the fighters received no food at all; which increased the number of exhausted fighters, and deaths from starvation appeared.

Deputy beginning The political department of the 46th division, Zubov, detained a soldier of the 57th rifle brigade, Afinogenov, who was cutting a piece of meat from the corpse of a killed Red Army soldier for food. Having been detained, Afinogenov died of exhaustion on the way.

Food and ammunition in the army ran out, they were transported by air due to white nights and the loss of the landing site near the village. Finev Meadow was essentially impossible. Due to the negligence of the army's logistics chief, Colonel Kresik, the ammunition and food dropped by planes into the army were not fully collected.
Total Sent to the Army Collected by the Army 7.62mm rounds 1,027,820 682,708 76mm rounds 2,222 1,416 14.5mm rounds 1,792 Not received 37mm anti-aircraft rounds 1,590 570 122mm rounds 288 136

The position of the 2nd Shock Army became extremely complicated after the enemy broke through the defense line of the 327th Division in the Finev Lug area.

The command of the 2nd Army - Lieutenant General Vlasov and the division commander, Major General Antyufeev - did not organize the defense of the swamp west of Finev Lug, which the enemy took advantage of, entering the division's flank.

The retreat of the 327th division led to panic, the army commander, Lieutenant General Vlasov, was confused, did not take decisive measures to detain the enemy, who advanced to Novaya Keresti and subjected the rear of the army to artillery fire, cut off the 19th Guards and 305th from the main forces of the army rifle divisions.

Units of the 92nd Division found themselves in a similar situation, where, with an attack from Olkhovka by two infantry regiments with 20 tanks, the Germans, with the support of aviation, captured the lines occupied by this division.

The commander of the 92nd Rifle Division, Colonel Zhiltsov, showed confusion and lost control at the very beginning of the battle for Olkhovka.

The withdrawal of our troops along the Kerest River line significantly worsened the entire position of the army. By this time, the enemy artillery had already begun to sweep the entire depth of the 2nd Army with fire.

The ring around the army closed. The enemy, having crossed the Kerest River, entered the flank, penetrated our battle formations and launched an attack on the army command post in the Drovyanoye Pole area.

The army command post turned out to be unprotected; a special department company of 150 people was brought into battle, which pushed back the enemy and fought with him for 24 hours - June 23. The military council and army headquarters were forced to change their location, destroying communications facilities and, essentially, losing control of the troops. The commander of the 2nd Army, Vlasov, and the chief of staff, Vinogradov, showed confusion, did not lead the battle, and subsequently lost all control of the troops.

This was used by the enemy, who freely penetrated into the rear of our troops and caused panic.

On June 24, Vlasov decides to withdraw the army headquarters and rear institutions in marching order. The entire column was a peaceful crowd with disorderly movement, unmasked and noisy.

The enemy subjected the marching column to artillery and mortar fire. The Military Council of the 2nd Army with a group of commanders lay down and did not emerge from the encirclement. The commanders heading for the exit safely arrived at the location of the 59th Army. In just two days, June 22 and 23, 13,018 people emerged from encirclement, of which 7,000 were wounded.

The subsequent escape from the encirclement of the enemy by the 2nd Army soldiers took place in separate small groups.

It has been established that Vlasov, Vinogradov and other senior officials of the army headquarters fled in panic, withdrew from the leadership of combat operations and did not announce their location, they kept it under wraps.

The military council of the army, in particular in the persons of Zuev and Lebedev, showed complacency and did not stop the panicky actions of Vlasov and Vinogradov, broke away from them, this increased the confusion in the troops.

On the part of the head of the special department of the army, state security major Shashkov, decisive measures were not taken in a timely manner to restore order and prevent betrayal at the army headquarters itself:

On June 2, 1942, during the most intense combat period, he betrayed his Motherland - he went over to the enemy’s side with encrypted documents - pom. beginning 8th Department of the Army Headquarters, 2nd Rank Quartermaster Technician Semyon Ivanovich Malyuk, who gave the enemy the location of the 2nd Shock Army units and the location of the army command post. There have been cases of voluntary surrender to the enemy by some unstable military personnel.

On July 10, 1942, German intelligence agents Nabokov and Kadyrov, who we arrested, testified that during the interrogation of captured servicemen of the 2nd Shock Army, the following were present in the German intelligence agencies: the commander of the 25th Infantry Brigade, Colonel Sheludko, the assistant chief of the army's operational department, Major Verstkin, a quartermaster of the 1st rank. Zhukovsky, deputy commander of the 2nd Shock Army, Colonel Goryunov, and a number of others who betrayed the command and political composition of the army to the German authorities.

Having taken command of the Volkhov Front, Army General Comrade. Meretskov led a group of troops of the 59th Army to join forces with the 2nd Shock Army. From 21 to 22 June this year. units of the 59th Army broke through the enemy defenses in the Myasnoy Bor area and formed a corridor 800 m wide.

To hold the corridor, army units turned their front to the south and north and occupied combat areas along the narrow-gauge railway.

By the time units of the 59th Army reached the Polnet River, it became clear that the command of the 2nd Shock Army, represented by Chief of Staff Vinogradov, had misinformed the front and had not occupied defensive lines on the western bank of the Polnet River. Thus, there was no ulnar connection between the armies.

On June 22, a significant amount of food was delivered to the resulting corridor for units of the 2nd Shock Army by people and on horseback. The command of the 2nd Shock Army, organizing the exit of units from the encirclement, did not count on leaving in battle, did not take measures to strengthen and expand the main communications at Spasskaya Polist and did not hold the gate.

Due to almost continuous enemy air raids and shelling of ground troops on a narrow section of the front, exit for units of the 2nd Shock Army became difficult.

Confusion and loss of control of the battle on the part of the command of the 2nd Shock Army completely aggravated the situation.

The enemy took advantage of this and closed the corridor.

Subsequently, the commander of the 2nd Shock Army, Lieutenant General Vlasov, was completely at a loss, and the chief of staff of the army, Major General Vinogradov, took the initiative into his own hands.

He kept his latest plan a secret and didn’t tell anyone about it. Vlasov was indifferent to this.

Both Vinogradov and Vlasov did not escape the encirclement. According to the chief of communications of the 2nd Shock Army, Major General Afanasyev, who was delivered on July 11 on a U-2 plane from behind enemy lines, they walked through the forest in the Oredezhsky region towards Staraya Russa.

The whereabouts of members of the military council Zuev and Lebedev are unknown.

The head of the special department of the NKVD of the 2nd Shock Army, State Security Major Shashkov, was wounded and shot himself.

We continue the search for the military council of the 2nd Shock Army by sending agents behind enemy lines and partisan detachments.

Head of the special department of the NKVD of the Volkhov Front Senior Major of State Security MELNIKOV

REFERENCE

Army Commander - Major General VLASOV
Member of the Military Council - divisional commissar ZUEV
Chief of Army Staff - Colonel VINOGRADOV
Beginning Special Department of the Army - State Major. safety checkers

In January 1942, the 2nd Shock Army was tasked with breaking through the enemy’s defense line in the Spasskaya Polist - Myasnoy Bor sector, with the task of pushing the enemy to the northwest, jointly with the 54th Army, capturing the Lyuban station, cutting the Oktyabrskaya railway , completing its operation by participating in the general defeat of the enemy’s Chudov group by the Volkhov Front.
Fulfilling the assigned task, the 2nd Shock Army on January 20–22 of this year. broke through the enemy's defense front in an area of ​​8–10 km indicated to her, brought all units of the army into the breakthrough, and for 2 months, in persistent bloody battles with the enemy, advanced to Lyuban, bypassing Lyuban from the southwest.
The indecisive actions of the 54th Army of the Leningrad Front, which was marching to join the 2nd Shock Army from the northeast, extremely slowed down its advance. By the end of February, the offensive impulse of the 2nd Shock Army ran out of steam and the advance stopped in the area of ​​Krasnaya Gorka, southwest of Lyuban.
The 2nd Shock Army, pushing back the enemy, drove into its defenses in a wedge stretching 60–70 km through wooded and swampy terrain.
Despite repeated attempts to expand the initial breakthrough line, which is a kind of corridor, no success was achieved...
March 20–21 this year the enemy managed to cut off the communications of the 2nd Shock Army, closing the corridor, with the intention of tightening the ring of encirclement and complete destruction.
Through the efforts of the 2nd Shock Army, units of the 52nd and 59th armies, the corridor was opened on March 28th.
May 25 this year Headquarters of the Supreme High Command gave the order from June 1 to begin the withdrawal of units of the 2nd Shock Army to the southeast, i.e. in the opposite direction through the corridor.
On June 2, the enemy closed the corridor for the second time, having carried out a complete encirclement of the army. From that time on, the army began to be supplied with ammunition and food by air.
On June 21, in a narrow area 1–2 km wide in the same corridor, the enemy’s front line was broken through for the second time and the organized withdrawal of units of the 2nd Shock Army began.
June 25 this year the enemy managed to close the corridor for the third time and stop leaving our units. From that time on, the enemy forced us to stop supplying the army with air due to the large loss of our aircraft.
Headquarters of the Supreme High Command on May 21 this year. ordered units of the 2nd Shock Army, retreating from the northwest to the southeast, firmly covering themselves at the Olkhovka-Lake Tigoda line from the west, striking the main forces of the army from the west and simultaneously striking the 59th Army from the east to destroy the enemy in the Priyutino-Spasskaya salient Polish...
Commander of the Leningrad Front, Lieutenant General KHOZIN hesitated to carry out the order from Headquarters, citing the impossibility of moving equipment off-road and the need to build new roads. By the beginning of June this year. units did not begin to withdraw, but to the General Staff of the Red Army, signed by KHOZIN and the beginning. Staff of the STELMAKH front sent a report about the beginning of the withdrawal of army units. As it was later established, KHOZIN and STELMAKH deceived the General Staff, by this time the 2nd Shock Army was just beginning to pull back the rear of its formations.
The 59th Army acted very indecisively, launched several unsuccessful attacks and did not complete the tasks set by Headquarters.
Thus, by June 21 this year. formations of the 2nd Shock Army in the amount of 8 rifle divisions and 6 rifle brigades (35-37 thousand people), with three regiments of the RGK 100 guns, as well as about 1000 vehicles, concentrated in an area several kilometers south of N. Kerest on an area of ​​6x6 km.
According to data available from the General Staff as of July 1 of this year, 9,600 people with personal weapons left the units of the 2nd Shock Army, including 32 employees of division headquarters and army headquarters. According to unverified data, the head of the Special Barma came out.
According to data sent to the General Staff by an officer of the General Staff, Army Commander VLASOV and member of the Military Council ZUEV on 06.27. They reached the western bank of the Polist River, guarded by 4 machine gunners, ran into the enemy and scattered under his fire; supposedly no one else saw them.
Chief of Staff STELMAKH 25.06. on HF reported that VLASOV and ZUEV reached the western bank of the Polist River. The withdrawal of troops was controlled from the destroyed tank. Their further fate is unknown.
According to the Special Department of the NKVD of the Volkhov Front on June 26 of this year, by the end of the day 14 thousand people had left the units of the 2nd Shock Army. There is no information about the actual position of army units and formations at the front headquarters.
According to the statement of the commissar of a separate communications battalion PESKOV, Army Commander VLASOV and his headquarters commanders were moving towards the exit in the 2nd echelon; the group led by VLASOV came under artillery and mortar fire. VLASOV ordered to destroy all radio stations by burning, which led to the loss of command and control of the troops.
According to the head of the Special Department of the Front, as of June 17 The situation of the army units was extremely difficult; there were numerous cases of exhaustion of soldiers, illnesses from hunger, and an urgent need for ammunition. By this time, according to the General Staff, passenger planes daily supplied air to army units with 7–8 tons of food with a requirement of 17 tons, 1900–2000 shells with a minimum requirement of 40,000, 300,000 rounds, a total of 5 rounds per person.
It should be noted that, according to the latest data received from the General Staff on June 29. this year, a group of military personnel from units of the 2nd Shock Army entered the sector of the 59th Army through enemy rear lines into the area Mikhaleva, with absolutely no losses. Those who came out claim that in this area the enemy forces are few in number, while the passage corridor, now tightened by a strong enemy group and targeted by dozens of batteries of mortars and artillery, with daily intensified air strikes, is today almost inaccessible for the breakthrough of the 2nd Shock Army from the west, as well as the 59th Army from the east.

It is characteristic that the areas through which 40 servicemen leaving the 2nd Shock Army passed were precisely indicated by the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command for the exit of units of the 2nd Shock Army, but neither the Military Council of the 2nd Shock Army nor the Military Council The Volkhov Front did not ensure the implementation of the Headquarters directive.

Introduction

Chapter I. Creation of the Volkhov Front

Chapter II. Lyuban offensive operation

Chapter III. Appointment of Vlasov

Chapter IV. Tragedy of the 2nd Shock

Conclusion

Applications

Bibliography

Introduction

Cursed and killed.

Victor Astafiev

The Great Patriotic War... Just three words, but how much grief, adversity, pain, suffering and heroism lie behind these words. War in any Fatherland gives birth to both its heroes and its traitors. War reveals the essence of events, the essence of every person. War poses a dilemma for everyone: to be or not to be? To die of hunger, but not to touch the unique planting materials, as was the case in besieged Leningrad, or for a ration of bread and additional food to change the oath and cooperate with the enemy?

History is made by people. Ordinary people, not alien to human vices. It is they who elevate or belittle certain circumstances of life.

Victories and defeats... In what way, by what means were they achieved? How many destinies and lives have been ground through the meat grinder of war! There is no clear answer. The only important thing is how a person emerges from the crucible of trials, how he behaves, how his actions even influence the course of history. After all, history is created and written by people.

My choice of the topic of work was influenced by the fact that the history of the combat path of the 2nd Shock Army is interesting to study, especially in the period from January to June 1942. This topic is also interesting because it is inextricably linked with the name of the traitor A.A. Vlasov.

The topic of the 2nd Shock Army is relevant today. Only now, 60 years after the end of the Great Patriotic War, is a rethinking of those distant events taking place, when the political course of the country is changing, more and more archives and sources are being opened, more and more documents and memories of participants in those distant events are being made public, more and more books and articles are appearing. It is not without reason that a few weeks ago a monument to the soldiers of the 2nd Shock Army was unveiled in Myasnoy Bor, Novgorod Region, the opening of which was attended by the Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation S.B. Ivanov.

The purpose of the work is to objectively show what happened to the 2nd Shock Army during the Lyuban operation, what caused it, what events influenced the further fate of Lieutenant General of the Red Army Andrei Andreevich Vlasov. Try to understand how the “Stalinist general” could become not just a traitor, but the leader of the Russian Liberation Army movement. The task is based on the literature of the 2nd Shock Army, the memories of veterans, research work about Vlasov, draw general conclusions.

Speaking of historiography, it must be said that even in recent times, almost everything connected with the 2nd Shock Army and its commander was prohibited. In any case, there was little material and there was one officially accepted point of view - the general and the soldiers of his army - the “Vlasovites” - were traitors. And there is no need to talk a lot about them, study those distant events, analyze them, objectively approaching all the details of that tragedy.

The process of studying the actions of the 2nd Shock, as well as the biography of A.A. Vlasov, began only in the first half of the 90s of the last century. Of course, you can find information about the 2nd Shock Army in the literature of the 1970s - 1980s, but this information is very scarce, and there is no mention of General Vlasov. For example, in the book “On the Volkhov Front” published in 1982, in the table on page 342 in the column of the commander of the 2nd Shock Army in the period from April 16 to July 24, 1942, Vlasov’s surname does not appear. In general, looking at this table, one gets the impression that during this period the 2nd Shock Army disappeared from the Volkhov Front. In the collection of articles “On the Volkhov Front,” Vlasov is also not mentioned.

Most full information You can learn about the military operations and the formation of the 2nd Shock Army from the collection “Lyuban Offensive Operation. January - June 1942." The compilers of the collection K.K. Krupits and I.A. Ivanov objectively described fighting Shock army. But this is already 1994...

Works about the biography of A.A. Vlasov, about his career, as well as about his further activities began to appear only in recent years. All the authors of the works I studied are unanimous in the opinion that Vlasov is a traitor. For example, in N. Konyaev’s book “Two Faces of General Vlasov: Life, Fate, Legends,” the author provides an analysis of the activities of A. A. Vlasov, and also studies his biography in detail. Also interesting is the work of Yu.A. Kvitsinsky. “General Vlasov: the path of betrayal,” which describes in sufficient detail the captivity and further activities of the general.

Important for writing the research were books, memories, memoirs, diaries of other authors, whose names are indicated in the list of used literature.

Today's generation can give an objective assessment of those distant events in accordance with their honor and conscience, moral and ethical priorities.

Chapter I . Creation of the Volkhov Front

The defense of Leningrad occupies one of the most tragic and heroic pages in the history of the Great Patriotic War. The enemy expected to capture Leningrad two weeks after the attack on the USSR. But the resilience and courage of the Red Army and the people's militia thwarted the German plans. Instead of the planned two weeks, the enemy fought his way to Leningrad for 80 days.

From the second half of August to mid-September 1941, German troops tried to storm Leningrad, but did not achieve decisive success and proceeded to blockade and siege of the city. On October 16, 1941, eight German divisions crossed the river. Volkhov and rushed through Tikhvin to the river. Svir to connect with the Finnish army and close the second blockade ring east of Lake Ladoga. War 1941-1945. Facts and documents. M., 2001. P. 111 For Leningrad and the troops of the Leningrad Front, this meant certain death

The enemy, after joining with the Finns, was going to attack Vologda and Yaroslavl, intending to form a new front north of Moscow and, with a simultaneous strike along the October Railway, encircle our troops of the North-Western Front. Under these conditions, the Soviet Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, despite the critical situation near Moscow, found the opportunity to strengthen the 4th, 52nd and 54th armies, which were defending in the Tikhvin direction, with reserves. They launched a counter-offensive and by December 28th drove the Germans back beyond the Volkhov. History of the Order of Lenin of the Leningrad Military District. M., 1974. P. 261.

During these battles, the Soviet Headquarters developed an operation to completely defeat the Germans near Leningrad. To complete the task, the Volkhov Front was formed on December 17. It included the 4th and 52nd armies and two new armies from the Headquarters reserve - the 2nd Shock (formerly the 26th) and the 59th. The front under the command of Army General K.A. Meretskov had to use the forces of the 2nd Shock, 59th and 4th Armies, together with the 54th Army of the Leningrad Front (located outside the blockade ring), to destroy the enemy’s Mginsk group and thereby break the blockade of Leningrad, and with a strike in the southern direction with the forces of the 52nd army to liberate Novgorod and cut off the enemy's escape routes in front of the North-Western Front, which was also going on the offensive. Weather conditions were favorable for the operation - in the wooded and swampy area, the harsh winter shackled the swamps and rivers.

Even before the start of the operation, individual units and units of the 52nd Army, on December 24 - 25, crossed the Volkhov on their own initiative to prevent the enemy from gaining a foothold on the new line, and even captured small bridgeheads on the western bank. On the night of December 31, the Volkhov was crossed by units of the newly arrived 376th Infantry Division of the 59th Army, but no one managed to hold the bridgeheads. Right there. P. 275.

The reason was that just the day before, on December 23-24, the enemy completed the withdrawal of his troops beyond the Volkhov to previously prepared positions and brought up reserves of manpower and equipment. The Volkhov group of the 18th German Army consisted of 14 infantry divisions, 2 motorized and 2 tank. The Volkhov Front, with the arrival of the 2nd shock and 59th armies and units of the Novgorod Army Group, gained an advantage over the enemy in manpower by 1.5 times, in guns and mortars by 1.6 times, and in aircraft by 1.3 times. Halder F. From Brest to Stalingrad: War Diary. Smolensk, 2001. P. 567

On January 1, 1942, the Volkhov Front united 23 rifle divisions, 8 rifle brigades, 1 grenadier brigade (due to a lack of small arms it was armed with grenades), 18 separate ski battalions, 4 cavalry divisions, 1 tank division, 8 separate tank brigades, 5 separate artillery regiments, 2 high-power howitzer regiments, a separate anti-tank defense regiment, 4 guards mortar regiments of rocket artillery, an anti-aircraft artillery division, a separate bomber and separate short-range bomber air regiment, 3 separate attack and 7 separate fighter air regiments and 1 reconnaissance squadron.

However, the Volkhov Front had a quarter of its ammunition at the beginning of the operation, the 4th and 52nd armies were exhausted by the battles, and 3.5 - 4 thousand people remained in their divisions. instead of the regular 10 - 12 thousand. Only the 2nd Shock and 59th armies had a full complement of personnel. But on the other hand, they almost completely lacked gun sights, as well as telephone cables and radio stations, which made it very difficult to control combat operations. The new armies also lacked warm clothing. In addition, the entire Volkhov Front lacked automatic weapons, tanks, shells, and vehicles. On the Volkhov Front: Sat. L., 1973. P. 13

On December 17, 1941, the first echelons of the 2nd Shock Army began to arrive at the newly formed Volkhov Front. The army included: a rifle division, eight separate rifle brigades, two separate tank battalions, three guards mortar divisions and an artillery regiment of the RGK. The 2nd Shock Army began to form at the end of October 1941 on the territory of the Volga Military District. The bulk of its personnel were drafted from the southern and steppe regions and saw forests and swamps for the first time on the Volkhov Front. The fighters cautiously walked around the thickets of the forest and crowded together in the clearings, which made them an excellent target for the enemy. Many soldiers did not have time to undergo basic combat training. The skiing units did not shine with their training either. Some skiers, for example, preferred to walk through deep snow, carrying skis like an unnecessary burden on their shoulders. Great efforts were required to turn these recruits into skilled fighters. Battle of Leningrad 1941-1945: collection. St. Petersburg, 1995. pp. 104-105.

The formations had a full staff, which, however, as mentioned above, did not undergo combat training and their units were not put together. The headquarters were not trained and had no means of communication. There were not enough mortars, machine guns and small arms. The troops did not have anti-aircraft protection. The artillery had only a quarter of its ammunition. There was very little ammunition for small arms.

Now I would like to turn to the memories of veterans of the 2nd Shock Army, in particular I. Vents, retired colonel, former commissar of the 59th separate rifle brigade:

“The formation of the brigade began at the end of October 1941 in the Volga Military District with a base in the village of Dergachi, the regional center of the Saratov region. Apart from the school building, adapted for the brigade headquarters, there were no other buildings to accommodate the emerging units and subunits, so the personnel were billeted in the peasant houses of Dergachi and surrounding villages, which certainly had a negative impact on the training and formation of the units.

I had to lead the formation, since the commander and chief of staff of the brigade arrived at the unit only on the 20th of December - a day or two before the departure of the first echelon.

Literally on the last day before departure, we were able to conduct the brigade’s only exercise on the topic “March and oncoming battle,” and then a sudden blizzard and a snow blizzard prevented a successful completion, as mass frostbite began.

The supply of weapons and materiel during the formation was very poor. So we received guns and mortars, some rifles and a few machine guns only in Yaroslavl at the Vspolye station, where we joined the 2UA in the last ten days of December 1942. All this could not but affect the quality of the brigade’s first combat operations.

However, it should be noted that the brigade received excellent reinforcements.

Suffice it to say that we received 500 communists and Komsomol members, former middle and junior commanders and political workers, sent to the brigade as ordinary political fighters.

Having received equipment and weapons in Yaroslavl, we began to send trains that had accumulated at the station. Upside down. Progress was extremely slow. Our first train, in which I was also, arrived at the station. Neboloch, final destination, early at dawn on December 31st. Here we received our first baptism of fire - a raid by German aircraft, which fired at the train and dropped bombs. Fortunately there were almost no casualties.

Then, on foot in deep snow drifts, clearing the way for transport, the units moved to Malaya Vishera and further along the route of the advanced units of 2UA.” Lyuban offensive operation. January-June 1942: Sat. St. Petersburg, 1994. pp. 76-77.

Using the example of the 59th separate rifle brigade, we see that the troops arriving at the front were either poorly trained or not trained at all. The fact that the replenishment included “500 communists and Komsomol members” does not mean anything - the front needs soldiers who know military affairs first-hand, and love for the party did not protect against German bullets and shells.

Characterizing the 2nd Shock Army, it is worthwhile to dwell on its commander, in the period from January 10 to April 20, 1942, Lieutenant General G.G. Sokolov. He recently came to the Red Army from the NKVD, where he was one of Beria’s deputies. This army commander was distinguished by his complete military mediocrity and inability to lead troops. I will quote, as an example, excerpts from the order of this newly-minted commander dated November 19, 1941:

1. I abolish walking like the crawling of flies in the fall and order from now on in the army to walk like this: a military step is a yard, and that’s how to walk. Accelerated - one and a half, just keep pressing.

2. Food is out of order. In the midst of the battle they have lunch and the march is interrupted for breakfast. In war, the order is this: breakfast is in the dark, before dawn, and lunch is in the dark, in the evening. During the day you will be able to chew bread and crackers with tea - good, but not - and thank you for that, fortunately the day is not particularly long.

3. Remember to everyone - commanders and privates, both old and young, that during the day you cannot march in columns larger than a company, and in general in war it is night to march, so then march.

4. Don’t be afraid of the cold, don’t dress up like Ryazan women, be great and don’t succumb to the frost. Rub your ears and hands with snow.” Battle of Leningrad 1941-1945: Sat. St. Petersburg, 1995. pp. 105-106.

According to the plan of the operation, the 2nd Shock Army was supposed to unload at Malaya Vishera as the echelons arrived and forced a march to the location of the 52nd Army of General N.K. Klykov (80-90 km in deep snow and off-road) and immediately enter the battle. When Colonel Antyufeev drew Sokolov’s attention to the poor organization of the march, the lack of ammunition and food, he carefreely shrugged his shoulders and pointed his finger meaningfully at the ceiling: “That’s what the owner demands. We must do it!” Right there. P. 106.

But, as has happened more than once, the ironclad “must” did not work. The 2nd Shock Army did not arrive at the combat positions in a timely manner, and this forced Meretskov to ask Moscow to postpone the start of the offensive. The headquarters, taking into account the difficult situation of Leningrad, agreed to delay the start of the offensive until January 7, 1942.

General Meretskov was recently released from the dungeons of the NKVD. Fear and the desire to prove his devotion will lead to the fact that Meretskov will meekly carry out many insufficiently thought-out orders from Moscow. In the event of difficulties arising at the front, Meretskov, instead of bold personal decisions, will be insured by the decisions of the Military Council of the front.

The notorious L.Z. was appointed to him as a representative of Headquarters. Mehlis.

Despite all the negative qualities of Mehlis, his capriciousness, suspicion, and suspiciousness, the Stalinist envoy played a generally positive role in preparing the Volkhov Front for the offensive. Thus, having learned that the arriving armies were not at all provided with artillery, and that the guns available at the front were dismantled, deprived of optical instruments and communications, Mehlis informed Stalin about this, and soon the commander of the artillery of the Red Army, N.N., was sent to Malaya Vishera. Voronov with several carriages of missing equipment.

Mehlis also helped the Volkhov Front in that he was able to personally verify Sokolov’s complete inability to lead the army. He supported the petition of the Front Military Council for his removal. True, Sokolov was recalled to Moscow only on January 10, 1942, already during the ongoing offensive. At the same time, on the recommendation of Mehlis, a member of the military council of the army, brigade commissar A. I. Mikhailov, was also replaced. And a few days earlier, reporting to Moscow, Mehlis was very pleased with Meretskov, who promised Stalin, despite the unpreparedness of the front, to launch an offensive on January 7. The Supreme Commander appreciated such zeal and sent Meretskov a personal message with the following content: Dear Kirill Afanasyevich!

The task that has been entrusted to you is the historical task of liberation of Leningrad, you understand - a great task. I would like the upcoming offensive of the Volkhov Front not to be exchanged for minor skirmishes, but to result in a single powerful blow to the enemy. I have no doubt that you will try to turn this offensive into a single and general blow against the enemy, overturning all the calculations of the German invaders.

On January 6, the commander of the Volkhov Front, artillery general K.A. Meretskov signed an order to go on the offensive.

“On January 7, 1942, the troops of the Volkhov Front, with all their might, launched a decisive offensive against the enemy, broke through his fortified positions, crushed his manpower, relentlessly pursued the remnants of the defeated units, encircled and captured them.” The order determined the direction of the front's main attack (Siverskaya - Volosovo) and the immediate task of breaking through the enemy's defensive lines on the Volkhov, Tigoda, Ravan rivers and reaching the front of Lyuban, Dubovik, Cholovo. Konyaev N. Two faces of General Vlasov. M., 2003. P. 60.

Assessing the actions of the commander of the Volkhov Front, we can conclude that this letter from Comrade Stalin not only did not encourage Meretskov, but plunged him into panic. He understood perfectly well that it was impossible to implement the plan proposed by the Headquarters using front-line funds. Meretskov should have explained this to Stalin, but, apparently, Kirill Afanasyevich’s memory of interrogations in the NKVD was too fresh. He chickened out. Most likely, this is where the first fatal mistake was made.

By the beginning of the offensive in the 2nd Shock and 59th armies, a little more than half of the formations had occupied their starting position. The remaining formations, army artillery and some reinforcement units still followed in railway trains. The rear of the front did not create a system of bases with reserves of materiel, ammunition, communications equipment, did not deploy medical institutions, and did not form a road maintenance and road construction service. The frontline and army rear areas were not provided with the required quantity of either motor transport or horse-drawn transport.

Without completing concentration and preparation, the front troops went on the offensive. But the enemy’s defensive position, which was not explored and, therefore, not suppressed by our artillery, allowed him to maintain his entire fire system. Our units, met by strong machine-gun, mortar and artillery fire, were forced to retreat to their original lines. The Military Council of the Front again turned to Headquarters with a request to postpone the start of the operation for three days, which again was not enough, and Headquarters on January 10, during a conversation via direct wire, proposed to postpone the start of the offensive again.

A recording of K.A.’s telephone conversation has been preserved. Meretskov with Headquarters.

By all accounts, you are not ready to attack by the 11th. If this is true, one must wait a day or two to advance and break through the enemy's defenses. The Russians say: if you hurry, you will make people laugh. That’s what happened to you, you rushed the offensive without preparing it, and made people laugh. If you remember, I suggested that you postpone the offensive if Sokolov’s shock army is not ready, and now you are reaping the fruits of your haste...” Konyaev N. Two faces of General Vlasov. M., 2003. P. 61.

Here I would like to make a small digression.

Reading the text of Stalin’s personal letter to Meretskov and the recording of their telephone conversation, one involuntarily thinks about Stalin’s treachery. By sending this letter to Meretskov two weeks ago, he provoked the commander of the Volkhov Front to launch an unprepared offensive, and now he is removing himself from responsibility, placing it entirely on the shoulders of the front commander.

On the other hand, the letter does not even hint at the need to speed up the start of the operation. On the contrary, Stalin emphasized that the offensive should not be exchanged for minor skirmishes. Now he is again holding back Meretskov, giving him days to finally prepare for a breakthrough.

But, it seems to me, out of fear, Kirill Afanasyevich was no longer able to adequately evaluate Stalin’s words. It seems that he did not even understand that Stalin was waiting from him not for a report on the start of the offensive, but for a specific result - breaking the blockade of Leningrad.

So, I.V. Stalin agreed to postpone the offensive date of the front troops to January 13, although in reality it took at least another 15-20 days to prepare the offensive. But such terms were out of the question.

Before moving on to the description of the battles of the Lyuban operation and the battles of the 2nd Shock Army in particular, I would like to describe the position of the armies at the front.

For the German troops, the upcoming offensive of the Volkhov Front troops was known. Intelligence accurately established the creation of an enemy strike group in front of the front of the 126th Infantry Division and in front of the right wing of the 215th Infantry Division. It was also established that the enemy was preparing attacks on the bridgeheads of Gruzino and Kirishi, as well as on the northeastern front of the army on both sides of Pogostye.

The front line of the German defense mainly ran along the western bank of the Volkhov. The river mirror was shot through with dense oblique and flank fire. The second defensive line passed along the embankments of the railway and the Kirishi-Novgorod highway. It consisted of intermittent lines of strong points in populated areas and at heights with well-organized fire communications between them. From the water's edge of the Volkhov River to the railway embankment, the area is equipped with engineering barriers and barbed wire fences with minefields, forest debris and landmines. The steep western bank of the river was doused with water in places, and its icy surface presented an insurmountable obstacle for infantry without special equipment. The strongholds are filled with machine guns and mortars. The defending troops were supported by strong artillery and fairly powerful aviation units.

The Volkhov line from Lake Ilmen to the mouth of the Tigoda River was defended by the divisions of the 38th Army Corps of the 16th Army, the 250th Spanish defended the strip from the lake. Ilmen to Teremets, 126th Infantry - from Teremets to Kuzino, 215th Infantry - from Kuzino to Gruzino, 61st Infantry - from Gruzino to Tigoda.

The 21st Infantry Division of the 28th Army Corps of the 18th Army defended on the Volkhov line from Tigoda to the embankment of the Kirishi - Volkhovstroy railway line, holding the Kirishi bridgehead on the eastern bank of the Volkhov.

The reserve of the northern group of the 16th Army consisted of one tank and one motorized division of the 39th Motorized Corps, which were being replenished after the retreat from Tikhvin. Halder F. From Brest to Stalingrad: War Diary. Smolensk, 2001. P. 591.

When planning an offensive operation, the command of the Volkhov Front did not avoid a drawback characteristic of that period of the war - a violation of the principle of massing forces and means in a decisive direction. All four armies of the front were placed in the first echelon. The front did not have a second echelon. In the front reserve were the 25th and 87th cavalry divisions, the first of them weakened in previous battles and without artillery, and four separate ski battalions. The front had no artillery or tank forces in reserve. In the armies of the front shock group there were: in the 59th Army - two army-type artillery regiments, three guards mortar divisions and two tank battalions of light tanks; in the 2nd Shock - one army-type artillery regiment, three guards mortar divisions and two tank battalions of light tanks.

Front aviation consisted of only 118 aircraft, of which: fighters - 71, attack aircraft - 19, bombers - 6, reconnaissance aircraft - 4, U-2 - 18. However, in the first days of the operation, when almost a hundred U-2 aircraft arrived, front aviation already numbered 211 units. The dominance of enemy aviation was overwhelming, which, of course, could not but have an impact on the course of offensive operation extremely negative. The almost complete absence of bombers and attack aircraft in the front's aviation did not make it possible to support the offensive of our troops and strike at the enemy's rear and communications. Lyuban offensive operation. January-June 1942: Sat. St. Petersburg, 1994. P. 14.

On the right wing of the front, in the Kirishi-Lezno sector, the 4th Army of General P.A. Ivanova adopted an operational formation in two echelons. The 377th, 310th, 44th, 65th and 191st rifle divisions operated in the first echelon.

The army's strike force (65th and 191st rifle divisions) advanced from a small bridgehead on the western bank of the Volkhov towards Zelentsy and Lezno. The second echelon was the 92nd Infantry Division, and the 27th and 80th Cavalry Divisions were in reserve.

The army’s task is to advance in the general direction of Kirishi, Tosno and, in cooperation with the 54th Army of the Leningrad Front, to encircle and destroy the enemy who has advanced north of Mga to Lake Ladoga. To the left of the 4th Army in the Zavizha-Dymno sector, the newly arrived 59th Army of General I.V. deployed. Galanina. Right there. P.15.

The directive of the commander of the troops of the Volkhov Front of the army set the task: to go on a decisive offensive from the Volkhov line (the border on the right is Oskuy, Lezno, Malaya Kunest; on the left is Dymno, Glushitsa, the Isakov tract), capture the city of Chudovo and reach the Karlovka line.

The 111th and 288th rifle divisions of the 4th Army, which had previously operated in this zone, were transferred to the 59th Army.

In his decision, the army commander determined a strike from the area north of Gruzino with the forces of four divisions (378th, 376th, 288th and 111th) with the aim of breaking through enemy defenses in the Vodosye, Pertechno sector and continuing the offensive in the direction of the Kirov state farm, and with part of the forces to bypass Chudovo from the north and north-west and take possession of it. Deliver an auxiliary strike with the forces of the 372nd and 374th Rifle Divisions with the task of breaking through the enemy’s defenses in the Sosninskaya Pristan, Dymno sector and developing an offensive towards Chudovo, bypassing it from the south and southwest.

In the second echelon are the 366th and 382nd rifle divisions. The 59th Army was strengthened by three tank battalions of light tanks, three guards mortar divisions and seven separate ski battalions.

The two army-type artillery regiments provided for by the Headquarters Directive to strengthen the 59th Army did not arrive in the concentration area. The 78th and 87th cavalry divisions were withdrawn from the army and placed under the command of the front. (The 78th Division did not arrive at the front).

To the south of the 59th Army on the right bank of the Volkhov on the front of Krupichino, Russa the 2nd Shock Army of General N.K. Klykova, who had just arrived from the General Headquarters reserve.

By the directive of the front commander on January 6, 1942, the troops of the 2nd Shock Army were given the task of breaking through the enemy’s defensive positions on the western bank of the river in the Peresvet Ostrov area, the Krasny Udarnik state farm and reaching the end on January 19 with the main forces on the Kerest River, then advancing to direction Finev Lug, Chasha station, Nizovsky crossing, with part of the forces to support the left flank from the Batepkaya station.

The army was reinforced by two separate tank battalions, three separate guards mortar divisions, one army-type artillery regiment (which arrived later) and six ski battalions.

The operational formation of the army was determined in two echelons: the first echelon - one rifle division (327th) and five rifle brigades (25th, 57th, 58th, 53rd and 22nd); second echelon - three rifle brigades (59th, 23rd and 24th).

The army commander decided to deliver the main blow with the forces of the 327th Infantry Division, operating in the Selishchensky barracks, Kolomno sector (4 km wide), break through the enemy defenses on the western bank of the Volkhov and reach the Polist River line.

52nd Army of General V.F. Yakovleva occupied the front to the left of the 2nd Shock Army from Russ to Lake. Ilmen, which with battles cleared the territory east of the Volkhov River from the enemy.

The army included five rifle divisions (46th, 225th, 259th, 267th and 305th), 442nd, 561st ap, 448th pope. Army units, having fought intense battles for four months, suffered heavy losses in manpower and equipment.

The commander of the front forces set the troops of the 52nd Army the task of capturing Novgorod and further advancing in the direction of Soltsa, thereby ensuring the advance of the armies of the Volkhov Front to the north-west. The operational formation of the army is defined in two echelons: in the first echelon - four rifle divisions (267th, 46th, 305th and 225th), in the second - the 259th rifle division, the 25th cavalry division was reassigned to the front . Right there. P.15-17.

The army commander decided to launch the main attack on the right flank with the forces of three rifle divisions (267th, 46th and 305th). The second echelon division (259th Infantry) was also located behind the right flank.

The army's shock group was ordered to break through the enemy's defensive line on the western bank of the Volkhov on the front of B. and M. Bystritsy, Kotovipy, capture its strongholds in B. and M. Bystriny, Zapolye, Lelyavino, Teremets and reach the end of January 19 to the Pitba River, subsequently break through the enemy’s second defensive line on the iron and highways Chudovo-Novgorod, capture its strongholds Lyubtsy, Koppy, Tyutipy, and with part of the forces secure the left flank from Novgorod.

Before moving on to describing the course of hostilities, I would like to express my thoughts that arise when studying the Lyuban operation.

The headquarters in its Directive of December 17, 1941 determined that the troops of the Volkhov Front should launch a general offensive against the enemy defending along the western bank of the river. Volkhov, defeat it and go to the front with the main forces Lyuban, Art. Cholovo. In the future, developing an offensive in the direction of Siverskaya, Volosovo, encircle the enemy under

Leningrad and, together with the troops of the Leningrad Front, defeat its troops and free it from the blockade. Liberate Novgorod with your left flank and, in a further offensive towards Soltsy, in cooperation with the troops of the North-Western Front, encircle the enemy troops west of Lake. Ilmen.

In this Directive, the Headquarters determined the operational formation of the front, the composition and tasks of the armies.

Setting before the front troops such a decisive goal as the defeat of the 18th German Army and the liberation of Leningrad from the siege. The headquarters did not provide the front with the necessary forces or material resources to successfully carry out such a large offensive operation.

The front, stretching for 150 km, consisted of 20 rifle divisions, 5 cavalry divisions, 8 rifle brigades with small aviation, artillery, tank, ski and engineering units. There was no strength to build up the initial blow in order to develop success in the depths of the enemy’s defense and deliver the final blow.

The main efforts of the front were directed in the direction of the Moscow-Leningrad highway and railway, which would withdraw troops directly to Leningrad along good roads. But in this direction the enemy had the opportunity to provide the defending troops with engineering structures and concentrate their artillery and tank forces.

“The front command took into account the problematic nature of the success of the offensive in this direction. Therefore, it intended to transfer the main effort to the area of ​​​​operation of the 2nd Shock Army in order to solve the problem with a strike on Lyuban, bypassing the heavily fortified enemy positions. But all our attempts to strengthen the 2nd Shock Army by transferring at least two rifle divisions from the 59th Army were not supported by Headquarters.” Right there. P. 18.

The front's shock group (59th and 2nd Shock Armies) was deployed over a 60-kilometer area.

The 59th Army, having six rifle divisions in the first echelon and two divisions in the second, was supposed to advance in a zone of 30 kilometers. Four rifle divisions were to operate in the army’s main attack zone, 8 kilometers wide, i.e. each division had to break through enemy defenses in a 2-kilometer area. The army delivered an auxiliary strike with two rifle divisions in a 10-kilometer zone or in a 5-kilometer zone for each division.

The 2nd Shock Army, having one rifle division and five rifle brigades in the first echelon and three rifle brigades in the second echelon, was supposed to advance in a 27-kilometer zone. The 327th Infantry Division, operating in the main direction, was given the task of breaking through an enemy defense area 4 kilometers wide. Rifle brigades were given 4.5-kilometer sections each to break through.

The 4th Army on a 55-kilometer front had five rifle divisions in the first echelon and one division in the second echelon. The main blow was delivered by two rifle divisions on a 5-kilometer section of the planned breakthrough of the enemy defenses, or 2.5 kilometers for each division.

The 52nd Army occupied a front of 35 kilometers with four rifle divisions in the first echelon and had one division in the second echelon. The army delivered the main blow with the forces of three rifle divisions in an area of ​​12 kilometers, i.e. each division broke through the enemy’s defenses in a 4-kilometer area. Right there. P. 19.

Consequently, nine rifle divisions and eight rifle brigades were concentrated in the front’s shock group, which amounted to about half the forces of the entire front. But the main blows of the army of the front’s shock group were delivered in areas 40 kilometers apart from each other.

In addition, the Volkhov Front had not yet completed the organizational period; it did not have rear services and the necessary warehouses with material resources. The almost roadless territory of the rear of the front did not make it possible to transport material resources in the required quantity and at the right time.

But the tragic situation of the population and troops in Leningrad forced both the Headquarters and the command of the Volkhov Front to launch an offensive without completing its preparation, without providing the necessary forces and means to achieve success, ignoring the well-known provision that an offensive launched before the end of the concentration of troops intended for it, and being underprepared will ultimately do more harm than delaying the start of the operation.

Chapter II .

At dawn on January 13, 1942, after a short artillery preparation, the troops of the armies of the Volkhov Front moved forward. The valley of the Volkhov River, 800-1000 meters wide, extended to the front line of the enemy’s defense. Deep snow, frost down to -30? C. Strong machine-gun and mortar fire from the enemy forced our soldiers, who had neither skis nor white coats, to move from rushing to crawling across the valley, burying themselves in the snow. History of the Order of Lenin of the Leningrad Military District. M., 1974. P. 278.

In the sector of the 4th Army, the enemy himself attacked our positions before us, and the army was forced to conduct defensive battles instead of attacking.

The divisions of the 59th Army, unable to withstand enemy machine-gun and mortar fire, especially artillery shelling with shrapnel shells, retreated to their original position. Only in the center of the formation of the 2nd Shock Army and the right flank of the 52nd Army did success emerge. By 2 p.m., the first echelon company of the 327th Infantry Division, Colonel I.M. Antyufeyeva reached the western bank of the Volkhov, but were unable to launch an attack on the enemy’s defensive positions on the high river bank. Only the entry into battle of the second echelon of the division in cooperation with the 57th Infantry Brigade of Colonel P.N. Vedenichev allowed a swift attack to break through the enemy’s defenses in the Bor, Kostylevo sector. During the further battle, the division threw the enemy back across the Polist River.

To the left of the 327th division was advancing the 58th rifle brigade of Colonel F.M. Zhiltsova, who interacted with the 53rd Infantry Brigade of General V.S. Rakovsky, took possession of Yamno.

The 59th Infantry Brigade, located in the second echelon, under Lieutenant Colonel Chernik, by combat order of the army on the morning of January 14, through the battle formations of the 327th Division, entered a breakthrough at the line of the villages of Bor and Kostypevo and, acting behind the German rear, moved to the second line of enemy defense, having a mission on the Myasnoy Bor, Spasskaya Polist section, cut the Novgorod - Chudovo railway and immediately take Myasnoy Bor and Spasskaya Polist. The brigade began unsuccessful battles with the defending enemy, but suffered heavy losses and was unable to complete the task. The brigade was withdrawn to the second echelon for replenishment. Colonel I.F. took command of the brigade. Glazunov.

In the 52nd Army, the right-flank 267th Rifle Division, going on the offensive, broke through the enemy defenses in the St. sector on the morning of January 13. and Nov. Bystritsy, Gorka and captured the pioneer camp and Gorka. Units of the division, successfully advancing, reached the village of Koptsy on January 15 and began fighting to break through the second defensive line of the Germans. Stubborn bloody battles did not yield success and the division moved to the defense of the occupied line.

To the left of the 267th Division were the advancing 46th Infantry Division of General A.K. Okulichev and the 305th Rifle Division of Colonel D.I. Barabanshchikov broke through the enemy’s defenses in the Gorka, Teremets sector and captured its strongholds on the morning of January 15.

On January 15-19, the strike group of the 52nd Army reached the second defensive line in the Lyubtsy-Tyutitsy sector.

259th Infantry Division Colonel A.V. Lapsheva crossed the Volkhov and took up defense in the Gorki area. Right there. pp. 279-280.

The superiority of the Germans in aviation, technical means of combat, as well as the supply of artillery with ammunition, while our artillerymen counted every shot, led to increased losses of our advancing units and required a larger number of troops to continue the development of the offensive, since very often the outcome of the attack depended on the massiveness of the onslaught , produced on a narrow section of the front. There have been cases when a successfully launched attack froze for no apparent reason, without any tactical failure. The attacks simply faded due to too many losses in personnel.

2nd Shock Army, weak in its own way original composition, from the first days of the fighting required reinforcement with new formations to continue the offensive. On January 15, the front command was forced to transfer from the second echelon of the 59th Army the 382nd Infantry Division to Colonel G.P. Sokurov, 366th Infantry Division, Colonel S.I. Bulanova.

On January 19, after fierce fighting, the 327th Rifle Division, together with the 57th Separate Rifle Brigade, captured Kolomno. Until the end of January, the division fought offensive battles for Spasskaya Polist.

By January 21, the troops of the 2nd Shock Army reached the enemy’s second defensive position in the Spasskaya Polist, Myasnoy Bor sector. An attempt to break through the second position on the move was unsuccessful and the fighting became protracted.

The front commander ordered the concentration of all possible forces and means against Spasskaya Polist and Myasny Bor. Of particular danger was the enemy stronghold in Spasskaya Polist, located along the axis of the offensive direction of the 2nd Shock Army. As part of the army, on January 20, the front commander organized a special operational group of General I.T. Korovnikova. Initially, the 327th and 382nd rifle divisions, 59th rifle brigade, 162nd separate tank battalion, 43rd and 39th ski battalions, 105th and 6th guards mortar divisions were included. A few days later, the 382nd division was withdrawn from the group, and in its place the 374th rifle division of Colonel A.D. was included. Vitoshkin and the 111th Infantry Division of Colonel S.V. Roginsky, 22nd separate rifle brigade, Colonel F.K. Pugacheva.

The introduction of significant forces into the battle for Spasskaya Polnet did not bring success. To strengthen the troops of the operational group, the front commander ordered the deployment of 230 guns here. Right there. P. 281.

In the evening of January 25, divisions of the 18th Army Artillery Regiment, Major M.B., took up firing positions. Friedland (152 mm guns).

After artillery shelling on the morning of January 26, the strong point was attacked by the 59th Rifle Brigade and the 374th Rifle Division, but were unable to capture Spasskaya Polist. The highway and railroad to the south of the strong point were intercepted, and the logging point to the west of the roads was captured.

By order of the commander of the 2nd Shock Army, the 366th Infantry Division was concentrated in the Dubovitsy area, Gorodok, the forest east of Dubovitsy by January 17, ready for action in a westerly direction.

On January 18, the division received a combat order from the army: “At dawn on January 19, 1942, advance along the eastern edge of the forest west of Arefino, Krasny Poselok, with the task, together with the 58th, 23rd and 24th rifle brigades, to destroy the enemy in the Borisovo area with subsequent entry to the Myasnoy Bor line.” Lyuban offensive operation. January-June 1942: Sat. St. Petersburg, 1994. P. 22.

Destroying small groups of the enemy, the division reached Myasny Bor on January 21 and began a battle to take possession of it. Parts of the division, in fierce battles, slowly wedged themselves into the enemy’s defensive positions. On the night of January 23-24, units of the division, during a decisive attack, captured the stronghold of the enemy’s second defensive line, Myasny Bor, and completed the breakthrough of the line.

Designed to develop a breakthrough, the 13th Cavalry Corps of Brigade Commander I.I. Gusev, concentrated in the forests of the Shevelevo and Yamno regions.

By operational directive No. 0021 on January 23, 1942, the commander of the Volkhov Front, General K.A. Meretskov defined the task for the corps as part of the 25th Cavalry Division under Lieutenant Colonel D.M.

Barinov, 87th Cavalry Division Colonel V.F. Trantina with the 366th Infantry Division of Colonel S.I. Bulanova: “Defeat the remnants of the enemy in the Leningradskoye Highway strip, preventing the formation of enemy defenses on the river. Tigoda and Kerest, by the end of January 25, reach the river. Trubitsa, advancing forward detachments to Sennaya Keresti, Novaya Derevnya, Finev Meadow.

In the future, advance in the general direction of Olkhovka, Apraksin Bor and Lyuban, no later than January 27, intercept the Chudovo-Leningrad highway and railway and capture Lyubanyo. Don’t mess with the defense organization...” Ibid. P. 23.

On the morning of January 24, the cavalry corps was transferred from the front reserve to the 2nd Shock Army.

The 366th Rifle Division, developing an offensive along the clearing, captured the villages of Krechno and Novaya Kerest by the morning of January 25.

By order of the corps commander, the 25th Cavalry Division left the Shevelevo area and by the morning of January 25 concentrated in the forest 1.5 km east of Myasnoy Bor. Throughout the day, the division was attacked by German aircraft and was unable to enter the breakthrough.

With the onset of darkness, units of the division began to advance along the clearing to the Novaya Korost area. Throughout the evening and night, the cavalrymen moved on foot through deep snow above their knees, leading their horses, constantly stopping to assist in the advancement of their battle train. Only by the morning of January 26, having covered 15 km along a forest clearing, units of the division reached the forest area east of Novaya Keresti.

The 87th Cavalry Division, which undertook a march during daylight hours, in the area northwest of Myasnoy Bor, was subjected to air bombing and lost several carts with machine guns and their crews.

The vanguard 236th cavalry regiment of the division was only able to reach the Novaya Keresti area in the evening, and the main forces of the division - by the morning of January 27.

In pursuance of the front directive, the commander of the 13th Cavalry Corps decided to end on January 26:

87th Cavalry Division to capture Olkhovka;

366th Rifle Division - Finev Lug;

25th Cavalry Division - Glukhaya Keresti Voskhod.

By the end of January 26, the 236th Cavalry Regiment of the 87th Cavalry Division captured Olkhovka, defeating the enemy garrison with a surprise attack. The division concentrated in the Olkhovka area, where it remained until January 28, conducting reconnaissance in the directions of the Olkhovsky farms - Sennaya Kerest and Vdipko.

By the end of the day on January 28, the 240th cavalry regiment of the division captured Vdipko, and the 241st cavalry regiment captured Novaya Derevnya. The 236th Cavalry Regiment approached the outskirts of Ruchya, but was unable to capture them. A joint attack with the approaching 241st regiment also ended unsuccessfully. The battles for the capture of Ruchi continued until February 3, when the cavalrymen, by order of the 2nd Shock Army, handed over this area to the approaching units of the 191st Infantry Division.

The 98th cavalry regiment of the 25th cavalry division in a dismounted formation at 9.00 on January 27 attacked Glukhaya Kerest on the move, but was repulsed, the 100th cavalry regiment of the division in a dismounted formation attacked at 18.00 on January 27 Voskhod and in a stubborn battle with the assistance of the 104th By the morning of the 28th, the cavalry regiment occupied Voskhod and Rogavka station.

On the morning of January 30, the corps commander assigned a new task to the 25th Cavalry Division. At 18.00 on January 30, the division (without the 98th regiment) left along the route Finev Lug, Ogoreli, Tigoda. Cervino and further north, destroying small enemy garrisons on the move.

The 366th Infantry Division received orders to relieve the 98th Cavalry Regiment and advance in the direction of Kleptsa, Chauni, Pyatilipa, and Glukhaya Kerest.

The advance detachment of the 25th Cavalry Division, shooting down small enemy groups, marched 30 km at night and by the morning of January 31 reached Cherevinskaya Luka, where it was stopped by organized fire. The main forces of the 100th and 104th regiments of the division were drawn into protracted battles that continued to no avail until February 3.

The 366th Rifle Division captured Kleptsy, Chauni, Glukhaya Kerestya, but was unable to break enemy resistance in Pyatilipy.

The corps formations, lacking artillery, were drawn into unsuccessful battles to capture enemy strongholds in populated areas, lost maneuverability and initiative, and were unable to complete their task - to capture Lyubanya by January 27.

The fighting of the 13th Cavalry Corps during the week-long offensive revealed the impossibility of moving cavalry columns off roads. The dominance of enemy aviation, with weak cover by our aviation and the complete absence of anti-aircraft defenses, forced us to stop active operations during daylight hours. The almost complete absence of artillery and mortars in the 25th division and the completely insufficient number of them in the 87th division determined the possibility of capturing settlements with an enemy garrison only by surprise night attacks in dismounted formation, which was ensured by the high fighting qualities of the cavalrymen.

The fighting was carried out along existing roads by separate regiments. The movement of units at night, mainly in columns, the leading regiment sent a separate patrol with a force of up to a platoon forward along the route of movement. Unfortunately, the cavalry divisions were not reinforced with ski battalions, which were indispensable for bypassing fortified settlements through deep snow covering numerous swamps and swampy forests.

Neither the front nor the army organized material support for the corps' actions.

Simultaneously with the battles for Spasskaya Polist and Myasnoy Bor, formations of the 2nd Shock Army continued to clear the western bank of the Volkhov from small enemy groups. On January 22, the 57th Infantry Brigade of Colonel P.N. Vedenicheva cut the highway Selishchensky village, Spasskaya Polist and reached the southern and western outskirts of Kuzino. 23rd Infantry Brigade, Colonel V.I. Shilova captured the village of Lobkovo, and the 24th Infantry Brigade of Colonel M.V. Romanovsky cleared Old and New Bystritsy from the enemy. Right there. pp. 24-25.

If the 2nd Shock Army was successful in the offensive, then in the 4th and 59th armies all efforts to break through the enemy’s defenses were unsuccessful.

The attacks of their formations became weaker and then stopped completely. The 54th Army of the Leningrad Front, having used up its ammunition, also stopped its offensive on January 17. The army troops remained in their original positions.

In the current situation, it was necessary to make a decision to shift the main direction of the offensive. The front command, having received permission from Headquarters, stopped attacks on the right wing of the front and transferred all the efforts of the front troops to the direction of Spasskaya Polist, Lyuban. The 59th Army received a new offensive line within the borders: on the right - Pshenichishche. Tushin Island, on the left - Kolyazhka, Isakov tract. The Lezno, Pshenichishche sector with the 288th and 376th rifle divisions operating there was transferred to the 4th Army.

The 59th Army took over from the 2nd Shock Army the Krupichino, Bor sector, as well as the 25th and 53rd rifle brigades located in this sector. The 92nd and 377th rifle divisions were transferred from the 4th Army and made a 90-100 kilometer march on foot.

The main goal of the 59th Army's operation - the defeat of the enemy's Chudov group - remained unchanged, but now the army's immediate task was to strike north of Spasskaya Polist and capture the Sosninskaya Pristan, Ant, Priyutino, Spasskaya Polist line. Subsequently, bypassing Chudovo from the west, reach the line of the Kerest River and cut off the escape routes of the enemy Chudovo group to Lyuban.

By his order dated January 27, the commander of the 59th Army ordered the troops to complete the regrouping by the end of the day, and on the morning of January 28 to go on the offensive in cooperation with the 4th Army to encircle and destroy the enemy’s Chudov group, delivering the main blow with the forces of the 377th, 372nd and the 92nd Infantry Divisions. The second shock in the battle for Leningrad: Sat. L., 1983. P. 14.

During the fighting that began on the morning of January 28, the army troops occupied the villages of Peresvet Ostrov and Kiprovo on the left bank of the Volkhov and, building on their success, pushed the enemy back to the Chudovo-Novgorod highway.

The troops, fighting to capture enemy strongholds, without the support of aviation and tanks, with limited artillery support, and with an acute shortage of ammunition for all types of weapons, suffered heavy losses. Continuous enemy counterattacks, accompanied by powerful artillery and mortar fire, often had to be repelled with bayonets.

Fierce battles were fought unsuccessfully to capture defense strongholds on the left bank of the Volkhov: Dymno, Vergezha, on the Chudovo-Novgorod highway: Mikhalevo, Ovinets, Kolyazhka. Was busy only in February

Vergezha, and on February 8 Ovinets. Units of the 92nd Infantry Division of Colonel A.N. Laricheva went to the Polist River. Right there. P. 16

In February, the 372nd Rifle Division reached the approaches to the village of Maloe Opochivalovo and began a battle to capture it. In the evening, the enemy launched counterattacks along the highway from the north and south against units of the division that had not yet gained a foothold on the occupied line. Successfully advancing, the northern and southern enemy groups united and surrounded the 1236th and 1238th rifle regiments of the division. For eleven days the regiments fought surrounded and only on the night of February 18, on the orders of the division, they broke through the encirclement, suffering heavy losses in personnel and heavy weapons, and reached the division’s location.

The 377th Rifle Division fought unsuccessful battles on the approaches to Tregubovo and Mikhalevo. The troops of the 59th Army went on the defensive. On February 21, an operational group of General P.F. was created. Alferov with the task of pinning down the enemy at the line Dymno, Spasskaya Polist.

The 92nd Infantry Division transferred on February 21 from the operational group of General I.T. Korovnikov to the operational group of General P.F. Alferova.

The exit of formations of the 2nd Shock Army to the line of settlements Sennaya Kerest, Ruchi, Chervinskaya Luka, located 20-25 km from the railway

and the Moscow-Leningrad highway, created the preconditions for the encirclement and defeat of the enemy’s Miracle-Kirishi group. If our troops had cut the Chudovo-Leningrad railway and highway, then the enemy troops would not have been able to fight without the supply of ammunition and food. But to solve this difficult task appropriate forces and means were required, which the troops wedged into the enemy’s defenses did not have.

Only towards the end of February 2, the 58th separate rifle brigade of Colonel F.M. began to approach Chervinskaya Luka and Ruchi to change cavalrymen. Zhiltsova and the 57th separate brigade of Colonel P.N. Vedenicheva. Lyuban offensive operation. January-June 1942: Sat. St. Petersburg, 1994. P. 29.

Transferred on January 25 from the 4th Army to the 2nd Shock Army, the 191st Infantry Division of Colonel A.I. Starunina only went to Krivilo on the night of February 2, the 4th Guards Rifle Division of General A.I. Andreeva moved towards Sennaya Keresti.

The commander of the front forces, by his directive dated February 3, demanded that the commander of the 2nd Shock Army complete the liquidation of the enemy in the Ostrov, Spasskaya Polnet area and no later than February 6 concentrate a group of troops consisting of the 327th, 374th in the area of ​​​​Sennaya Kerest, Krivino, Olkhovka , 382nd and 4th Guards Rifle Divisions to strike in the area of ​​Friday, Art. Babino (20 km northwest of Chudovo). At the same time, the 13th Cavalry Corps was ordered to move to the Krasnaya Gorka and Konechki areas.

The instructions of this directive could be fulfilled on time only by the formations of the 13th Cavalry Corps, which, having surrendered their combat areas on the night of February 3, set out on new directions of attack. To strengthen the corps, the 59th Infantry Brigade of Colonel I.F. arrived. Glazunov, concentrated by February 3 in the Yazvinka area. The 366th Rifle Division left the corps.

The corps commander decided to advance the 98th cavalry regiment of the 25th division to Filippovichi, Frolevo to cover the flank and rear of the corps.

The 25th Cavalry Division was ordered with the main forces together with the 59th Infantry Brigade, advancing along the Novgorod-Leningrad railway, to capture Dubovik, Bol. and Mal. Eglino, then advance in a northern direction to the Leningrad-Chudovo railway.

Concentrating in the Poddubye, Kubolovo area, the 87th Cavalry Division was supposed to advance in the direction of Tolstoy, Veretye, Krnechki, and then cut the Leningrad-Chudovo railway north-west of Lyuban.

On the night of February 2, the 98th Cavalry Regiment set out along two parallel roads along the river. Rydenka and, without encountering enemy resistance for 3 days, went out with the right detachment (1st and 2nd squadrons) to Frolevo, and the left detachment to Volkino. Right there. P. 29. Only in the Pechkovo-Zapole region was the right detachment counterattacked by the enemy with a battalion-sized force. The arriving detachment of German aviator cadets pushed back the cavalrymen and occupied Frolevo and Zagorye. Konyaev N. Two faces of General Vlasov. M., 2003. P. 71.

By order of the corps commander, on February 5, the 236th Regiment of the 87th Cavalry Division arrived to reinforce the 98th Regiment. Replaced in the Chervino area by the 191st Infantry Division, the 104th Cavalry Regiment of the 25th Division was also sent to Filippovichi. Under the command of the commander of the 104th regiment, Colonel Trofimov, a combined detachment of three regiments successfully repelled enemy counterattacks and defeated him in battles on February 6, 7 and 8, capturing prisoners, weapons and warehouses. Right there. P. 72.

Having restored the situation, the combined detachment on February 9 handed over this area to the approaching 23rd separate rifle brigade of Colonel V.I. Shilova. On the evening of February 9, a combined detachment of three cavalry regiments, by order of the corps commander, set out along the route Zaruchye, Ostrov, Abramove, Gdebovo, Porozhki, Konechki. The advance detachment - the 236th regiment, by the morning of February 10, entered Glebovo without encountering enemy resistance, only in the Savkino area in equestrian formation the regiment destroyed the enemy garrison with a sudden attack, capturing rich trophies. Pursuing the hastily retreating Germans, the 236th Regiment reached Valjakka, where it was met with organized fire. The 104th regiment, following the 236th regiment, went to Valjakka, and the 98th regiment was located in Savkino-1 and Savkino-2, covering the rear of the combined detachment. Battle of Leningrad 1941-1944: Sat. St. Petersburg, 1995. P. 108.

The enemy took active action against the 98th regiment from the Porozhek area with a ski battalion, reinforced with artillery and mortars, and from the Ozereshno, Nesterkovo area with an infantry battalion, also with artillery reinforcement. Fighting broke out for Porozhki and Nesterkovo.

The 100th Regiment of the 25th Cavalry Division, moving along the Novgorod-Leningrad railway, on the morning of February 4 occupied Gorki without a fight, moving towards the Radofinnikovo station, defeated skiers from the 183rd Estonian battalion and attacked Dubovik in horse formation and by the end of February 5 completely cleared it of the enemy.

Acting together with the approaching 59th Infantry Brigade of Colonel I.F. Glazunov, reinforced by a ski battalion, the commander of the 100th regiment decided on the night of February 6 to attack the enemy in Bol. and Mal. Eglino. The attack was not successful and Bol was occupied only by a repeated attack on the night of February 7 by the joint efforts of the cavalrymen of the 100th Regiment and the 59th Rifle Brigade at 3.30. and Mal. Eglino after a heavy street fight. Rich trophies were captured here. Lyuban offensive operation. January-June 1942: Sat. St. Petersburg, 1994. P. 32.

The enemy retreated to defensive positions in the Verkhovye, Eglino platform, Konechki section equipped along the embankment of the Chudovo-Weimarn railway under construction. All attempts to break through the enemy's defenses ended unsuccessfully due to the lack of artillery reinforcement.

The reinforced concrete overpass at the intersection of the existing railway with the embankment under construction was especially impregnable. Direct hits from the 76-mm cannons of the brigade's artillery division could not cause noticeable destruction; the cavalry and the brigade had no other artillery reinforcements. After several days of continuous unsuccessful attacks on enemy positions, the cavalry and brigade moved to the defense of the captured line. All subsequent repeated attempts by the enemy to push back parts of the brigade with counterattacks were successfully repelled and the brigade occupied this line of defense until May 25, 1942 - until the order to withdraw was received.

The 87th Cavalry Division, replaced by rifle formations near Ruchi on February 5, without the 236th Regiment, concentrated in the area of ​​Yazvinka, Poddubye, Kubolovo and put itself in order.

Carrying out the order of the corps commander, division commander Colonel V.F. Trantin decided to move in regimental columns (240 and 241 regiments) along forest roads along the route Zhiloe Rydno, Tolstoye, Veretye ​​and reach the area southeast of Konechka. Complete impassability and deep snow made movement difficult and the division was late in reaching the area of ​​level 62.5, which is 2.2 km southeast of Konechka. The joint actions of the combined detachment of Colonel Trofimov and the 87th Division to defeat the enemy garrison in Konechki did not work out, and attacks at different times from the southwest of the detachment and the southeast of the division on the enemy garrison in Konechki did not bring success. Right there. P. 32

On February 12, the newly arrived Finnish ski battalion drove out a detachment of two squadrons of the 98th regiment from Porozhek.

On February 16, the enemy launched an attack during the day on the squadron of the 98th regiment defending Nesterkovo and by the evening occupied Nesterkovo and pushed the squadron back to Savkino-1. By the end of the day, the 98th Regiment retreated to a height of 76.1, where, together with the 104th Regiment, they organized a defense and, during February 17 - 20, repelled the fierce attacks of the Germans and Finns. On February 20, under enemy pressure, the 98th and 104th regiments retreated to an area 1 km southeast of Valjakka, where they established contact with the 87th division and organized a new line of defense in the Valjakka, Glebovskoe swamp area.

By February 20, the cavalry corps had lost its striking force and went on the defensive along the entire offensive front.

The corps commander ordered the defense of the line: the 59th separate rifle brigade, the Eglino platform, south of the embankment line of the Chudovo-Weimarn railway to the right flank of the defense of the 87th division.

87th Division - in the section from height with mark 58.0, which is 1 km eastern Konechki, to height with mark 64.8 on the Glebovsky swamp.

25th Division - in the section from the height with mark 64.8 to mark 58.3 (west of Veretye) further along the river. Black.

The headquarters of the 87th division was located at height 62.5.

The headquarters of the 25th division is in Veretye.

Corps headquarters is in Dubovik. Right there. P. 33.

By mid-February, the following situation had become clear for the armies of the Volkhov Front. In the center, deeply wedged into the enemy’s defenses, the troops of the 2nd Shock Army fought; on the right, with a ledge back, with the main forces concentrated at Chudovo and Spasskaya Polist, the troops of the 59th Army fought fierce but unsuccessful battles on the enemy’s second defensive line; to the right of this army, along the eastern bank of the Volkhov to Kirishi, the troops of the 4th Army fought to pin down the enemy; On the left flank of the front, with a ledge back to the 2nd Shock Army in the Myasnoy Bor, Teremets sector, troops of the 52nd Army fought. History of the Order of Lenin of the Leningrad Military District. M., 1974. P. 290.

The immediate target of the front's strike group (2nd Shock and 59th Armies) was identified as Lyuban. The 4th Army, in cooperation with the 54th Army of the Leningrad Front, is fighting for Kirishi; The 52nd Army supports the actions of the strike group from Novgorod.

Due to its initial success, the 2nd Shock Army secured the directions of the main attack, advanced deep into the enemy’s defenses, but was unable to continue the offensive further without significant reinforcement.

As the combat area expanded and the number of formations in the 2nd Shock Army increased, command and control became more complicated. For sustainable and timely leadership of troops, the army decided to create operational groups for the leadership of troops in certain directions.

Thus, the group of General P.F. Privalov united the 53rd and 57th rifle brigades and the 191st rifle division, operating east along the line Krivino, Ruchi, Chervinskaya Luka.

The 4th Guards Rifle Division and the 59th Rifle Brigade, operating in the direction of Sennaya Kerest, formed the operational group of General A.I. Andreeva.

As the battles progressed, other groups were created not only in the 2nd Shock Army, but also in the 59th Army. In the latter, the task force of General P.F. Alferova (deputy commander of the 59th Army) led the formations fighting to expand the bridgehead on the Volkhov in the Dymno, Tregubovo sector towards Chudovo.

The operational group of General Privalov fought unsuccessful battles for Krivino, Ruchi, Chervinskaya Luka, remaining in their previous positions. General Andrev's operational group fought defensive battles in Olkhovka.

At the neck of the breakthrough, the troops of the 2nd Shock Army fought continuous battles to widen the gap. Finally, on February 12, the 111th Infantry Division of Colonel S.V. Roginsky, 22nd Infantry Brigade, Colonel R.K. Pugachev broke the German resistance and occupied enemy strongholds in Lyubino Pole and Mostki on the Moscow-Leningrad highway. Now the width of the breakthrough throat had reached 14 kilometers and the army’s communications took place without machine gun and actual artillery fire.

Continuing the offensive, the formations came close to Spasskaya Polist, the 22nd brigade from the south, and the 111th division from the southwest and west.

Bypassing Spasskaya Polist from the west, the division, advancing in the direction of Chudovo, overcoming fierce enemy resistance and repelling counterattacks, cut the Spasskaya Polist - Olkhovka road on February 17. On March 2, the division cut the Glushitsa-Sennaya Kerest road and on March 6 reached the approaches to the village of Korpovo-2, where it was stopped by the enemy. Lyuban offensive operation. January-June 1942: Sat. St. Petersburg, 1994. P. 34.

The fighting did not subside on the southern face of the breakthrough neck. 267th Division of Lieutenant Colonel P.A. Potapov. On January 25, she surrendered her defense zone near Koptsy to the 259th Infantry Division of Colonel A.V. Lapsheva and was introduced into the breakthrough at Myasny Bor. The division became part of the 2nd Shock Army and received combat orders to break through the enemy’s defenses near the village of Teremets-Kurlyandsky, bypass its stronghold of defense and, advancing from the west to the village of Koptsy, capture the village with a surprise attack. On the march, paving the way in deep snow in a column, the division, bypassing Teremets-Kurlyandsky, came under massive air bombing and suffered significant losses. The surprise of the attack on Koptsy was lost; the surprise attack failed to capture the village of Koptsy. The enemy from Novgorod launched counterattacks, which were repulsed with heavy losses on both sides. The division went on the defensive. On February 25, the 267th Infantry Division surrendered its defense zone in the area west of the village of Koptsy to the 259th Infantry Division, marched to the Olkhovka area, where it withstood a big battle for the Spasskaya Polist - Olkhovka road with a counterattacking enemy. The division was placed at the disposal of General Korovnikov’s group, who ordered a march through the Gazhi Sopki swamp and capture the villages of Glushitsa and Priyutino and be ready for an attack on Tregubovo. Right there. pp. 34-35.

Intense battles unfolded from March 3 to 15 on the approaches to Priyutino, Glushitsa and Tregubovo, but the division did not capture these points and went on the defensive.

On February 23, the 259th Rifle Division, having surrendered its defense sector to the 46th Rifle Division, was introduced into the breakthrough at Myasnoy Bor and on February 24 took over the defense in the Bol sector from the 267th Rifle Division. Zamoshye, Teremed-Kurlyandsky, becoming part of the 2nd Shock Army. While conducting defensive battles, the division conducted reconnaissance searches on its open right flank in the direction of Selo Gora. Having received information about the arrival of the fascist legion "Flanders" at the front, the division commander decided to organize a mobile detachment for a surprise attack on the Dutch in Selo Gora, defeating the garrison and capturing prisoners. During the night attack, the Nazis were defeated.

On February 28, the division surrendered its defense sector to the 305th Infantry Division of Colonel D.I. Barabanshchikova and marched to the Olkhovka area. The 259th Rifle Division received the combat mission of capturing the Olkhovsky farms, which were located along the elevated ridge of the bank of the Kerest River. To the right and left of the Kerest River stretched huge swamps without bushes, covered with a thick layer of snow. Enemy positions set up on farmsteads made it possible to clearly view and accurately fire at all approaches to their defenses. The division, fighting for many days until March 10, did not achieve success and was transferred to a wooded area 2 kilometers south of Krasnaya Gorka.

To replace the 267th and 259th divisions that had left the 52nd Army, the 65th Infantry Division of Colonel P.K. arrived from the 4th Army. Koshevoy. The division took up defensive positions along the northern outskirts of Lyubtsa to the Polist River, covering the neck of the breakthrough from enemy attacks from Zemtitsa.

With a view to focusing the attention of the command and staff of the 2nd Shock Army only on leading the troops advancing at the edge of the breakthrough, the commander of the front forces assigned responsibility for maintaining the communications of the 2nd Shock Army and for expanding the neck of the breakthrough to the north to the troops of the 59th Army, and to the south of the neck of the breakthrough to the troops of the 52nd Army. Right there. pp. 35-36.

An operational group of General I.T. was created in the 59th Army. Korovnikov to eliminate the enemy’s defense resistance center in Spasskaya Polist and the entire protrusion of his defense Tregubovo, Spasskaya Polist, Priyutino. This group included the 92nd, 11th, 327th, 374th and 378th rifle divisions.

From the end of January until March, the troops of the 59th Army tried to eliminate the enemy defense wedge up to 10 kilometers wide along the railway and highway from Tregubovo to Spasskaya Polist. Attacks on this wedge came from the south, east and west, but they were unable to break through the enemy’s defensive positions and expand the breakthrough throat of the 2nd Shock Army. Right there. P. 36.

Troops of the operational group of troops of General I.T. Korovnikov's continuous unsuccessful attacks by the enemy were unable to penetrate his defenses, but they suffered heavy losses and significantly lost their combat effectiveness. The commanders of units and formations, constantly organizing attacks, even gathered transport workers for them, were unable to devote the necessary attention, forces and means to create defensive structures on the captured lines and to refurbish the enemy’s defensive structures. Commanders of all levels of troops of the operational group of General I.T. Korovnikov, constantly urged to organize attacks, did not focus on the possibility of an enemy counterattack and did not prepare to repel them. There were no reserves, either in the operational group itself or in the formations. The 52nd Army also conducted continuous unsuccessful attacks with the aim of expanding the breakthrough neck, using all its capabilities and did not erect defensive structures. The army had no reserves. Korovnikov I.T. On three fronts. M., 1974.

The 92nd Rifle Division, participating in the battles to break through the enemy’s second defensive position in the Mikhalevo-Ostrov sector, suffered heavy losses. To restore combat effectiveness, by order of the headquarters of the 59th Army, on March 2, the division transferred its combat area to neighboring formations and moved to the replenishment area. Having completed a 15-kilometer march, the division concentrated on March 3 in the area between Lyubino Pole and Myasny Bor in the center of the breakthrough neck of the 2nd Shock Army. The headquarters drew up plans for the defense and engineering equipment of the site, which included options for combat operations, unit duty, air defense, adaptation of dugouts for the defense of a section of trenches, and construction of barriers.

By order of the army headquarters, contact was established with the 65th Infantry Division and the headquarters of the 52nd Army to cooperate in the defense of the breakthrough neck.

During March 5 and 6, the division received 3,521 reinforcements, which were distributed among units; on March 6, the division received news from the headquarters of the 59th Army that the division had transferred to the front reserve. By order of the front headquarters, the division left its area on the night of March 7 with the expectation of concentrating in the Ogoreli area by the morning of March 8 and joining the 2nd Shock Army. On March 8, during a day's work in Ogoreli, the headquarters of the 2nd Shock Army received an order to concentrate the division in the Chervino, Tigoda area by the morning of March 10. Along the route of movement, the division passed at a slow pace through the virgin snow, while from Myasny Bor to Ogoreli the march took place along a cleared army road without delay. Lyuban offensive operation. January-June 1942: Sat. St. Petersburg, 1994. P. 37.

At the front and army headquarters, it became clear that the army troops, heavily stretched along the front, having suffered heavy losses in offensive battles, not provided with regular supplies of ammunition, food and fodder, and unprotected from enemy aircraft, could not advance.

The front did not have its own reserves, and the other three armies of the front transferred a significant part of their formations, and further transfer of their formations to the 2nd Shock Army can only happen when a decision is made on the passive actions of these armies.

On February 15, the front commander clarified the task of the 2nd Shock Army and demanded the rapid movement of its units to the west towards Lyuban, including the 13th Cavalry Corps that was to move in the direction of Ushaki for quick access to the Moscow-Leningrad railway. The operational group of General Privalov, having eliminated the enemy in Ruchi and Chervinskaya Luka, was supposed to reach the railway in the Pomerania region. General Andreev’s task force was tasked with firmly holding Olkhovka.

Unfortunately, both the corps and Privalov’s operational group were not successful and remained at their original positions.

Commander of the 2nd Shock Army, General N.K. Klykov reported to the front commander, General K.A. Meretskov: “In my sector, enemy aircraft dominate the air all the time and paralyze the actions of the troops. The road network is in poor condition and there is no one to keep it passable. Due to the lack of a sufficient number of vehicles, the supply of fodder, food, fuel and ammunition is far from meeting existing needs. To develop a successful offensive, the army needs three fresh divisions, a division of missile launchers, at least two motor battalions, at least three road construction battalions, at least fifteen fuel tankers, hay, replenishment of the horse force and air cover for the army.” The second shock in the battle for Leningrad: Sat. L., 1983. P. 16.

To strengthen the group of General Privalov, advancing in the direction of Chervinskaya Luka, Lyuban, the 46th Infantry Division of General A.K. was transferred from the 52nd Army. Okulich and from the group S.V. Roginsky 22nd Infantry Brigade Colonel F.K. Pugacheva.

The 80th Cavalry Division of Colonel L.A. was transferred to the 13th Cavalry Corps from the 4th Army. Slanov and from the front reserve the replenished 327th Infantry Division of Colonel I.M. Antyufeyeva. The commander of the front troops ordered: “The 80th Cavalry Division, in cooperation with the 327th Infantry Division, strike in the direction of Krasnaya Gorka, Kirkovo, reach the Lyuban area, cutting off the Chudovo-Leningrad railway and highway.” Lyuban offensive operation. January-June 1942: Sat. St. Petersburg, 1994. P. 37. After the capture of Krasnaya Gorka, the 46th Infantry Division and the 22nd Separate Infantry Brigade were introduced into the breakthrough to reach the Lyuban region.

On February 16, the 80th Cavalry Division approached the combat area and began clearing the forest of small enemy groups. On February 18, the commander of the 1st squadron of the 205th cavalry regiment, Lieutenant Zhelobov, having scouted out a weak spot in the enemy’s defenses, with a dashing attack knocked the Germans off the embankment of the railway under construction and, pursuing them, broke into Krasnaya Gorka. The approaching main forces of the regiment secured the positions occupied by the squadron.

The capture of Krasnaya Gorka opened the way to Lyuban. It was urgent to develop the success achieved, but the formations allocated by the front were still on the way.

Only on February 23, the 46th Rifle Division reached Krasnaya Gorka and took over the line of defense against the cavalrymen. The 80th Cavalry Division began moving towards Lyuban and, passing during the night along the river. Sichev near

15 kilometers, and by the morning of February 24 it was concentrated in the forests two kilometers northwest of Kirkovo. There were only 6 kilometers left to Lyuban... But there were no additional forces. The 327th Rifle Division had just approached Ogoreli and still had to march 25 kilometers to Krasnaya Gorka, of which 10 kilometers were off-road, which the division covered at a speed of 2 kilometers per hour with great effort. By the end of February 26, the advanced 1100th Infantry Regiment of the 327th Infantry Division arrived in the area of ​​the command post of the 13th Cavalry Corps in the forest 5-6 kilometers south of Krasnaya Gorka.

By order of the commander of the 13th Cavalry Corps, an advance detachment of the corps was formed consisting of the 80th Cavalry Division, the 1100th Infantry Regiment and two tank companies with the task of capturing Lyubanya. Advancing, the advance detachment on the approaches to Lyuban was met by severe artillery fire, aerial bombing and a tank counterattack of the enemy and was thrown back into the forest to its original position in the Kirkovo area, where it continued to be under artillery fire and bombing. Right there. pp. 37-38.

The main forces of the cavalry and the 327th division could not immediately enter the breakthrough at Krasnaya Gorka due to continuous air bombing during daylight hours. The cavalrymen and rifle division suffered heavy losses in personnel and especially in cavalry. There was nothing to pull the artillery pieces and supply wagons with. This led to a delay in the exit of the main forces for several hours.

The enemy, taking advantage of this delay, drove back the small units of the 46th Rifle Division from Krasnaya Gorka and closed the breakthrough gap on February 27. The advance detachment found itself surrounded without ammunition, food or fodder. The existing radio stations did not provide communication due to low power.

The command of the 2nd Shock Army took all measures to once again break through the enemy defenses in the Krasnaya Gorka area and restore contact with the forward detachment. The 22nd Infantry Brigade and the 166th Separate Tank Battalion were brought in to reinforce the 327th Division. But all the attacks undertaken on enemy positions were unsuccessful. The advance detachment was forced to destroy all heavy weapons and leave the encirclement on the night of March 8-9.

The exit was organized 3-4 kilometers west of Krasnaya Gorka.

The breakthrough was carried out by two parallel groups: the 200th cavalry regiment and a reinforced battalion of the 1100th regiment with a surprise attack from the rear. The remaining regiments of the 80th Cavalry Division and the battalions of the 1110th Regiment with personal small arms entered the breakthrough.

The fighting in the Krasnaya Gorka area, weakening and intensifying, continued until the tenth of March, attracting significant forces of the 2nd Shock Army, but did not bring success. The enemy's defensive position, equipped along the embankment of the railway under construction, for a breakthrough required appropriate aviation, artillery and tank forces and a large amount of ammunition. The embankment, towering above the surrounding terrain, was equipped with artillery and machine-gun bunkers, dug-in tanks and shelters for personnel. In front of the embankment there are two snow-and-ice ramparts with machine-gun nests, covering wire barriers and minefields with their fire. Behind the embankment, a road was laid from prefabricated metal elements of the airfield pavement, which ensured the maneuver of enemy forces and means inaccessible to our observation.

General Privalov’s group was unable to take Krivino, Ruchi, or Chervinskaya Luka. In search of a solution to the problem of reaching Lyuban, General Privalov found an opportunity, using the successful advance of the 80th Cavalry Division, to send the 191st Infantry Division behind enemy lines to capture the village and Pomerania station on the railway

Moscow - Leningrad 5 kilometers southeast of Lyuban. The 191st division, consisting of special units, the 546th and 552nd rifle regiments without artillery, mortars and convoys, was supposed to cross the front line behind enemy lines and, moving through the forest, reach the Pomeranian station and, with a night attack, capture the village and station, organize a strong all-round defense and prevent enemy movement along the Chudovo-Leningrad highway and railway. Right there. P. 39.

The division (without the 559th Infantry and 484th Artillery Regiments, the 8th Anti-Tank Fighter Division and the 15th Medical Battalion) withdrew from the front road section and on February 20 concentrated in the forest 1.5 kilometers northwest of the village of Dubovoe . Here a task was set and given 5 pieces of crackers and the same number of sugar cubes. They carried 10 rounds of ammunition per rifle, a disc per light machine gun and machine gun, and two hand grenades. The commandant's company had 10 anti-tank grenades. There was only one radio station. General Privalov promised to deliver ammunition and food to Pomerania using airplanes. Konyaev N. Two faces of General Vlasov. M., 2003. P. 63.

At night, the division moved to the front line between the German strongholds, crossed the Apraksin Bor - Lyuban road and went deep into the old pine forest. After resting on the night of February 22, the division moved to Pomerania, but upon exiting the forest into a swampy area with sparse stunted pine trees, it was discovered by an enemy Rama reconnaissance aircraft, which had been patrolling over the forest in the morning. After 15 minutes, enemy artillery began intensively shelling the wooded area. The shelling caused heavy losses in killed and wounded. The radio operator was killed and the only radio station was destroyed. The division lost contact with our troops.

The division retreated into the forest. On the fifth day, the command decided to approach our troops in three groups: the division headquarters with special units, the 546th and 552nd regiments. Everyone on their own. The chief of staff of the regiment, Mesnyaev, led out the people of his regiment that same night, and without losses. In the morning, the division headquarters approached the front line at the junction of the 559th Infantry Regiment with its neighbor south of Dubovoe towards Apraksin Bor. We placed ourselves in free dugouts and trenches of the enemy’s second line of defense, ready to break through to our own forces when darkness fell. But about an hour before dark, the division headquarters was covered with a salvo of Katyusha rockets and a battery of 76-mm cannons. There were no casualties, but it was impossible to go out. The headquarters moved deep into the forest to the northeast, where they wandered for 6 days. The commander of the commandant's company with five of his soldiers was tasked to cross the front line and inform General Privalov about the location of the division headquarters to organize its withdrawal. The commandant's company group crossed the front line, but General Ivanov, who replaced General Privalov, did not take measures to withdraw the division headquarters. A new division commander, N.P., was appointed. Korkin, the chief of staff was Major Arzumanov, who commanded the 559th Infantry Regiment.

The personnel of the division's command and headquarters are still on the list of missing persons.

At the end of February, the front command approached headquarters with a proposal to regroup within the armies and the front in order to free up forces to strengthen the troops of the 2nd Shock Army advancing on Lyuban, and the troops of the 59th Army blocking the highway and the Chudovo-Novgorod railway. First of all, it was necessary to put in order the divisions attacking Lyuban, replenishing them with personnel, weapons and ammunition, strengthening the artillery group, and putting the roads in order. Battle of Leningrad 1941-1944: Sat. St. Petersburg, 1995. P. 111.

On February 26, the Headquarters responded to these proposals that it did not object to the proposed strengthening of the 2nd Shock and 59th Armies, but spoke out against bringing the advancing divisions into order, since this would require suspending the attacks for some time. Headquarters categorically demanded that the Military Council of the front under no circumstances stop the offensive actions of the 2nd Shock and 59th armies in the Lyuban and Chudovo directions in anticipation of their strengthening, but, on the contrary, to reach the Lyuban-Chudovo railway by March 1.

To assist in the capture of Lyuban, the Headquarters instructed the Leningrad Front to strike no later than March 1 with the forces of the 54th Army towards the troops of the 2nd Shock Army in order to then, through the efforts of troops of two fronts, no later than March 5, liquidate the enemy’s Lyuban-Chudov group and liberate section of the Lyuban - Chudovo railway. Lyuban offensive operation. January-June 1942: Sat. St. Petersburg, 1994. P. 41.

In pursuance of this instruction, a strike force was created in the 2nd Shock Army, which included the cavalry corps and General Privalov’s group already operating at the tip of the offensive wedge. The strike group of the 59th Army, also as part of already existing formations, aimed at intercepting the Chudovo-Novgorod highway and railway north of Spasskaya Polist.

Fulfilling the front's directive to intercept the Chudovo-Novgorod highway and railway north of Spasskaya Polist, the commander of the 59th Army ordered on March 1, with counter strikes, to break through the enemy defenses north of Tregubovo from the west from the area north-west of the village of Glushila with the forces of the 378th Infantry Division with the reinforced regiment 111- th rifle division and from the east, between Mal. Opochivalovo and Tregubovo by the forces of the 377th Infantry Division with a reinforced regiment of the 92nd Infantry Division. The main forces of the 111th Infantry Division from the west, and the 92nd Infantry Division from the east, pin down the enemy south of Tregubovo. Korovnikov I.T. On three fronts. M., 1974. P. 23.

The 378th Infantry Division, leaving the 1256th Infantry and 944th Artillery Regiments in a defensive position southwest of Mostka, on February 28 set out along the route east of the Gazhi Sopki swamp to the initial area for the offensive northwest of the village of Glushitsa. For the division's march, it was necessary to continue a 15-kilometer column path through wooded and swampy terrain with deep snow cover at 35° below zero, as a result of which the division only reached the given area on March 11, fighting across the enemy's road between its strongholds of the village of Sennaya Kerest and the village of Glushila. The element of surprise when the division entered the offensive area was lost.

The enemy quickly brought in additional forces and stopped the division's advance towards the intended breakthrough site. Defending along the western bank of the river. The suppressed regiment of the 111th Infantry Division, which came under the operational subordination of the 378th Infantry Division, could not take active action on its own.

The 377th Infantry Division, reinforced by the 317th Regiment of the 92nd Infantry Division, went on the offensive from the east north and south of Tregubovo on March 1, but was unable to break through the enemy defenses and did not link up with the 378th Infantry Division. Right there. P. 29.

On March 24, the enemy intercepted the column route of the 378th Infantry Division at the intersection with the road Sennaya Kerest - the village of Glushila and firmly blocked the division's communications with the rear. The division found itself surrounded in the area north of the Skrebelsky stream west of the Glushila and Polist rivers. With continuous counterattacks under heavy artillery fire and frequent air bombing, the enemy forced the division to take up a perimeter defense in a small swampy forest area measuring 1.5 x 2.5 km. The swampy terrain did not allow soldiers to bury themselves in the ground; shelters were built from wood, poles, and peat. Inevitably, the division suffered heavy losses in personnel and weapons from heavy artillery fire and air bombing. Right there. P. 31.

On April 24, units of the division, with permission from the army command, began to leave the encirclement through the Skrebelsky stream, but the enemy firmly held the defense along the road from the village of Sennaya Kerest - the village of Glushila and blocked the exit to the south. On the night of April 25, the division, having a regiment of the 111th Infantry Division at the center of the breakthrough, fought its way to the southwest in the direction of Gazhi Sopka. Having covered 8 km through the swamp, the remnants of the division reached the Olkhovsky farms to the location of the troops of the 2nd Shock Army.

The shock group of the 4th Army was supposed to act towards the 2nd Shock Army in the direction of Babino. The undertaken attacks on enemy positions by heavily weakened troops without the support of tanks, artillery and aviation did not bring the expected result.

For personal acquaintance with the situation, front commander General K.A. Meretskov with the commander of the 2nd Shock Army, General N.K. Klykov visited the 327th and 46th rifle divisions, as well as the cavalry corps. Konyaev N. Two faces of General Vlasov. M., 2003. P. 77.

The commanders and soldiers with whom the generals met complained about the very weak support of our aviation, the lack of anti-aircraft defenses, while enemy aircraft continuously fired and bombed our battle formations, pinned the attackers to the ground and prohibited all movement on the battlefield and on the roads . The cavalrymen suffered especially heavy losses; their every movement was accompanied by the immediate impact of enemy aircraft. It was impossible to hide the horse train even in the forests.

Our artillery, having a quantitative and qualitative advantage over enemy artillery, was not provided with shells.

Due to the lack of tanks, infantry attacks were not accompanied by direct support tanks, as a result of which the infantry suffered heavy losses from machine gun and mortar fire from undestroyed fire installations and unsuppressed enemy firing positions.

Military headquarters, not having a stable connection with the units, responded untimely to events, not knowing the actual situation, and often gave incorrect information to higher authorities. The commander of the Volkhov Front established the lack of clear and firm leadership of the troops. “We had to take extreme measures. On the recommendation of the Military Council of the front, the Headquarters removed the chief of staff of the 2nd Shock Army, General A.V., from his post. Vizzhilin and the head of the operational department, Colonel N.P. Pakhomova. Colonel P.S. was accordingly appointed to their positions. Vinogradov and brigade commander I.N. Burenin." Lyuban offensive operation. January-June 1942: Sat. St. Petersburg, 1994. P. 44.

General P.F. Alferyev was appointed deputy commander of the army, and divisional commissar I.V. Zuev was appointed member of the Army Military Council.

On February 28, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command in its directive clarified the tasks of the Volkhov and Leningrad fronts, the 2nd Shock and 54th armies of which were to advance towards each other and unite in Lyuban with the aim of encircling and destroying the enemy’s Lyuban-Chudov group, and upon completion of this the task of attacking Tosno and Siverskaya in order to eliminate the Mginsk group and lift the blockade of Leningrad.

The directive indicated the creation of shock groups in each army: in the 2nd Shock Army - from five rifle divisions, four rifle brigades and one cavalry division; in the 59th Army - from three rifle divisions and in the 4th Army - from two rifle divisions. Right there. P. 44.

On March 9, K.E. arrived at front headquarters. Voroshilov, G.M. Malenkov, Deputy Commander of the Red Army Air Force, General A.A. Novikov, as well as General A.A. Vlasov, newly appointed to the post of Deputy Commander of the Volkhov Front. Representatives of the Headquarters demanded strengthening of the offensive operation in order to capture Lyubanyo and carry out joint actions with Leningrad Front with the aim of encircling and destroying the enemy’s Chudov group. Konyaev N. Two faces of General Vlasov. M., 2003. P. 75.

Fulfilling the front directive, the commander of the 2nd Shock created on March 10 a strike group from the 92nd Infantry Division with the 24th Infantry Brigade, the 46th Infantry Division with the 53rd Infantry Brigade, the 327th Infantry Division with the 58th Infantry and 7th Guards Tank Brigade, 259th and 382nd Rifle Divisions, 59th Rifle Brigade and 80th Cavalry Division. Right there. pp. 75-76.

On the morning of March 11, the strike group launched an offensive against the German defensive positions at the line Chervinskaya Luka, Dubovik, Koroviy Ruchey, Krasnaya Gorka, Verkhovye, Art. Etino with the aim of capturing Lyubanyo and intercepting sections of the Chudovo-Leningrad highway and railway to encircle the enemy's Chudovo group.

The 92nd Rifle Division, together with the 24th Rifle Brigade, only arrived on March 10 in the concentration area, located 6-8 kilometers from starting position, and the 259th Infantry Division was 5-6 kilometers away, so there was no time to select movement routes and conduct reconnaissance of the area and assign tasks to the commanders of units and subunits. In addition, the divisions did not receive information about the enemy, and there was no time for reconnaissance. The divisions of the strike group did not receive reinforcement with artillery. There was less than one round of ammunition. Aviation and anti-aircraft artillery cover of the battle formations was not organized.

The divisions had offensive zones of 7-10 kilometers into continuous defensive positions with an artillery density of 8-10 barrels per kilometer of front, while in the 7-kilometer offensive zone of the 92nd division the enemy had an infantry regiment in position, about 70 light and 30 heavy machine guns, 15 mortars, 20 individual guns, 10 tanks and was supported by four artillery batteries.

It is not surprising that as a result of multi-day battles, the 24th Infantry Brigade with the 93rd separate ski battalion occupied the village of Dubovo, the 92nd Infantry Division only captured the enemy resistance center in the village of Koroviy Ruchey on March 17, and the 327th Infantry Division, jointly with the 58th The 1st Rifle and 7th Guards Tank Brigades captured the resistance center of Krasnaya Gorka on March 15. The remaining formations were not successful and from March 15 to 20 went on the defensive. The enemy began to probe the weak points in our defense with counterattacks.

The command of the front and armies, completely absorbed in the continuous offensive actions of the troops, reviewed the measures being prepared by the enemy to eliminate the breakthrough neck.

Unexpectedly, on March 15, the enemy went on the offensive, delivering counter attacks from his troops from the Spasskaya Polist and Zemtitsy area to Lyubino Pole. The attacks of his infantry with tanks were accompanied by massive air bombing and artillery fire.

A critical situation immediately arose on the northern face of the breakthrough neck. Units of the 374th Infantry Division of Colonel A.D. Vitoshkin, having come under heavy attacks from aviation and artillery, while suffering significant losses in people and equipment, were unable to hold back the onslaught of enemy tanks and infantry and retreated to Mostki.

To hold positions north of Mostki, a front fighter detachment was urgently advanced to reinforce the 374th Division, then the 1238th Infantry Regiment of the 372nd Infantry Division. Through joint efforts, the enemy's advance to the south was stopped. The second shock in the battle for Leningrad: Sat. L., 1983. P. 83.

On the same day, on the southern front of the breakthrough neck, the enemy attacked the battle formations of the 65th Infantry Division of Colonel P.K. Koshevoy with infantry and tanks.

The division withstood air bombing and artillery fire and was able to repel infantry and tank attacks.

The 1347th Infantry Regiment of the 225th Infantry Division, adjacent to the 65th Division, also steadfastly and bravely repelled enemy attacks.

The General Staff's assessments of the current situation and the enemy's capabilities were considered dangerous and requiring immediate measures to counter the enemy's offensive. Headquarters, believing that the front, with the available forces and means, can not only allow the interception of communications of the 2nd Shock Army, but also completely destroy the enemy’s counter-attacking units, without stopping the offensive operation to encircle and defeat his Chudov group, as indicated in the Headquarters directive of March 17 1942.

The headquarters offered General Meretskov K.A. take the operation to eliminate the enemy's counterattack into your own hands. To accomplish this task, it was allowed to transfer the 376th Infantry Division from the 4th Army to the Myasnoy Bor area.

General Meretskov K.A. clearly understood the threat of the enemy entering the communications of the 2nd Shock Army, having received a report of an enemy counterattack on the flanks of the breakthrough, he immediately went to the checkpoint of the 52nd, then the 59th Army. On the visible battlefield, the enemy continuously attacked our units on the northern and southern fronts of the breakthrough neck with infantry and tanks. Enemy aircraft dominated the battlefield, fiercely bombing and shelling the battle formations of our troops. The troops had difficulty holding back the enemy’s attacking infantry and tanks, but there were no reserves in the armies and the army commanders could not strengthen the defending troops by introducing reserves to defeat the enemy who was striking at the neck of the breakthrough; reserves were needed. Therefore, as soon as Headquarters allowed the 376th Division to be taken from the 4th Army, and General Meretskov K.A. transfers it to the neck of the breakthrough, at the same time instructing the commander of the 2nd Shock to prepare an attack from the west on the enemy in the neck with the forces of the 58th Rifle and 7th Guards Tank Brigades, transferring them from near Krasnaya Gorka to the Novaya Keresti area. Konyaev N. Two faces of General Vlasov. M., 2003. P. 78.

The enemy, realizing that the attacks of his troops along the highway and railway were not successful, shifted the direction of the main attack to the area between the Polist and Glushitsa rivers. Having quickly concentrated infantry and tanks here with continuous support from aviation and artillery, the enemy breaks through the front of our defending units on the northern and southern fronts of the breakthrough neck, first establishing his front along the river. Polist, and then a few days later along the river. Gluszyce. The neck of our breakthrough with the communications of the 2nd Shock Army was blocked. The delivery of food, fodder and ammunition has stopped, without which the army cannot live and fight.

The front commander demanded that the commanders of the 52nd and 59th armies clear the neck of the breakthrough from the enemy and restore communications of the 2nd Shock Army.

General Yakovlev threw the army courses for junior lieutenants into battle. The cadets with an energetic jerk, following the explosions of their army artillery, passed the enemy’s defenses on the river. Polist and R. Glushitsa, united with units of the 305th Infantry Division defending on the western bank of the river. Glushitsa, but, having suffered losses, were unable to consolidate the success achieved. The enemy closed the breakthrough again.

On March 21, the 376th Infantry Division under Lieutenant Colonel D. I. Ugorich arrived. Reinforced by the 193rd Tank Battalion, the division attacked the enemy on March 23 in the direction of the Myasnoy Bor - Novaya Kerest road. The 1248th Infantry Regiment of the division followed two KV tanks and four T-34s in a chain and successfully advanced to the river. Polist. But then the regiment was subjected to massive enemy air and artillery attacks and retreated to its original positions. Right there. P. 79.

On March 25, the 376th Rifle Division, reinforced by cadets of the junior lieutenant courses of the 59th Army and a company of machine gunners, with the support of army artillery and three divisions of guards mortars, again went on the offensive in the same direction. To the right in the direction of Lyubino Pole, Novaya Kerest, the 372nd Infantry Division of Lieutenant Colonel D.S. Sorokin was advancing, and to the left - the 305th Infantry Division of Colonel D.I. Barabanshchikov. and the 65th Infantry Division of Colonel P.K. Koshevoy. The enemy was driven back to the north and south of the Myasnoy Bor - Novaya Kerest road. The enemy brought in new forces and the fight for the communications of the 2nd Shock Army resumed again with varying degrees of success.

On March 26, the 24th Rifle and 7th Guards Tank Brigades arrived, immediately attacked the enemy and on March 27 linked up with the 376th Rifle Division, advancing from the east.

The corridor cut along the Myasnoy Bor - Novaya Kerest road was only 600-700 meters wide and was shot through by all types of weapons. At great risk, a convoy of 30 vehicles, led by the commander of the 868th motor transport battalion, Captain V.G. Vvedensky, went with food, fodder and ammunition for the 2nd shock army.

In order to expand the corridor, on the morning of March 28, the 376th and 372nd Rifle Divisions from the east, and the 58th Rifle and 7th Guards Tank Brigades from the west resumed the offensive and expanded the corridor to 2 kilometers.

The fighting for the corridor did not subside for a single day. Attacks gave way to counterattacks, but the corridor remained.

Starting from the first days of April, the fierce fighting in the corridor began to weaken and during April and the first ten days of May the northern and southern faces of the breakthrough neck remained unchanged. The enemy began systematic aerial bombing and artillery shelling of the only communications of the 2nd Shock Army, trying to stop the supply of food, fodder and ammunition, as well as the evacuation of the wounded. Despite the incredibly difficult transport conditions, the traffic flow was not interrupted.

The only road, and even under the constant influence of bombing and artillery shelling, of course, could not provide even the primary needs of the army. The approaching spring thaw jeopardized the movement of transport along the winter road.

Here I would like to turn to the memories of the commissar of the 280th Autobat L.K. Guivmana. He writes that the chief of logistics of the Volkhov Front, General Anisimov, instructing officers, said that if eighty out of two hundred vehicles arrive in the 2nd Shock Army, great. Sixty is good. Fifty is satisfactory. Right there. P. 74. That is, 75 percent losses were considered satisfactory. But this is no longer supplying the shock army. This is a breakthrough into the shock army.

In this regard, the Military Council of the 2nd Shock Army on April 16, 1942 discussed the problems of supplying the army and decided to build a narrow-gauge railway Myasnoy Bor - Novaya Kerest. The construction of the road was carried out day and night, despite continuous bombing and shelling. Two weeks after the start of construction, platforms with food and ammunition moved along the road, which were moved manually. Builders' duty units restored damaged sections of the road using aerial bombing or artillery shelling.

A ferry crossing was built in the Shevelevo area, and a floating bridge was built in Selishchi. Sappers of the 1243rd, 1244th and 1246th sapper battalions and the 34th bridge-pontoon battalion worked around the clock.

The enemy's entry into the communications of the 2nd Shock Army and the approach of spring with the disruption of all winter roads, with floods in a forested and swampy area with an abundance of rivers, rivers and swampy lowlands could not but force the front command to seriously think about the state of affairs at the front, how to complete the operation that had begun . As General K.A. writes in his article. Meretskov: “Three options for solving the problem suggested themselves: the first is to ask Headquarters to strengthen the front with one army and, before the thaw occurs, to solve the problem; the second is to withdraw the 2nd Shock Army from the area it occupied and, if the situation is favorable, look for a solution to the operational problem in another direction; the third is to go over to a tough defense on the achieved lines, wait out the mud, and then, having accumulated strength, resume the offensive.

We stuck to the first option. It made it possible to use the results already achieved and complete the operation before the end of the winter campaign. Headquarters did not object to him either.” Lyuban offensive operation. January-June 1942: Sat. St. Petersburg, 1994. P. 49.

“...The front command began preparing a new attack on Lyuban. As a first step, by decision of Headquarters, we began the formation of the 6th Guards Rifle Corps on the basis of the 4th Guards Rifle Division, which had been transferred to the front reserve. Other formations and units came from the General Headquarters reserve. The corps was intended to strengthen the 2nd Shock Army. In terms of the number of troops and weapons, it was stronger than the 2nd Shock Army in its original composition.

By decision of Headquarters, the Volkhov Front was transformed into the Volkhov Operational Group of the Leningrad Front.” Right there. P. 49.

Chapter III . Appointment of Vlasov

So, spring 1942, April. The Lyuban offensive operation has been going on for four months now. The 2nd Shock Army is in a critical situation. This situation is critical not only in terms of the operational situation, but also in terms of providing the army with ammunition and food, and the terrible sanitary conditions of soldiers and officers. According to the testimony of the lieutenant of the rifle regiment of the 382nd rifle division, Ivan Dmitrievich Nikonov, people were plump from hunger, all clothes were completely covered with lice and nits, all the horses had long been eaten along with bones and skin. The soldiers ate literally everything, including grass and worms. Suicides among officers have become more frequent. Konyaev N. Two faces of General Vlasov. M., 2003. pp. 81-84. And at this time, orders were constantly coming from Headquarters to continue the offensive...

In early April, Vlasov, as deputy front commander, was sent by Meretskov to the 2nd Shock Army at the head of a special commission of the Volkhov Front.

“For three days, members of the commission talked with commanders of all ranks, with political workers, with soldiers” Ibid. P. 76., and on April 8 the commission’s act was read out, and by the evening she dropped out of the army.

The entire next day, as his colleagues recall, Army Commander Klykov did nothing but sort through the contents of the drawers of his desk.

The premonition did not deceive the army commander: a few days later he was removed from his post as commander.

This evidence somehow completely disagrees with the letter to Klykov and Zuev sent by Meretskov on April 9, 1942: “The operational position of our armies creates a mortal threat to the enemy group of about 75 thousand - the threat of extermination of his troops. The battle for Lyuban is the battle for Leningrad.” Right there. P. 77.

However, it seems to me that the contradiction was generated not by the mistakes of the documentarians, but by the whimsicality of the staff intrigue, which Kirill Afanasyevich himself was then implementing.

You need to try to understand why this letter was sent at all.

It is easy to see that it was, as it were, copied from Stalin’s message, received by Meretskov himself before the start of the offensive. And, of course, Meretskov could not help but understand what impression his letter would make on N.K. Klykova.

Perhaps on April 9 the shock army was still capable of breaking out of the encirclement, but sending it on the offensive to encircle the 75,000-strong German group was pure madness.

Meretskov could not help but understand this. N.K. himself understood this. Klykov. General Klykov's reaction is known.

Having received Meretskov’s message, he immediately fell ill and was taken by plane to the rear: “In April 1942, I became seriously ill. I had to go to the hospital. A new commander was appointed in my place.” Second strike in the battle for Leningrad: Sat. L., 1983. P. 20. - this is how N.K. recalls these events. Klykov.

But here the question arises: wasn’t this what Kirill Afanasyevich was trying to achieve? Isn't his plan to "get sick" N.K. Is Klykov an integral part of the intrigue directed against Vlasov?

Meretskov certainly wanted to remove his deputy and possible successor as front commander. And, of course, when the opportunity arose to lock up a dangerous competitor in an encircled army, far from the means of communication with Headquarters, Meretskov did not miss it.

Moreover, the reason for Vlasov’s removal was quite valid - the shock army was in a critical situation, and the presence of the deputy commander there could be explained by this critical situation.

Meretskov carried out his plan to isolate Vlasov with his characteristic General Staff brilliance. Some researchers believe that Vlasov returned with the commission to front headquarters on April 8. Meanwhile, a tape from Baudot’s apparatus has been preserved, recording Meretskov’s negotiations with members of the Military Council of the 2nd Shock Army, which indicates otherwise.

Who are you nominating as a candidate for the position of army commander? - asked Meretskov.

“Member of the Military Council Zuev: We have no candidates for this position. I consider it necessary to report to you on the advisability of appointing Lieutenant General Vlasov as army commander.

Vlasov: The temporary performance of the post of army commander must be entrusted to the chief of staff of the army, Colonel Vinogradov.

Meretskov and Zaporozhets (to Vlasov): We consider Zuev’s proposal correct. How do you, Comrade Vlasov, feel about this proposal?

Vlasov: I think, judging by the situation, that, apparently, I will have to stay longer in this army. As for appointment to a permanent position, then if this is your decision, I will, of course, carry it out.

Meretskov: Okay, after our conversation an order will follow.” Konyaev N. Two faces of General Vlasov. M., 2003. pp. 77-78.

Pushing his competitor into the dying, surrounded army, K.A. Meretskov was committing a serious violation of order. Usually the appointment of a new commander took place in the presence of a representative of Headquarters. The procedure is bureaucratic, but necessary.

The headquarters was supposed to represent which army the new commander would accept. Therefore, the order to appoint Vlasov as commander of the 2nd Shock Army never came. Vlasov remained deputy front commander.

What such an appointment meant for Vlasov is also clear. He found himself in an army unable to fight, and he himself could neither demand additional reserves, as was usually done upon appointment, nor simply explain to the Headquarters representative that he was already like that and accepted the army.

It should be recalled that according to the reports of K.A. Meretskov's 2nd Shock Army retained its combat capability, its supply was normal, and it was ready to continue the attack on Lyuban...

Vlasov’s former colleague in the 4th Mechanized Corps (Vlasov commanded this corps at the beginning of the war), brigade commissar Zuev, who so imprudently “hurt” Vlasov during his current appointment, probably did not understand the tragedy of the situation both for the encircled army and for Vlasov himself, but Vlasov could not help but understand this. It was impossible to refuse the appointment, but Vlasov also could not do anything to save the army.

Carried away by the implementation of a combination associated with the elimination of his possible successor, Meretskov overlooked the danger that had crept up from a completely different direction.

General M.S. Khozin carried out a brilliant staff intrigue in Moscow. Having reported to Headquarters that the Lyuban operation had failed due to the lack of a unified command of the troops, he proposed to unite the Leningrad and Volkhov fronts, entrusting their command to him, Khozin.

April 21, 1942 Battle of Leningrad 1941-1944: Sat. St. Petersburg, 1995. P. 117. This issue was brought up at a meeting with I.V. Stalin. The meeting, which was attended by V.M. Molotov, G.M. Malenkov, L.P. Beria, B.M. Shaposhnikov, A.M. Vasilevsky, P.I. Bodin, G.K. Zhukov, A.A. Novikov, N.G. Kuznetsov, S.I. Budyonny and M.S. himself Khozin, lasted seven hours.

Undoubtedly, M.S. Khozin himself understood how difficult it was to command nine armies, three separate corps and two groups of troops, separated by territory occupied by the enemy.

But this is not what the unification was intended for.

Already arrived in Leningrad L.A. Govorov, and M.S. Khozin, who found himself in almost the same situation as K.A. Meretskov, in his position, had to take care of creating a worthy general position for himself.

This was done.

On April 23, by decision of the Headquarters, the Volkhov Front was transformed into the Volkhov Special Group of the Leningrad Front. Right there. P. 118. Govorov remained in Leningrad, and Khozin went to command the armies of K.A. Meretskova.

Meretskov found out about this when General M.S. Khozin appeared at the front headquarters with the Headquarters directive in his pocket.

Meretskov, trying to preserve the front, reported to Headquarters about the need to bring the 6th Guards Rifle Corps into the breakthrough area - there was no success. Kirill Afanasyevich was coldly told that the fate of the 2nd Shock Army should not worry him, since he had been appointed deputy commander of the Southwestern Front. The new appointment for Meretskov was a demotion, and he was very upset.

And for the fate of Andrei Andreevich Vlasov, the reorganization of the fronts turned into a disaster.

The early spring of 1942, more reliably than the German divisions, locked the 2nd Shock in the swamps, and by the end of April its fate was irrevocably determined.

Frostbitten, hungry, lice-ridden soldiers spent weeks and months in the swamps, and only death could save them from suffering.

Having reported to Headquarters that the army’s communications had been restored, K.A. Meretskov deceived Moscow. The supply of the 2nd shock never improved, and already from mid-April, less than half of the norm of bread was issued there, and there were no other products at all.

The shortage in divisions reached seventy percent. Konyaev N. Two faces of General Vlasov. M., 2003. P. 91.

The artillery was deprived of shells.

The most absurd thing is that Vlasov now and formally did not have the right to bother about reinforcements and improved supplies. Headquarters never approved the general as commander of the 2nd Shock Army, and the position of deputy front commander disappeared along with the front itself.

Only victory could bring Vlasov out of his state of “forgottenness,” but the 2nd Shock was unable to win any victories, even imaginary ones.

“Stalin’s Commander” (that was the title of the book about Andrei Andreevich, which was already written by Vlasov’s personal biographer, Major K. Tokarev) seemed to be suspended in the air.

Vlasov has always been lucky. He was lucky in China. I was lucky during the big purges. I was incredibly lucky at the beginning of the war.

But phenomenal luck could no longer save him in the Second Shock Army, because the army itself was doomed.

“While with the Second Shock Army,” Major I. Kuzin said during interrogation, “Vlasov made it clear that he had great weight, for he repeatedly said that he had a special assignment from Moscow and that he had a direct connection with Moscow. In the Second Shock Army, Vlasov was good friends with member of the Military Council Zuev and chief of staff Vinogradov. They worked together with Zuev before the war in the 4th Corps. In a conversation with Zuev and Vinogradov, Vlasov repeatedly said that the great strategists - this is him addressing Comrade Meretskov - led the army to destruction. Vlasov said this to Meretskov: his rank is great, but his abilities... - and he didn’t say anything further, but made it clear. Judging by Vlasov's conversation, he did not want to understand anyone and wanted to be the master. Vlasov in the Second Shock Army did not like the head of the special department, Shashkov. Vlasov expressed this to Zuev more than once, and once even commanded Shashkov to leave the dugout...” Ibid. P. 88.

Vlasov’s “biographer,” Major K.A. Tokarev, says that “Vlasov, without hesitation, hinted to us that in the event of a successful attack on Lyuban, Meretskov, as the former chief of the General Staff, would again be recalled to Headquarters, and he would remain in his place.” Right there. P. 88.

Talking about the direct connection with Moscow that he allegedly has, Vlasov, of course, was bluffing.

And he needed this bluff not so much in order to strengthen his authority - at the army headquarters, as we see, Andrei Andreevich felt like a complete master, since he could openly speak out about Meretskov’s leadership talents, since he could drive the head of the Special Department of the Army out of the dugout , - but in order to convince himself.

The idea of ​​​​connection with Moscow became simply obsessive for Vlasov in the April days. Perhaps it seemed to Vlasov that his report to Headquarters could change the situation, if not on the Volkhov Front, then at least in his own destiny.

Perhaps he believed that Moscow, having learned about the true state of affairs, would take appropriate measures...

Perhaps he was just hoping to remind himself...

Apparently, the mission of Vlasov’s adjutant, Major Kuzin, to Moscow was partly connected with the implementation of the obsession to establish a direct connection with Headquarters through some influential patrons.

All this suggests that Vlasov wanted, bypassing his immediate superiors, to convey to Headquarters proposals related to the withdrawal of the 2nd Shock Army from encirclement.

Perhaps, at that memorable meeting for Vlasov in the Kremlin on March 8, Stalin spoke about some reserves, about some fresh armies, like near Moscow, that would be used to liberate Leningrad, and now Vlasov proposed a plan for their use.

It was a wonderful goal. Liberate Leningrad, save the city from starvation for many hundreds of thousands of people.

The commander who did this in January '42 would have become folk hero. But in January '42, for this the commander had to be a folk hero.

Alas... Neither Kirill Afanasyevich Meretskov, nor Mikhail Semenovich Khozin, nor Andrei Andreevich Vlasov himself was clearly suitable for this role. They were unable to rise above concerns about their own careers, and as a result, what happened to them is what always happens to people placed at the crest of events and unable to turn the tide.

On April 30, M.S. Khozin gave an order according to which the 59th Army was to drive the Germans out of the Spasskaya Polist area. After this, it was necessary to “prepare for withdrawal to the front reserve the 4th Guards and 372nd Rifle Divisions, as well as the 7th separate brigade" Right there. P. 91.

Everything - what and where to withdraw - was provided for in the directive, but there was a slight overlap - on the day when this order was issued, the Germans began to liquidate the encircled 2nd Shock Army.

In early May, the Germans managed to break through the defenses along the road from Olkhovka to Spasskaya Polist. From the north they wedged in almost to Myasny Bor. Already completely deprived of supplies, the fighters of the 2nd Shock Army continued to fight.

“The assessment of the terrain by this time was very difficult... All winter roads were flooded with water, impassable for horse-drawn transport and vehicles... communications during this period of mud and enemy artillery fire were completely closed. The passage at times was accessible only to certain people.” Right there. P. 92.

This quote is taken from a memo to the Military Council of the Volkhov Front dated June 26, 1942, by Major General Afanasyev. It is clear that a memorandum is not the genre where stylistics are honed, but the expression “during the period of mud and artillery fire” is worthy to remain in the memory.

This is not a disclaimer. Since April 30, the intense and destructive fire of German artillery became as familiar a landscape detail for the Shock Army as swamps swollen with water.

On May 20 and 21, Khozin and Zaporozhets (member of the Military Council of the Volzov Front) were summoned to Stalin. At meetings on May 20 and 21, it was decided to begin the withdrawal of the 2nd Shock Army. Both Khozin and Zaporozhets hid that by that time the 2nd Shock Army had practically been destroyed.

But the Headquarters in the 2nd Shock Army received this directive very late.

Chapter IV . Tragedy of the 2nd Shock

Meanwhile, the 2nd Shock Army was making desperate attempts these days to break out of the bag. June 4, 1942. 00 hours 45 minutes.

We will strike from the Polist line at 20 o'clock on June 4. We don’t hear the actions of the troops of the 59th Army from the east, there is no long-range artillery fire. Vlasov." Right there. P. 92.

This breakthrough failed. Moreover... Having crushed the almost unarmed strands of the 2nd Shock Army, the Germans occupied Finev Meadow and went to the rear.

On June 6, M.S. Khozin was forced to report to Headquarters that the 2nd Shock Army was surrounded. Headquarters immediately removed him from his position.

As K.A. Meretskov recalls, on June 8, G.K. Zhukov received an unexpected call: “Come urgently to the Politburo meeting.” Right there. P. 93.

“We made a big mistake, Comrade Meretskov, by uniting the Volkhov and Leningrad fronts,” said Stalin. - General Khozin, although he was stationed in the Volkhov direction, conducted the matter poorly. He did not comply with Headquarters directives to withdraw the 2nd Shock Army. You, Comrade Meretskov, know the Volkhov Front well. Therefore, we instruct you and Comrade Vasilevsky to go there and, at any cost, rescue the 2nd Shock Army from encirclement, even without heavy weapons. You must immediately upon arrival take command of the front.” Right there. P. 93.

At 3.15 on June 8, 1942, K.A. Meretskov and A.M. Vasilevsky left Stalin’s office. That same day, in the evening, Meretskov flew to Malaya Vishera.

The Chief of the General Staff of the German Ground Forces, Colonel General Franz Halder, who scrupulously noted the changing situation on the fronts, writes these days: “the situation remains unchanged,” “ significant changes did not happen”, “serious attacks from the east were repulsed”, “the offensive at Volkhov was repulsed”, “attacks on Volkhov were repulsed again”, “on Volkhov fierce attacks supported by tanks were repulsed with great difficulty”, “heavy fighting again in the Volkhov sector. Enemy tanks entered the corridor. I believe that the enemy will pull back his forces. Hunger begins to be felt in the cauldron.” Halder F. From Brest to Stalingrad: War Diary. Smolensk, 2001.S. 644-650.

“MILITARY COUNCIL OF THE VOLKHOV FRONT. I report: the army troops have been conducting intense, fierce battles with the enemy for three weeks... The personnel of the troops are exhausted to the limit, the number of deaths is increasing and the incidence of illness from exhaustion is increasing every day. Due to the cross-fire of the army area, the troops suffer heavy losses from artillery fire and enemy aircraft... The combat strength of the formations has sharply decreased. It is no longer possible to replenish it from the rear and special units. Everything that was there was taken. On the sixteenth of June, an average of several dozen people remained in battalions, brigades and rifle regiments. All attempts by the eastern group of the army to break through the corridor from the west were unsuccessful. VLASOV. ZUEV. Vinogradov." Konyaev N. Two faces of General Vlasov. M., 2003. P. 93.

“JUNE 21, 1942. 8 HOURS 10 MINUTES. TO THE HEAD OF THE GSHK. TO THE MILITARY COUNCIL OF THE FRONT. Army troops receive fifty grams of crackers for three weeks. Last days there was absolutely no food. We are finishing off the last horses. People are extremely exhausted. There is group mortality from starvation. There is no ammunition... VLASOV. ZUEV." Right there. P. 93.

During these days, Vlasov not only sent radiograms to various headquarters about the plight of the army, but also tried to find a solution on how to break the encirclement on his own. The fighters of the 2nd Shock Army, staggering from hunger, still managed to accomplish the impossible - they broke through the German fortifications. According to the report of state security captain Kolesnikov, sent under the heading “Top Secret” to the Special Department of the Volkhov Front, on that day 6,018 wounded and about 1,000 healthy people emerged from the encirclement. The wounded were luckier. They were sent to the hospital, from the rest a detachment of Colonel Korkin was formed, which was again driven into the “Valley of Death”. Truly evil fate hung over the fighters of the 2nd Shock. No one was allowed to leave this hell unscathed.

But let's return to A.A. Vlasov. The column in which the army staff were marching was met by the Germans with mortar fire, and it was forced to retreat. “JUNE 23, 1942. 01 HOUR 02 MINUTES. ARMY TROOPS, AFTER THE BREAKTHROUGH BY THE FORCES OF THE 46TH RIFLE DIVISION, REACHED THE BORDER OF AN NAMELESS STREAM 900 METERS EAST OF MARK 37.1 AND ONLY IN THIS AREA MEETED WITH UNITS OF THE 59TH ARMY. ALL REPORTS ABOUT THE APPROACH OF UNITS OF THE 59TH ARMY TO THE POLIST RIVER FROM THE EAST ARE TRAITORY LIES.” Right there. P. 105.

On the morning of June 23, the 2nd Shock Army, finally broken during the night assault, still held the defense along the line Gluhaya Kerest - Novaya Kerest - Olkhovka, but in the evening the Germans broke through to the landing site area in Novaya Keresti, and by 16-00 they infiltrated to the army command post. And although by eight o’clock in the evening the German machine gunners were repulsed from the command post, it was clear that the army was living out its last hours.

“JUNE 23, 1942. 22.15. THE ENEMY HAS CAPTURED NOVAYA KERESTA AND FURTHER EAST. THE PASSAGE EAST OF THE POLIST RIVER IS CLOSED AGAIN BY THE ENEMY... NO ACTIVE OPERATIONS ARE HEARD FROM THE EAST. ARTILLERY DOES NOT FIRE. AGAIN I ASK YOU TO TAKE DECISIVE MEASURES TO CLEAR THE BREAKTHROUGH AND FOR THE 52ND AND 59TH ARMIES TO ENTER THE POLIST RIVER FROM THE EAST. OUR UNITS ON THE WEST BANK ARE POLISHED. VLASOV. ZUEV. Vinogradov." Right there. P. 106.

“JUNE 23, 1942. 23.35. FIGHT AT THE ARMY HEADQUARTERS CP MARK 43.3. HELP IS NEEDED. VLASOV." Right there. P. 106.

Meretskov failed to organize an assault force of such strength that was capable of breaking through the German defenses. And as always in such cases, again the bitter truth about failure was so abundantly diluted with slyness that, in general, perhaps even minor exaggerations of success, when added together, turned into a real breakthrough, as ordered.

On the morning of June 24, German machine gunners broke through to army headquarters, and all command passed to the command post of the 57th Infantry Brigade. From here the last radiogram went to front headquarters...

“JUNE 24, 1942. 19.45. WITH ALL AVAILABLE FORCES OF THE ARMY TROOPS WE BREAK OUT FROM THE WEST BANK OF THE RIVER TO THE EAST, ALONG THE ROADS AND NORTH OF THE NARROW GAUGE RAILWAY. THE ATTACK STARTED AT 22.30 JUNE 24, 1942. I ASK YOU TO ASSIST FROM THE EAST WITH MANIFOLD, TANKS AND ARTILLERY OF THE 58TH AND 39TH ARMIES AND TO COVER THE TROOPS WITH AVIATION FROM 3.00 JUNE 25, 1942. VLASOV. ZUEV. Vinogradov." Right there. pp. 106-107.

By 22.00. The column, in which Vlasov also came out this time, moved to the area of ​​the CP of the 46th Infantry Division, from where at 24.00 they moved to the withdrawal point. At the head of the column were two platoons of a company of the Special Department of the Army, armed with twelve light machine guns, and a platoon of employees of the Special Department of the NKVD with machine guns. Next moved the head of the Special Department A.G. Shashkov, the Army Military Council, and departments of the army headquarters. A platoon from a company from the Special Department brought up the rear.

According to the report of the General Staff, compiled on the basis of the report of K.A. Meretskov, “On June 25, at 3:15 a.m., with a coordinated strike by the 2nd and 59th armies, the enemy’s defenses in the corridor were broken, and from 1:00 a.m. units began to withdraw 2 th army." Right there. P. 107.

Some of the soldiers and officers actually managed to break through this time. They told how things happened.

“Everything became indifferent, we often fell into half-asleep and oblivion. Therefore, it is completely unclear where the strength came from when... we began to leave. Going out is not the right word. We crawled, fell into a swamp, climbed out into a dry clearing, saw our tankers - our tanks, having deployed their turrets, were hitting the Nazis. But the Germans shot through this clearing - there was no living place in it. I even ran across one place. What guided the direction - where to run - is also unclear, some kind of instinct, even a shrapnel wound in the shoulder seemed like a trifle in this sodom.” Right there. P. 107.

The fate of the headquarters column was also unfortunate. At about two o'clock in the morning, the entire group, according to the testimony of Major General Afanasyev, came under artillery barrage fire.

Surgeon A.A. Vishnevsky was present these days at the front line, where the encircled army was trying to break through. Here are entries from his front-line diary.

“June 25th. At six o'clock in the evening we went to Myasny Bor. There are feeding and dressing stations along the road. Along the narrow-gauge railway there are people in winter uniform, thin, with a sallow complexion. We meet two, just boys.

From the 2nd Shock....

We went to the command post of the 59th Army to General Korovnikov, met Meretskov, he was sitting on a stump, with a lot of people around him. Korovnikov has swelling in both legs. EVERYONE IS WAITING FOR GENERAL VLASOV, the commander of the 2nd Shock Army. There are various rumors: some say that he came out, some say that he did not.

June 26. There will be an attack again at night. I took out my machine gun and at 11 o’clock in the evening I went to the neck of Myasnoy Bor, where the 2nd Army units were again scheduled to leave.

27th of June. We woke up from a strong cannonade. Artillery, mortars and Katyusha rockets fired through us. It turned out that the Germans had closed all the cracks in the ring, and today not a single person emerged from the encirclement...

June 28. During the night, only six people left the 2nd Shock Army; three of them were slightly wounded. We are going to the command post to Korovnikov. We arrived safely. They had a meeting of the Military Council, it soon ended, Meretskov came out and greeted us. You could tell by his appearance that he was very upset.” Vishnevsky A.A. A surgeon's diary. M., 1967. S. 179-182.

Alas... Almost none of the leadership of the 2nd Shock Army managed to escape from the encirclement.

Commissioner Zuev will die a few days later, running into a German patrol near the railway.

Chief of Staff Vinogradov, who had just been awarded the rank of major general, also died.

But Vlasov himself survived...

One of the last to see General Vlasov was the head of the political department of the 46th Infantry Division, Major A.I. Zubov. “At 9 o’clock in the evening, regimental commissar Shablovsky’s arm was torn off. I dragged him into four pines, bandaged him, I heard the lieutenant screaming and asking for help to Commander Vlasov, who, as the captain said, was dying. The commander of the 176th regiment, Sobol, and I indicated the place where he could find shelter. Commander Vlasov was also taken to this shelter. At 12 noon on June 25, the headquarters of the 2nd Shock Army and the headquarters of the 46th division were in the same place...” Konyaev N. Two faces of General Vlasov. M., 2003. P. 111. The cover in the rank of this officer very accurately conveys the confusion that reigned then in the area of ​​the army rush. And in this confusion, news about Vlasov, starting from June 25, becomes increasingly fragmentary until it stops completely.

As is clear from the report submitted to the head of the Special Department of the NKVD of the Volkhov Front, the deputy head of the Special Department of the NKVD of the 2nd Shock Army, state security captain Sokolov tried to find Vlasov on June 25, but he failed.

We learn where the generals and officers went from the testimony of the same head of the political department of the 46th Infantry Division, Major A.I. Zubov.

“At 12 noon on June 25,” he said, “the headquarters of the 2nd Shock Army and the headquarters of the 46th division were in the same place in the forest. Division commander Cherny told me that we were now going behind enemy lines, but commander Vlasov warned us not to take extra people and it is better to strive to remain alone. Thus, there were 28 of us left from the headquarters of the 2nd Shock Army and no less from the headquarters of the 46th division. Having no food, we went to the Zamoshe swamp and walked on the twenty-fifth and twenty-sixth. In the evening we found a dead elk, had dinner, and in the morning of June twenty-seventh, the chief of staff of the 2nd Shock Army, after consulting with Vlasov, decided to split into two groups, since it was impossible to travel in such a large number. At two o’clock in the afternoon we split into two groups and went in different directions.” Right there. P. 111.

The senior political instructor of a separate chemical defense company of the 25th Infantry Division, Viktor Iosifovich Klonyev, claimed that he saw Vlasov “around June 29”...

“Moving north with my group in the forest area, three kilometers southwest of Priyutin, I met the commander of the 2nd Shock Army, Lieutenant General Vlasov, with a group of commanders and soldiers of 16 people. Among them was Major General Alferyev, several colonels and two women. He questioned me and checked my documents. He gave advice on how to get out of the encirclement. Here we spent the night together, and the next morning at three o’clock I left with my group to the north, and I was embarrassed to ask permission to join...” Ibid. P. 112.

This is the latest news about Andrei Andreevich Vlasov.

After this, Vlasov’s trace is lost until July 12, when Vlasov was captured by the Germans in peasant hut in the village of Tuhovechi.

Conclusion

When I started working on this topic, I knew little about General A.A. Vlasov and the 2nd Shock Army. If something was written or said about this topic, then only - “Vlasov, the Vlasovites (meaning the fighters of the 2nd Shock Army) are traitors.” All. Up to one. Peremptorily. That is why I wanted to figure out this question myself: who is General Vlasov - a traitor or was it a fatal coincidence of circumstances.

As mentioned above, I believe that the soldiers and officers who carried out orders coming “from above” are not guilty of anything, and calling them “Vlasovites”, that is, traitors, is not something that is wrong, it is criminal! These people died not in hundreds, not in thousands, but in tens of thousands! Being in these inhuman, I would even say hellish, conditions, they still remained Soviet people, with all their might, as best they could and as circumstances allowed them, they tried to carry out orders and remain faithful to the oath.

Of course, some soldiers and officers went over to the side of the enemy, but everyone cannot be accused of treason. Therefore, I believe that these people are not traitors, not “Vlasovites”, they are heroes. And those who survived, who managed to escape from the encirclement - they are holy people!

It seems to me that the 2nd Shock Army was forgotten by the Soviet government, the press, and writers, not only because the name of General Vlasov is associated with this army, although this also happened, but because the 2nd Shock Army is one of the greatest the shame of the Great Patriotic War. What a state it was necessary to bring people, fighters, so that they, without fear for their lives, right on the battlefield, under a hail of bullets and mines, would first of all look at what kind of food was in the duffel bags of their killed comrades!

People rejoiced at earthworms, which they tore off in the ground and swallowed whole; they ate frogs, various plants, and tree bark. Everything that was at least somehow suitable for food. Because of hunger, people no longer understood anything. An example: doctors arrived at the medical unit of the 382nd Infantry Division on a sleigh. A few minutes later, the fighters unshackled this horse, killed it and prepared meat for food. On the one hand, they need to be condemned, but on the other hand, they didn’t do it out of a good life, not out of hooligan motives! Konyaev N. Two faces of General Vlasov. M., 2003. P. 64.

There were cases when the felt boots were removed from the dead, literally breaking off their legs. They took off the short fur coats of the fighters with whom they were still talking just a few seconds ago. Often they died only because they tried to find food and get clothing under heavy fire. It’s unlikely, I think, that they could write openly about all this in the Soviet press or publish books.

As for the personality of General A.A. Vlasov, I believe that if a person swore an oath of allegiance to his state, then he must strictly fulfill it and follow it to the end. Rigorously. Whatever happens. And if so, it turns out that General A.A. Vlasov is a traitor.

Studying the biography of Andrei Andreevich Vlasov, it seems strange that he decided in a critical situation to go over to the side of the enemy. Excellent track record, fantastic career growth for those years: Ibid. P.15, 17, 19.

1936 - commander of the 11th Infantry Regiment (LenVO);

1937 - commander of the 215th Infantry Regiment (KOVO);

1937-1938 - member of the military tribunal of the Leningrad and Kyiv military district (during this period not a single acquittal was issued on his initiative);

1938-1939 - A.A. Vlasov’s business trip to China. According to V. Filatov, Vlasov proved himself to be a good commander - the Chinese fought successful battles for the Kun-Lun Pass for more than a month during his stay there as a military adviser.

In general, in less than two years of A.A. Vlasov’s stay in China, the Chinese fought as many battles with the Japanese and won as many victories over them as they did not have until the end of 1943. It is also reported that in China, a poster was allegedly released depicting Chinese General Yan Xinan and Vlasov leading troops into battle with the Japanese.

According to various sources, before Comrade Volkov (under this name Vlasov served in China) was recalled to his homeland, Chiang Kai-shek awarded him either the Golden Order of the Dragon or the Order of the Moon.

It should also be noted that Andrei Andreevich Vlasov was saved from the “Stalinist purges” by his love. His affair with a certain Yulia Osadchaya ended with this same Yulia giving birth to a daughter from him and filing for alimony... By the way, at that time he was already married.

End of 1939. The position of commander of the 99th Infantry Division of the 6th Army, stationed in the city of Przemysl.

May 1940. A.A. Vlasov was elected a member of the Przemysl City Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks).

September 25-27, 1940. At an inspection exercise conducted by the People's Commissar of Defense - Marshal of the Soviet Union, Comrade. S.K. Timoshenko, the division commanded by A.A. Vlasov, received a “good rating” and was awarded the challenge banner of the Red Army.

October 3, 1940. The newspaper "Red Banner" published an article by A.A. Vlasov "New Methods of Study", where the author quotes Alexander Suvorov and emphasizes the usefulness of political studies.

November 9, 1940. The newspaper “Krasnaya Zvezda” published an article by P. Ogin and B. Krol “Commander of the Forward Division” about A.A. Vlasov.

February 23, 1941. The Krasnaya Zvezda newspaper reprinted the article by A.A. Vlasov “New methods of study”.

This is a chronology of life.

And here are the characteristics of A.A. Vlasov: Kvitsinsky Yu.A. General Vlasov: the path of betrayal. M., 1999. pp. 3-4.

“Being in especially difficult conditions, he showed himself as a worthy Bolshevik of our Motherland.”

“Practically healthy and hardy in camp life. Has a desire to leave the service and return to duty.”

“Energetic in decisions, proactive.”

“Major General Vlasov directly supervises the training of division and regiment headquarters. He pays a lot of attention to the state of accounting and storage of secret and mobilization documents and knows well the technology of the headquarters service.”

“Major General Vlasov... accepted the personal instructions of the People’s Commissar on restructuring combat training better and faster than others.”

These characteristics have different signatures. There is also the signature of the commander of KOVO, Army General Zhukov.

Also, Andrei Andreevich Vlasov showed his best side during the defense of Kyiv. As commander of the 37th Army, he managed to organize the defense of Kyiv and hold the city from early August to September 18, 1941, when German troops had already surrounded Kyiv. Then Vlasov had to leave the encirclement for the first time.

When A.A. Vlasov was appointed commander of the 2nd Shock Army, he was already in the rank of lieutenant general. To the general’s credit, it must be said that he did everything in his power to save the army entrusted to him. But at that moment there was only so much he could do...

The general constantly sent radiograms to headquarters with the following content: “Please do not send any more weapons. We will get weapons in battle. Please send food."

K.A. Meretskov writes in his memoirs that Vlasov did not think at all about saving the 2nd Shock Army. I don't agree with him. In my opinion, he just wants to forget that it was he who appointed Vlasov as army commander. That is, he simply disowns it. When the last plane took off from the 2nd Shock Army, A.A. Vlasov gave it to the wounded. Did the general really decide to go over to the side of the Germans even then? I do not believe!

The greatest interest is caused by the two-week disappearance of Lieutenant General A.A. Vlasov. The disappearance is also surprising because considerable forces were involved in the search for the general...

From the report of the Volkhov Front headquarters “On the operation to withdraw the 2nd Shock Army from encirclement” it is clear that at the end of June a large-scale and active search for Vlasov began.

“To search for the Military Council of the 2nd Shock Army, the reconnaissance department of the front sent radio-equipped AT groups on June 28, 1942 - two groups to the Glushitsa area, both were scattered by enemy fire, and contact with them was lost. In the period from July 2 to July 13, 1942, 6 groups of three to four people each were dropped from the plane. Of these groups, one was scattered during the drop and partly returned, two groups, which were successfully dropped and established communication, did not provide the necessary data, and three groups provide regular reports on the movements of small groups of commanders and soldiers of the 2nd Shock Army behind enemy lines. All attempts to find traces of the Military Council have so far been unsuccessful.” Konyaev N. Two faces of General Vlasov. M., 2003. P. 113.

If we add that the entire search area was actively combed by the Germans, then Vlasov’s disappearance becomes completely surprising.

The general disappeared without a trace until July 12, 1942, when he was discovered in a peasant hut in the village of Tuhovechi by an intelligence officer of the German 38th Corps, Captain von Schwerdner, and translator Klaus Pelchau.

On July 13, 1942, Lieutenant General Vlasov was taken to General Lindemann, commander of the 18th Army, at the headquarters in Siverskaya. On July 15 he was transported to Letzen.

The partisans searched for Vlasov to the end, but found only Afanasyev. The wrong general was saved that Headquarters demanded.

So... On July 12, as Ekaterina Andreeva writes in her book, guided by German sources, “Vlasov was discovered in a peasant hut in the village of Tuhovechi by an intelligence officer of the German 38th Corps, Captain von Schwerdner, and translator Klaus Pelchau. Before that, they found a corpse, which they mistook for the body of Vlasov, and decided to check if anyone was hiding in the hut...”

Ekaterina Andreeva writes that when Vlasov heard the steps of the Germans, he came out and said:

Don't shoot, I am Vlasov.

A similar version is presented by political instructor Khonimenko, who said that, wandering through the forests, he went to look for food in Sennaya Kerest. When they arrived there, one of the old women advised them to leave the village immediately. She said that there were many Germans in the village who had captured Army Commander Vlasov yesterday.

“This old woman was invited to the edge of the forest, where she said that a woman came and asked for food, when she was fed, she asked to feed her friend. The lady of the house agreed. When Vlasov ate, at that time the house was already surrounded by Germans. Approaching the door and opening it, Vlasov was asked to raise his hands up. Vlasov said: “Don’t shoot, I am the commander of the 2nd Shock Army Vlasov.” They were taken away and taken along with the woman. Right there. P. 117.

But not everything fits in these stories...

Events are piling up, creeping on top of each other, not in accordance with common sense.

Captain von Schwerdner and translator Klaus Pelchau first find a corpse, which they mistook for General Vlasov, and then they search the hut where Vlasov is hiding, and find Vlasov alive...

A woman (probably Voronova) asks to feed her, then Vlasov... Was he sitting on the street while she was having lunch? It is difficult to imagine this happening in a populated village. In addition, judging by the photograph taken at Siverskaya station, where Vlasov stands in front of the porch of General Lindemann’s headquarters, he did not look very haggard during the two weeks he spent in God knows where.

So information about Vlasov’s wanderings through forests and swamps must be treated with caution, especially if we remember that Vlasov’s wanderings took place in an area where a huge army was dying of hunger for two months.

According to researcher N. Konyaev, it seems that Vinogradov and Vlasov knew of some spare, unused command post of the 2nd Shock Army, where there was a supply of food. This command post became “his refuge” for General Vlasov.

And why couldn’t Vlasov and Vinogradov (after the death of the special officer Shashkov, they were the only ones who knew for sure where the reserve command post was located)?

This version seems to me the most likely.

It was to such a shelter that A.A. Vlasov’s group broke through, since it is otherwise impossible to explain why they, instead of looking for cracks in the German ring - and in the swampy area, there certainly were such cracks! - undertook a forced march in the opposite direction from the front. Let me remind you once again how persistently Vlasov and Vinogradov sought to separate themselves from their comrades in the encirclement.

Indirectly, the assumption of the existence of a shelter with a supply of food is confirmed by the very composition of the group with which Vlasov left. Apart from the “field wife,” Maria Ignatievna Voronova, the only person in the group was the chief of staff of the army, Major General Vinogradov. Soldiers Kotov and Pogibko, as follows from the testimony, joined the group later.

It’s difficult to get out of encirclement in such a lineup. It is unlikely that generals Vlasov and Vinogradov were suitable pathfinder fighters. And the age is not suitable to go on reconnaissance, and the presence of a woman... It would be easier for her alone, dressed in civilian clothes, to get out of the encirclement. But, apparently, Vlasov had no intention of breaking through the front line again. This was obviously his plan, to hide in his shelter and try, when the combing of the area was over, to contact the partisans and then cross the front line.

During interrogation by the NKVD, Maria Ignatievna Voronova also avoided the question of where they were hiding for two weeks. Right there. pp. 120-121.

“Around July 1942, near Novgorod, the Germans discovered us in the forest and forced a battle, after which Vlasov, I, the soldier Kotov and the driver Pogibko escaped into the swamp, crossed it and reached the villages. Killed with the wounded soldier Kotov went to one village, Vlasov and I went to another. When we entered a village, I don’t know its name, we went into one house, where we were mistaken for partisans. The local Samookhova surrounded the house and arrested us. Here we were put in a collective farm barn, and the next day the Germans arrived, showed Vlasov a portrait of him as a general, cut out from a newspaper, and Vlasov was forced to admit that he was really Lieutenant General Vlasov. Previously, he had been recommended by a refugee teacher.

The Germans, making sure that they had caught Lieutenant General Vlasov, put us in a car and brought us to the Siverskaya station to the German headquarters. Here I was put in a prisoner of war camp located in the town of Malaya Vyra, and Vlasov was taken to Germany two days later.”

All these testimonies still do not answer the question of where Lieutenant General A.A. Vlasov was hiding during these two weeks - whether he was wandering in the forest or whether there was some secret command post. But still, this is no longer so important. The important thing is that he was not going to surrender to the Germans. Although, seeing the horrors that happened in the 2nd Shock Army, perhaps, having learned the true attitude of the Supreme Command towards his army, realizing himself as a victim of staff intrigues, the thought of treason could have arisen in him. And yet, it seems to me that this is unlikely.

I am not trying to whitewash Andrei Andreevich Vlasov. He is a traitor. But he can only be accused of collaborating with the Germans, that’s all. And yet, I think it can be, if not justified, then understandable. He had two options - cooperation or death. What should I choose? I don’t know, despite the fact that I consider myself a patriot. Put a bullet in the forehead... Die as befits a Russian Soviet officer. Beautiful... You will be a hero... Posthumously... And so - a traitor...

I would like to end my work with V. Bazhinov’s poem “Myasnoy Bor”:

Under the machine guns firing excitedly,

Above the swamp ripped open by explosions,

Got up and fell, scraped the ground,

An infantry regiment leaving the encirclement.

And he left, not a regiment, but a platoon,

To put it more accurately - only leftovers

Several soldiers from each company,

Those who did not perish in mortal combat.

This June night is forever for them,

Like a measure on a scale of suffering,

As the highest thing a person can do,

Worthy of both songs and legends.

Appendix No. 1 Lyuban offensive operation. January-June 1942: Sat. St. Petersburg, 1994. P. 119

LYUBAN OFFENSIVE OPERATION

January-June 1942

Command of the 2nd Shock Army:

Army Commander - Lieutenant General G.G. Sokolov, since January 10, Lieutenant General N.K. Klykov, from April 20 to June 25, Lieutenant General A.A. Vlasov, from June 26, Lieutenant General N.K. Klykov.

Members of the Military Council:

1st member - brigade commissar A. K MIKHAILOV, from February 11, 1942 divisional commissar M.N. ZELENKOV, from March 5 - divisional commissioner K.V. ZUEV.

2nd member - brigade commissar N.N. LEBEDEV

Head of the political department:

from May - brigade commissar I.P. WORSTED.

Artillery Commander - Major General of Artillery G.E. DEGTYAREV.

Head of the Engineering Troops - Lieutenant Colonel IL. MELNIKOV,

Combat composition of the 2nd Shock Army:

The army arrived at the Volkhov Front at the end of December 1941 consisting of:

22nd separate rifle brigade Colonel R,K, PUGACHEV.

23rd separate rifle brigade Colonel V-I, SHILOV,

24th separate rifle brigade Colonel M.V. ROMANOVSKY,

25th separate rifle brigade of Colonel P.G. SHOLUDKO.

53rd separate rifle brigade, Major General V. S. RAKOVSKY,

57th separate rifle brigade of Colonel P.K VEPET"TICHEV,

58th separate rifle brigade of Colonel F.M. ZHILTSOVA,

59th separate rifle brigade under Colonel CHERNIK, from January 15 under Colonel I.F. GLAZUNOV, and from April 3, Lieutenant Colonel S.A. PISARENKO,

160th and 162nd separate tank battalions,

18th artillery regiment RGK army type,

3 guards mortar divisions.

At the beginning of January 1942, the army included:

39, 42, 43. 45, 46, 49 separate ski battalions,

839th howitzer artillery regiment,

121st bomber

522nd fighter,

704th light bomber aviation regiments,

285th army separate communications battalion,

360th separate linear communications battalion,

7 separate engineer battalions.

Z66th rifle division of Colonel S.N. BULANOVA,

382nd rifle division of Colonel G.P. SOKUROV, from March 22, Colonel N.E. KARTSEVA,

111th rifle division of Colonel S.V. ROGINSKY,

191st rifle division of Major General T.V. LEBEDEV, from January 27, Colonel A.I. STARUNIN, from May 16 - Lieutenant Colonel N.I. ARTEMENKO.

Arrived in mid-January:

46th rifle division of Major General A.K. OKULICHEV, from March 21, lieutenant colonel, and from April 11, colonel R.E. BLACK.

4th Guards Rifle Division of Major General A.I. ANDREEV, from May 15, Colonel S.T. BIYAKOVA,

259th rifle division colonel, from May 13 Major General A.V. LANSHEV, from May 28, lieutenant colonel, from July 11, colonel P.N. LAVROVA,

267th rifle division brigade commander YaD. ZELENKOV, from December 20, 1941 Colonel I.R. GLAZUNOV, from January 20, 1942 Lieutenant Colonel P.A. POTAPOV.

13th cavalry corps of Major General N.I. GUSEVA,

25th cavalry division of Lieutenant Colonel D.M. BARINOVA,

80th cavalry division of Colonel L.A. SLANOV, since March Lieutenant Colonel N.A. POLYAKOVA.

From the end of January to the end of February arrived:

40, 41, 44, 48. 50, 95.160,161,162, 163, 164, 165. 166, 167,168. 169, 170,

171, 172, 173 and 174th separate ski battalions,

166 1st separate tank battalion;

442nd And 445th artillery regiments;

1163rd RGK cannon artillery regiment;

60th howitzer artillery regiment R.G.K;

24th And 30th Guards mortar regiments R.A..

At the end of February - beginning of March the following arrived:

305th rifle division of Colonel D.I. BARABANSHIKOV, from May 15, Colonel N.N. NIKOLSKY,

374th Rifle Division Colonel AD. VITOSHKINA.

378th rifle division of Colonel I.P. DOROFEEV, from March 10, colonel, from May 30, major general G.P. LILENKOVA,

92nd rifle division of Colonel A.N. LARICHEVA,

7th Guards Tank Brigade Colonel V.A. KOPTSOV, from the end of March Colonel B.I. SCHNEIDER.

29th tank brigade of Colonel M.I. KLIMENKO.

25, 80, 87 cavalry divisions 13th cavalry corps,

24 And 25th

4th And 24th guards, 378th rifle divisions,

7th guards and 29th tank brigades.

191st And 382nd rifle divisions, 18th army-type artillery regiment.

The diagram for the May 22 front directive on the withdrawal of troops of the 2nd Shock Army from encirclement shows:

259th, 267th And 191st rifle divisions, 57th, 53rd, 22nd separate rifle brigades, 46th, 92nd, 327th And 382nd rifle divisions, 59th, 25th and 23rd separate rifle brigades, 19th guards and 305th rifle divisions.

By order of the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR No. 22 of March 20, 1942, for distinction in battles, the 366th Rifle Division was transformed into the 19th Guards Rifle Division, the 111th Rifle Division was transformed into the 24th Guards Rifle Division.

Appendix No. 2 Right there. P. 123.

Bibliography

Research.

1. Andreeva E. General Vlasov and the Russian Liberation Movement. / Per. from English London: Overlease, 1990. 214 pp.

2. Kvitsinsky Yu.A. General Vlasov: the path of betrayal. M.: Sovremennik, 1999. 320 pp., illus.

3. Konyaev N. Two faces of General Vlasov: life, fate, legends. M.: Veche, 2003. 480 pp., 8 l. ill.

4. Mitcham S. Hitler’s Field Marshals and Their Battles. / Translated from English. Smolensk: Rusich, 1999. 576 pp., 4 l. ill.

5. Smyslov O.S. Hitler's "fifth column" From Kutepov to Vlasov. M.: Veche, 2004. 507 pp., 7 l. ill.

Memoirs, memoirs, diaries.

1. Vasilevsky A. A matter of a lifetime. M.: Politizdat, 1988. 304 pp., 11 l. ill.

2. Vishnevsky A.A. A surgeon's diary. M.: Medicine, 1967. 472 p.

3. Halder F. From Brest to Stalingrad: War Diary. Daily notes of the Chief of the General Staff of the Ground Forces 1941-1942. Smolensk: Rusich, 2001. 656 p.

4. Degtyarev G.E. Ram and shield. M.: Voenizdat, 1966. 149 pp., 1 sheet. portrait

5. Dichbalis S.A. Zigzags of fate. Memoirs / Ed. A. V. Popova. M.: IPVA, 2003. 272 ​​pp., 8 l. ill.

6. Zhukov G.K. Memories and reflections: In 3 volumes. M.: Politizdat, 1988.

7. Korovnikov I.T. On three fronts. M.: Voenizdat, 1974. 327 pp., illus.

8. Meretskov K.A. At the service of the people. M.: Politizdat, 1968. 471 pp., illus.

9. Polman H. Volkhov. 900 days of fighting for Leningrad 1941-1944. / Per. with him. M.: Zakharov, 2000. 128 pp., illus.

10. Tikhvin, year 1941. Memories. / Comp. D.K. Zherebov. L.: Lenizdat, 1974. 400 pp., illus.

11. Tokarev K. Verdict. From the notes of a military correspondent of the 2nd Shock Army // Komsomolskaya Pravda, 1988 October 3.

Collections of articles and documents.

1. Alexandrov K.M. Against Stalin.// Vlasovites and Eastern volunteers in the Second World War. Sat. Art. and mat. St. Petersburg: Yuventa, 2003. 352 pp., illus.

2. Alexandrov K.M. Officer Corps of the Army of Lieutenant General A.A. Vlasov. 1944-1945. Sat. Art. and mat. St. Petersburg, 2001. 321 p.

3. War 1941-1945. Facts and documents / Ed. O.A. Rzheshevchevsky. M., 2001.

4. Second strike in the battle for Leningrad. Sat. doc. // Comp. V.A. Kuznetsov L., 1983.

5. History of the Order of Lenin of the Leningrad Military District. M.: Voenizdat, 1974.

6. Battle of Leningrad 1941-1944: Sat. Art. / Comp. G.I. Vavilina, T.I. Koptelova, V.I. Pozdnyakova. St. Petersburg, 1995. 208 p.

7. B. Liddell Hart. The Second World War. Sat. Art. and mat. / Ed. S. Pereslegina. M.: AST, 2002. 944 p.

8. Lyuban offensive operation. January-June 1942. / Comp. Sat. K.K. Krupitsa, I.A. Ivanova. St. Petersburg: INKO, 1994. 128 p.

9. On the Volkhov front. 1941-1944. Sat. doc. // Ed. A.I. Babin. M.: Nauka, 1982. 400 pp., illus.

10. On the Volkhov front. Sat. Art. / Comp. D.K. Zherebov. L.: Lenizdat, 1978. 344 pp., illus.

11. Andreeva E. General Vlasov and the Russian Liberation Movement. / Per. from English London: Overlease, 1990. 214 pp.

12. Kvitsinsky Yu.A. General Vlasov: the path of betrayal. M.: Sovremennik, 1999. 320 pp., illus.

13. Konyaev N. Two faces of General Vlasov: life, fate, legends. M.: Veche, 2003. 480 pp., 8 l. ill.

14. Mitcham S. Hitler’s Field Marshals and Their Battles. / Translated from English. Smolensk: Rusich, 1999. 576 pp., 4 l. ill.

15. Smyslov O.S. Hitler's "fifth column" From Kutepov to Vlasov. M.: Veche, 2004. 507 pp., 7 l. ill.

In blessed memory of the soldiers and commanders

2nd Shock Army, who fell in battles with the Germans

Dedicated to the fascist invaders.

During the Great Patriotic War, seventy Soviet combined arms armies fought with the enemy. In addition, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command formed five more shock troops - intended for operations in offensive operations in the directions of the main attack. At the beginning of 1942 there were four of these. The fate of the 2nd strike turned out to be tragic...

The year two thousand was coming to an end. The clock impassively counted down the time remaining until the new millennium. TV channels and radio stations, newspapers and magazines pushed the theme of the millennium to the max. Forecasts were made by politicians, scientists, writers, palmists, and sometimes outright charlatans.

The results were summed up. Lists of the “most-most” outstanding people and events were widely circulated last century, millennium. All different. Yes, it could not be otherwise in a world where momentary conjunctures constantly prevail over historical objectivity.

Russia was acutely affected by the Kursk tragedy. The society wanted to receive complete information about the tragedy. In the meantime, only versions were expressed, rumors multiplied...

And in this huge stream of messages about past and future disasters, accomplishments and anniversaries, information about the opening of a monument-memorial to the soldiers of the 2nd Shock Army of the Volkhov Front on November 17 in the village of Myasnoy Bor, Novgorod Region, was somehow lost, not being distinguished from other news. Have you opened it? Well, good. Thanks to the sponsors - they gave money for a holy cause.

Sounds cynical, doesn't it? But, nevertheless, life is life. Second World War has long since become a thing of history. And there are fewer and fewer veterans of the Great Patriotic War on the streets. And more of them are quite young people with medal strips for other wars - Afghan, Chechen. New time. New people. New veterans.

So the St. Petersburg authorities did not delegate anyone to the opening of the monument to the soldiers of the 2nd shock. And again, from the point of view of modern bureaucratic formalism, it is true: a foreign region. And the fact that the army, through its actions, forced the Germans to finally abandon their plans to capture Leningrad, played a crucial role in the operations to break through and completely lift the blockade, knocked out the last German units from the territory of the Leningrad region in the battles near Narva... Well, let them do that historians.

But historians did not study the combat path of the 2nd Shock Army separately. No, of course, in numerous monographs, memoirs, reference books, encyclopedias and other literature devoted to the Second World Army, the Army is mentioned repeatedly and its combat operations in specific operations are described. But there is no research available to a wide range of readers about the 2nd shock. To rummage through the heap of literature in order to get a real idea of ​​it battle path There will only be graduate students preparing a dissertation on a specialized topic.

It comes to something amazing. The whole world knows the name of the Tatar poet Musa Jalil. Both in literary and in any “general” thick Big and Small encyclopedic dictionaries You will read that in 1942, being wounded, he was captured. In a fascist prison he wrote the famous “Moabit Notebook” - a hymn to the fearlessness and perseverance of man. But nowhere is it noted that Musa Jalil fought in the 2nd Shock Army.

However, writers still turned out to be more honest and persistent than historians. Former TASS special correspondent on the Leningrad and Volkhov fronts Pavel Luknitsky in 1976 at the Moscow publishing house “ Soviet writer” published a three-volume book “Leningrad is Acting...”. The author managed to overcome censorship obstacles, and from the pages of his most interesting book openly declared:

“The feats accomplished by the warriors of the 2nd Shock are countless!”

It would seem that in 1976 the ice broke. The writer spoke in as much detail as he could about the army soldiers and described their participation in operations. Now historians must pick up the baton! But... they remained silent.

And the reason here is an ideological taboo. For a short time, the 2nd Shock was commanded by Lieutenant General A.A. Vlasov, who later became a traitor to the Motherland. And although the term “Vlasovites,” which usually characterizes the fighters of the “Russian Liberation Army” (ROA), cannot in any way refer to veterans of the 2nd shock, they are still (so that the name of the traitor does not come to mind once again) from the history of the Great Patriotic War , as far as possible, we tried to cross them out. And the collection “2nd Shock in the Battle of Leningrad”, published in 1983 in Lenizdat, could not fill this gap.

It’s a strange situation, you’ll agree. Books have been written about the traitor Vlasov, and historical and documentary films have been made. A number of authors are seriously trying to present him as a fighter against Stalinism, communism, and a bearer of some “high ideas.” The traitor was convicted and hanged long ago, and discussions around Vlasov’s personality do not subside. The last (!) veterans of the 2nd shock, thank God, are alive, and if they are remembered at all, it will be on Victory Day, along with other participants in the war.

There is obvious injustice, since the role of the 2nd shock and the role of Vlasov in the history of the Great Patriotic War are incomparable.

To see this, let's look at the facts.

... Army Group North was advancing towards Leningrad. Field Marshal Wilhelm von Leeb led to the city that Hitler so wanted to destroy, the 16th and 18th armies of Colonel Generals Busch and von Küchler, and the 4th Panzer Group of Colonel General Hoepner. A total of forty-two divisions. From the air, the army group was supported by over a thousand aircraft of the Luftwaffe I Fleet.

Oh, how the commander of the 18th Army, Colonel General Karl-Friedrich-Wilhelm von Küchler, rushed forward! In 1940, with his invincible young men, he had already crossed Holland, Belgium, and marched under the Arc de Triomphe in Paris. And here is Russia! Sixty-year-old Küchler dreamed of a field marshal's baton, which was waiting for him on the first street in Leningrad - all he had to do was bend down and pick it up. He will be the first of the foreign generals to enter this proud city with an army!

Let him dream. He will receive the field marshal's baton, but not for long. Küchler's military career would end ingloriously under the walls of Leningrad on January 31, 1944. Enraged by the victories of the soldiers of the Leningrad and Volkhov fronts, Hitler would throw Küchler, who by that time commanded the entire Army Group North, into retirement. After this, the field marshal will be revealed to the world only once - in Nuremberg. To be tried as a war criminal.

In the meantime, the 18th Army is advancing. It has already become famous not only for its military successes, but also for its brutal massacres of civilians. The soldiers of the “Great Fuhrer” did not spare either the inhabitants of the occupied territories or prisoners of war.

During the battles for Tallinn, not far from the city, the Germans discovered three reconnaissance sailors from a combined detachment of sailors and Estonian militias. During a short bloody battle, two scouts were killed, and a seriously wounded sailor from the destroyer “Minsk”, Evgeniy Nikonov, was captured in an unconscious state.

Evgeniy refused to answer all questions about the location of the detachment, and torture did not break him. Then the Nazis, angry at the Red Navy man’s stubbornness, gouged out his eyes, tied Nikonov to a tree and burned him alive.

Having entered the territory of the Leningrad region after the most difficult battles, von Küchler’s wards, whom Leeb called “a respected man with fearlessness and composure,” continued to commit atrocities. I'll give just one example.

As the documents of the Trial in the case of the Supreme Command of Hitler's Wehrmacht irrefutably testify, “in the area occupied by the 18th Army ... there was a hospital in which 230 mentally ill and women suffering from other illnesses were placed. After a discussion during which the opinion was expressed that “according to German standards” these unfortunates “were no longer worth living,” a proposal was made to liquidate them, an entry in the combat log of the XXVIII Army Corps for December 25-26, 1941 shows that “ the commander agreed with this decision” and ordered its implementation by SD forces.”

Prisoners in the army of the “respected” and “fearless” Küchler were sent to clear the mines in the area and were shot at the slightest suspicion of wanting to escape. Finally, they simply starved. I will quote only one entry from the combat log of the chief of the intelligence department of the 18th Army headquarters for November 4, 1941: “Every night 10 prisoners die from exhaustion.”

On September 8, 1941, Shlisselburg fell. Leningrad found itself cut off from southeastern communications. The blockade began. The main forces of the 18th Army came close to the city, but were unable to take it. Strength collided with the courage of the defenders. Even the enemy was forced to admit this.

Infantry General Kurt von Tippelskirch, who at the beginning of the war held the post of Oberquartiermeister IV (chief of the main intelligence department) of the General Staff of the German Ground Forces, wrote irritably:

“German troops reached the southern outskirts of the city, but due to the stubborn resistance of the defending troops, reinforced by fanatical Leningrad workers, there was no expected success. Due to lack of forces, it was also not possible to oust Russian troops from the mainland...”

Continuing the offensive on other sectors of the front, units of the 18th Army came close to Volkhov in early December.

At this time, in the rear, on the territory of the Volga Military District, the 26th Army was formed anew - for the third time after the battles near Kiev and in the Oryol-Tula direction. At the end of December it will be transferred to the Volkhov Front. Here the 26th will receive a new name, with which it will pass from the banks of the Volkhov River to the Elbe and will forever remain in the history of the Great Patriotic War - the 2nd shock!

I specifically described in such detail the methods of warfare by the Nazi 18th Army so that the reader would understand what kind of enemy our 2nd Shock would have to face. There was very little time left before the start of the most tragic operation in 1942 in the North-West of the country.

In the meantime, headquarters on both sides of the front were assessing the results of the 1941 campaign. Tippelskirch noted:

“During heavy fighting, Army Group North, although it inflicted significant losses on the enemy and partially destroyed his forces... however, did not achieve operational success. The planned timely support by strong formations of Army Group Center was not provided.”

And in December 1941, Soviet troops launched a strong counterattack near Tikhvin, defeated and routed the Germans near Moscow. It was at this time that the defeat of the Nazis in the northwestern and Moscow directions was predetermined.

In military science there is such a concept - analytical strategy. It was developed by the Prussians - great experts in all kinds of teachings on how to kill more people better, faster and more. It is no coincidence that all the wars with their participation, starting with the Battle of Grunwald, went down in world history as the bloodiest. The essence of the analytical strategy, if we omit all the complicated and long explanations, comes down to the following: you prepare and you win.

The most important component of the analytical strategy is the doctrine of operations. Let us dwell on it in more detail, since without this the course of the described operations and battles, the reasons for successes and failures, will be difficult to understand.

Don’t be too lazy to take a sheet of paper and put on it the coordinate system you know from school. Now, just below the X-axis, start drawing an elongated capital letter S so that its “neck” makes an acute angle with the axis. At the intersection point, put the number 1, and at the top, at the point where the letter begins to bend to the right, put the number 2.

So here it is. Up to point 1, the preparatory stage of the military operation is underway. At the very point it “starts” and begins to develop rapidly, at point 2 it loses momentum and then fades away. The attacking side strives to go from the first to the second point as quickly as possible, attracting maximum forces and resources. The defender, on the contrary, tries to stretch it out over time - the resources of any army are not unlimited - and, when the enemy is exhausted, crushes him, taking advantage of the fact that at point 2 the phase of extreme saturation has begun. Looking ahead, I will say that this is what happened during the Lyuban operation of 1942.

For the German divisions, the “neck” of the letter S on the way to Leningrad and Moscow turned out to be prohibitively long. The troops stopped at both capitals, unable to advance further and were beaten almost simultaneously - near Tikhvin and near Moscow

Germany did not have enough strength to conduct the 1942 campaign along the entire front. On December 11, 1941, German losses were estimated at 1 million 300 thousand people. As General Blumentritt recalled, in the fall “...in the troops of the Center armies, in most infantry companies, the number of personnel reached only 60-70 people.”

However, the German command had the opportunity to transfer troops to the Eastern Front from the territories occupied by the Third Reich in the West (from June to December, outside the Soviet-German front, fascist losses amounted to about 9 thousand people). Thus, the 18th Army of Army Group North included divisions from France and Denmark.

Today it is difficult to say whether Stalin counted on the opening of a second front in 1942 at a time when the Headquarters was planning a number of upcoming operations, including the liberation of Leningrad. At least the correspondence between the Supreme Commander regarding the need to open a second front with the President of the United States and the Prime Minister of Great Britain was quite lively. And on January 1, 1942, in Washington, representatives of the USSR, USA, England, China and 22 other countries signed a United Nations declaration on an uncompromising struggle against the states of the fascist bloc. The governments of the USA and Great Britain officially announced the opening of a second front in Europe in 1942.

Unlike Stalin, the more cynical Hitler was convinced that there would be no second front. And he concentrated the best troops in the East.

“Summer is the decisive stage of the military dispute. The Bolsheviks will be driven so far away that they will never be able to touch the cultural soil of Europe... I will make sure that Moscow and Leningrad are destroyed.”

Our Headquarters did not intend to give Leningrad to the enemy. On December 17, 1941, the Volkhov Front was created. It included the 2nd shock, 4th, 52nd and 59th armies. Two of them - the 4th and 52nd - have already distinguished themselves during the counterattack near Tikhvin. The 4th was especially successful, as a result of a decisive attack on December 9, which captured the city and inflicted serious damage on enemy personnel. Nine of its formations and units were awarded the Order of the Red Banner. In total, 1,179 people were awarded in the 4th and 52nd armies: 47 with the Order of Lenin, 406 with the Order of the Red Banner, 372 with the Order of the Red Star, 155 with the medal “For Courage” and 188 with the medal “For Military Merit”. Eleven soldiers became Heroes of the Soviet Union.

The 4th Army was commanded by Army General K.A. Meretskov, the 52nd Army by Lieutenant General N.K. Klykov. Now one army commander led the front, the other was to command the 2nd shock. The headquarters set a strategic task for the front: to defeat the Nazi troops, with the help of units of the Leningrad Front, to carry out a breakthrough and complete lifting of the blockade of Leningrad (this operation was called “Lyubanskaya”). Soviet troops failed to cope with the task.

Let us give the floor to Marshal of the Soviet Union A.M. Vasilevsky, who traveled to the Volkhov Front and is well acquainted with the situation. In the book “The Work of a Whole Life,” the famous marshal recalls:

“Almost the entire winter, and then the spring, we tried to break through the ring of the Leningrad blockade, striking at it from two sides: from the inside - by the troops of the Leningrad Front, from the outside - by the Volkhov Front, with the goal of uniting after the unsuccessful breakthrough of this ring in the Lyuban region. The main role in the Lyuban operation was played by the 2nd Shock Army of the Volkhovites. She entered the breakthrough of the German defense line on the right bank of the Volkhov River, but failed to reach Lyuban, and got stuck in forests and swamps. The Leningraders, weakened by the blockade, were even more unable to solve their part of the overall task. The matter hardly moved. At the end of April, the Volkhov and Leningrad fronts were united into a single Leningrad front, consisting of two groups: a group of troops in the Volkhov direction and a group of troops in the Leningrad direction. The first included troops of the former Volkhov Front, as well as the 8th and 54th armies, which were previously part of the Leningrad Front. The commander of the Leningrad Front, Lieutenant General M.S. Khozin, was given the opportunity to unite actions to eliminate the blockade of Leningrad. However, it soon became clear that it was extremely difficult to lead nine armies, three corps, two groups of troops separated by an enemy-occupied zone. The decision of the Headquarters to liquidate the Volkhov Front turned out to be erroneous.

On June 8, the Volkhov Front was restored; it was again headed by K.A. Meretskov. L.A. Govorov was appointed to command the Leningrad Front. “For failure to comply with the order of the Headquarters on the timely and rapid withdrawal of troops of the 2nd Shock Army, for paper and bureaucratic methods of command and control of troops,” said the order of the Headquarters, for separation from the troops, as a result of which the enemy cut off the communications of the 2nd Shock Army and the latter was put in an exceptionally difficult position, remove Lieutenant General Khozin from the post of commander of the Leningrad Front” and appoint him commander of the 33rd Army of the Western Front. The situation here was complicated by the fact that the commander of the 2nd Army, Vlasov, turned out to be a vile traitor and went over to the side of the enemy.”

Marshal Vasilevsky does not disclose the very course of the Lyuban operation (little has been written about it at all), limiting himself to stating the negative result achieved. But, please note, neither he nor the Headquarters make any accusations against the 2nd Shock Units at their disposal. But the following quote is extremely far from objectivity. Although, to be honest, it’s hard to accuse the authors of the major work “The Battle of Leningrad” of deliberate bias (and in our uncensored era, many people adhere to this point of view). I quote:

“In the first half of May 1942. Fighting resumed on the western bank of the Volkhov River in the Lyuban direction. Our attempts to expand the breakthrough in the enemy’s defenses in order to develop a subsequent attack on Lyuban were unsuccessful. The fascist German command managed to pull up large forces to this area and, by delivering strong blows to the flanks of the Soviet troops moving forward, created a real threat of their destruction. In mid-May 1942, the Supreme Command headquarters ordered the withdrawal of troops of the 2nd Shock Army to the eastern bank of the Volkhov River. However, as a result of the treacherous behavior of General Vlasov, who subsequently surrendered, the army found itself in a catastrophic situation, and it had to escape the encirclement with heavy fighting.”

So, from the above text it logically follows that the failure of the army is the result of Vlasov’s betrayal. And in the book “On the Volkhov Front”, published in 1982 (and, by the way, published by the USSR Academy of Sciences and the Institute Military history) in general the following is categorically stated:

“Inaction and betrayal of the Motherland and the military duty of its former commander, Lieutenant General A.A. Vlasov, is one of the most important reasons that the army was surrounded and suffered huge losses.”

But this is clearly too much! The army was surrounded by no fault of Vlasov, and the general had no intention of surrendering it to the enemy. Let's take a brief look at the progress of the operation.

The commander of the Volkhov Front, Army General K.A. Meretskov, made a well-founded decision to attack with two fresh armies - the 2nd shock and the 59th. The offensive of the strike group had the task of breaking through the German defense front in the Spasskaya Polist area, reaching the line of Lyuban, Dubrovnik, Cholovo and, in cooperation with the 54th Army of the Leningrad Front, defeating the enemy’s Lyuban-Chudov group. Then, having built on the success, break the blockade of Leningrad. Of course, Meretskov, who held the post of Chief of the General Staff before the war, was aware that it would be extremely difficult to carry out the decision of the Supreme Command Headquarters, but he made every effort to do this - an order is an order.

The offensive began on January 7. For three days, our troops tried to break through the German defenses, but were unsuccessful. On January 10, the front commander temporarily stopped the attacking actions of the units. On the same day, the 2nd Shock received a new commander.

“Although a change of command is not an easy matter... we still took the risk of asking the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command to replace the commander of the 2nd Shock Army,” recalled K.A. Meretskov. Kirill Afanasyevich spoke about G.G. Sokolov not in the best way:

“He got down to business ardently, made any promises. In practice, nothing worked for him. It was clear that his approach to solving problems in a combat situation was based on long-outdated concepts and dogmas.”

It was not easy for Meretskov to contact Headquarters with a request to remove the army commander. The former chief of the General Staff of the Red Army, repressed and only miraculously not sharing the fate of many senior military leaders, Kirill Afanasyevich proposed (before the start of the strategic operation!) to remove from office not just General Sokolov, but, in the very recent past, Deputy People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR Sokolov.

However, precisely because it was before the offensive, Meretskov asked to replace the army commander. And... a few days later G.G. Sokolov was recalled to Moscow. Open the latest edition of the Military Encyclopedic Dictionary - there you will find articles about all the commanders of the 2nd Shock. Besides Sokolov...

But let's go back to 1942. On the Volkhov Front, forces were regrouped and reserves were concentrated. On January 13, after an hour and a half of artillery preparation, the offensive resumed along the entire area of ​​​​the deployment of front troops from the village of Podberezye to the city of Chudovo in the north-west direction from the original lines. Unfortunately, only the 2nd Shock Army, commanded by Lieutenant General N.K. Klykov from January 10, had the main and only success in this operation.

This is what Pavel Luknitsky, an eyewitness, writes in the Leningrad Diary:

“In January, in February, the initial excellent success of this operation was achieved under the command of... G.G. Sokolov (under him, in 1941, the 2nd Shock was created from the 26th, which was in the reserve of the Army High Command and some units of the Volkhov ... front...) and N.K. Klykov, who led it on the offensive... The army had many brave soldiers, selflessly devoted to the Motherland - Russians, Bashkirs, Tatars, Chuvash (the 26th Army was formed in the Chuvash Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic ), Kazakhs and other nationalities.”

The war correspondent did not sin against the truth. The onslaught was truly terrible. Reinforced by reserves transferred from other sectors of the front, the troops of the second shock wedged themselves in a narrow strip into the location of the enemy's 18th Army.

Having broken through the deeply echeloned defense in the zone between the villages of Myasnoy Bor - Spasskaya Polist (about 50 kilometers northwest of Novgorod), by the end of January the advanced units of the army - the 13th Cavalry Corps, the 101st Separate Cavalry Regiment, as well as units of the 327th 1st Infantry Division reached the city of Lyuban and enveloped the enemy group from the south. The remaining armies of the front practically remained at their original lines and, supporting the development of the success of the 2nd Shock Army, fought heavy defensive battles. Thus, even then Klykov’s army was left to its own devices. But it was coming!

In the diary of the Chief of the General Staff of the German Ground Forces, Franz Halder, there were entries one more alarming than the other:

January 27. ...On the front of Army Group North, the enemy achieved tactical success on Volkhov.

Feeling a serious threat from the connection of units of the 2nd shock with units of the 54th Army of the Leningrad Front of General I.I. Fedyuninsky, located 30 kilometers northeast of Lyuban, the Germans are strengthening their 18th Army. In the period from January to June 1942, 15 (!) full-blooded divisions were transferred to the area of ​​operations of the Volkhov Front to eliminate the offensive of the 2nd Shock Army. As a result, the command of Army Group North was forced forever abandon plans to capture Leningrad. But the tragic fate of the 2nd shock was a foregone conclusion.

On February 27, the Germans attacked the exposed flanks of the Soviet troops. Our units that reached Ryabovo found themselves cut off from the main forces of the front and only after many days of fighting did they break out of the encirclement. Let's take another look at Halder's diary:

2nd of March. ...Meeting with the Fuhrer in the presence of the commander of Army Group North, army commanders and corps commanders. Decision: go on the offensive on Volkhov on March 7 (until 13.03.). The Fuhrer demands that aviation training be carried out several days before the start of the offensive (bombing warehouses in forests with super-heavy caliber bombs). Having completed the breakthrough on Volkhov, one should not waste energy on destroying the enemy. If we throw him into the swamp, it will doom him to death.”

And from March 1942 until the end of June, the troops of the 2nd Shock Army, being surrounded and cut off from their communications, fought fierce battles, holding the Germans in the southeastern direction. Just look at the map of the Novgorod region to be convinced: the battles were fought in wooded and swampy areas. In addition, in the summer of '42, the level of groundwater and rivers sharply increased in the Leningrad region. All bridges, even on small rivers, were demolished, and the swamps became impassable. Ammunition and food were supplied by air in extremely limited quantities. The army was starving, but the soldiers and commanders honestly performed their duty.

Circumstances were such that in mid-April Army Commander N.K. became seriously ill. Klykov - he had to be urgently evacuated by plane across the front line. At this time, the army had the deputy commander of the Volkhov Front, Lieutenant General A.A. Vlasov (who, by the way, arrived at the front on March 9). And it was quite natural that he, who had proven himself well as an army commander in the battles near Moscow, was appointed to act as commander of the encircled army.

Veteran of the 2nd Shock I. Levin testifies to the conditions under which they had to fight in his notes “General Vlasov on both sides of the front”:

“The situation with ammunition was desperate. When vehicles and carts could not get through the neck to us, the soldiers carried the shells - two ropes over their shoulders - on themselves. “Junkers”, “Heinkels”, “Messers” literally hung over our heads and during daylight hours they hunted (I’m sure with passion) for every moving target - be it a soldier or a cart. There was nothing to cover the army from the air. Our native Volkhov forest saved us: it allowed us to play hide and seek with the Luftwaffe.”

In May the situation worsened. This is how the commander of the 327th Infantry Division, Colonel (later Major General) I.M., remembers it. Antyufeyev:

“The situation at the line occupied by the division was clearly not in our favor. The forest roads have already dried up, and the enemy has brought tanks and self-propelled guns here. He also used massive mortar fire. And yet the division fought on this line for about two weeks... Finev Meadow changed hands several times. Where did our soldiers get their physical strength and energy from!... In the end, a critical moment came at this point. To our left, between the lakes, a partisan detachment was defending, which was pushed back by the enemy. In order not to be completely surrounded, we were forced to retreat. This time we had to part with almost all the heavy weapons... The rifle regiments by that time numbered no more than 200-300 people each. They were no longer capable of any maneuver. They still fought on the spot, literally clinging their teeth to the ground, but movement was unbearably difficult for them.”

In mid-May 1942, the command of the 2nd Shock received a directive to leave the army beyond the Volkhov River. This was more than difficult to achieve. When the enemy closed the only corridor in the Myasny Bor area, the very possibility of an organized breakthrough became unlikely. As of June 1, in 7 divisions and 6 brigades of the army there were 6,777 commanding officers, 6,369 junior command personnel and 22,190 privates. A total of 35,336 people - approximately three divisions. It should be taken into account that the command lost operational control over the troops, the units were scattered. Nevertheless, Soviet soldiers offered heroic resistance to the enemy. The fighting continued.

On the night of June 24-25, 1942, as a result of the failed operation of the troops of the Volkhov Front and the remaining combat-ready units of the 2nd Shock Army to break through the encirclement ring from Myasny Bor and the withdrawal of the remaining groups of fighters and commanders, the army command decided to fight their way to their own, breaking into small groups (soldiers and army officers have already done this).

When leaving the encirclement, the chief of staff of the 2nd shock, Colonel Vinogradov, died under artillery fire. The head of the special department, State Security Major Shashkov, was seriously wounded and shot himself. Surrounded by fascists, member of the Military Council Zuev saved the last bullet for himself, and the head of the political department Garus also did the same. The head of army communications, Major General Afanasyev, went to the partisans, who transported him to the “mainland.” The Germans captured the commander of the 327th division, General Antyufeev (who refused to cooperate with the enemies of the divisional commander and was subsequently sent to a concentration camp). And General Vlasov... surrendered to a patrol of the 28th Infantry Corps in the village of Tukhovezhi (together with the chef of the army military council canteen, M.I. Voronova, who accompanied him).

But our own people were looking for him, trying to save the army commander! On the morning of June 25, officers who emerged from the encirclement reported: Vlasov and other senior officers were seen in the area of ​​the narrow-gauge railway. Meretskov sent there his adjutant, Captain Mikhail Grigorievich Boroda, a tank company with an infantry landing force. Of the five tanks in the German rear, four were blown up by mines or were knocked out. M.G.Boroda on last tank I got to the headquarters of the 2nd shock - there was no one there. By the evening of June 25, several reconnaissance groups were sent to find the Army Military Council and withdraw it. Vlasov was never found.

After some time, a message was received from the partisans of the Oredezh detachment F.I. Sazanov: Vlasov went over to the Nazis.

When, many days later, the surviving soldiers of the 2nd Shock found out about this, they were simply shocked. “But how they believed this heroic general, scolder, joker, eloquent speaker! The army commander turned out to be a despicable coward, betrayed everyone who, not sparing their lives, went into battle on his orders,” wrote Pavel Luknitsky.

“The question arises: how did it happen that Vlasov turned out to be a traitor?” Marshal Meretskov writes in his book “In the Service of the People.” “It seems to me that only one answer can be given. Vlasov was an unprincipled careerist. His behavior before this can well be considered a disguise, behind which his indifference to the Motherland was hidden. His membership in the Communist Party is nothing more than a path to high positions. His actions at the front, for example in 1941 near Kiev and Moscow, are an attempt to distinguish himself in order to demonstrate his professional abilities and quickly advance.”

During the trial of the ROA command, when asked why he surrendered, Vlasov answered briefly and clearly: “He was faint-hearted.” And you can believe it. Surrendering on July 12, the general, who did not have the courage to shoot himself, was already a coward, but not yet a traitor. Vlasov betrayed his Motherland a day later, when he found himself at the headquarters of the commander of the 18th German Army, Colonel General Gerhard Lindemann. It was to him that he described in detail the state of affairs on the Volkhov front. A photograph has been preserved: Vlasov with a pointer bent over the map, Lindemann standing next to him carefully follows his explanations.

Here we will leave the traitor. He has nothing to do with the further fate of the 2nd strike.

Despite Vlasov’s betrayal, the entire army was not blamed for the failure of the Lyuban operation. And in those days, just the slightest suspicion of betrayal was enough for the very name “2nd Shock” to disappear forever from the lists of the Red Army. In addition, none of the army units lost their battle flags.

This means that the Headquarters correctly assessed its role: despite the tragic outcome of the operation, the army buried the enemy’s hopes of capturing Leningrad. The losses of Hitler's troops were too heavy. Pavel Luknitsky also reports this in the three-volume book “Leningrad is Acting...”:

“...it destroyed a lot of enemy forces (the 2nd strike motor vehicle): six German divisions, pulled from Leningrad to Volkhov, were exsanguinated by it, the fascist legions “Netherlands” and “Flanders” were completely defeated, many remained in the swamps enemy artillery, tanks, airplanes, tens of thousands of Nazis...”

And here is an excerpt from a leaflet issued by the political department of the Volkhov Front shortly after the 2nd shock fighters left the encirclement:

“Valiant warriors of the 2nd Shock Army!

In the fire and roar of guns, the clang of tanks, the roar of airplanes, and fierce battles with Hitler’s scoundrels, you won the glory of the valiant warriors of the Volkhov borders.

Courageously and fearlessly, during the harsh winter and spring, you fought against the fascist invaders.

The military glory of the soldiers of the 2nd Shock Army is captured in golden letters in the history of the Great Patriotic War...”

However, Hitler, unlike his commanders, who did not give up his obsession with taking and destroying Leningrad, demanded from the Wehrmacht representative at the Finnish headquarters, General Erfurt, to achieve an offensive by the Allied units from the north. But the Finnish command turned Hitler’s envoy away, declaring: since 1918, our country has been of the opinion that the existence of Finland should not pose a threat to Leningrad. Apparently, the Finns, who carefully assessed both the international and military situation, were then groping for a way out of the war into which Germany had dragged them.

But Hitler did not let up. He took an unprecedented step: he transferred the victorious 11th Army of Field Marshal von Manstein from the southern borders to Leningrad. Manstein took Sevastopol! Manstein “figured out” the Russian Kerch operation! Let Manstein take Leningrad!

Manstein has arrived. I didn’t take Leningrad. In his memoirs he wrote:

“On August 27, the headquarters of the 11th Army arrived on the Leningrad Front, here in the zone of the 18th Army, to find out the possibilities of striking and draw up a plan for the attack on Leningrad. It was agreed that then the headquarters of the 11th Army would occupy the part of the front of the 18th Army facing north, while the eastern part of the front along the Volkhov remained behind the 18th Army.”

And the 11th Army entered into heavy fighting with Soviet troops, which lasted until the beginning of October. Actually. Manstein had to solve the problems of the 18th Army, which was badly beaten during the Lyuban operation by units of the 2nd shock and was no longer capable of large-scale actions.

The field marshal managed to destroy a number of our formations, but did not have enough strength to take the city. Manstein would later remember these autumn battles in 1942:

“If the task of restoring the situation on the eastern sector of the 18th Army’s front was completed, the divisions of our army nevertheless suffered significant losses. At the same time, a significant part of the ammunition intended for the attack on Leningrad was used up. Therefore, there could be no talk of a quick offensive. Meanwhile, Hitler still did not want to give up his intention to capture Leningrad. True, he was ready to limit the tasks of the offensive, which, naturally, would not lead to the final liquidation of this front, and in the end it all came down to this liquidation(emphasis mine – author). On the contrary, the headquarters of the 11th Army believed that it was impossible to begin the operation against Leningrad without replenishing our forces and without generally having a sufficient number of forces. October passed by discussing these issues and drawing up new plans.”

In November, the situation was such that the presence of the 11th Army was required in other sectors of the Eastern Front: the decisive battle for Stalingrad was approaching. Manstein's headquarters was transferred to Army Group Center. In addition to the unsuccessful attempt to take Leningrad, fate dealt the German commander another terrible blow. On October 29, the 19-year-old son of the field marshal, infantry lieutenant Gero von Manstein, who fought in the 16th Army, died on the Leningrad Front.

Many years later, after the events described, while working on his book “Lost Victories,” the old field marshal, always stingy in his praise of the enemy, would pay tribute to the heroic warriors of the 2nd Shock (an army at that time was only in name; an eight-thousand-strong rifle force fought the enemy division and one rifle brigade). He will appreciate their courage in a military way, clearly and concisely:

“The enemy’s losses in killed were many times greater than the number captured.”

And in the forty-second year, another thing happened on the Volkhov front an important event, at first glance, not directly related to the development of hostilities. A song was born that soon became popularly known and loved. Because it sounded truthful and, most importantly, it was already victorious!

Songs that raise the morale of soldiers sometimes mean more than new weapons, plentiful food, and warm clothes. The time of their appearance rightly takes its rightful place in military chronology. In 1941, this became “Get up, huge country!”, in 1942 - “Volkhov Table” to the words of the front-line poet Pavel Shubin.

They didn't sing then:

Let's drink to the Motherland, let's drink to Stalin,

Let's drink and pour again!

They didn’t sing because such lines had never been written before. but, you see, it sounded great:

Let's drink to the meeting of the living!

These words fully applied to all soldiers of the 2nd Shock Army.

At the end of 1942, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command decided at the beginning of the next year to carry out an operation to relieve the siege of Leningrad, better known in history as Operation Iskra.

From the Leningrad Front, the 67th Army was assigned to the strike group. The Volkhov Front again entrusted this task to the 2nd Shock. The almost completely renewed army (only about ten thousand people emerged from the encirclement) included: 11 rifle divisions, 1 rifle, 4 tank and 2 engineer brigades, 37 artillery and mortar regiments and other units.

The fully equipped 2nd Strike continued its combat path. And he was nice!

On January 18, 1943, the 2nd Shock Army of the Volkhov Front, in cooperation with the 67th Army of the Leningrad Front, broke the blockade of Leningrad. The course of this operation is described in detail both in fiction and in special military literature. Numerous documentaries and feature films have been made about her. Every year, January 18 was celebrated in Leningrad, is and will be celebrated in St. Petersburg as one of the main city holidays!

Then, in the cold January days of 1943, the main thing happened: conditions were created for land and transport communications with the entire country.

For the courage and bravery shown in breaking the blockade, about 22 thousand soldiers of the Volkhov and Leningrad fronts received state awards. The 122nd Tank Brigade, which interacted with units of the 2nd Shock Brigade, became the Red Banner Brigade. And in the army itself, the 327th Rifle Division was transformed into the 64th Guards Rifle Division. The chest of the commander of the newly minted guardsmen, Colonel N.A. Polyakov, was decorated with the Order of Suvorov, II degree. The commander of the 2nd attack, Lieutenant General V.Z. Romanovsky, was awarded one of the highest military leadership insignia - the Order of Kutuzov, 1st degree.

Since April 1943, already operating as part of the Leningrad Front, the army participated in the Leningrad-Novgorod offensive operation, and with its active participation from the Oranienbaum bridgehead in January 1944, it ensured the final liberation of Leningrad from the siege.

In February-March - liberated Lomonosovsky, Volosovsky, Kingiseppsky, Slantsevsky and Gdovsky districts of the Leningrad region, reached the Narva River and Lake Peipus. In April-August she fought with German troops on the Narva Isthmus and successfully carried out an operation to liberate Narva. In September forty-four, in the successful Tallinn operation, the territory of Estonia was liberated from the invaders.

How were things going for the long-no longer victorious German 18th Army? Tippelskirch writes:

“On January 18 (1944 - author), that is, a few days after the start of the Russian offensive on the northern sector of the 18th Army front, the troops of the Volkhov Front went on the offensive from a wide bridgehead north of Novgorod with the aim of striking the flank of the 18th Army . It was impossible to prevent this breakthrough, and it led to the withdrawal of the entire army group. The very next day I had to leave Novgorod.”

But, true to its tradition of smashing and destroying everything, the 18th Army continued the practice of “scorched earth”!: out of the almost fifty thousand population of Novgorod, only fifty people survived, out of 2,500 buildings - only forty. Colonel General Lindemann, already familiar to us, ordered the famous monument “Millennium of Russia”, which is still located on the territory of the Novgorod Kremlin, to be dismantled into parts and sent to Germany. They dismantled it, but they didn’t have time to take it out - they had to run away from the rapidly advancing Soviet army.

Under the blows of the Soviet troops, the 18th Army rolled back further and further until, together with the 16th Army, it was blocked as part of the Courland group. Together with her, the failed conquerors of Leningrad laid down their arms on the night of May 9. And then a terrible panic began among the soldiers of the 16th and 18th armies. General Gilpert, who commanded the group, was seriously afraid. It turns out that the Nazis “miscalculated.” Pavel Luknitsky says in his narration:

“Before accepting the ultimatum, Gilpert did not know that Marshal Govorov was in command of the Leningrad Front, he believed that they would surrender to Marshal Govorov, the “commander of the 2nd Baltic Front,” - this seemed to the Germans who committed atrocities near Leningrad not so terrible: “Baltic people,” Having not experienced the horror of the blockade, they have no reason to take “merciless revenge” as the Leningraders allegedly will.”

You should have thought earlier when they were executed at the walls of the Neva Stronghold, dying of hunger, but not surrendering!

On September 27, 1944, the Military Council of the Leningrad Front, transferring the 2nd strike to the reserve of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, addressed its troops with the words:

“The 2nd Shock Army as part of the front forces played a big role in lifting the blockade of Leningrad, winning the Great Victory near Leningrad and in all the battles for the liberation of Soviet Estonia from the Nazi invaders.

The victorious path of the 2nd Shock Army on the Leningrad Front was marked by brilliant successes, and the battle banners of its units were covered with unfading glory.

The working people of Leningrad and Soviet Estonia will always sacredly cherish in their memory the military merits of the 2nd Shock Army, its heroic warriors - the faithful sons of the Fatherland.”

At the final stage of the war, the 2nd Shock Division, as part of the troops of the 2nd Belorussian Front under the command of Marshal of the Soviet Union K.K. Rokossovsky, fought in East Prussia and participated in the East Pomeranian operation. In his memoirs, Konstantin Konstantinovich Rokossovsky more than once noted her skillful actions:

“The 2nd Shock Army fought through a strong defensive line on the approaches to Marienburg, which in ancient times was a crusader fortress, and on January 25 reached the Vistula and Nogat rivers. Using part of her forces, she crossed these rivers in several places and captured small bridgeheads. The troops were unable to capture Elbing on the move... I.I. Fedyuninsky (commander of the 2nd strike - author) had to organize an assault on the city according to all the rules of military art. The fighting lasted for several days until the 2nd Shock captured the city.”

Together with the 65th Army and a separate tank brigade of the Polish Army, the 2nd Shock Division played decisive role in the assault on Danzig - the Polish city of Gdansk.

“On March 26, the troops of the 2nd shock and 65th armies, having broken through the enemy defenses to their entire depth, approached Danzig,” wrote K.K. Rokossovsky. “In order to avoid senseless losses, the garrison was given an ultimatum: it is useless to continue resistance. If the ultimatum was not accepted, residents were advised to leave the city.

Hitler's command did not respond to our proposal. The command was given to begin the assault... The fight was for every house. The Nazis fought especially stubbornly in large buildings, factory buildings... On March 30, Gdansk was completely liberated. The remnants of the enemy troops fled to the swampy mouth of the Vistula, where they were soon captured. The Polish national flag soared over the ancient Polish city, which was hoisted by soldiers - representatives of the Polish Army.”

From East Prussia the army's route lay in Pomerania. The Germans understood perfectly well - soviet soldiers had every right to take revenge. The memories of how the Nazis treated prisoners of war and civilians were too fresh. And even in the May days of 1945, living examples almost constantly appeared before our eyes.

On May 7, units of the 46th division of the 2nd shock cleared the island of Rügen from the Germans. Our soldiers discovered a concentration camp in which our compatriots were languishing. In his book “From the Neva to the Elbe,” the division commander, General S.N. Borshchev, recalled the incident on the island:

“Our Soviet people, liberated from concentration camps, walked along the road. Suddenly a girl ran out of the crowd, rushed to our famous intelligence officer Tupkalenko and, hugging him, screamed:

- Vasil, my brother!

And our courageous, desperate intelligence officer, Vasily Yakovlevich Tupkalenko (full holder of the Order of Glory - author), on whose face, as they say, never moved a single muscle, cried...”

But the winners, to the surprise of the local population, didn't take revenge. On the contrary, they helped as best they could. And when a column of young men in fascist soldier’s uniforms came across the 90th Rifle Division, division commander General N.G. Lyashchenko simply waved his hand to the teenagers:

- Go to mom, to mom!

Naturally, they happily ran home.

And the Great Patriotic War ended for the 2nd Shock with participation in the famous Berlin operation. And our soldiers had their own “meeting on the Elbe” - with the 2nd British Army. Soviet and English soldiers celebrated it solemnly: with a football match!

Over the four years of war, the troops of the 2nd Shock Army were expressed gratitude to the Supreme Commander-in-Chief twenty-four times, and the sky over Moscow was colored with victorious volleys of fireworks. For heroism, courage and bravery, 99 formations and units were given honorary names of liberated and captured cities. 101 formations and units attached the Order of the Soviet Union to their banners, and 29 formations and units became guards. 103 soldiers of the 2nd shock were awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.

History has given everyone what they deserve. Soldiers, officers and generals of the 2nd Shock Army found themselves on the heroic pages of the chronicle of Victory. And General Vlasov - to the gallows. The execution took place on the night of August 1, 1946 in Tagansk prison according to the verdict of the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court of the USSR. And with this we could have parted ways with the traitor, if not for certain circumstances.

Our country entered the new millennium without a textbook on the history of Russia. Well - nothing surprising: too many idols in the previous decade were overthrown from their pedestals, not all heroes were pulled out of oblivion. And the history of any state is made up of the actions of individuals.

But when scientists thoroughly shook the flask with the historical cocktail of the twentieth century, many strange and sometimes terrible personalities appeared on the surface, whom the “independently-minded” pseudo-chroniclers, quick to hand, immediately began to present to us as heroes misunderstood by the people. A sort of Don Quixote of modern history, not at all concerned with the fact that, unlike Mister La Mancha, the knights are not of a sad, but rather of a bloody image.

General Vlasov was also included in the category of such “Don Quixotes”. His defense is based mainly on two positions (everything else is verbal fluff): the general is not a traitor, but a fighter against the regime, which collapsed anyway, and Vlasov is the Soviet analogue of Stauffenberg.

Not noticing such statements is dangerous. Our country is rightly called the most reading country in the world. But we must add to this that for the most part the Russian people are accustomed to believing the printed word: once it is written, so it is. That is why expositions are so popular among us and refutations often go unnoticed.

Without intending to engage in refutations of the arguments of Vlasov’s supporters in this narrative, I invite readers to consider only the factual side of the matter.

So, Vlasov and Stauffenberg. The German colonel never fought against Prussian militarism - the main opponent of Stauffenberg and his like-minded people was the Nazi elite. A competent officer of the General Staff could not help but understand that preaching the idea of ​​​​the superiority of one nation cannot build a “thousand-year Reich”. It was planned to replace key figures with less odious ones, abandon the most unacceptable Nazi principles - and that’s all. The world is for a certain period of time. One could not expect anything more from a graduate of a German military school, initially accustomed to planning wars and offensive actions. Stauffenberg did not consider himself a traitor to Germany, since he ultimately acted in its interests.

Oath to the Fuhrer? But we should not forget: for the hereditary aristocrat Count Klaus Philipp Maria Schenck von Stauffenberg, the son of the Chief Chamberlain of the King of Württemberg and the queen's lady-in-waiting, a descendant of the great Gneisenau, Hitler was a plebeian and an upstart.

Stauffenberg led the military conspiracy while on the territory of his country, fully understanding the inevitability of death in case of failure. Vlasov simply chickened out when danger threatened him personally and surrendered. And the next day he laid out to Colonel General Gerhard Lindemann not plans to fight the communist regime, but military secrets that he owned as deputy commander of the Volkhov Front.

At the beginning of the war, Stauffenberg actively pushed through the General Staff his ideas for creating national volunteer armies. Consequently, Vlasov, who eventually headed the ROA, was considered no more than the commander of one of these legions.

For the Germans, Vlasov was not a person; he was not assigned any serious role in military and political plans. Hitler repeated more than once: “Revolution is made only by those people who are inside the state, and not outside it.” And at a meeting in the summer of 1943 he said:

“...I don’t need this General Vlasov in our rear areas at all... I only need him on the front line.”

Leaders who are seriously counted on for a successful outcome of the war, as is known, are not sent there - it is dangerous. The order of Field Marshal Keitel dated April 17, 1943 stated:

“...in operations of a purely propaganda nature, Vlasov’s name may be required, but not his personality.”

Moreover, in the order, Keitel calls Vlasov a “Russian prisoner of war general” - and nothing more. But that’s what they called him on paper. In colloquial speech, harsher expressions were chosen, for example: “This Russian pig is Vlasov” (Himmler, at a meeting with the Fuhrer).

Finally, Soviet historians, unwittingly, played a significant role in “perpetuating” the memory of A.A. Vlasov, calling all ROA fighters “Vlasovites.” In fact, they never were.

The “Russian Liberation Army” was formed from traitors and prisoners of war. But the soldiers surrendered and were captured by the enemy, and the traitors went to serve the Germans, and not Vlasov. Before the war, his name was not widely known in the USSR, and after the transition to the Germans, Vlasov was known only as a traitor. They didn’t go to him the way they went to Denikin or Kolchak, Petlyura or Makhno - not the same figure.

And he didn’t behave like a leader. The same Denikin, at the end of the civil war, refused an English pension, rightly noting that only the Russian government could pay a Russian general. Vlasov willingly ate in German kitchens; when he was arrested in 1945, he was found to have thirty thousand Reichsmarks hidden “for a rainy day.” He lived comfortably - he even got a German wife - the widow of SS officer Adele Billingberg (after the war she will try to receive a pension for her hanged husband, like a general's widow).

One of the commanders of the White Guard corps, General Slashchev, did not wear shoulder straps during the civil war, believing that the volunteer army had disgraced them with robberies and violence. Vlasov also did not wear epaulettes among the Germans, but he gladly donned the comfortable overcoat of a Wehrmacht general. “Just in case” I kept the book of the commanding staff of the Red Army and... my party card.

Well, Vlasov was not a leader. But maybe then he is a fighter for the people’s happy lot? Many refer to his so-called “Smolensk appeal” to the people and other propaganda speeches. But Vlasov himself subsequently explained that the texts of the appeals were compiled by the Germans, and he only slightly edited them. The former general complained:

“Until 1944, the Germans did everything themselves, and they used us only as a sign that was profitable for them.”

And, by the way, they did the right thing, because an unedited Vlasov would hardly have been perceived by Russian people as a patriot.

As already mentioned, in the spring of 1943 he made a “tour” to parts of Army Group North. The kind of “love for the Motherland” that the speeches of the former army commander were imbued with can be judged by the occasion at the banquet in Gatchina.

Believing in his own importance, the distraught Vlasov assured the German command: if they now give him two shock divisions, he will quickly take Leningrad, since the residents are exhausted by the blockade. And then he, Vlasov the victor, will arrange a luxurious banquet in the city, to which the Wehrmacht generals invite him in advance. As you already know, Hitler, outraged by such impudence, recalled Vlasov from the front and even threatened him with the death penalty.

As a result, the Fuhrer still had to put the ROA into action - there was not enough “cannon fodder” at the front and in the Reich they formed units even from teenagers. But the ROA no longer had any “liberation” character. And the German command did not have much hope for it. The same Tippelskirch will write after the war that the “Vlasov army,” despite its large numbers, was a stillborn fetus.

And how the Soviet units perceived it is clearly demonstrated by the memories of 2nd Shock Veteran I. Levin:

“In the sector of our 2nd Shock Army, I remember only one battle with the Vlasovites. Somewhere in East Prussia, near Koenigsberg, our tank landing came across a large German unit, which included a Vlasov battalion.

After a fierce battle, the enemy was scattered. According to reports from the front line: they took many prisoners, Germans and Vlasovites. But only the Germans reached the army headquarters. Not a single person with the ROA badge was brought in. You can say a lot of words about this... But no matter what they say, no one has the right to condemn our paratroopers, who have not cooled down from the battle, who have just lost their friends at the hands of traitors...”

The Vlasov army, in principle, had nothing to count on. In the thirties and forties of the twentieth century in our country, the power of personal example was of great importance to people. Hence the Stakhanov movement, the Voroshilov riflemen. During the war, fighters deliberately repeated the feat Matrosova, pilots - Talalikhina, snipers - achievements Smolyachkova. And the feat was an example of civil courage for people Kosmodemyanskaya, and not the activities of Vlasov. He could not find a place in this row.

At that time, the word “SS man” was the worst curse word—nothing to do with sometimes kindly Russian swearing. And Vlasov conducted propaganda with the help of SS Obergruppenführer Goebbels, equipped and armed the ROA under the leadership of Reichsführer SS Himmler, and chose an SS widow as his life partner. And finally, the official ID of the commander of the “Russian (!) Liberation Army” for Vlasov was signed by SS General (!) Kroeger. Isn’t the attraction to the security forces of the Nazi Party too strong for a “carrier of high ideas”, a fighter for a “free Russia”?

In the described historical period a person who had any connection with the SS could, at best, count on a place in prison cell. But not on the political Olympus. And this opinion was held not only in the USSR.

After the war, traitors were tried throughout Europe. Quisling was shot in Norway, and the Belgian king Leopold III, who signed the capitulation to Germany, was forced to abdicate. Marshal Petain was sentenced to death in France, which was later commuted to life imprisonment. By the verdict of the people's tribunal, Antonescu was executed as a war criminal in Romania. If such punishment befell traitors of the first magnitude, then what could smaller fry like Vlasov count on? Only for a bullet or loop.

And presenting an obvious traitor today in the role of a martyr and “sufferer for the people” means deliberately engaging in false patriotic propaganda. This is much worse than selling from the stalls of Hitler’s Mein Kampf. Because it has long been the custom - sufferers in Rus' are loved and pitied. But Vlasov is not a holy cripple. And a scaffold instead of a platform was erected for him according to his merits.

Russia had other generals. During the Great Patriotic War, one of the leaders of the White Guard movement and an irreconcilable enemy of Soviet power, Lieutenant General A.I. Denikin, called on White emigrants to fight the Germans in order to support the Red Army. And Soviet Lieutenant General D.M. Karbyshev preferred martyrdom in a concentration camp to treason.

How did the fates of other commanders turn out? Lieutenant General Nikolai Kuzmich Klykov (1888-1968), after recovery, from December 1942, was assistant to the commander of the Volkhov Front, participated in breaking the siege of Leningrad. In June 1943, he was appointed to the post of deputy commander of the Moscow Military District. In 1944-1945 he commanded the troops of the North Caucasus Military District. Having led the 2nd Shock Army before the operation to break through the blockade ring, Valery Zakharovich Romanovsky (1896-1967) subsequently became deputy commander of the 4th Ukrainian Front and in 1945 received the rank of Colonel General. After the war, he commanded troops in a number of military districts and worked in military educational institutions.

Hero of the Soviet Union, Lieutenant General Ivan Ivanovich Fedyuninsky (1900-1977), who replaced him as army commander in December 1943, also commanded district troops in 1946-47 and 1954-65. He again had the opportunity to serve his Motherland on already peaceful German soil: in 1951-54, he was deputy and first deputy commander-in-chief of a group of Soviet troops in Germany. Since 1965, Army General Fedyuninsky worked in the group of inspectors general of the USSR Ministry of Defense. In 1969, as a participant in the battles in Mongolia, a veteran of the famous Khalkhin Gol, he was awarded the title of Hero of the Mongolian People's Republic.

Colonel-General Gerhard Lindemann (1884-1963), who opposed the 2nd shock at the head of the 18th German Army - the same one who wanted to remove the Millennium of Russia monument from Novgorod - led Army Group North on March 1, 1944, but for military failures in early July of the same forty-fourth, he was removed from office. Commanding German troops in Denmark at the end of the war, he surrendered to the British on May 8, 1945.

Field Marshals Wilhelm von Leeb and Karl von Küchler were tried as war criminals by the Fifth American Military Tribunal in Nuremberg. On October 28, 1948, the verdict was announced: von Leeb (1876-1956) received an unexpectedly lenient sentence - three years in prison. Von Küchler (1881-1969) was treated more strictly. No matter how much he lied, no matter how he dodged, no matter how he referred to only the exact execution of orders, the “respected” and “fearless” field marshal, the tribunal turned out to be inexorable: twenty years in prison!

True, in February 1955, Küchler was released. From the beginning of the fifties, many “Fuhrer soldiers” began to be released and amnestied - in 1954, the Federal Republic of Germany joined NATO and “experienced specialists” were required to form units of the Bundeswehr.

They had a lot of “experience”! Suffice it to say that soon after the formation of the Bundeswehr, the fascist General Ferch, one of the leaders of the artillery shelling of Leningrad, was appointed its commander. In 1960, Wehrmacht Major General, former head of the General Staff of the Ground Forces Adolf Heusinger became the chairman of the NATO Permanent Military Committee. The same Heusinger who calmly gave orders for punitive expeditions and reprisals against the civilian population of the occupied territories of the Soviet Union.

However, these are different times now. But, you see, historical facts are stubborn things. And it is necessary to remember them - evidence of the bloodiest war of the twentieth century!

Every year on May 9, Moscow salutes the Winners. Alive and dead. Majestic monuments and modest obelisks with red stars remind us of their exploits.

And in Myasny Bor there is a memorial in memory of the feat of the soldiers of the 2nd Shock Army, which cannot be erased from History!

2002-2003

P. S. HIS MEAT BOR

In memory of N.A. Shashkova

Businessmen are different. Some love to show off in front of television cameras, others love to support “high-profile” projects, sanctified by the patronage of statesmen. Still others engage in charity work, receiving in return laureate badges of various awards - from literary to fence-building (the main thing is to hang a beautiful diploma in the office).

My longtime acquaintance, the general director of the BUR mining company, Leonid Ivanovich Kulikov, did not belong to any of the above categories. But if there was a need to support an interesting and necessary initiative, he helped. True, having first made sure that the money will go to a good cause, and not into the pocket of the initiator.

Therefore, in Kulikov’s office one could often meet writers and poets, officials, generals, and scientists. And I was not at all surprised when several years ago, on one hot June day, I found a tall, gray-haired old man in the uniform of a vice admiral at Leonid Ivanovich’s. He was talking animatedly, walking around the table. The star of the Hero of the Soviet Union swayed above the order bars in time with the movements.

- Shashkov. Nikolai Alexandrovich,” the admiral extended his hand. “It’s good that you came.” “We are just discussing one important topic,” explained Leonid Ivanovich. “You, of course, have heard about the Second Shock Army?”

– Lyuban operation of 1942?

“You see!” Shashkov exclaimed. “He knows.” And he didn’t tell me, like this idiot (the name of one official was mentioned): Vlasov’s army.

- Well, Vlasov is Vlasov, and the army is an army. In the end, she later broke the blockade of Leningrad and took part in the East Prussian operation.

Because of Vlasov, little was written about her, but we heard a lot about the heroism of the fighters. After all, he worked as a city reporter for a long time. WITH different people met.

I know, for example, that the brother of the famous BDT artist Vladislav Strzhelchik fought in the Second Shock. The mother of the writer Boris Almazov, Evgenia Vissarionovna, was the senior operating sister of an army field hospital in 1942. In Yakutia - God grant him many years to come - lives a unique person - Sergeant Mikhail Bondarev. He was drafted from Yakutia and spent the entire war as part of the Second Shock! In a rare case, she was born again three times. And the son of Eduard Bagritsky, war correspondent Vsevolod, died during the Lyuban operation.

– Just like my father – Alexander Georgievich. “He was the head of a special department of the army,” Shashkov interrupted.

We talked for a long time that day. About heroes and traitors. Memory and unconsciousness. About the fact that the recently opened memorial to the fallen soldiers in Myasny Bor needs to be equipped, but there is no money. The surviving veterans are very old people. Businessmen are not interested in them, so they don’t try to help.

“We’ll help, we’ll help,” Kulikov reassured the admiral every time.

We also talked about search engines who are absolutely disinterestedly engaged in a holy work - searching for and burying the remains of fighters. About officials who give vague answers to all proposals to perpetuate the memory of the fallen.

It was firmly stuck in their heads: the Vlasov army,” Shashkov got excited. – When I was still an assistant to the Minister of Defense of the USSR, I told the head of Glavpur many times (the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy - author) - it is necessary to prepare and publish a normal history of the Second Shock. And this old wood grouse answered me: let’s see, let’s wait. We waited...

Listen. I have read some of your historical essays. Maybe you'll take up this. You see, it is necessary to briefly and clearly reflect the entire battle path. Young people will not read the Talmud. And she definitely needs to know this page of history.

What happens: they write and make films about Vlasov, this bastard, a traitor. And they forgot about the army that actually saved Leningrad!

Since then we began to meet quite often.

What was striking about Nikolai Alexandrovich was, first of all, his irrepressible energy and determination. He constantly shuttled between St. Petersburg and Moscow. And not in the "SV" carriage - at the wheel of his own "nine". He made his way into high offices - he persuaded, proved, signed the necessary papers. It seemed that he no longer needed anything in this life except to perpetuate the memory of the soldiers of the Second Shock. It was largely thanks to the efforts of Shashkov that the memorial appeared in Myasnoy Bor in the Novgorod region.

Many wondered: why does a respected and honored person need all this trouble? At such a respectable age, with such merits and, let us note in parentheses, connections, you can calmly rest on your laurels. And sometimes - decorate the presidium of some important forum with your ceremonial admiral's uniform.

But the fact of the matter is that Shashkov was not a “wedding general.” In the full sense of the word, a combat commander (it was his submarine that was ready to fire missiles at the Promised Land during the Arab-Israeli conflict in 1968), he felt personally responsible for returning from oblivion the names of his father’s comrades. With the help of the FSB, he installed a memorial plaque at the memorial. But how many more nameless heroes lie in the Novgorod land! And Shashkov continued to act.

In Kulikov’s office, which became our headquarters, Nikolai Alexandrovich prepared requests and letters, copied and sent out documents, and met with potential sponsors. Here we made clarifications to the manuscript of the story.

He came to this office on May 8, 2003, after a meeting with Valentina Ivanovna Matvienko, who then held the post of presidential plenipotentiary representative in the North-West, joyfully excited:

– Valentina Ivanovna reacted to my proposals more attentively than she expected. Now things will move forward.

And indeed, it has moved. We were convinced of this a few months later, when we arrived on August 17 - the next anniversary of the opening of the memorial - in Myasnoy Bor.

Nikolai Alexandrovich told us what still needs to be done. And, knowing his ability to achieve his goal, I, Kulikov, and everyone involved in this work by the admiral had no doubt: so be it.

Throughout the fall, winter and spring, Shashkov was engaged in routine and, as he put it, bureaucratic work. On May 1, the phone rang in my apartment.

– I just arrived from Moscow. A lot of interesting news on the memorial. As I said before, a film will be made about Second Impact. Vladimir Leonidovich Govorov (Army General, Hero of the Soviet Union, Deputy Chairman of the Pobeda Foundation - author) is actively promoting this idea. By the way, I brought you a letter from him thanking you for the story.

Yes. Remember when you scanned photos for me? So...

And we delved into a discussion of technical issues. In parting, Nikolai Alexandrovich reminded us: we will meet on May 9, in Myasnoy Bor. But fate decreed differently.

...On May 7, I stood in the large funeral hall of the crematorium and looked at the portrait of the admiral displayed in front of the closed coffin. The artificial light reflected dimly in the orders resting on scarlet cushions.

The night after our conversation, a fire broke out in the Shashkovs’ apartment. Nikolai Alexandrovich and his wife Valentina Petrovna died in the fire. The apartment itself was completely burned out.

...The farewell fireworks died down. The sailors removed the Navy flag from the coffin. Vice Admiral Shashkov passed away into eternity.

A man who fought all his life to preserve the names of fallen heroes in our history has passed away, leaving only a memory of himself. Like a true Patriot of the Motherland, a man of Honor and Duty.

This is a lot, and not everyone has it...

June 2004

Musa Jalil (senior political instructor Musa Mustafievich Dzhalilov) was executed in the terrible Nazi prison Moabit on August 25, 1944. Shortly before his death, the poet wrote the following lines:

I'm leaving this life

The world may forget me

But I'll leave the song

Which will live.

The homeland did not forget Musa Jalil: in 1956 - posthumously - he was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union, and the next year he was awarded the Lenin Prize. And today his poems are widely known in Russia.

After the war, one of the streets in Tallinn was named after Hero of the Soviet Union Evgeniy Aleksandrovich Nikonov. Now you won’t find a street with this name on the city map. In recent years, in Estonia, on whose territory the Nazis killed 125 thousand local residents, history has been carefully rewritten...

One of the best commanders of the Great Patriotic War, Kirill Afanasyevich Meretskov (1897-1968) - later Marshal of the Soviet Union, holder of the highest military order “Victory”. After the war - Assistant Minister of Defense of the USSR. Since 1964, Hero of the Soviet Union Marshal K.A. Meretskov worked in the group of general inspectors of the USSR Ministry of Defense.

As an example of Sokolov’s “commander’s skill,” in his book “In the Service of the People,” Marshal Meretskov cites an excerpt from Army Commander Order No. 14 of November 19, 1941:

"1. I abolish walking like the crawling of flies in the fall, and I order from now on in the army to walk like this: a military step is a yard, and that’s how they walk. Accelerated - one and a half, just keep pressing.

2. Food is out of order. In the midst of the battle they have lunch and the march is interrupted for breakfast. In war, the order is this: breakfast is in the dark, before dawn, and lunch is in the dark, in the evening. During the day you will be able to chew bread or crackers with tea - good, but not - and thank you for that, fortunately the day is not particularly long.

3. Remember to everyone - commanders, privates, old and young, that during the day you cannot march in columns larger than a company, and in general in war it is night to march, so then march.

4. Don’t be afraid of the cold, don’t dress up like Ryazan women, be brave and don’t succumb to the frost. Rub your ears and hands with snow.”

“Why not Suvorov?” comments K.A. Meretskov. “But it is known that Suvorov, in addition to issuing catchy orders that penetrate the soldier’s soul, took care of the troops... Sokolov thought that it was all about a dashing piece of paper, and limited mainly only to orders.”

Of the 2,100 people of the “Netherlands” legion, 700 remained alive. As for the “Flanders” legion, its strength was reduced threefold in just a few days of fighting.

The war spares no one - neither the marshals nor their children. In January 1942, the son of the famous Soviet commander Mikhail Vasilyevich Frunze, aviation lieutenant Timur Frunze, died on the Leningrad Front. Posthumously, pilot T.M. Frunze was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.

Here full text“Volkhov Table”, written by Pavel Shubin in 1942:

Rarely, friends, do we meet,

But when it happened,

Let's remember what happened and drink, as usual,

How it happened in Rus'!

Let's drink to those who spent many weeks

Lying in frozen dugouts,

Fought on Ladoga, fought on Volkhov,

He didn't take a step back.

Let's drink to those who commanded the companies,

Who died in the snow

Who made their way to Leningrad through the swamps,

Breaking the enemy's throat.

They will be glorified forever in legends

Under a machine gun blizzard

Our bayonets are on the heights of Sinyavin,

Our regiments are near Mga.

Let the Leningrad family be with us

He sits nearby at the table.

Let us remember how Russian soldier strength

She drove the Germans for Tikhvin!

Let's stand up and clink glasses, standing we -

Brotherhood of fighting friends,

Let's drink to the courage of the fallen heroes,

Let's drink to the meeting of the living!

Around the same time, the traitor Vlasov, traveling around German headquarters, visited Riga, Pskov, and Gatchina. He spoke to the population with “patriotic” speeches. Hitler became enraged and ordered Vitia to be placed under house arrest: the 2nd Shock Strike was beating Wehrmacht units, and its former army commander was carrying all sorts of nonsense about victory in the rear of the suffering Army Group North. By the way, the Fuhrer ordered Vlasov to be executed if he allowed anything like that to happen again. It is clear how “highly” he valued the traitor.

By May 14, 1945, 231,611 Germans with all their weapons, including 436 tanks, 1,722 guns, and 136 aircraft, surrendered to the troops of the Leningrad Front in Courland.

All those who surrendered were guaranteed life, as well as the preservation of personal property.

Victor Kokosov

Meer Kugelov

The order was laconic and difficult to reach consciousness. It sounded something like this: get dry rations for two days, stock up on ammunition as much as possible, and at 2:30 a.m. (at night, of course) parachute in “bast shoes” (in front-line slang, old shoes meant tanks). With the help of tanks, it was planned to break through the front line of the enemy’s defense and help the medical battalion escape from encirclement.

Our battalion commander’s brief speech ended with the fact that the Fritz were not ready to repel a tank attack. As was customary at the forefront, a whole tirade was added to the word “Fritz”, most of which were expressions that in our time are called profanity.

Fierce fighting raged for almost a month in a relatively small area between the villages of Myasnoy Bor, Spasskaya Polist, Lyubino Pole and the Chudovo-Novgorod railway line. Hundreds of thousands of soldiers of the 2nd Shock Army of the Volkhov Front tried to escape from encirclement to the mainland. Exhausted warriors, still in winter uniform, without a single cartridge for rifles, preferred death in battle to shameful captivity.

The author of these lines, with the rank of junior lieutenant, commanded a platoon in the second battalion of the 1242nd Infantry Regiment of the 374th Division. Our formation was part of the 2nd strike and practically did not get surrounded. Regardless of losses, we assisted in rescuing those around us.

The tanks crawled out of the fog when it was completely dawn. Before this, none of our fighters had encountered rattling armor. The wooded and swampy terrain of the Novgorod region was not suitable for tank attacks. The Germans opened hurricane artillery and mortar fire on the vehicles. In the roar of explosions, infantry surrounded the iron monsters from all sides. Our battalion commander, a senior lieutenant, was also on the tank where I and the platoon were located. The car jerked, several people, accidentally or deliberately, fell to the ground. Due to the strong shaking, I was able to hit the tower. He broke a tooth and blood flowed profusely from his broken lip. Busy with my worries, I didn’t notice where the planes with crosses on the wings came from. The bombing began, and the dust raised in the air made the sun disappear from view. We passed the front line with virtually no losses. With zero visibility, the car fell into some kind of pit, where sand must have been mined before, and then it increased from the explosion of an aerial bomb.

Several dozen wounded soldiers of both warring armies found shelter in the pit. When the front line was a multi-layered pie, such a community was par for the course.

During energetic maneuvering, the caterpillars tore apart the crippled warriors and buried themselves in the sand to the very bottom. Before we knew it, gray German uniforms appeared from all sides. The tankers came to the rescue. The guns rose slightly above the ground, the shells exploded at a short distance, and fragments reached our location. Several volleys knocked down the arrogance of the Krauts.

The battalion commander began to energetically prepare for defense. A heavy German machine gun with a lot of ammunition was found.

-Can you? – the senior lieutenant turned to me.

- I tried it!

The platoon took up defensive positions in the most vulnerable area. Three soldiers from yesterday's reinforcement completely lost heart. The young boy fell to his knees and began to frantically cross himself. Just as lambs hide near the womb when they see an angry dog, so the newcomers never left my side.

The attacks followed one after another. Grenades flew. My platoon sergeant distinguished himself in accuracy and throwing range. During short breaks, they collected the crushed bodies piece by piece and buried them in the far corner. Three of ours also died. The first three...

By noon the sun was hot, and thirst began to torment me. The glass flasks could not withstand the combat with the armor. They began to dig a well. Water with blood clots appeared. They were patient and patient, and they removed the wrappings from the dead man (the cloth tape that replaces the boot tops). With the help of such a primitive filter they quenched their thirst.

Leningrad white nights also happen in the Novgorod lands. By two o'clock it was already dark. They crawled and brought us food and several hundred rifle cartridges. Before we had time to have dinner, shooting was heard in the German rear. Another group was making a breakthrough. A dozen or two soldiers jumped into our pit. They were immediately sent to the rear.

A huge clearing stretched before our eyes, the rails of a narrow-gauge railway were visible. The village of Myasnoy Bor itself was not visible. For many years I thought that the soldiers called the village Myasny Bor because of the enormous human losses. It turns out that this was its real name.

Five or six days later, there were only 11 of us left - 4 tank crews and 7 infantrymen. At night, the regimental commissar with ten privates made his way to us. We took a breath and perked up a little. A stray fragment landed in a box with signal flares, which for some reason was mounted on the armor of the tank. Three people died a painful death. The rest dragged those who were only wounded. The commissioner stayed with us and trained us in shooting for two days.

The mountain of corpses in the clearing kept growing. Hot, terrible stench. And the troops went to certain death. By what miracle it was given to me to survive in this hell, only the Almighty knows. Although I never turned to Him for help.

When our soldiers were bleeding, when Leningraders were dying by the thousands, the German troops intensified their propaganda. Leaflets, some on glossy paper, with excellent quality clichés, covered every inch of the ground. Almost all of them had a photo of a middle-aged man wearing thick glasses. It was Lieutenant General Vlasov, former commander of the 2nd Shock Army. No matter what motives the general explains for his betrayal, in our eyes he will still remain a vile, despicable person.

Perhaps he really was neutral towards Jews. Perhaps he hated Stalin. But the harm it brought Soviet army and all the people, nothing can redeem. The respected magazine is mistaken in its article about Vlasov, that his troops did not take part in the battles against the Red Army. Near Pskov, I saw with my own eyes the tricolors marking the front line of the ROA (Russian Liberation Army). I came across dozens of corpses in ROA uniforms. I had to talk to many prisoners. ROA soldiers were between a rock and a hard place. Many, perhaps most, did not want to serve the Germans. But the Soviet soldiers did not take the Vlasovites prisoners; they dealt with them right away. The hatred towards traitors was great.

Our epic lasted twenty days. Those who could - left the encirclement; the vast majority of the fighters died a heroic death. According to Novgorod search engines, to this day in the Soldatskaya Valley of Death (as the people dubbed the place where the army came out of encirclement), about 300 thousand soldiers and commanders are not interred.

Our bloodless division was replaced by a new formation. I was ordered to report to regimental headquarters. By this time, the Germans had strengthened their front line and retreated to more convenient positions. The commander of the battalion being relieved advised me to crawl three hundred meters, and there they had already dug a trench. A kind of indifference came over me. Remembering the well-known obscene expression (one, they say, the devil), he rose to his full considerable height. The pistol (front-line soldiers carried it in their belt) contained only one cartridge - as a last resort, so as not to be captured.

In the trench, attention was paid to the ragged commander who had lost the “cube” of his buttonhole. I heard a whisper: “This is the lieutenant from the tank.” A platoon of soldiers stood at attention without a command.

Our division was replenished with people and new weapons. The division correspondent brought me a copy of the newspaper “For the Defeat of the Enemy” - either an army publication or a front-line publication. An essay about our garrison was published there, my name was also indicated, but the brand of the machine gun was confused. The last one really offended me.

Somewhere at the end of August of the same 1942, another attempt took place to break through the Leningrad blockade in the Sinyavino area. The renewed command of the 2nd Shock repeated the mistake of its predecessors. We advanced forward without securing our flanks. I emerged from the encirclement wounded, but still this breakthrough was more successful than the previous one.

The soldiers of the Leningrad and Volkhov fronts will never forget the liberation of the inhabitants of the city on the Neva.

In honor of this event, a medal “For the Defense of Leningrad” was established. Everyone was looking forward to its presentation. I was among the first awarded in our division (there were 90 of them). And then an order came: the personnel of the 2nd Shock were not entitled to medals.

No matter how much my comrades in arms complained after the war, the order was not canceled.

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