And here is how events developed on the southern face of the Kursk Bulge. Here, as well as on the northern front, a pre-emptive strike was launched against the Germans:
“...on the night of July 4, a Czech defector from the sapper battalion of the 52nd Army Corps said that all German soldiers had been given dry rations for five days and additional portions of schnapps. Judging that in the coming hours the Germans would go on the offensive, the commander of the Voronezh Front N.F. Vatutin, at dawn on July 5, following the planned plan, gave the order to the artillerymen to open pre-emptive fire on German forward positions and troop concentration areas. Intensive artillery counter-preparation lasted about half an hour...” (p. 273).
So the enemy suffered very significant losses here even before the start of the operation. And yet the German offensive began:
“... in terms of the number of guns, the weight of the salvo and fire control, the Russian artillery was incomparably stronger than the German one. The artillery pieces at Manstein's disposal were unable to destroy the Russian defensive positions or clear passages through the minefields. As a result, many tanks were blown up by mines on the approaches to Russian positions and were soon left behind by the advancing German infantry.
The tank crews received strict instructions:
“Under no circumstances should you stop the tank to assist damaged vehicles. Technical assistance is the responsibility of engineering units only. Tank commanders must continue to advance until the tank loses mobility. In cases where the tank loses its mobility, but the weapon’s combat effectiveness remains intact (for example, a technical breakdown or damage to the track), the crew must continue to fire from a stationary tank.”
This order, in essence, doomed the crew of the damaged tank to death, since numerous Soviet guns could shoot a stopped tank in a matter of minutes after it was detonated by a mine” (p. 275).
So the disposition, already before the start of the battle, obliged the Germans to prepare for a total war. It took on a total character, but mostly for the German side. Mellentin:
“We met fierce resistance, and despite the best efforts of our troops, they were unable to advance. In front of the “Great Germany” division there was a swamp, and Russian artillery fired heavily at its dense battle formations. The sappers were unable to establish the necessary crossings, as a result, many tanks became victims of Soviet aviation...” (p. 314).
Further:
“It was not possible to completely clear the area of ​​the minefields left by Soviet troops. The concentration on three kilometers of several hundred combat vehicles from different units, vehicles with four battalions of infantry and artillery tractors, with the road unprepared, could not lead to anything other than traffic jams on the main directions and losses during raids by attack aircraft of the 2nd VA and hits by mines. didn’t bring it” (p. 432).
“The headquarters of the 2nd SS Tank Tank was closely monitoring the situation. At this moment, for the corps command, as well as for the leadership of the entire army, it was very important to break through the front edge of the first most fortified Russian line as quickly as possible and make a decisive push towards the Prokhorovsk direction, even before the Soviet side pulled up mobile operational reserves” (p. 393).
But these mobile reserves, which would be a complete surprise for the Germans, were brought here in advance by us - after all, our generals were practicing meeting the enemy here. And this is how our “thirty-four” “talked” to the enemy already on the second day of his attacks, which were extremely rich in technology. And at that moment the positions of the 1st Tank were attacked by:
“...48th Panzer Corps, SS Panzer Division “Adolf Hitler”, two SS Panzer Corps, Motorized Division “Gross Germany”, SS Panzer Divisions “Totenkopf”, “Reich”, “Viking”.
But there was no time to be afraid of the enemy’s superiority...
The first blow was taken by the 2nd tank battalion under the command of Semyon Vovchenko. The battalion had 10 tanks, but fought with 70 enemy tanks. Within two hours, Semyon Vovchenko’s battalion destroyed 24 enemy tanks, including 14 “tigers”” (pp. 187–188).
So in the very first oncoming battles, our tanks already pretty much kicked in the teeth of the tanks of the future memoirist - each and every winner - Mr. Manstein. And they fought tooth and nail, already dying themselves, while trying to destroy another five “kulturtregers” hidden under the armor, trying in horror to dodge the burning Russian tank going to ram!
This is how Katukov’s wife, herself, understandably, a participant in this battle, describes the feat of Shalandin’s crew in this, the first battle of a tank brigade:
“...Shalandin and his crew members Vladimir Kustov, Vladimir Lakomtsev and Sergeant Pyotr Zelenin entered into battle with a numerically superior enemy. They acted from ambushes, bringing enemy tanks within direct shot range, and then, hitting the sides, burned two “tigers” and one medium tank. Yes, this required strong nerves and a courageous heart!” (p. 188).
But then Shalandin’s tank caught fire. However, instead of leaving the burning tank and being shot point-blank from the machine guns of the approaching enemy tank, the crew, most likely wounded and crippled by a shell hitting the tank, decided to die themselves, but to block the road to the enemy rushing to Kursk.
And here you just have to imagine what horror gripped the crew only a moment before the seemingly successful German ace, who nevertheless set fire to our medium tank with his heavy tank? And what did the crews of all the other German tanks who were nearby at that moment think when they saw this whole picture? And what, perhaps most importantly, did you hear? After all, the communications of the German tanks, unlike ours, worked excellently. At that moment, defense factories were working to improve its quality not only in the part of Europe overrun by Hitler, but, as it turns out, throughout the whole world.
They saw, and most importantly, heard with the dying cry of horror from their colleagues, a prospect that was too unhappy for themselves: in order to escape from the Russian tankers, it is not enough to knock out their tank - they must also move away from the set fire to a respectful distance in time. And this is in order not to fly up into the air from an overabundance of shells, which Europe, which equipped the Germans so generously for their campaign in the East, so generously provided. After all, this in a different situation is simply a priceless warehouse located under the feet of German tankers, who are now simply obliged to detonate in a collision with these crazy Russians!
And our burning tank:
“...went to ram the “tiger”. The “Tiger” caught fire, but the entire crew of our tank also died” (p. 188).
The enemy, of course, hardly counted on this. AND:
“...analysis of the incoming information indicated that the level of resistance of the Soviet troops was underestimated. Each message from the divisions confirmed the previous one - the troops continue to mark time. The prepared plan to break through the advanced positions of the Russians collapsed already at the initial stage, and with it the entire schedule of the corps’ offensive” (p. 393).
This is how these events were described from the German side:
“On the southern front of the arc, a day after the start of the offensive, through the efforts of the 48th Panzer Corps of General Knobelsdorff and the 2nd SS Panzer Corps of General Hausser, the Germans managed to wedge themselves into the Russian defenses... Hoth decided at the first rays of the sun to strike across the Berezovaya River with the forces of the 3rd Panzer divisions and “Greater Germany” divisions. But at night a thunderstorm broke out, torrential rain poured down, the water in the river overflowed its banks and turned the adjacent meadows into a muddy muddy swamp. Under cover of darkness, the Russians brought artillery and tanks to the ruins and surviving houses on the north bank, and both German armored divisions suffered heavy damage from direct Russian fire as they formed up in tight battle formations at dawn. During the day, under the cover of smoke screens, German sappers persistently established crossings. Overhead, a furious artillery duel raged between Soviet guns and concentrated tanks, accompanied by continuous raids by German dive bombers, with which Hoth sought to compensate for the lack of heavy artillery. By evening, the Germans, despite serious losses, were unable to advance a single step. On the night of July 6–7, both divisions were pulled back and reorganized” (p. 279).
“... well-prepared positions, a well-thought-out system of artillery fire and engineering structures - all this amazed the enemy and suggested that if victory were achieved in this operation, then a very high price would have to be paid for it” (p. 451).
But even in other parts of this battlefield, the defeat of the attacking side was already visible at the very beginning:
“Already the first hours of the fighting showed that the reliance on a massive attack by heavy combat vehicles on the Russian defense did not justify itself.
“...Shackled by minefields and natural obstacles, the advancing tanks were a good target for the Russians,” note G. Heinrici and V. Gauk. “Therefore, super-heavy tanks were unable to actually demonstrate their striking power” (p. 114–115)” (p. 431).
There was also some confusion inherent in battles of this scale. This is how the “tiger” company from the 503rd detachment of the 19th TD, Major General G. Schmidt, completed its attack:
“The division report noted:
“...The Tiger company, which crossed during the day under the command of Captain Heitman, failed to break through the enemy fortifications around the Mikhailovka suburb. Almost all the “tigers” were disabled by mines” (TsAMO RF, f. 38 A, op. 9027, d. 46, l. 151–152).
Nine “tigers” were blown up by mines, seven of them on their own…” (p. 435).
And this is how our artillerymen fought here. On July 7, captain of the artillery division Vasily Mironenko accomplished his feat. When, in the heat of battle with the German “tigers,” the gun crew was killed, and enemy tanks were already close to the battery:
“...Mironenko took the place of the gunner and, loading the gun himself, began to shoot the tanks point-blank. He set six tanks on fire. A shell exploded next to him, and Vasily Mironenko was killed. He was posthumously awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union” (p. 190).
And this is just one of many episodes that glorified the steadfastness of the Russian people on this fiery Kursk Bulge. Because:
“...despite huge losses, the Germans were unable to break through our front. The enemy has encountered an impenetrable wall” (p. 190).
Here's another episode:
“A hot situation has also developed in the zone of the 6th Tank Corps.
...here the enemy ran into stubborn resistance from the tankers. The enemy lost 74 tanks and had no success” (p. 190).
“Our troops showed courage and bravery. They did not spare their lives, showing mass heroism. These were infantrymen, artillerymen, tank crews, doctors, and logistics personnel - all as one. Everything was given for victory” (p. 191).
Here's the next episode:
“The commander of the 3rd company, Lieutenant Kruglov, let 56 enemy tanks pass through the company. The company was hidden in the cracks, and not a single soldier flinched, there were no losses in the company. After three attacks, enemy losses - 20 tanks were burned and destroyed” (p. 191).
And here is what the Germans who fought here report. Erhard Routh:
“The development of the operation has reached a crisis point. We have no reserves left to throw into battle” (p. 306).
Here are the impressions of our front-line intelligence officer Vladimir Karpov about this moment of the Battle of Kursk:
“Tank armadas, bombed by aviation and shot by artillery, burned in the fields like iron cities.
Finally the Nazis retreated. At first slowly, every now and then rushing into ferocious counterattacks, then faster, but still organized, from line to line. Our troops were hot on their heels. No, not only by the divisions that remained in reserve, but mainly by the same ones that fought to the death in defense. Tired, unshaven, smoke-soaked fighters pressed back the enemy day and night. Fatigue accumulated to such an extent that people sometimes fell asleep on the move and moved forward half asleep, with their eyes closed, holding their hand on a cart, a cannon, or a neighbor” (pp. 226–227).
But until the very moment of its retreat, this southern, more powerful enemy group advanced during this deadly week in one of the sectors to a distance of up to 35 km. But even this, with the speed of advance of tank columns of 5 km per day, speaks specifically about the mountains of corpses that the Germans sacrificed for this last attempt to move across our land with the aim of capturing it.
“On July 6 alone, the enemy lost here more than 200 tanks, tens of thousands of soldiers and about 100 combat aircraft” (p. 153).
“...two guards divisions of General I.M. Chistyakov, in a daily battle, were able to break the plan of the enemy command and hold on their lines the most powerful tank formation of the GA “South” - the Knobelsdorff corps” (p. 364).
“The division of Brigadefuehrer T. Wisch was also marking time. Its armored groups were unable to immediately break through the sector of the 151st Guards. sp... From the diary of the division's summary: “The artillery preparation of our offensive on 5.7.43 went according to plan and, according to the testimony of prisoners, very successfully. The breakthrough with the last bomb at 4.05 was successful only as far as the anti-tank ditch, where the troops lay down and dug in under flanking fire from enemy batteries from the western bank of the Vorskla” (Stadler S. Op. cit. S. 43).
The reader probably noticed an inconsistency in the report: the artillery barrage was successful, but there was no breakthrough. This form of reporting, “we are acting according to a well-developed plan, but there are no results,” was widespread in the German army. The reason for its survivability is its versatility, it suited everyone: both the higher command (everything is going according to plan, failures are a temporary phenomenon), and the executors (we are acting according to your plan; it is brilliant, of course, the enemy’s stubbornness is not taken into account in it and everything is wrong, as we wanted, but we are heroes and under your leadership we will certainly win). After the war, the beaten Wehrmacht generals transferred this proven technique to memoir literature” (p. 388).
But if the Germans only report on some supposed success of their actions, very wisely avoiding mention of losses, then this is what the operational reports of our units looked like that day:
“His headquarters reported in detail to the command of the 1st TA in an operational report by 12.00 on July 7 about the results of the battles on July 6 and the condition of the corps:
“...10th ICBM... Losses: 3 T-34s, 1 person killed, 3 people wounded. Destroyed: 36 tanks, 9 vehicles and up to 70 enemy soldiers and officers...
1st infantry brigade... 13 people were killed, 84 people were wounded. Losses of material and weapons: heavy machine guns - 1, carbines - 1, armored personnel carriers - 1, vehicles - 5. Destroyed: 40 enemy tanks, of which 23 were burned, 17 were knocked out, vehicles with ammunition and infantry - 7, warehouses with ammunition - one and up to 400 soldiers and officers.
3rd ICBM... Losses in materiel and personnel: 3 T-34 tanks, 3 vehicles, one 45-mm cannon, one 76-mm cannon, one heavy machine gun. Killed - 7 people, wounded 10 people. Destroyed: up to 20 enemy tanks, the rest is being confirmed.
1st Guards Tank Brigade... Losses: (burned out) 8 T-34s, 3 T-34s were knocked out and remained on the battlefield, one 76-mm gun was destroyed, one vehicle was knocked out, 16 people were killed, 25 people were wounded. Destroyed: enemy tanks (knocked out) - 18, of which 3 T-6s, two anti-tank guns, destroyed to a company of enemy infantry.
49th Tank Brigade... Losses: 7 T-34s burned out in battle, 4 T-34s did not return from the battle. Total losses: 11 T-34s. In personnel: killed - 11 people, wounded - 10. Destroyed: 4 tanks, of which 2 T-6s, 5 armored tractors, 3 ammunition wagons and 150 soldiers and officers" (p. 585–586) .
This is how these losses were recorded in the enemy camp. Division "Gross Germany":
“On July 4, the division’s tank regiment had 112 combat-ready tanks... after two days of fighting, Strachwitz’s regiment lost more than half of its tank fleet - 53%.
The Panther brigade found itself in a more difficult situation. According to the staff, it had 192 linear tanks... According to the same report from the corps headquarters, by the end of the day on July 6, only a fifth remained in service - 40 combat vehicles.
Most of the T-5 - more than a hundred tanks - failed due to technical reasons and required repairs. But in combat conditions, both the command of the 48th Tank Tank and the 4th TA, in general, did not care for what reasons they failed. The main thing is different: the shock formation of the Civil Aviation Unit “South” almost instantly lost such a significant amount of military equipment... But in the “Citadel” plan, calculations were made for these forces, certain goals and tasks were set for them, and considerable ones. And everything collapsed. The sharp loss of combat capability of the brigade and serious problems with its use, along with a significant lag of the troops of AG Kempf, had a very significant negative impact on the actions of the troops of the 4th TA during the first stage of the operation and were important factors that “collapsed” the “Citadel” (p. 587–588).
And despite all this, many German units never budged. But subsequently, the Germans continued to mark time, assuring their command that they were winning victory after victory:
“On the morning of July 7, fierce enemy attacks began again” (p. 153).
However, over the next two days:
“...the enemy lost at least 200 more tanks and a lot of other equipment. His infantry units already numbered in their ranks no more than half of their original strength” (p. 133).
Serious damage to the enemy was caused by competent mining of military installations intentionally abandoned by our troops. Here's just one example:
““Good results have been obtained from the activation of TOS facilities in the high areas. 228.6.
The plan for mining the heights included the following. The attacking enemy infantry following the tanks, when they capture the heights, should be driven into previously mined trenches, dugouts and bomb shelters and completely destroyed there. This plan was a complete success... on the site at the height. 228.6, 12 enemy tanks and up to one and a half battalions of infantry were destroyed” (TsAMO RF, f. 203, op. 2845, d. 227, l. 13)” (p. 390–391).
And this is just one of many episodes when the attacking side is often simply unable to protect itself from such losses. But those fields of glory of Russian weapons were simply stuffed with such “surprises”, when the already bloodless German formations at Stalingrad were finally finished off and since then the enemy continued to yield to us more and more in manpower.
Mellentin:
“The speed with which the Russians laid mines was amazing. In two or three days they managed to lay over 30 thousand mines... Despite the fact that we advanced deep into the Russian defenses up to 20 km, there were still minefields around us, and further advance was hampered by anti-tank defense areas. In this regard, the most skillful camouflage of the Russians should be emphasized once again. Not a single minefield, not a single anti-tank area could be discovered until the first tank was blown up by a mine or the first anti-tank gun opened fire. It is difficult to directly answer the question of how German tanks managed to overcome all this powerful anti-tank defense...” (p. 469).
There is only one thing that Mellenthin, understandably, is too embarrassed to mention: the mountains of mangled iron and cannon fodder of the German general’s compatriots. Because:
“...one cannot but agree with the beaten German general” (p. 469).
Meanwhile, this very effective means of defense, one of the surprises prepared specifically for this German offensive, was perfectly used not only in front of Mellenthin. Minefields:
“... were widely used by all armies defending the Kursk ledge” (p. 469).
But even fragments of fairly successful military operations of individual formations of the German army in the Battle of Kursk did not bring any benefit to the enemy:
“... along with positive results, the breakthrough of the SS Corps brought a number of significant problems. Moreover, they arose like a chain reaction - one gave rise to another. The main one is that the front of the 2nd SS Tank Corps turned out to be significantly extended, more than 40 km. In addition to the fact that he was constantly subjected to strong pressure, including from tank units, his divisions had open flanks. It was not possible, as expected, to break the Russian resistance at the junction of the 48th Tank Tank and the 2nd SS Tank Tank. This led to the fact that Knobelsdorff on July 6 failed to withdraw the corps to the Yakovlev area and replace Hausser’s left-flank division. And he, in turn, was unable to reduce the front of the 2nd SS Tank Tank and concentrate significant forces on the breakthrough site in the northeast direction.
The failures of AG Kempf had a significant impact on the situation in the direction of the main attack of the 4th TA, and on the situation in the Prokhorovsky direction itself. Its troops moved far from what was originally intended - shoulder to shoulder with the SS corps. She continued to mark time... Already on the morning of July 6, a new strong and quite active Russian tank corps appeared in the floodplain of the Lipovy Donets. The presence of two tank groups at the base of the strike wedge of the 2nd SS Tank Tank: in the area of ​​Novye Lozy and Yakovlevo-Pokrovka constrained its actions and forced it to divert significant forces for cover. The “Dead Head” and the main forces of “Das Reich” are already concentrated along the floodplain of the Linden Donets. At the same time, the main forces of the Leibstandarte, due to the active actions of enemy tank forces from the north, were unable to advance further than Yakovlev; its battle group, including the tank regiment, fought heavy defensive battles...
At the same time, the 48th Tank Corps failed to create a bridgehead on the western bank of the Pena... The Russians held firm everywhere, strengthening the areas of the rifle units with numerous tanks. The concentration of tank formations on the flanks of the 48th Tank Tank increased the danger of an attack under the base of the entire 4th Tank...
In the current situation, on July 7, Hoth intended to suspend attempts to break through to the north and northeast ... to solve the problem of the threat to the flanks of both corps, and the left wing of the army” (pp. 613–614).
Thus:
“Instead of creating a grandiose cauldron for the Soviet fronts, the enemy drove himself into the steel vice of our defense... the armored fist of Army Group South was cut into several separate parts... Hoth and Manstein broke through the layered defense, albeit with iron, but outstretched “fingers”” (with 778–779).
So even very modest successes only brought more trouble to the Germans:
“The well-thought-out and long-tested tactics used by M.E. Katukov, allowed five tank brigades to pin down three enemy divisions and part of the Das Reich tank regiment” (p. 629).
Our rocket artillery also provided very significant assistance here. Here is one of the results of her shelling:
““...they fired a salvo from 4 M-13 installations. After which reconnaissance reported that in the indicated squares 140 burnt vehicles were found, transporting infantry, ammunition and fuel” (TsAMO RF, f. 11 Guards Tk, op. 1, d. 28, l. 276)” (p. 636) .
What horrors of the stampede of only a few German soldiers who survived in this hell by chance lie behind these dry, laconic figures extracted from the archive?!
But such successful attacks on the enemy with rocket artillery were not the exception here, but the norm:
“We fired a volley from open firing positions with direct fire at fascist tanks and infantry. As a rule, several tanks were knocked out, and the infantry was practically destroyed. Then our tanks entered the battle, and the combat vehicles quickly drove away and took cover in the ramps” (p. 765).
So the Germans had a rather hard time on the Kursk Bulge. And because:
“The breakthrough into the areas planned by Goth came with great difficulty. The Russian lines turned out to be much stronger and more resistant to heavy tank attacks than expected. And thanks to the introduction of operational tank reserves into battle, the Soviet side created conditions under which, even splitting the front of the 6th Guards in half. And having actually broken through the second line of defense, the 4th TA was completely pinned down by the battle throughout the entire offensive sector, and even the divisions of the 2nd SS Tank Tank were unable to close their flanks, not to mention their corps. The divisions of Hausser's strike group fought in the corridors they had broken through, experiencing strong pressure not only along the front, but also on the flanks. Hausser was forced to allocate substantial funds to cover them. This led to a dispersion of forces and did not allow the formation's efforts to be concentrated in the direction of the main attack. The absence of a continuous breakthrough front and the constant flank threat were the most important problems that both the command of the 4th TA and the GA “South” had to solve in the coming days. After all, AG “Kempf” on July 7 failed to overcome the line of the 7th Guards. And to reliably cover the right wing of Hoth’s army.
In addition, another important factor has appeared that will negatively affect the actions of Manstein’s formations - the failures of the 9th A of General V. Model of the GA “Center”. She was completely bogged down in the defense of the troops of the Central Front of General K.K. Rokossovsky. Already on the evening of July 7, the Wehrmacht High Command took a number of steps to break the deadlock in the situation in its zone. And Berlin was forced to seize the means of reinforcement for Kluge from Manstein” (pp. 661–662).
But such “help” was only “Trishkin’s caftan”, which could not be extended on two fronts.
The Germans’ technology was such that in order to continue the full-fledged offensive of their bulky tanks, it was necessary to wait “by the sea of ​​​​weather.” That is, in order to advance, they needed the puddles to dry up...
And they waited for this:
“On the third day of the offensive, the soil dried out enough... and the 48th Tank Corps was finally able to cross to the northern bank of the river. Hoth's army had now almost half overcome the Russian army defense zone and came close to the second defensive line. To the right of Knobelsdorff's corps, three SS divisions managed to penetrate even deeper into the Russian defensive formations, but, unlike Knobelsdorff, the SS corps commander was unable to push back the Russians on a wide front. Instead, each SS Panzer division made its own hole and now, suffering heavy losses, tried to advance further north under continuous enemy flank fire” (p. 280).
“Analyzing the situation, Goth realized: very serious problems are beginning to arise with the Citadel, the offensive is experiencing significant disruptions, losses are growing, and there is no need to think about reserves” (p. 695).
“By the end of July 9, 1943, the Nazi At the cost of huge losses, the troops managed to wedge themselves into the defenses of the Voronezh troops. front (Commander General of the Army N.F. Vatutin) in the Oboyan direction to a depth of 35 km" (vol. 6, p. 612).
“For two days, the grenadiers of the 3rd Panzer Division and the motorized infantry of “Greater Germany” stubbornly stormed the Russian positions. In continuous fierce battles, they captured a number of villages straddling the Pena River valley, and by the evening of July 11, they forced the Russians to retreat to a forested area north of Berezovka. A quadrangular protrusion approximately 15 kilometers deep and 25 kilometers wide was pressed into the defense of the Voronezh Front - a pitiful result of a week of colossal efforts and losses...
In the offensive sector of the SS Panzer Corps, even this limited success could not be achieved. The grenadiers found themselves forced to fight so hard to protect the flanks of the wedged tank divisions that the division commanders could hardly pull back the tanks that were at the edge of the wedges. On July 11, the “Reich” and “Adolf Hitler” divisions managed to connect with each other, but the “Totenkopf” division still remained isolated from them.
This was the last and most fierce battle fought by SS divisions, staffed only by Germans. After Operation Citadel, Himmler will open access to the SS troops to an influx of volunteers from occupied countries and criminal rabble from the civilian prisons of the Reich” (p. 281).
So if Stalingrad only begins to grind the bones of the aggressor who invaded our country, then the Kursk Bulge will already complete the destruction of elite units made up exclusively of Germans. And all because after this battle there will no longer be enough Germans left to recreate the SS units.
What can you say to this?
What they came for is what they got.

Bibliography

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2. Zamulin V. Kursk break. "Yauza" "Eksmo". M., 2007.
3. Katukova E.S. Memorable. M., 2002.
4. Koltunov G.A., Soloviev B.G. Battle of Kursk. M., 1970.
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Battle of Kursk. The largest tank battle in history. In terms of scale, results and consequences, it is one of the key ones in the Patriotic War. The Battle of Kursk completed and summed up the turning point that began at Stalingrad; from its moment until the end of the war, there was practically no more offensive activity on the part of the Germans; the initiative was seized. But losses... 250 thousand killed, 600 thousand wounded. 6 thousand tanks, 5 thousand guns, more than one and a half thousand aircraft. The Germans lost four times less equipment and two times less people.

The length of the Kursk Bulge is about 200 kilometers. Its center is Kursk, hence the name, in the north - Ponyri, where the museum we are going to is located, in the south - Prokhorovka and Belgorod. The battle lasted 49 days, from July 5 to August 23, 1943.

We are driving along the upper edge of the red line indicating the Kursk Bulge on the map. From Zheleznogorsk to Ponyri. Along the way we stop at all the monuments we come across. And the first one is new Memorial "Angel of Peace" with a temple and a worship cross on a hill, installed on the site of the dugouts of the command post of the 70th Army.

The 70th Army, by the way, is an army formed at the end of 1942, consisting of NKVD troops for various purposes (border guards, railway guards, internal troops). Here, on the northern front of the Kursk Bulge in early July 1943, the army repelled the attack of German troops trying to break through to Kursk.

The memorial consists of a stele with an angel holding a wreath - the Angel of Peace:

Temple of the Apostles Peter and Paul:

And the worship cross, which was installed here, on the 269th height, before anyone else, before the stele, opened in 2015, and before the temple, completed only last year:

There is a sign on the temple that says " To the glory of the Holy, Consubstantial, Life-Giving and Indivisible Trinity, the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit, in honor of the supreme apostles Peter and Paul with the blessing of His Grace Benjamin, Bishop of Zheleznogorsk and Lgov, in prayerful memory of the soldiers who fought on the northern face of the Kursk Bulge, through the labors of General - Colonel of the Ministry of Internal Affairs Vladimir Vasilyevich Pronin and those who helped him with good deeds (many names and surnames are listed)"Thus, we conclude that the idea and implementation of the memorial is not entirely state-owned.

The meadows around the height are pitted and abundant with wildflowers:

The work has not yet been completed; a cable for lighting is being laid along the paths:

At the foot of the worship cross there is an inscription: Here in July 1943, the heaviest battles of the Battle of Kursk, the decisive battle of the Great Patriotic War, took place. At the cost of their lives, the soldiers of the 140th Infantry Division did not allow the enemy to reach strategic heights. In one day, July 10, 513 people were killed and 943 wounded. Eternal memory to the defenders of the Fatherland. The worship cross was installed on November 12, 2011 by grateful descendants

The stela with the Angel of Peace has a height of 35 meters, eight of which are the Angel himself. He holds a wreath and releases a dove. The monument faces the West, as planned by the sculptor Burganov - with an appeal from the Russian people to stop the new fascism. Standing at the site of the death of more than 70 thousand Soviet and German soldiers, the Angel reminds everyone how it ends.

The tablets at the foot of the stele give details of the Battle of Kursk:
The Battle of Kursk is a turning point, decisive, fundamental battle in the Great Patriotic War. More troops took part in it than in the Moscow and Stalingrad battles combined. On the northern front, the defense was carried out by the Central Front - commanded by Army General K.K. Rokossovsky, which included the 48th, 13th, 70th, 65th and 60th Armies, 2nd Tank Army. The main blow of Hitler's troops on July 5, 1943 was directed along the old Kromskaya road to Kursk at the junction of the 13th Army - commander Lieutenant General N.P. Pukhov, which took the first blow with its units, and the 70th Army - commander Lieutenant General I.V. Galanin. , which, with attached reserves at the heights, blocked the Nazis’ path to the south and deployed the 9th Wehrmacht Army to retreat. On July 12, the Supreme Command Headquarters introduced Operation Kutuzov and began a counteroffensive of Soviet troops to Berlin. Our victory in this battle came at the cost of heavy losses. 34 soldiers, mostly posthumously, were awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.

On the other hand - another text:
Operation Citadel was introduced by the German command after the encirclement and defeat in the Battle of Stalingrad, when the Wehrmacht was still strong, to deliver two dagger strikes from the north and south on the Kursk Bulge on July 5, 1943, converging at Kursk in order to take Soviet troops “into the cauldron” ". From the north, in the Olkhovat direction, a group of German troops of the 9th Army was advancing, which included 27 divisions: 20 infantry, 6 tank, 1 motorized - with 460 thousand military personnel, about 6 thousand guns and mortars, up to 1200 tanks and assault guns. Army losses from July 5 to July 11, 1943 amounted to more than 20 thousand soldiers and officers. The Nazis' plans were thwarted and on July 12, 1943, the German command canceled the operation. This was the beginning of the irrevocable retreat of the fascist troops to their lair

My little boy is not yet very versed in military strategies and is simply enjoying the sun, wind and spacious fields around the heights:

The fields are amazing. It’s hard to believe that such heavy fighting took place here - these fields look so peaceful now:

The memorial is very thoughtful. There are paths, benches, lighting, even, excuse me, toilets with running water. In an open field.

Rose hips have been planted, they will soon grow and remove the feeling of new construction:

We drive further and see a fork with signs. One of them promises a monument to the 140th Division (which, by the way, is part of that same 70th Army), but points in the direction opposite to our goal, and Natasha hurries us, because the museum in Ponyri may close. We miss a turn and after a while we run into monument to artillery heroes near the village of Teploe.

The monument was erected at height 240 near the south-eastern outskirts of the village of Teploe. This is one of the first monuments on the Kursk Bulge. It was erected by the artillerymen themselves on November 30, 1943, raising one of the damaged guns on a pedestal - 76-mm gun No. 2242 of Sergeant Katyushenko from the Igishev battery.

In 1968, the monument was reconstructed, slabs with the names of the fallen were installed at the burial site, the pedestal under the gun was changed, a stele was added...

Look at the bouquet standing next to one of the slabs:

The bouquet is like from an old war movie. Cornflowers, wheat... Lilies that grow right there along the fence:

Eternal memory to the heroes who died a brave death in the battles for their homeland against the Nazi invaders on the Kursk Bulge in 1943 - it is written on the stone:

There are a lot of names on the plates:

The 1st artillery battery of Captain Igishev was the first on the enemy’s path and was completely destroyed here, on the Teplovsky Heights, having previously destroyed 19 tanks. Then the 7th battery of Senior Lieutenant V.P. Gerasimov took over the battle. And the last one is the 2nd battery. Almost the entire artillery brigade of Rukosuev died in those battles and is buried here. But the enemy’s attacks on the northern edge of the arc finally fizzled out. Already on July 10 he was forced to go on the defensive...

On the stele there is an icon of artillery troops - crossed cannons. Danka has the same shoulder straps:

Behind the fence are new graves. Search work continues in the area; the remains of the dead are still being found and transferred here:

The next, penultimate stop before Ponyri is a memorial sign in honor of the heroes of the 19th Red Banner Perekop Tank Corps - IS-2 tank , installed near the Ponyri-Olkhovatka highway:

And the last point, already near the village of Ponyri - Mound of Glory. It stands on the border of two battlefields of July 1943. The mound was raised in 1968 by participants in the 4th All-Union youth campaign to places of military glory. Students and schoolchildren carried soil from the surrounding fields in backpacks. At the foot of the Mound of Glory there are slabs on which the appeal is written: “ Stop, passerby! Bow down to this earth! Here, during the menacing years of the Great Patriotic War, soldiers - guardsmen of the 6th Red Army Order of Lenin Rifle Rivne Order of Suvorov Division - fought heroically»

The next point is the museum in Ponyry.

But before I start writing about him, tell me what’s wrong with the photographs in this text? Due to the closure of Yandex Photos, I am trying to use Flickr photo hosting for the first time. Can anyone see anything? Is it visible normally? Ukraine is visible (should be visible)? Has the quality (relatively, let’s call it quality) of the photographs deteriorated compared to the previous ones? Any suggestions?

In those terrible days, when the sky and earth burned during the Nazi offensive, there were fierce battles for every piece of native land. In almost every village you can erect monuments to Soviet soldiers who defended the Fatherland at the cost of their own lives. Many words have been said about the significance of the Battle of Kursk: about tank battles on the Southern front of the arc, and no less strategically important battles on the Northern front.

A memorial sign in honor of the soldiers of the 19th Red Banner Perekop Tank Corps The IS-2 tank was installed on August 6, 1988 on the initiative of veterans of the 19th Tank Corps under the leadership of the 1st Secretary of the CPSU RK V.V. Gukov, Chairman of the District Executive Committee I.S. Demidov .

Looking back to history

In ancient times, in these places there was a high road called the Pakhnutsky Way, which connected Moscow with the Crimean Khanate. The road passed through Kromy, Olkhovatka and Fatezh and connected Orel with Kursk in the shortest possible way. A whole series of hills stretches here. From the heights, a grandiose overview of the area opens up, and in good weather, with binoculars, you can even see Kursk, located 65 kilometers to the south.

Not far from the villages of Molotychi and Olkhovatka there is the highest place in the Kursk region - Teplovsky Heights, which the Germans wanted to capture. Possession of these places gave the troops an undeniable strategic advantage. The German command also understood this, sending huge forces here. By the summer of 1943, the Soviet-German front, stretching for more than 1,500 kilometers, was a straight line, with the exception of the Kursk salient, the arc of which wedged 200 kilometers to the west. This situation arose in 1943 during Operation Zvezda, when vast areas of the Voronezh and Kursk regions were liberated.

In 2013, the first memorial of the Teplovsky Heights complex, “Northern Face of the Battle of Kursk,” was opened. The monument is made in the shape of an anti-tank mine.

Hitler's command prepared huge forces with the goal of encircling and destroying Soviet troops and capturing Kursk. The operation was called "Citadel". The Germans carefully concealed the direction of the main attack. One thing was clear: if the Nazis launched an offensive, it would be from the south and the north simultaneously. The commander of the troops of the Central Front, Konstantin Rokossovsky, a Soviet military leader, managed to reveal the plans of the Nazis on the Northern Front. Konstantin Konstantinovich understood: in order to stop the German offensive, it was necessary to go on the defensive, to literally hide personnel and military equipment in the ground. Rokossovsky proved himself to be a brilliant strategist and analyst - based on intelligence data, he was able to accurately determine the area where the Germans planned to deliver the main attack, create a defense in depth there and concentrate about half of their infantry, artillery and tanks. Rokossovsky's defenses turned out to be so strong and stable that he was able to transfer part of his reserves to the commander of the southern flank of the Kursk Bulge, Hero of the Soviet Union Nicholas, when there was a threat of a breakthrough there.

The construction of the temple was completed in the shortest possible time: a year and a half after laying the foundation, the temple opened its doors.

However, when mentioning the Battle of Kursk, associations take us to Prokhorovka. In Soviet times, they often printed and showed a photograph taken after the battle, where Soviet troops knocked out 21 Ferdinand self-propelled guns. However, some photographs and a panorama were taken on the Northern face of the Kursk Bulge, including in the village of Goreloye, and near Prokhorovka these same “Ferdinands” did not participate in the battles at all.

Colonel General Model, commander of the German forces on the northern flank, called the Teplov Heights directly “the key to the door to Kursk.” Therefore, the enemy concentrated the main forces in the direction of the village of Olkhovatka. The model argued that the one who owns the heights will own the space between the Oka and the Seimas. The huge field, located between the villages of Olkhovatka, Podsobarovka and Tyoploye, was very convenient for a tank battle. This gave the Germans a great advantage. After all, as is known for certain, the medium T-34-76 and light T-70, which were obsolete by that period, took part in the Battle of Kursk. There were few heavy tanks of the KV-1 type. In order to maintain the strategically damp height 269, Rokossovsky orders the commander of the 13th Army N.P. Pukhov launched a counterattack, thanks to which the Soviet troops provoked the Germans to redirect their forces to the village of Ponyri. This, in turn, made it easier for our troops to defend Olkhovatka and Teploye.

During the construction of the memorial complex “Poklonnaya Height 269,” an aerial bomb from the Great Patriotic War was found, one of those with the help of which the Nazis sought to capture the height. It was neutralized not far from the memorial, and everyone can see what kind of wound such bombings caused to our native land.

The battles were terrible, units and battalions held out until the last soldier, until the last drop of blood, but did not give up their positions. Thus, Captain Igishev’s battery, holding back German tanks on the approaches to the village of Samodurovka, destroyed 19 tanks in three days. The enemy delivered the main blow on July 8, this was another attempt to capture height 269. In the way of the Nazis were two batteries of artillerymen under the command of captains G.I. Igishev and V.P. Gerasimov. Until July 12, 1943, a fierce struggle continued here for every piece of land land. Captain Igishev was shell-shocked, but continued to control the fire of the battery, soon of which only one gun would remain. The entire crew will die as soon as gunner Puzikov continues to fight alone, destroying 12 tanks...

Fortunately, the plans of the Third Reich were not destined to come true. After the victory at Kursk, Soviet troops went on the offensive, and this continued until the end of the war. And at the end of the Battle of Kursk, a monument to the artillerymen was erected at the battle site. The same cannon from Igishev’s battery was placed on the pedestal.

“A time capsule with an appeal to descendants is kept here. This capsule was laid on July 12, 2014 in the presence of the leaders of the Kursk region, philanthropists, and landscapers on the day of laying the foundation for the construction of the “Angel of Peace” monument of the “Poklonnaya Height” Memorial Complex. Open the capsule on July 12, 2043,” reads the inscription addressing descendants on the memorial stone.

As a keepsake for posterity

There are many monuments to soldiers on Kursk land. There are especially many of them north of Kursk on the former Northern face of the Kursk Bulge. Paying tribute to the memory of Soviet soldiers, two memorials were opened on the day of the 70th anniversary of the Great Victory: the Teplovsky Heights monument and the memorial stele “Angel of Peace”.

The memorial complex “Poklonnaya Height 269”, which was installed on the initiative and organization of the ROO (regional public organization) “Kursk Fellowship” to perpetuate the feat of Soviet soldiers who prevented the Nazi invaders from breaking through to Kursk in July 1943, is located near the village of Molotychi Fatezhsky district of the Kursk region.

In November 2011, on the initiative of Vladimir Vasilyevich Pronin, at the height where the command post of the 70th Army of the NKVD was located, an 8-meter cross of worship was installed. “At the cost of their lives, the soldiers of the 140th Infantry Division did not allow the enemy to reach strategic heights,” Vladimir Vasilyevich, Colonel General of the police, honorary citizen of the Kursk region, the city of Fatezh and the Fatezh region, head of the Kursk community, quotes the inscription installed on the monument.

The next stage in the creation of the monumental complex was the construction of a memorial stele and temple. On July 19, 2013, Metropolitan Herman of Kursk and Rylsk, together with representatives of the Kursk community in Moscow, visited Molotiche Heights and gave his blessing for the implementation of the project.

The monument to artillerymen on the Teplovsky Heights, erected on November 26, 1943, was the first monument to military glory in the USSR, opened during the Great Patriotic War

The construction of the temple was carried out in the shortest possible time; a year and a half after laying the foundation, the temple opened its doors . Builders from different parts of Russia took a direct part in the construction of the temple. For example, domes and crosses were made in Rostov, and specialists from Yaroslavl were responsible for the bell. Separately, I would like to note the design solutions in the decoration of the temple, which corresponds to all modern canons. The iconostasis is made to look like malachite, and the floor has Italian malachite tiles. By the way, most of the icons of the temple are directly related to the Kursk land, for example, an exact copy of the Kursk root icon “The Sign”, the faces of Seraphim of Sarov and Luke.

On August 20, 2016, at the memorial complex, in a solemn ceremony, a cross was installed on the dome of the church under construction in honor of the holy apostles Peter and Paul. Among the honored guests of the ceremony are the Governor of the Kursk region Alexander Mikhailov, the head of the community Vladimir Pronin, the general director of Management Company "Metalloinvest" Andrey Varichev and many other high-ranking officials, as well as veterans of the Great Patriotic War, the delegation of the RPO "Kursk community", youth, residents of nearby districts who came here to honor the memory of fallen Soviet soldiers. Alexander Nikolaevich in his welcoming speech expressed the hope that the built temple will become a spiritual center for residents of Kursk and neighboring regions

From the heights, a grandiose overview of the area opens up, and in good weather, with binoculars, you can even see Kursk, located 65 kilometers to the south.

At the memorial complex “Poklonnaya Vysota 269,” His Eminence Benjamin, Bishop of Zheleznogorsk and Lgov consecrated the bells and the main dome for the temple in honor of the holy supreme apostles Peter and Paul. What was unusual was that to sprinkle the bells with holy water, the Bishop climbed to a height using special equipment, but the dome was consecrated on the ground.

On May 9, 2017, the first liturgy for the dead took place in the Church of the Supreme Apostles Peter and Paul, and now priests hold services every Friday, Saturday, and Sunday.

Letter of gratitude from the President to the head of the regional public organization ROO "Kursk Community".

Angel flying in the sky

The memorial complex on the Northern face of the Kursk Bulge was approved and supported by the plenipotentiary representative of the President of Russia in the Central Federal District A.D. Beglov, the leaders of the Kursk region, and public organizations. One of the outstanding links in the artistic composition is the monument “Angel of Peace”. - The monument is a 35-meter sculpture. At its top is an eight-meter angel who holds a wreath and releases a dove,” says Vladimir Vasilyevich. – The elements of the monument were not chosen by chance: the crown symbolizes the memory of the fallen soldiers during the war, and the dove facing the west calls for peace, because the angel stands on the blood, at the site of the death of the soldiers.

The composition is equipped with lighting, so at dusk a beautiful picture opens up: the illusion of an angel soaring in heaven is created. The authors of the idea of ​​artistic composition are Vladimir Vasilyevich Pronin, Mikhail Leonidovich Lytkin, a military engineer by training, and Alexander Nikolaevich Burganov, a world-famous sculptor who made a huge contribution to the development of the national school of monumental sculpture. His monuments and large monumental ensembles are installed in the largest cities of Russia and abroad.

The design of the sacred territory is also not accidental: the red color of the paths and the foundation of the temple symbolize the blood shed by the soldiers in those terrible days. And the white walls of the church are a sign of the light and purity of Soviet soldiers, because the guys who fell here were very young, most of them were not even 23 years old at the time of the fighting.

Now, admiring the beauty of the memorial complex “Poklonnaya Vysot 269”, it is difficult to imagine that six years ago there were only impenetrable thickets of grass. The Worship Cross, the “Angel of Peace” monument, the Temple and other objects of the Memorial Complex were built for future generations solely on donations from individuals and legal entities. The area has been landscaped: the access road has been paved, benches have been installed, and there is convenient parking. It is also planned to restore the army command post dugouts.

The construction of the memorial complex was noted by the President of the Russian Federation Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin

In November 2011, an 8-meter worship cross was installed.

The biggest mine

In 2013, the first memorial of the Teplovsky Heights complex, “Northern Face of the Battle of Kursk,” was opened. The monument is made in the shape of an anti-tank mine. The monument is a three-level observation deck, the upper level is located at a bird's eye view - 17 meters above the ground. There is an elevator inside the tower, which allows people with disabilities to go upstairs. The flag of the USSR flutters above the monument, and on the railing of the observation deck there is a calendar of the Battle of Kursk. Looking around the surroundings, you understand why there were such fierce battles for each height. From here the area is clearly visible. The view that opens from this hill is stunning: unprecedented space, fields and copses stretching to the very horizon.

“Poklonnaya Height 269” and “Northern face of the Battle of Kursk” are part of a single memorial complex along with the monument “For our Soviet Motherland”, the Eternal Flame, a mass grave in which 2 thousand soldiers are buried, a colonnade, and personalized plaques of the Heroes of the Soviet Union - the winners battles on the Kursk Bulge. Also carved on the slabs are the names of military units that took part in the hostilities. This is the Teplovsky Heights memorial.

The construction of this complex is a tribute to the memory of the defenders of the Fatherland who stood to their death on the battlefield. Then, in the terrible and bloody 1943, our grandfathers and great-grandfathers gave their lives for our peaceful sky above their heads. And today it is our duty to pay attention and care in memory of them.

The monument is a 35-meter sculpture. At its top is an eight-meter angel who holds a wreath and releases a dove.

Material prepared by: Olga Pakhomova, Nadezhda Rusanova.

Fact

On December 10, 2015, at the Cultural Center of the FSB of Russia, a solemn ceremony was held to award laureates and diploma holders of the FSB of Russia competition for the best works of literature and art about the activities of the federal security service. In the “Fine Arts” category, the first prize was awarded to Alexander Nikolaevich Burganov, sculptor, author of the “Angel of Peace” stela

The material was prepared with the support of JSC Avtodor and JSC Fatezhskoye DRSU No. 6

(eng. FAS, free alongside sheep - freely along the ship) front

one of the basic conditions determining the procedure for the delivery and payment of goods in international trade. According to this condition, the seller is obliged to deliver the goods on board the ship, and the recipient bears the costs of loading the goods onto the ship.

Dictionary of financial terms

FAS

commercial terms that determine the procedure for the delivery and payment of goods in international trade. The term is formed from the initial letters of the English words "Free Along Ship" (free along the ship). The purchase and sale of goods under FAS terms means the seller’s obligation, at his own expense and resources, to deliver the goods to the ship. The buyer is obliged to charter the vessel in a timely manner and bears all costs of loading the goods on board. The risk of accidental loss or damage passes from the seller to the buyer at the time of actual delivery of the goods along the side of the vessel. When delivering goods under FAS terms, the selling price includes the price of the goods itself, as well as transportation and other costs.

Explanatory Dictionary of the Living Great Russian Language, Dal Vladimir

Explanatory dictionary of the Russian language. D.N. Ushakov

front

face, m. (French face - face).

The front side of something. (book). The front of our building... overlooked the Neva. Leskov.

A straight section of a fortress fence or field fortification with a certain direction of fire (military).

Explanatory dictionary of the Russian language. S.I.Ozhegov, N.Yu.Shvedova.

front

A, m. (special) Front view, from the linden, full face. Take a photo in your personal profile. Turn your face around.

adj. front, -aya, -oe.

New explanatory dictionary of the Russian language, T. F. Efremova.

Encyclopedic Dictionary, 1998

front

FAS (from the French face - face) in fortification - a straight section of a trench, a communication path, non-explosive anti-tank and anti-personnel barriers.

front

FAS (English fas, abbreviated from free alongside ship - freely along the side of the ship) is a type of foreign trade purchase and sale agreement related to the delivery of goods by water, when the price of the goods includes the cost of delivering it to the side of the ship.

Large legal dictionary

front

an international trade term, one of the free delivery terms in commercial transactions (remained unchanged in the 1990 edition of Incoterms). Literally means "free along the side of the ship." According to this condition, the seller is considered to have fulfilled his obligations when the goods are placed along the side of the ship on the quay or on lighters. From this moment on, all costs and risks of loss or damage to the goods must be borne by the buyer. As with the ex-works condition, the buyer clears the goods of export duties and customs formalities - unlike the FOB condition, where this operation is assigned to the seller. The FAS condition is applicable only for transportation by sea or river transport.

Fas (face)

Fas- the side of something facing the viewer (see. full face). In military affairs: front is the side of the fortification facing the enemy.

Fronts are also called straight sections of wire obstacles, trenches and anti-tank ditches.

Fas (disambiguation)

• Fas- front side.
• Fas- command when training dogs.

FAS

FAS (football club)

"FAS" - Salvadoran football club from the city of Santa Ana. He competes in the El Salvador Premier, the strongest division in El Salvador. The club was founded on February 16, 1947, and plays its home matches at the Estadio Oscar Quiteno arena, which seats 15,000 spectators. " FAS"The most titled club in El Salvador, and one of the most titled clubs in CONCACAF.

Examples of the use of the word fas in literature.

Having such large forces in front of the southern face-on Barvenkovsky bridgehead, the fascist German command intended them to launch two attacks - on Barvenkovo ​​and in the direction of Dolgenkaya, where the auxiliary control point of the 9th Army was located.

The most important thing is that Bayazet was taken, the Russian flag fluttered over fronts ancient fortress.

The height and width of the nose, the length of the bridge of the nose, the depth of the bridge of the nose, the protrusion of the nose, the contour of the back in profile, the width and shape of the back in profile are indicated. front, the position of the base of the nose in profile, the position and shape of the tip of the nose and the shape of the wings of the nose.

Let's try to unravel the mysterious phenomenon - domestication, but not in front, but in profile.

Approaching the police officer's house, overlooking face-on out into the street, Turkevich cheerfully winked at his companions, threw his cap in the air and loudly announced that it was not the boss who lived here, but his own, Turkevich’s, father and benefactor.

Puff up the cigarette to the brim, to the mouth itself, opari behold, khverli facade and send two terns to kill.

From high facade one could see how the Rediffs, trained by British instructors, were digging trenches: the earth flew up from their shovels high above the parapet, and the rifle fire threatened to become especially dense and dangerous.

First of all, it represents the reverse side of the large canvas depicted on the left, or rather not even the reverse side, but the front side, since it shows in front what is hidden by the position of this canvas.

This was the southern one front Kursk ledge, where the defense was led by the field administration of the Voronezh Front.

Meanwhile, during November 12 and 13, the front commander, in accordance with the instructions of Headquarters, assigned the troops tasks for the defense of the southern facade bridgehead on the front Zhitomir, Fastov, Trypillya.

It occupied part of the western facade Kursk ledge - to the junction with the troops of the Central Front.

By this time we had moved our headquarters to the northern outskirts of Oboyan, deep into the southern facade arcs.

That same day in the evening he left for Peterhof so that the next day he could congratulate those lined up at three in the same manner. facade midshipmen with promotion to midshipman.

This is confirmed by the fact that in the southern face On the first day of the Kursk Bulge, the enemy struck with the forces of five corps, and on the northern one - with three.

Suddenly the girl turned her head to the window, and Sergei simultaneously saw her profile and front already from the depths of the dark running pool of carriage glass, and her face now looked at Sergei from there carefully and sadly.