June 22, 1941 at 4 o'clock in the morning, an event occurred that turned the life of every citizen of our country. It seems that a lot of time has passed since that moment, but there are still a lot of secrets and reticences. Over some of them we tried to lift the veil.

Underground heroes

"AiF" conducted a special investigation, looking through the archives of the Wehrmacht. The conclusions were stunning.

“The losses are very heavy. For all the time of the fighting - from June 22 to June 29 - we lost 1121 people killed and wounded. The fortress and the city of Brest are captured, the bastion is under our complete control, despite the cruel courage of the Russians. Soldiers are still being fired upon from basements, lone fanatics, but we will soon deal with them.”

This is an excerpt from a report to the General Staff Lieutenant General Fritz Schlieper, commander of the 45th Infantry Division of the Wehrmacht- the one that stormed the Brest Fortress. The official date of the fall of the citadel is June 30, 1941. The day before, the Germans launched a large-scale assault, capturing the last fortifications, including the Kholm Gate. The surviving Soviet soldiers, having lost their commanders, went into the cellars and flatly refused to surrender.

Memorial complex "Brest Fortress - Hero". Ruins of the White Palace. Photo: RIA Novosti / Yan Tikhonov

lone ghosts

“After the capture of the citadel, the guerrilla war in the casemates went on for at least a month,” explains Alexander Bobrovich, historian-researcher from Mogilev. – In 1952, an inscription was found on the wall of the barracks near the Bialystok Gate: “I am dying, but I do not give up. Farewell, Motherland. July 20, 1941. They fought according to the “shoot-and-run” tactics: they made a couple of accurate shots at the Germans and went back to the cellars. August 1, 1941 non-commissioned officer Max Klegel wrote in his diary: “Two of ours died in the fortress - a half-dead Russian stabbed them with a knife. It's still dangerous here. I hear gunfire every night."

The archives of the Wehrmacht dispassionately record the heroism of the defenders of the Brest Fortress. The front went far ahead, the fighting was already going on near Smolensk, but the destroyed citadel continued to fight. On July 12, "a Russian rushed from the tower to a group of sappers, holding two grenades in his hands - four were killed on the spot, two died in the hospital from wounds." 21 July " Corporal Erich Zimmer, went out for cigarettes, was strangled with a belt. How many fighters were hiding in the casemates is unclear. There is no consensus on who the last defender of the Brest Fortress could be. Historians of Ingushetia refer to the testimony Stankus Antanas, a captured SS officer: “In the second half of July, I saw an officer of the Red Army get out of the casemates. Seeing the Germans, he shot himself - in his pistol was the last cartridge. During the search of the body, we found documents in the name of Senior Lieutenant Umat-Girey Barkhanoev". The latest case - captivity Major Pyotr Gavrilov, head of the defense of the Eastern Fort. He was taken prisoner on July 23, 1941 at the Kobrin fortification: a wounded man killed two German soldiers in a shootout. Later, Gavrilov said that he hid in the basements for three weeks, making sorties at night with one of the fighters until he died. How many more such lone ghosts remained in the Brest Fortress?

In 1974 Boris Vasiliev, author of the book "The Dawns Here Are Quiet...", published the novel "Not on the Lists", which received no less fame. book hero, Lieutenant Nikolai Pluzhnikov, fighting alone in the Brest Fortress ... until April 1942! Mortally wounded, he learns the news that the Germans are defeated near Moscow, leaves the basement and dies. How reliable is this information?

- I must note that the novel by Boris Vasiliev is a purely artistic work, - shrug Valery Hubarenko, director of the memorial complex "Brest Hero Fortress", Major General. - And the facts of the death of the last defender of Brest given there, unfortunately, do not have any documentary evidence.

Monument "Courage" of the memorial complex "Brest Hero Fortress". Photo: RIA Novosti / Alexander Yuriev

Flamethrowers against courage

Meanwhile, on August 15, 1941, a photo of soldiers with flamethrowers "performing a combat mission in the Brest Fortress" appeared in the Nazi press - living proof that skirmishes in the casemates went on for almost two months after the start of the war. Having lost patience, the Germans used flamethrowers to smoke out the last brave men from the shelters. Half blind in the dark, without food, without water, bleeding, the fighters refused to surrender, continuing to resist. The inhabitants of the villages around the fortress claimed that the shooting from the citadel was heard until mid-August.

- Presumably, the end of the resistance of the Soviet border guards in the fortress can be considered August 20, 1941, - believes Tadeusz Krolewski, Polish historian. — A little earlier German commandant of Brest, Walther von Unruh, Colonel of the General Staff Blumentritt visited and ordered "urgently put the fortress in order." For three days in a row, day and night, using all types of weapons, the Germans carried out a total cleansing of the Brest Fortress - probably, these days its last defenders fell. And already on August 26, two people visited the dead fortress - Hitler and Mussolini ...

Myself Lieutenant General Fritz Schlieper in the same report he indicated: he cannot understand the meaning of such fierce resistance - "probably the Russians fought purely out of fear of execution." Schliper lived until 1977 and, I think, did not understand: when a person rushes with a grenade at enemy soldiers, he does not do this because of someone's threats. And just because he is fighting for his homeland ...

Little Known Facts

1. The Brest Fortress was stormed not by the Germans, but by the Austrians. In 1938, after the Anschluss (annexation) of Austria to the Third Reich, the 4th Austrian division was renamed the 45th Wehrmacht infantry division - the same one that crossed the border on June 22, 1941.

2. Major Gavrilov was not repressed, as indicated in the credits of the movie hit "Brest Fortress", but in 1945 he was expelled from the party ... for losing his party card in captivity!

3. In addition to the fortress, the Nazis could not take the Brest railway station for 9 days. Railway workers, police and border guards (about 100 people) went into the basements and at night made attacks on the platform, shooting Wehrmacht soldiers. The soldiers ate cookies and sweets from the buffet. As a result, the Germans flooded the basements of the station with water.

USSR losses Total: about 962 people died. Losses of Nazi Germany Total: 482 killed, about 1,000 wounded.

Special project "Cities-Heroes". Photo archive of the Brest Fortress.

Defense of the Brest Fortress (defense of Brest)- one of the very first battles between the Soviet and German armies in the period Great Patriotic War.

Brest was one of the border garrisons on the territory of the USSR, it covered the path to the central highway leading to Minsk. That is why Brest was one of the first cities to be attacked after the German attack. The Soviet army held back the onslaught of the enemy for a week, despite the numerical superiority of the Germans, as well as support from artillery and aviation. As a result of a long siege, the Germans were still able to capture the main fortifications of the Brest Fortress and destroy them. However, in other areas, the struggle went on for quite a long time - small groups that remained after the raid resisted the enemy with their last strength.

The defense of the Brest Fortress became a very important battle in which the Soviet troops were able to show their readiness to defend themselves to the last drop of blood, despite the advantages of the enemy. The defense of Brest went down in history as one of the bloodiest sieges, and at the same time, as one of the greatest battles that showed all the courage of the Soviet army.

Brest Fortress on the eve of the war

The city of Brest became part of the Soviet Union shortly before the start of the war - in 1939. By that time, the fortress had already lost its military significance due to the destruction that had begun, and remained as one of the reminders of past battles. The Brest Fortress was built in the 19th century and was part of the defensive fortifications of the Russian Empire on its western borders, but in the 20th century it ceased to have military significance.

By the time the war began, the Brest Fortress was mainly used to house garrisons of military personnel, as well as a number of families of the military command, a hospital and utility rooms. By the time of the treacherous German attack on the USSR, about 8,000 military personnel and about 300 command families lived in the fortress. There were weapons and supplies in the fortress, but their number was not designed for military operations.

Assault on the Brest Fortress

The assault on the Brest Fortress began in the morning June 22, 1941 simultaneously with the beginning of the Great Patriotic War. The barracks and residential buildings of the command were the first to be subjected to powerful artillery fire and air strikes, since the Germans wanted, first of all, to completely destroy the entire command staff in the fortress and thereby introduce confusion into the army, disorient it.

Despite the fact that almost all the officers died, the surviving soldiers were able to quickly orient themselves and create a powerful defense. The surprise factor did not work as Hitler had hoped, and the assault, which, according to the plans, was supposed to end by 12 noon, dragged on for several days.

Even before the start of the war, the Soviet command issued a decree according to which, in the event of an attack, the military must immediately leave the fortress itself and take positions along its perimeter, but only a few managed to do this - most of the soldiers remained in the fortress. The defenders of the fortress were in a deliberately losing position, but even this fact did not allow them to give up their positions and allow the Germans to quickly and unconditionally take over Brest.

The course of the defense of the Brest Fortress

The Soviet soldiers, who, contrary to plans, could not quickly leave the fortress, nevertheless were able to quickly organize defenses and, within a few hours, drive the Germans out of the territory of the fortress, who managed to get into its citadel (central part). The soldiers also occupied the barracks and various buildings along the perimeter of the citadel in order to most effectively organize the defense of the fortress and be able to repel enemy attacks from all flanks. Despite the absence of a commanding staff, volunteers from among ordinary soldiers were very quickly found, who took command and led the operation.

22nd of June It was committed 8 attempts to break into the fortress from the Germans, but they did not give a result. Moreover, the German army, contrary to all forecasts, suffered significant losses. The German command decided to change tactics - instead of an assault, the siege of the Brest Fortress was now planned. The troops that broke through were withdrawn and sorted around the perimeter of the fortress in order to start a long siege and cut off the Soviet troops from the exit, as well as disrupt the supply of food and weapons.

On the morning of June 23, the bombardment of the fortress began, after which an assault was again attempted. Part of the groups of the German army broke through, but faced fierce resistance and were destroyed - the assault failed again, and the Germans had to return to siege tactics. Long battles began, which did not subside for several days and greatly exhausted both armies.

The battle went on for several days. Despite the onslaught of the German army, as well as shelling and bombing, the Soviet soldiers held the line, although they lacked weapons and food. A few days later, the supply of drinking water was cut off, and then the defenders decided to release women and children from the fortress so that they would surrender to the Germans and stay alive, but some of the women refused to leave the fortress and continued to fight.

On June 26, the Germans made several more attempts to break into the Brest Fortress, they managed to do this partially - several groups broke through. Only by the end of the month, the German army was able to capture most of the fortress, killing Soviet soldiers. However, the groups, scattered and having lost a single line of defense, still continued to offer desperate resistance even when the fortress was taken by the Germans.

The meaning and results of the defense of the Brest Fortress

The resistance of individual groups of soldiers continued until the autumn, until all these groups were destroyed by the Germans and the last defender of the Brest Fortress died. During the defense of the Brest Fortress, the Soviet troops suffered colossal losses, but at the same time, the army showed genuine courage, thereby showing that the war for the Germans would not be as easy as Hitler expected. The defenders were recognized as heroes of the war.

After the start of the Great Patriotic War, the garrison of the Brest Fortress for a week heroically held back the onslaught of the 45th German Infantry Division, which was supported by artillery and aviation.

After a general assault on June 29-30, the Germans managed to capture the main fortifications. But the defenders of the fortress continued to fight courageously in separate areas for almost three more weeks in the face of shortages of water, food, ammunition and medicines. The defense of the Brest Fortress was the first, but eloquent lesson that showed the Germans what awaits them in the future.

Fights in the Brest Fortress

The defense of the old fortress near the city of Brest, which had lost its military significance, was included in the USSR in 1939, is an undoubted example of steadfastness and courage. The Brest Fortress was built in the 19th century as part of a system of fortifications built on the western borders of the Russian Empire. By the time of the German attack on the Soviet Union, it could no longer perform serious defensive tasks, and its central part, as part of the citadel and three adjacent main fortifications, was used to accommodate the border detachment, border cover units, NKVD troops, engineering units, a hospital and auxiliary units. By the time of the attack, there were about 8,000 servicemen in the fortress, up to 300 families of commanders, a certain number of people who were undergoing military training, medical personnel and personnel of household services - in all likelihood, more than 10 thousand people.

At dawn on June 22, 1941, the fortress, primarily the barracks and residential buildings of the command staff, was subjected to powerful artillery fire, after which the fortifications were attacked by German assault detachments. The assault on the fortress was carried out by battalions of the 45th Infantry Division.

The German command hoped that the surprise attack and powerful artillery preparation would disorganize the troops stationed in the fortress and break their will to resist. According to calculations, the assault on the fortress was to be completed by 12 noon. However, the German staff miscalculated.

Despite the surprise, significant losses and the death of a large number of commanders, the personnel of the garrison showed courage and stubbornness unexpected for the Germans. The position of the defenders of the fortress was hopeless.

Only a part of the personnel managed to leave the fortress (according to the plans, in case of a threat of the outbreak of hostilities, the troops were to take positions outside it), after which the fortress was completely surrounded.

They managed to destroy the detachments that broke into the central part of the fortress (the citadel) and take up defense in strong defensive barracks located along the perimeter of the citadel, as well as in various buildings, ruins, cellars and casemates both in the citadel and on the territory of the adjacent fortifications. The defenders were led by commanders and political workers, in some cases by ordinary soldiers who took command.

During June 22, the defenders of the fortress repulsed 8 enemy attacks. German troops suffered unexpectedly high losses, so by evening all the groups that had broken through to the territory of the fortress were withdrawn, a blockade line was created behind the outer ramparts, and hostilities began to take on the character of a siege. On the morning of June 23, after shelling and aerial bombardment, the enemy continued to attempt an assault. The battles in the fortress took on a fierce, protracted character, which the Germans did not expect at all. By the evening of June 23, their losses amounted to more than 300 people killed alone, which was almost twice the losses of the 45th Infantry Division for the entire Polish campaign.

In the following days, the defenders of the fortress continued to stubbornly resist, ignoring the calls for surrender transmitted through radio installations and the promises of truce truants. However, their strength gradually dwindled. The Germans brought up siege artillery. Using flamethrowers, barrels of combustible mixture, powerful explosive charges, and according to some sources, poisonous or asphyxiating gases, they gradually suppressed pockets of resistance. The defenders experienced a shortage of ammunition and food. The water pipeline was destroyed, and it was impossible to get to the water in the bypass channels, because. the Germans opened fire on anyone who appeared in sight.

A few days later, the defenders of the fortress decided that the women and children who were among them should leave the fortress and surrender to the mercy of the winners. But still, some women remained in the fortress until the last days of hostilities. After June 26, several attempts were made to break out of the besieged fortress, but only separate small groups were able to break through.

By the end of June, the enemy managed to capture most of the fortress; on June 29 and 30, the Germans launched a continuous two-day assault on the fortress, alternating attacks with shelling and air bombardments using heavy bombs. They managed to destroy and capture the main groups of defenders in the Citadel and the Eastern redoubt of the Kobrin fortification, after which the defense of the fortress broke up into a number of separate centers. A small group of fighters continued to fight in the Eastern Redoubt until July 12, and later - in the caponier behind the outer rampart of the fortification. The group was headed by Major Gavrilov and Deputy Political Commissar G.D. Derevyanko, being seriously wounded, were captured on July 23.

Separate defenders of the fortress, hiding in the basements and casemates of the fortifications, continued their personal war until the autumn of 1941, and their struggle is covered with legends.

The enemy did not get any of the banners of the military units that fought in the fortress. The total losses of the 45th German Infantry Division, according to the divisional report, amounted to 482 killed on June 30, 1941, including 48 officers, and over 1000 wounded. According to the report, the German troops captured 7,000 people, which, apparently, include everyone who was captured in the fortress, incl. civilians and children. The remains of 850 of its defenders are buried in a mass grave on the territory of the fortress.

Smolensk battle

In the middle of summer - early autumn of 1941, Soviet troops carried out a complex of defensive and offensive operations in the Smolensk region, aimed at preventing the enemy from breaking through in the Moscow strategic direction and known as the Battle of Smolensk.

In July 1941, the German Army Group Center (commander - Field Marshal T. von Bock) sought to fulfill the task set by the German command - to encircle the Soviet troops defending the line of the Western Dvina and Dnieper, capture Vitebsk, Orsha, Smolensk and open the way to Moscow .

In order to frustrate the enemy's plans and prevent his breakthrough to Moscow and the central industrial regions of the country, the Soviet High Command from the end of June concentrated troops of the 2nd strategic echelon (22nd, 19th, 20th, 16th and 21st I army) along the middle reaches of the Western Dvina and the Dnieper. In early June, these troops were included in the Western Front (commander - Marshal of the Soviet Union S. K. Timoshenko). However, only 37 divisions out of 48 took up positions at the start of the German offensive. 24 divisions were in the first echelon. Soviet troops were unable to create a solid defense, and the density of troops was very low - each division had to defend a strip 25–30 km wide. The troops of the second echelon were deployed 210-240 km east of the main line.

By this time, formations of the 4th Panzer Army had reached the Dnieper and the Western Dvina, and the infantry divisions of the 16th German Army from Army Group North had reached the sector from Idritsa to Drissa. Over 30 infantry divisions of the 9th and 2nd armies of the German Army Group "Center", delayed by battles in Belarus, lagged behind the mobile troops by 120-150 km. Nevertheless, the enemy launched an offensive in the Smolensk direction, having a 2-4-fold superiority over the troops of the Western Front in manpower.

and technology.

The offensive of the German troops on the right wing and in the center of the Western Front began on July 10, 1941. A strike force consisting of 13 infantry, 9 tank and 7 motorized divisions broke through the Soviet defenses. Mobile formations of the enemy advanced up to 200 km, surrounded Mogilev, captured Orsha, part of Smolensk, Yelnya, Krichev. The 16th and 20th armies of the Western Front found themselves in an operational encirclement in the Smolensk region.

On July 21, the troops of the Western Front, having received reinforcements, launched a counteroffensive in the direction of Smolensk, and in the zone of the 21st Army, a group of three cavalry divisions raided the flank and rear of the main forces of Army Group Center. From the side of the enemy, the approaching infantry divisions of the 9th and 2nd German armies entered the fight. On July 24, the 13th and 21st armies were merged into the Central Front (commander - Colonel General F.I. Kuznetsov).

It was not possible to defeat the enemy’s Smolensk grouping, however, as a result of intense fighting, Soviet troops thwarted the offensive of German tank groups, helped the 20th and 16th armies to get out of the encirclement across the Dnieper River and forced the Center Army Group on July 30 to go on the defensive. At the same time, the Soviet High Command united all the troops of the reserve and the Mozhaisk line of defense (39 divisions in total) into the Reserve Front under the command of General of the Army G.K. Zhukov.

On August 8, German troops resumed their offensive, this time to the south - in the zone of the Central, and then the Bryansk Front (created on August 16, commander - Lieutenant General A. I. Eremenko), in order to secure their flank from the threat of Soviet troops from the south. By August 21, the enemy managed to advance 120-140 km and wedged between the Central and Bryansk fronts. In view of the threat of encirclement, on August 19, the Headquarters allowed the withdrawal of the troops of the Central and the troops of the Southwestern Fronts operating south of the Dnieper. The armies of the Central Front were transferred to the Bryansk Front. On August 17, the troops of the Western Front and two armies of the Reserve Front went on the offensive, inflicting significant losses on the Dukhovshchinskaya and Yelninskaya enemy groups.

The troops of the Bryansk Front continued to repel the offensive of the 2nd German Panzer Group and the 2nd German Army. A massive air attack (up to 460 aircraft) on the 2nd Panzer Group of the enemy could not stop its advance to the south. On the right wing of the Western Front, the enemy delivered a strong tank attack on the 22nd Army and on August 29 captured Toropets. The 22nd and 29th armies retreated to the eastern bank of the Western Dvina. On September 1, the 30th, 19th, 16th and 20th armies launched an offensive, but did not achieve significant success. By September 8, the defeat of the enemy grouping was completed and the dangerous ledge of the front in the Yelnya region was liquidated. On September 10, the troops of the Western, Reserve, and Bryansk Fronts went over to the defensive along the Subost, Desna, and Western Dvina rivers.

Despite the significant losses suffered during the Battle of Smolensk, the Soviet army managed to force the German troops for the first time during the Second World War to go on the defensive in the main direction. The battle of Smolensk was an important stage in the disruption of the German plan for a lightning war against the Soviet Union. The Soviet army gained time to prepare the defense of the capital of the USSR and subsequent victories in the battles near Moscow.

Tank battle in the area of ​​Lutsk-Brody-Rivne

From June 23 to June 29, 1941, during border clashes in the Lutsk-Brody-Rivne area, an oncoming tank battle took place between the advancing German 1st Panzer Group and the mechanized corps of the Southwestern Front, which launched a counterattack, together with the combined arms formations of the front.

Already on the first day of the war, the three corps that were in reserve received an order from the front headquarters to advance northeast of Rovno and strike, together with the 22nd mechanized corps (which was already there), on the left flank of the von Kleist tank group. While the reserve corps approached the place of concentration, the 22nd corps managed to suffer heavy losses during the battles with the German units, and the 15th corps, located to the south, was unable to break through the dense German anti-tank defenses. The reserve corps approached one by one.

The 8th Corps was the first to the place of the new deployment with a forced march, and he immediately had to go into battle alone, since the situation that had developed by that time in the 22nd Corps was very difficult. The approaching corps included T-34 and KV tanks, and the military contingent was well prepared. This helped the corps to maintain its combat effectiveness during the battles with superior enemy forces. Later, the 9th and 19th mechanized corps approached and also immediately entered into hostilities. The inexperienced crews of these corps, exhausted by 4-day marches and continuous German air raids, found it difficult to resist the experienced tankers of the German 1st Panzer Group.

Unlike the 8th Corps, they were armed with the old T-26 and BT models, which were significantly inferior in maneuverability to the modern T-34, moreover, most of the vehicles were damaged during air raids on the march. It so happened that the front headquarters was not able to collect all the reserve corps for a powerful strike at the same time, and each of them had to join the battle in turn.

As a result, the strongest tank grouping of the Red Army lost its striking power even before the really critical phase of the fighting on the southern flank of the Soviet-German front arose. Nevertheless, the front headquarters managed to preserve the integrity of its troops for a while, but when the strength of the tank units was running out, the headquarters gave the order to retreat to the old Soviet-Polish border.

Despite the fact that these counterattacks did not lead to the defeat of the 1st Panzer Group, they forced the German command, instead of attacking Kyiv, to turn its main forces to repulse the counterattack and prematurely use their reserves. The Soviet command won time to withdraw the Lvov group of troops, which was under the threat of encirclement, and to prepare defenses on the outskirts of Kyiv.

The defense of the Brest Fortress in June 1941 is one of the first battles of the Great Patriotic War. By June 22, 1941, at least 9 thousand people were located in the fortress, not counting family members (300 military families). The assault on the fortress, the city of Brest and the capture of bridges across the Western Bug and Mukhavets was entrusted to the 45th Infantry Division of Major General Fritz Schlieper. For artillery preparation, two super-heavy 600-mm Karl self-propelled mortars were involved.

June 22 at 4:15 am by fortress hurricane artillery fire was opened, which took the garrison by surprise. As a result, warehouses were destroyed, water pipes were damaged, communications were interrupted, and serious damage was inflicted on the garrison. At 4:23 the assault began. Up to one and a half thousand people attacked the fortress directly. The surprise of the attack led to the fact that the garrison could not provide a single coordinated resistance and was divided into several separate centers. However, the units of the garrison that found themselves in the rear of the Germans launched a counterattack, dismembering and almost completely destroying the attackers. The Germans in the Citadel were able to gain a foothold only in certain areas. By 9 o'clock in the morning the fortress was surrounded.

On the night of June 23, having withdrawn troops to the outer ramparts of the fortress, the Germans began shelling, in between offering the garrison to surrender. Surrendered about 1900 people. Nevertheless, on June 23, the remaining defenders of the fortress managed to unite the two most powerful pockets of resistance remaining on the Citadel. Having met in the basement of the "House of Officers", the defenders of the Citadel tried to coordinate their actions: dated June 24 draft order No. 1, in which it was proposed to create a combined battle group and headquarters led by Captain I.N. Zubachev and his deputy regimental commissar E.M. Fomin, to count the remaining personnel.

Major M.P. Gavrilov

By the evening of June 24, the Germans captured most of the fortress, with the exception of the section of the ring barracks (“House of Officers”) near the Brest Gates of the Citadel, casemates in an earthen rampart on the opposite bank of the Mukhavets and the so-called “Eastern Fort” located on the Kobrin fortification. The last 450 defenders of the Citadel were captured on June 26 after blowing up several compartments of the ring barracks "House of Officers" and point 145, and on June 29, after the Germans dropped an aerial bomb weighing 1800 kilograms, the Eastern Fort fell. However, the Germans managed to finally clean it up only on June 30. Only isolated centers of resistance and single fighters remained, gathering in groups and organizing active resistance, or trying to break out of the fortress and go to the partisans in Belovezhskaya Pushcha (many succeeded). Major P. M. Gavrilov was captured wounded among the last - July 23. One of the inscriptions in the fortress reads: “I am dying, but I do not give up. Farewell, Motherland. 20/VII-41".Resistance of single Soviet soldiers in the casemates of the fortress continued until August 1941. To eliminate the last pockets of resistance, the German high command gave the order to flood the cellars of the fortress with water from the Western Bug River.

From the memoirs of the capture of Major Gavrilov:

... the captured major was in full command uniform, but all his clothes turned into tatters, his face was covered with powder soot and dust and overgrown with a beard. He was injured, unconscious, and looked emaciated to the extreme. It was in the full sense of the word a skeleton covered in leather. To what extent exhaustion had reached, it could be judged by the fact that the prisoner could not even make a swallowing movement: he did not have enough strength for this, and the doctors had to apply artificial nutrition to save his life. But the German soldiers who took him prisoner and brought him to the camp told the doctors that this man, in whose body life was barely glimmering, just an hour ago, when they caught him in one of the casemates of the fortress, single-handedly took fought them, threw grenades, fired a pistol and killed and wounded several Nazis.

The Russians in Brest-Litovsk fought extremely stubbornly and persistently. They showed excellent infantry training and showed a remarkable will to fight.

Combat report of the commander of the 45th division, Lieutenant-General Shliper, about the occupation of the Brest-Litovsk fortress, July 8, 1941

Who were the "heroic defenders" of the fortress and why did they actually fight the Wehrmacht soldiers to the last.

On the day that in the USSR and now in modern Russia it is considered to be the beginning of the "Great Patriotic War" - June 22 - the traditional influx of Russian tourists to the Belarusian Brest. Guests walk around the memorial, watching performances. There are guided tours adapted to the perception of the citizens of the Russian Federation. And in Russia itself, on TV channels these days, films on military topics are spinning. Naturally, a special place is given to the defense of the Brest Fortress, one of the few facts that can be used in agitation - you won’t talk about the “heroic flight”.

Pyotr Krivonogov. Defenders of the Brest Fortress.

At first glance, there is nothing to add here, the words have long been learned, the memorial has been rebuilt, the script for the annual action has been "rolled back". But there is at least one fact, one episode, one monument that tourists are not told about. It is associated with the activities of the 132nd NKVD battalion, which defended itself in the casemates of the fortress and whose fighters, without exaggeration, fought to the last.

But it is not in vain that the official Soviet historiography tightly "forgot" about the full name of the battalion, and what its fighters did in the fortress, and modern Russian one continues to "not remember" after it. And so far the Belarusian has not "remembered".

To begin with, let's think: the Brest Fortress, according to Soviet historiography, was a military garrison, that is, it was under the jurisdiction (and on the balance sheet) of the Workers 'and Peasants' Red Army (RKKA). The NKVD is a completely different department. He was in charge of prisons, arrests, repressions, the Gulag and executions. Even more confusion comes when you read the full name of the battalion: "132nd (escort) NKVD battalion." That is, he must protect the prisoners.

This is what his fighters did. The personnel, except for the first company, guarded the prisons in Brest. The main one, No. 23, or, as it was called, "Rubella" was significantly expanded after the capture of Brest by the "soviets" in 1939. But all the same, there was “not enough space” - according to a memorandum on the “capacity of prisons”, as of June 10, 1941, 3807 people were kept in Brest prison No. 23, with 2680 places.

Again, a logical question arises: if Rubella was in the city, why was the 132nd battalion stationed in the fortress? The answer to it can be found if you look for documents and memories of another institution - the internal prison of the UNKVD or "Brigitki". The former building of the Brigid convent on the territory of the fortress was converted into a prison by the Russian Empire after the divisions of the Commonwealth.

It contained primarily political prisoners. Given that the uprisings against the "Russian brothers" on the territory of modern Belarus in the 19th century took place with enviable regularity, the prison was not empty. Kosciuszko's comrades-in-arms after the uprising of 1794, soldiers of the Poniatowski corps and hussars of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania who fought in Napoleon's army, underground "philomancers" arrested in 1823, rebels of 1831-32, kasiners of the Kalinovsky uprising of 1863-64, members of underground organizations of the end 19th century.

During the period of the Second Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, the "prison on Brigitki" was also used - the location on the territory of the fortress, filled with troops, made it extremely convenient to keep political prisoners there. In particular, 21 deputies of the Polish Sejm, accused of preparing a coup d'etat, were placed there. The commanders of the Belarusian and Ukrainian anti-Polish partisans were also kept there. "Brigitki", as they cynically joked then, were "an elite resort for very important people." A small number of places (up to 350 according to Polish data) and good security made escape impossible.

On this we again turn to the 132nd escort battalion of the NKVD. One of his key tasks was to protect the prisoners of "Brigitok" - the "soviets" used the prison as a place of detention for especially important prisoners, as they wrote, "Belarusian and Polish nationalists." True, the word "protection" in this case is only partly true. The cells of the "Brigitok" were death cells - people were placed there who needed to be destroyed.

As of June 20, 1941, the number of prisoners was "about 680 souls" - the battalion commanders found it difficult to give an exact figure, since they shot some, but more and more suicide bombers came to replace the dead. For example, in just three days, from June 19 to June 22, 1941, 24,442 people were arrested in Western Belarus. Of these, 2059 - members of Belarusian, Polish and Ukrainian organizations - were placed in special prisons (including death row). The rest are "evicted" to camps. The last train left Brest at one in the morning on June 22.

Now back to the events of June 22. According to the documents (including the testimonies of participants in the events), a hole was punched in the wall of the Rubella by artillery preparation, the guard fled, the prisoners were released.

With the "prison on Brigitki" there was a different story - artillery preparation bypassed the building of the complex, the prison was stormed by groups of the reconnaissance battalion of the 45th infantry division of the Wehrmacht under the command of Helmut von Panwitz. The guard was quickly destroyed, the Germans escorted about 280 people from the prison to the rear, who were released the next day. Among them, by the way, was Kazimir Swiatek, the future Catholic cardinal, who at the end of the 20th century headed the Belarusian Catholic Church.

Let's dwell on these data - 280 people out of 680 got to the Germans. Where are the others? Part, as Russian historians sparingly say, "died during the assault." But after all, artillery was not used, there was a shooting battle in the prison, the cells were separate rooms behind an iron door. It is possible that a stray bullet caught up with some of the prisoners, but it is highly likely that the soldiers of the 132nd NKVD battalion on the night of June 22 and even at the beginning of the assault simply shot people. For them, it was the most logical and familiar thing to do. By the way, it was precisely this logic that was contained in the orders for the department, which were already issued on June 23 and were sent to the western regions of the USSR.

Alas, even if somewhere in the archives there are documents and evidence of what happened "at Brigitki" in the first hours of the war, they are not yet available. And if they are in the special archives of the FSB, they will not be available for a very long time, because the 132nd battalion is the "heroic defenders of the Brest Fortress."

And all because the soldiers of this unit heroically defended not the Brest Fortress, but themselves - they simply had nowhere to go. Even in the edited version of the story slips information about, to put it mildly, the disloyal attitude of local residents to the Soviet regime. Even in the fortress there were cases when soldiers from among the inhabitants of Western Belarus surrendered or shot at their commanders and especially zealous Bolsheviks.

Why? You can cite a lot of facts, or you can refer to the document mentioned in the text about the special operation on June 19-21, when more than 24 thousand people were captured in three days. And this is after several large-scale waves of arrests and executions, which were carried out by the NKVD since the autumn of 1939. Every inhabitant of the region had a friend or relative who fell into the millstones of the red terror.

This, among other things, is the reason for the desperate defense of the soldiers of the 132nd battalion. The executioners had nowhere to run. If they were local, there would be at least one chance. But, on the Web there is a list of names of personnel, including the national one. Of the 563 people on the payroll, there were only eight Belarusians called up from the eastern regions. And even then, out of these eight, four are doctors. The soldiers and officers of the NKVD battalion were well aware that even breaking out of the fortress did not mean being saved - they would have been killed by local residents.

And this is not an assumption. For example, there is evidence that when the Germans approached the cities of Western Belarus, the local population looked for NKVD officers in the Houses of Command Staff - buildings built (or taken from the owners) near military camps. The fate of those who were found was unenviable.

In the city of Novogrudok, local residents attacked a train with prisoners, who were preparing to be sent "to the rear." They killed the convoy, released fellow countrymen to freedom. I note that this happened at a time when Novogrudok was in the rear of the Red Army.

Therefore, the soldiers of the 132nd NKVD battalion fought to the last bullet, did not retreat, did not surrender. They fought heroically. Just as heroically as when they were surrounded in 1944 and 1945, soldiers and officers of the SS from the detachments guarding the camps outside Germany fought. They also understood that an attempt to "leave one by one", to surrender means guaranteed death, and that an attempt to resist even in complete encirclement leaves more chances for survival. In the same way, a rabid beast driven by hunters rushes into the last attack.

But the whole truth about the 132nd NKVD battalion does not fit into the official Soviet-Russian myth about the "valiant defenders of the fortress." The protector cannot be the killer. Therefore, there is not even a mention of the "prison on Brigitki" in the official guides to the Brest Fortress. Moreover, knowing that the guard took the fight in the prison, no one carried out excavations in order to find the bodies of the fighters. It is logical - after all, instead of the bodies of soldiers and officers of the NKVD, one could stumble upon the "uncomfortable" remains of those very "Brigitok" prisoners who "died during the assault" with characteristic bullet holes in their skulls.

In the Soviet Union, a myth was created without noticing or destroying everything that interfered with it. Therefore, even the building of the former monastery, which practically survived during the war (I remind you that it was not shelled with artillery) was blown up in 1955 by army sappers. Today, this place is a wasteland overgrown with forest. But tourists are not taken into this forest. Russian historians do not write about him. "Prison on Brigitki" is not in the official historiography of the Russian Federation, nor is it in the Belarusian one.

The study of the topic "Brigitok" until recently was carried out by Belarusian enthusiasts. In the last 2-3 years, the situation began to change - publications appeared, including in the local press. I really hope that sooner or later professional historians, archaeologists, archivists will supplement the already available data and recreate a real picture of the "heroic" 132nd NKVD battalion in Belarus and in the Brest Fortress, in particular.