By the way, if the Terbunsky district, where the fighting took place, is being explored by search engines, excavations are constantly going on here, then the Yeletsk district, where the fiercest battles took place, is very poorly covered. There is a detachment there, but it is very weak and spends most of its field seasons not at home, but somewhere away. What I mean is that there is plenty of work for search engines in the Lipetsk region, and for several decades to come. It's a pity that this matter is now stagnant.
Next, I offer the story of a resident of Yeltsin, an eyewitness of those events, Vladimir Dmitrievich Daimidzenko.

I was born and raised in Yelets, graduated from local school No. 12,” recalls Vladimir Dmitrievich. - Just after graduation, disaster struck - the war began. - On June 22, 1941, my friends and I were walking around the city and heard from someone about the beginning of the war. The people on the streets began to fuss, the boys and I rushed to Torgovaya Street (now Mira Street), where there were radio speakers, and just arrived in time for Vyacheslav Molotov’s speech. It became scary. The residents of Yelts walked through the streets with their heads down. And already in July, all the townspeople felt what war was like - bombers with black crosses appeared in the sky above the city.

I lived in a house on Lermontov Street. One day an air raid alert was announced, locomotives in the depot and loudspeakers installed on the streets began to sound, and it began... The earth trembled. Explosions were visible from the second floor of the house where we lived. The Germans bombed behind Sosnaya. The first bombs fell on the railway transport technical school. Then several trucks rushed under the windows of my house, with a lot of wounded people in the back. This is my first perception of the war - a lot of blood and losses. And all this in my hometown.
evacuation and officer training

Already in August 1941, Yerevan residents began to be evacuated. Many families of Yelets railway workers were traveling with us on the train. They put us in heated carriages and took us to the southern Urals. The journey from Yelets to Kuvandyk station took two weeks. In the Urals, I wrote a report addressed to the military commissar of the city of Mednogorsk with a request to send me to the front. By that time, all three of my brothers had fought. The eldest, Alexander, laid his head under Livny, not far from the house. And I was so upset that I was sitting in the rear. After the report, I was called to the military registration and enlistment office and given a scolding. “What kind of front do you like, young man! What do you know about the war?!” the military commissar said heatedly. But then, seeing my desire to defend my homeland, the military commissar suggested: “If you want, we will send you to a military school...”. Naturally I agreed.

The mountain rifle military school where I was assigned was located in Ufa. Studying there was supposed to last two years, but they prepared according to an accelerated program, only six months, since the front needed junior command staff. By the summer of 1943, I was awarded the rank of junior lieutenant and sent to where I wanted to go - to the front.
front

I had to fight in the Moscow Guards Rifle Division, in the 171st regiment. At the formation in Kozelsk they gave me a company of machine gunners and sent me to the front line, to Kursk Bulge near Bryansk.

I remember the first mission of our company. We were ordered to take two German trenches and gain a foothold. But it turned out that the Germans offered little resistance and we, having jumped through two trenches, took the third one on the move and moved on. And instead of the 800 meters that we were ordered to advance, we flew 18 kilometers, and along the way we took two settlements! It wasn’t scary, on the contrary, there was a feeling of excitement. The boy was still there.

Once our regiment, moving towards the front, got into a terrible firefight. We entered into battle, but for me it did not last long. A mine exploded nearby, and I flew about three meters away from the explosion, getting injured. After being wounded, they sent me to the city of Bezhitsa, today it is one of the districts of Bryansk. I received treatment there and buyers from our own division came to us. I ended up back in my regiment and my company.

One day we went on a reconnaissance mission. The Fritz discovered us and shooting began. In that battle I lost my friend, with whom I studied at a military school. The bullet hit him right in the sprocket on his helmet, piercing the metal and his head.

And for another battle I received my first award - the medal “For Courage”. Once, the assistant chief of staff for intelligence, Captain Dolya, assigned our company of machine gunners a task: to help the intelligence officers take the “tongue”. Our division stagnate in one place for a long time, moved forward poorly, having no information about the enemy’s location. Information was required from the enemy. So we had to cover the scouts who went for the “language”. But only volunteers went on the mission. And our entire platoon took a step forward. The sappers were the first to go to the German positions, they cut the wire, we, machine gunners, were distributed into one squad on the right and left and crawled forward on our bellies. The Germans began to cover with machine guns, and we opened heavy fire from PPSh. The campaign for the “language” was crowned with success. Intelligence took a hefty, red-haired sergeant major, from whom valuable information was received.

In October 1943, we found ourselves near Vitebsk, in a settlement called Gorodok. Preparations began for Operation Bagration to liberate Belarus. The Germans fought fiercely, we suffered heavy losses.

Near Vitebsk, near a village called Serum, I was wounded again. This time it's hard. In the ensuing battle, the company commander was killed, I remained behind him. And so I led the fighters into the attack - with a pistol in my hand, standing up to my full height, shouting “Hurray!”, like in the movies. And then an explosive bullet hits me in the thigh, ripping apart the veins and tearing the sciatic nerve. From pain and heavy blood loss, I almost immediately lost consciousness and only woke up in the hospital. I ended up in a front-line hospital again. Then I was evacuated to Ivanovo, where I was treated for three months, and then to the Chelyabinsk region, where I spent another three months in the hospital. In total, after a serious injury, I was treated for 7 months, after which I was disabled. I practically couldn't walk. So for me the war ended at the end of 1944.

I returned home to Yelets. It took a very long time to recover from injury and surgery.

On May 9, 1945, I woke up from a terrible noise on the street. I was wary because I could hear shooting outside the window. But I learned about the Victory almost immediately. Such jubilation reigned in Yelets! Until now, no alcohol was sold in stores, but then wine immediately appeared on the shelves. Everyone celebrated the Victory. But joy and laughter were sometimes interrupted by tears - after all, many died.

Vladislav Goncharov. Yelets operation

The loudest and most widely known victories are not always the most brilliant. Many of the truly outstanding successes end up in the shadows for one reason or another. This happened with the offensive operation of the Southwestern Front near the city of Yelets in December 1941, which remained in the shadow of the battle of Moscow - although in terms of the level of success (especially relative to the number of troops involved) it is probably the most outstanding of the victories of the Red Army in 1941.

1. The offensive of German troops on Efremov and Yelets

At the beginning of November 1941, after stopping the frontal attack on Moscow, the German command transferred all its efforts to the flanks of Army Group Center. The center of the front (4th Army) went on the defensive, the 3rd and 4th tank armies (renamed from tank groups) broke through to Moscow from the north-west, covered on the left by the 9th combined arms army. At the same time, Guderian's 2nd Panzer Army was supposed to bypass Moscow from the southeast through Tula and Kashira. Its right flank in the Yelets and Bogoroditsk strip was covered by the 2nd German Army, which was operating further south - against the right wing of the Southwestern Front (3rd and 13th armies). In November, this army additionally received the 34th and 35th Army Corps to continue the offensive.

On November 18, Guderian's group attacked Bogoroditsk and broke through the already weakened front of the left-flank 50th Army of the Western Front in the Kunduki, Nikitskoye sector. The main German forces were brought into the breakthrough, rushing towards Stalinogorsk, then turning towards Kashira. At the same time, in order to expand the resulting breakthrough to the east and southeast, the 112th, 167th infantry and 18th tank divisions launched an offensive in the Volovo, Maslovo sector and further in the direction of Efremov, which was occupied by the enemy on November 22.

On November 25, advancing to the right, on the southern flank of Army Group Center, the 2nd German Army attacked the right wing of the Southwestern Front. The army advanced in three shock groups: the northern one - to Lebedyan, the central one - to Yelets, Zadonsk, the southern one - to Kastornoye. Hitler demanded that the commander of Army Group Center, Fedor von Bock, simultaneously with the bypass of Moscow, prepare for further operations - the left wing of the army group to Yaroslavl, and the right wing to Voronezh. Von Bock was very dissatisfied with this order, because he believed that the forces of the army group were already running out, and they were in best case scenario barely enough to capture Moscow. On November 21, he angrily wrote in his diary:

“The offense doesn’t have the depth it needs. In terms of the number of divisions, if we think purely in staff categories, the balance of forces is hardly less favorable than usual. But the decrease in the combat effectiveness of the troops - individual companies number from 20 to 30 people, huge losses of command personnel and fatigue of personnel, and even terrible frosts to boot - all this radically changes the picture.And yet, despite everything, it is quite likely that we will be able to encircle several enemy divisions west of the Istra Reservoir. But will we be able to move forward after all this? doubtful. The enemy is ready to bring everything he has to Moscow. And my army group is not ready to repel a counter-offensive of concentrated large enemy forces.”

However, the acting commander of the right-flank 2nd Army, Lieutenant General Rudolf Schmidt, thought differently. Having taken this post at the end of October, during von Weichs' illness, he sought to demonstrate success to the command and the Fuhrer. Schmidt explained the slow advance of the army and failures on its right flank, where it was never possible to overcome the Tim River, by the insufficient activity of the neighboring 6th Army and its commander Walter von Reichenau. The report from the 2nd Army headquarters said: “Advance through Tim is impossible until the 6th Army moves forward enough forces to cover the right flank of the 2nd Army”? On December 23, von Bock's diary also noted: “The 2nd Army is attacked in the Tima area from the south and southeast, the 6th Army does not react to this in any way» .

Killed in 1941. In early autumn, the Germans still had enough time and energy to lovingly decorate the graves, cut out figured crosses and set up a guard of honor

“Since there is no talk yet about the advance of the 2nd Tank Army to the Oka, the 2nd Army is ordered not to advance with its northern wing through Efremov and to send reconnaissance units to the Don.”

We see that the situation in the zone of the 2nd Army has not yet caused concern among the army group command - it only doubted the possibility and advisability of further advance to Lipetsk and Voronezh. However, on November 30, the tone of von Bock's recordings changes dramatically:

“The 2nd Army, despite repeated instructions, continues to advance east, receives an order where it is explained to the command that at this stage it is much more important not to seize more territory, but to concentrate forces and bring up lagging units in order to ensure combat effectiveness in case of an enemy attack from near Voronezh, where, according to intelligence reports, large concentrations of enemy forces have been spotted.”

Thus, German intelligence revealed the concentration of Soviet troops in the zone of the 2nd Army, but the command of Army Group Center still viewed it as defensive. For example, on November 30, aerial reconnaissance, reporting a noted increase in railway traffic between Tambov and Ranenburg, immediately stipulated that “It is impossible to clarify whether we are talking about the transfer of new forces, or about evacuation”? The question was not about the danger of a Russian counteroffensive, but about the possibilities of further German advance. The command of the 2nd Army noted on December 1:

“The situation in the army’s zone of operations is such that the damage that we can still inflict on the Russians is not worth the forces that we may need for this. Now only those are needed fighting, which will help create an advantageous frontier for winter conditions.”

The further from the front, the more optimistic was the assessment of the situation by the German headquarters. “I can’t shake the feeling that yesterday Brauchitsch still didn’t understand me, and... High Command I’m still prone to a clear overestimation of my strengths and capabilities,”– von Bock wrote in his diary on December 1. However, neither he nor the OKH had yet seen any serious danger in the current situation. According to German command the enemy was drained of blood and did not yet have the opportunity to launch a serious counteroffensive. On December 3, the OKH stated: “It can be assumed that at the moment the enemy does not have any significant full-strength formations to use as a reserve.” The “Summary of the Enemy’s Position” for December 4 noted:

"Information about the enemy for last days battles were confirmed. In the most threatened sectors of the front near Moscow, the Russians are gathering forces, transferring them from calmer areas and preparing them for counter-offensive operations... Otherwise, the enemy’s combat power is not so great that he can currently launch a large counter-offensive with his available forces on the Army Group’s front sector.” .

Meanwhile, there was a large-scale concentration of Soviet reserves and replenishment of existing forces. The 13th Army, transferred from the disbanded Bryansk Front to the Southwestern Front on November 10, was greatly weakened by heavy fighting in the encirclement and when leaving it. On October 17–18, about 10 thousand people left the encirclement, after which the 2nd Guards Division, the badly battered 121st and 160th Rifle Divisions, as well as the 133rd Tank Brigade, 38th Motorcycle Division were additionally transferred to the army. regiment, 386th anti-aircraft artillery regiment and one armored train. Later, the 2nd Guards and 160th divisions were transferred to the 40th Army.

In late autumn the crosses will be made of unplaned birch, and the graves will become mass graves.

By the end of November, the 13th Army had about 20 thousand people and only 21 guns. In early December, the army received serious reinforcements in the form of the 1st Guards (formerly 100th), 34th Motorized Rifle and 32nd Cavalry Divisions, as well as the 129th Tank Brigade. In addition, she was given about 200 anti-tank rifles and four artillery regiments from the reserve of the commander-in-chief of the direction. The arriving troops unloaded and concentrated in the area of ​​the Kastornoye railway junction.

Obviously, the plan for an offensive by the right wing of the Southwestern Front arose around November 20 - according to the memoirs of S.P. Ivanov, who held the position of chief of the operational department of the headquarters of the 13th Army, it was on this day that the army command first learned about it at a meeting at the headquarters of the Southwestern Front in Voronezh from the chief of staff of the front P.I. Bodin. At the same time, an order was received from front commander S.K. Timoshenko to urgently prepare an operation plan.

Three armies were to take part in the upcoming operation - the 3rd, 13th and 40th. The main burden fell on the 13th Army of Major General A. M. Gorodnyansky, from the north it was supported by the left flank of the 3rd Army of Major General Ya. G. Kreizer, from the south by the right flank of the 40th Army.

By the beginning of November, the headquarters of the 13th Army had developed an operation plan. According to him, the center of the army was supposed to restrain the enemy’s advance in the Yelets direction, while the right flank (the northern group of the army) from the area north of Yelets attacked the resulting ledge in the south-west direction, going to the rear of the enemy group continuing the offensive. The left flank formed the southern group of the army, it was the strongest - this included the newly received reserves. This group was supposed to strike to the northwest west of Yelets and connect with the forces of the 13th Army, closing a ring around two enemy corps. According to the maximum plan, the groups were supposed to unite near the city of Livny; according to the minimum plan, the northern group deviated to the south, and the southern group moved not to the northwest, but strictly to the north, to meet in the area of ​​​​the villages of Nikitskoye and Pyatnitskoye, approximately halfway between Livny and Yelets.

Colonel Y. K. Kuliev was appointed commander of the northern group; Gorodnyansky himself intended to head the southern group, appointing Major General V. D. Kryuchenkin as his deputy commander of the 5th Cavalry Corps. The actions of the center were to be coordinated by the head of the operational department of the army headquarters, S.P. Ivanov.

Meanwhile, the enemy continued the offensive in the direction of Yelets and Lebedyan. On November 26, the Germans occupied Livny in the central sector of the 13th Army front. To the south, in the zone of the 40th Army in the Kastornen direction, the enemy had no success, but as a result, a gradually widening gap formed between the 40th and 13th armies.

Meanwhile, the right flank of General Kreiser's 3rd Army was outflanked by the 47th Motorized Corps of the 2nd German Tank Army. As a result of the army's withdrawal by November 27, a 50-kilometer gap with the 13th Army formed on the left flank of the Cruiser, through which the enemy, almost without encountering resistance, quickly advanced to Pavelets and further to Skopin, threatening the Ryazhsk railway junction - that is, the entire railway connection from Ryazan to the south, through Michurinsk and Voronezh to Rostov. To cover this gap, the command of the Southwestern Front organized an independent group under the command of General Zhmachenko.

In early December, German reports still did not record any obvious Soviet preparations for a counteroffensive. The troops of Army Group Center continued to move forward slowly. On December 2, the 134th German Infantry Division reached the Tula-Rostov highway, occupying the village of Stanovaya, 23 km north of Yelets, and the village of Cossacks, 15 km west of the city, on the Livno road. The next day it approached Yelets, and at the same time the 45th Infantry Division reached the southern outskirts of the city. Troops central section The 13th Army was threatened with an encirclement from the north, as a result of which the command had to hastily withdraw the 148th and 132nd rifle divisions, as well as the 38th motorcycle regiment from under attack, concentrating them in the Olypanets and Arkhangelskoye area 15–20 km to the east Yelets. In addition, on December 3, on the left flank of the 3rd Army, the Pavelets railway junction was occupied by the Germans.

On December 4, with a counterattack from the 1st Guards Cavalry Corps, the strike group of the 24th Motorized Corps of the 2nd Tank Army (Eberbach Group and 17th Tank Division) was driven back from Kashira to Mordves.

The offensive of German troops in the Western and Southwestern fronts from October 30 to December 5

However, in general, Guderian’s situation was assessed as satisfactory - the railway and highway to Tula had already been cut; it seemed that the city was about to be completely surrounded. On this day, Bock's diary does not note serious concerns about the situation and only criticizes the command of the 2nd Army for being too hasty:

“The 2nd Army faces fierce enemy resistance in the Yelets area. Since the army command again started talking about entering the Don line, I called Schmidt and again chewed on all the counterarguments to him one by one. If he is so passionate about taking and holding Yelets, then he must be aware that his line of defense will stretch far to the east. The commander of the 2nd Army is of the opinion that “there is no way” to leave this important node at his line of defense safe and sound. He intends to take possession of it, destroy the railroad track, and then retreat again.The offensive of the 2nd Tank Army on Tula is carried out successfully. Russian attacks were repulsed by forces deployed to defend the northern wing.”

At 21:00 on December 4, General Gorodnyansky ordered to leave the city of Yelets, but under no circumstances allow the enemy to advance north into the initial area for a counterattack by Kuliev’s group. Kuliev himself was ordered to organize a counterattack north of Yelets, in the direction of Trosna and Stanovaya. Units of the northern group managed to penetrate the enemy’s defenses, but by evening they were forced to retreat to their previous positions. At the same time, the 148th Infantry Division was attacked from the south. The division managed to drive the Germans out of the village

Cossacks; According to our reports, up to a hundred enemy soldiers were killed here, 3 guns and 10 vehicles were captured. However, soon the Cossacks again had to be left under pressure from the north.

Meanwhile, the enemy tried to advance from Yelets along the Rostov highway to the southeast, towards Zadonsk - thereby further stretching the battle formations, while at the same time exposing his right flank to our troops. By December 5, the troops of the right wing of the Southwestern Front were fighting on the Samokhvalovka, (claim) Efremov, Borisovka, Novopogorelovo, Zhernovnoye, Ekaterinovka fronts and further to the south.

2. The nature of the terrain, the operation plan and the balance of forces

The fighting of the 13th Army took place in the area of ​​the cities of Efremov, Yelets, Kastornaya and Livny, on a front about 110 km wide and 90-100 km deep. The terrain in the area of ​​operation was a treeless, moderately rugged steppe and, in winter conditions, did not create obstacles for the actions of troops of all branches. The small rivers that crossed it in different directions (Kshen, Tim, Lyubovsha, Olym, Krasivaya Mecha) were good natural boundaries that could be used for defense by both our troops and the enemy. The largest river was the Sosna, flowing from west to east; it cut the combat area into two parts and represented an important obstacle during the operation. In the rear of the Soviet troops there was the Don River, flowing in a meridional direction; it represented a very serious natural boundary. The abundance of deep ravines and ravines here contributed to the camouflage of troops, and the long winter night prevented the enemy from conducting effective aerial reconnaissance.

In general, the area of ​​operation was of great operational importance, since two important railways from Moscow to the south passed here: through Uzlovaya, Efremov, Yelets, Kastornaya, Stary and Novy Oskol to Valuiki and further to Donbass, as well as through Ryazan, Michurinsk, Voronezh , Liski and further to Rostov and the Caucasus. The first of them had already been intercepted by the enemy; after intercepting the second, our command would have had serious problems with the rocade maneuver and supplying the entire southern flank of the Soviet-German front. In addition, these railways supplied not only the front, but also the center of the country with oil, coal and grain. Railways running from east to west (Elets - Orel and Voronezh - Kastornaya - Kursk) facilitated the transfer of troops to the front.

The main highway of the region was the Tula-Efremov-Elets-Voronezh highway; in addition to it, there was a developed network of dirt roads.

There were no large cities in the area of ​​operation, but there were many small and medium-sized settlements, including old ones - with many small stone houses, which gave the enemy the opportunity to quickly organize defenses and create strongholds. This, coupled with the desire of the Germans to act along roads and spend the night under a roof, determined the nature of the fighting, which was carried out mainly for populated areas. Most major cities the district were Yelets and Kastornaya station - junctions of railways and dirt roads, important administrative and economic centers.

There were extremely limited food supplies in the area - everything that was possible was evacuated before the Germans arrived. A particularly important role was played by the almost complete absence of local forage, which greatly affected the actions of cavalry units and horse artillery. The supply base for the 13th Army was Zadonsk, which, in turn, was transported by road from the Voronezh railway junction. The southern group was supplied from Kastornaya station, where trains also moved through Voronezh.

The situation at the junction of the Western and Southwestern fronts on December 5, 1941 and the offensive plan for the right wing of the Southwestern Front

As a result, by the beginning of the operation, all units, and primarily the cavalry, were fully supplied with winter uniforms, food, fodder and ammunition.

The command of the Southwestern Front slightly changed the operation plan presented by the headquarters of the 13th Army and made its own adjustments to the command and control of the troops. The main blow was to be delivered by the southern group of the 13th Army. It was transferred from the subordination of the army to the direct subordination of the front command, although the supply of the mobile group was still entrusted to the rear structures of the 13th Army. The deputy front commander, Lieutenant General F. Ya. Kostenko, was appointed as the group commander, and Major General I. Kh. Bagramyan was appointed as the chief of staff. This group was relatively mobile, it consisted of cavalry, infantry and motorized units, reinforced by tanks, artillery and guards mortar units. The group struck from the area of ​​Terbuny, Borki, Natalevka in the general direction of Nikitskoye, that is, to the flank and rear of the Yelets enemy group.

The northern group of the 13th Army launched an auxiliary attack bypassing Yelets. The offensive was to be carried out from the Maslovo, Rogatovo area in the direction of Trosna and further to Nikitskoye. The front command appointed Major General K. S. Moskalenko as the group commander, Y. K. Kuliev became his deputy. Since the strike groups operated in different directions and at a considerable distance from one another, an auxiliary control point was created to control the actions of the troops of the front mobile group, consisting of operational workers from the headquarters of the Southwestern Front. The VPU had four U-2 aircraft, but only one radio station; The main connection during the operation was supposed to be wired.

In conditions of deep advance of the enemy Yelets group, the connection of both strike groups in the area of ​​Nikitsky and Pyatnitsky, lying approximately halfway between Livny and Yelets, led to the complete encirclement and destruction of the entire German strike group. Thus, the operation plan pursued decisive goals and, at the same time, was distinguished by its simplicity of design, which did not require complex maneuvers and constant control from higher headquarters. In fact, the command of the 2nd German Army itself drove its troops into a trap. All that remained was to achieve surprise in the attack and prevent the enemy from retreating to the west in time.

SOVIET FORCES

13th Army of the Southwestern Front 132nd Rifle Division (Colonel M. M. Mishchenko)

Northern group (Moskalenko group):

55th Cavalry Division (Colonel K.V. Fiksel)

150th Tank Brigade (Colonel B.S. Bakharov)

307th Rifle Division (Colonel G. S. Lazko)

Central group:

148th Rifle Division (Colonel F. M. Cherokmanov)

129th Tank Brigade

38th Motorcycle Regiment

143rd Rifle Division (Colonel G. A. Kurnosov)

6th Rifle Division (Colonel M. D. Grishin)

Front group of the Southwestern Front (Kostenko group)

1st Guards Rifle Division (Major General I. N. Russiyanov)

5th Cavalry Corps (3rd, 14th and 32nd Cavalry Divisions, Major General V. Kryuchenkin)

34th Motorized Rifle Brigade (Colonel A. A. Shamshin)

121st Rifle Division (Major General P. M. Zykov)

GERMAN TROOPS

2nd Field Army(acting commander General Rudolf Schmidt)

35th Army Corps:

293rd Infantry Division (Lieutenant General Justin von Obernitz)

262nd Infantry Division (Artillery General Edgar Theissen)

34th Army Corps:

134th Infantry Division (Lieutenant General Konrad von Kochenhausen)

45th Infantry Division (Lieutenant General Fritz Schlieper)

95th Infantry Division (Lieutenant General Hans-Heinrich Sixt von Arnim)

As we see, Soviet troops had a significant superiority in the number of formations, but at the same time most of the divisions were extremely small, numbering 5–7 thousand people. The exception was the 1st Guards Rifle Division under Major General Russiyanov - it included four full-blooded rifle regiments (4th, 85th, 331st and 355th) and the 34th artillery regiment. In total, the division had about 9,000 people, 26 guns and 37 mortars. In addition, the 642nd artillery regiment, the 4th Guards Mortar Regiment of the Stavka Reserve and a tank company attached to the Kostenko group interacted with it. In contrast, the 129th Tank Brigade had only 16 light tanks. The 150th Tank Brigade had 12 serviceable tanks - nine T-26s and three T-34s. There were 6 tanks in the 5th Cavalry Corps of Kostenko’s group. Already during the offensive (December 9), the 57th NKVD brigade of Colonel M. G. Sokolov arrived as part of the 13th Army, significantly strengthening the northern strike force.

According to the staff, both German army corps (five divisions) had 80–90 thousand people, of which about 50 thousand were in combat strength. The actual strength of the 34th and 35th Corps at the beginning of December is unknown to us, and their combat strength could have been reduced by half. In any case, the 7 rifle and 4 cavalry divisions of the 13th Army and the front group opposing them were unlikely to number much more, if at all they had any superiority. The front mobile group had 20 thousand people, 126 guns of all calibers (including anti-tank), 80 mortars, 82 heavy and 360 light machine guns. The 13th Army has 19 thousand people, 21 guns, 5 mortars, 60 heavy and 95 light machine guns. Official Soviet sources assess the balance of forces during the operation as follows: “The Soviet troops outnumbered the opposing enemy group in men by 1.3 times, but were inferior to them in artillery by almost 2 times and in tanks by 2.4 times”? I. Kh. Bagramyan believes that the Soviet troops participating in the operation outnumbered the enemy by 8 thousand people, inferior to them in all types of equipment.

But another circumstance favored the Soviet side. As it turned out later, the junction of the 35th and 34th army corps was in the area of ​​Khripunovka and Trosna - the attack of the northern group fell precisely on it. Yelets was also located at the junction of two divisions of the 34th army corps - the 134th and 45th. In total, thus, three German divisions defended in front of the front of the 13th Army.

By a combat order dated December 5, the front command assigned the following tasks to the troops: the front group of General Kostenko on the morning of December 7 was to go on the offensive, reach the area of ​​​​the village of Nikitskoye and cut off the Germans’ escape route to the west. On the right flank of the group, the 1st Guards Rifle Division of General Russiyanov was advancing on Krugloye, on the left flank the 5th Cavalry Corps was advancing on Khukhlovo (7 km west of Nikitsky). To support the left flank and rear of the mobile group, the 121st Rifle Division of Major General P. M. Zykov was allocated - having advanced to the front of Lomigory, Aleksandrovka, it was supposed to occupy and defend the line of the Kshen River. The 34th Motorized Rifle Brigade, located in the Kozinki area, was allocated to the reserve of the group commander.

The strike group of the 13th Army advanced around Yelets from the north through Trosna and further to Nikitskoye and Pyatnitskoye, ensuring the encirclement of the enemy Yeletsko-Livensk group. The 61st Aviation Division of Colonel V.P. Ukhov covered the concentration of the mobile strike group at the starting lines, and with the start of the offensive it was supposed to support its troops, attack the enemy’s rear and prevent the approach of German reserves from Orel and Kursk.

The success of the operation depended on the speed of concentration of strike groups, including troops that had just been transferred to the Yelets and Kastornaya area. It was necessary to quickly bring up troops, unnoticed by the enemy, who were often 150–200 km away from the concentration area. Due to the heavy congestion of the railways, the movement of tank, cavalry and motorized infantry units had to be carried out under their own power. From the unloading points, the rifle units also moved on foot. As a result, the cavalry covered an average of 40 km per day, while the motorized infantry covered 140 km from Kastornaya station in two days.

The troops moved exclusively in the dark, which was facilitated by the long winter nights. During the day, marches were strictly prohibited, at which time the troops rested in populated areas, taking the strictest camouflage measures. All this made it possible to hide the concentration from German aerial reconnaissance. In addition, the attacks of the northern strike group, which began on December 5, diverted the enemy’s attention and forces, thereby ensuring surprise in the direction of the main attack and facilitating the actions of the mobile group. However, for the same reason, some units had to take up their original positions during the battle.

By the end of December 5, General Kostenko’s mobile group completed its concentration in the area indicated to it and on the night of December 6 began moving to the offensive line.